State of Texas v. United States of Am., & Interstate Com. Comm'n, 837 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1988). · Go Syfert
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State of Texas v. United States of Am., & Interstate Com. Comm'n, 837 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2000 · …moreover, because a federal agency seeks the injunction, the icc's motion is not directly precluded by the strictly enforced rule of the anti-injunction act, 28 u.s.c. 2283 . at p. 186 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2006–2022 · 2 courts · …necessary in aid of its jurisdiction ✓
41 citation events (25 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) American Airlines, Incorporated City of Dallas, Texas Southwest Airlines Company Love Field Citizens Action Committee v. Department of Transportation, the City of Fort Worth Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Board v. Department of Transportation
5th Cir. · 2000 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
moreover, because a federal agency seeks the injunction, the icc's motion is not directly precluded by the strictly enforced rule of the anti-injunction act, 28 u.s.c. 2283 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kojuvona A. Telfair and Milton C. Singleton Jr. v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, as Trustee for the Benefit of the Freddie Mac Seasoned Loans Structured Transaction Trust, Series 2019-1
E.D. La. · 2026 · confidence medium
Though Plaintiffs argue that the “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception applies, courts have interpreted this exception to be a narrow one, “finding a threat to the court’s jurisdiction only where a state proceeding threatens to dispose of property that forms the basis for federal in rem jurisdiction, or where the state proceeding threatens the continuing superintendence by a federal court, such as in a school desegregation case.” Cheneau, 2015 WL 12564182 , at *7 (quoting State of Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1988)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) D & J Investments of Cenla L L C v. Baker Hughes a G E Co L L C
W.D. La. · 2021 · confidence medium
State of Tex. v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
S.D. Miss. · 2020 · confidence medium
As a result, “federal courts are to be cautious about infringing on the legitimate exercise of state judicial power,” , 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1988), and may only enjoin state court proceedings if one of the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283 applies. , 412 F.3d 609 , 613 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting , 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John S. Stritzinger v. Christiana Trust, a Division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
Tex. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
REv. 137 (1998) (describing generally the Younger doctrine and its purpose). 82 In considering an injunction against state court litigation, the Fifth Circuit stated, "Nevertheless, we are guided by the overarching principle that federal courts are to be cautious about infringing on the legitimate exercise of state judicial power." State of Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)). 82428 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation
E.D. La. · 2012 · confidence medium
The Fifth Circuit likewise recognizes “the overarching principle that federal courts are to be cautious about infringing on the legitimate exercise of state judicial power.” Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir.1988). “[T]he fact that an injunction may issue under the Anti-Injunction Act does not mean that it must issue.” Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 151 , 108 S.Ct. 1684 (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Corley v. Entergy Corp. (2×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Tex. · 2006 · confidence medium
Because the Anti-Injunction Act embodies “the overarching principle that federal courts are to be cautious about infringing on the legitimate exercise of state judicial power,” Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir.1988) (citation omitted), “the [three] exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction.” Atl.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lipscomb v. Columbus Municipal Separate School District
N.D. Miss. · 2002 · confidence medium
Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation
5th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 235-36 , 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2158-59 , 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972) (“[A] third exception [to § 2283], more recently developed permits a federal injunction of state court proceedings when the plaintiff in the federal court is the United States itself, or a federal agency asserting ‘superior federal interests.’ ”); Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir.1988) (“Moreover, because a federal agency seeks the injunction, the ICC’s motion is not directly precluded by the strictly enforced rule of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 .”); Unit…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Castano v. American Tobacco Co.
E.D. La. · 1995 · confidence medium
State of Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186-87, n. 4 (5th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc. v. Woolsey & Company, Inc.
10th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1970)(holding that state court proceeding did not hinder federal court's jurisdiction when state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction, and court could not prevent party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts); Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir.) (holding that the "aid of jurisdiction" exception may not be invoked merely because the concurrent state proceeding might result in a judgment inconsistent with the federal court's decision), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (…
cited Cited "see" James v. Tangipahoa Parish
E.D. La. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Texas. v. United States, 837 F.2d 184 , 186 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE OF TEXAS, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, and Interstate Commerce Commission, Respondents
87-4725.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Feb 1, 1988.
837 F.2d 184
Robert Ozer, Anne Swenson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Gen. Litigation, State & County Affairs Div., Austin, Tex., for State of Tex., Robert S. Burk, Gen. Counsel, I.C.C., Michael L. Martin, Edwin Meese, III, Atty. Gen., Robert B. Nicholson, John P. Fonte, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for U.S.A. & I.C.C., Paul Rogers, Gen. Counsel, Charles D. Gray, Assoc., Washington, D.C., for Nat. Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Com’rs., Phillip Robinson, Mert Starnes, Austin, Tex., for Central Freight Lines., William F. Pugh, Alexandria, Va., for Nat. Mtr. Freight Traffic Ass’n., Robin A. McHugh, Helena, Mont., for Montana., James T. Quinn, J. Calvin Simpson, Janice E. Kerr, San Francisco, Cal., for Public Utilities Com’n of the State of Cal., Jerry Prestridge, Austin, Tex., for Merchants Fast Motor Lines., Hugh T. Matthews, Dallas, Tex., for Steere Tank Lines & Great Western Trucking., Byrd R. Latham, P. Michael Cole, Asst. Attys. Gen., Athens, Ala., for Alabama Public Service Com’n., Robert J. Higgins and Harriet Grant, Washington, D.C., for Intern. Broth, of Teamsters, etc., Keller & Heckman, Terrence D. Jones, Washington, D.C. for Nat. American Wholesale., William P. Jackson, Jr., Arlington, Va., Law Dept., Armstrong World Ind., Lancaster, Pa., for Armstrong and Reeves Transp. Co. of Georgia., Kevin M. Williams, Gen. Counsel, Alexandria, Va., for Regular Common Carrier Conference.
Politz, Johnson, Higginbotham.
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

The Interstate Commerce Commission seeks a preliminary injunction to stay certain proceedings in a Texas state court. According to the Commission, the state proceeding concerns claims identical to those pending before this court in an appeal from a declaratory ruling made by the Commission. Convinced that the state court proceeding poses no serious threat to our jurisdiction to hear the administrative appeal, we deny the motion.

I

The State of Texas has appealed directly from an order of the ICC determining that certain truck shipments made by Reeves Transportation Company within Texas are interstate — rather than intrastate — in nature. The consequence of this ruling is that the shipments, which Reeves made under an ICC certificate, are not subject to the rules of the Texas Railroad Commission. The main basis for the state’s appeal is that the ICC lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling as to the interstate status of a shipper. The controversy revolves around the proper interpretation of Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 171, 79 S.Ct. 714, 3 L.Ed.2d 717 (1959). [1]

Reeves transported carpet made by Armstrong Mills from Arlington, Texas, to other points within the state, but did not obtain authorization from the state commission. The state considered the shipments intrastate, and began an investigation of Reeves in 1985. Because the shipments involved goods originating in Georgia, Reeves and Armstrong petitioned the ICC for a declaratory ruling that the shipments were interstate and beyond the state’s regulatory authority. While the ICC proceedings were pending, the Attorney General of Texas filed an enforcement action against Reeves in Texas state court, styled State of Texas v. E & B Carpet Mills, a division of Armstrong World Indus., and Reeves Transp. Co., No. 386,524, 353d Texas Judicial District. The state also intervened in the ICC proceedings, but the Commission denied Texas’ motion to stay the administrative proceeding pending the outcome of the state court suit.

[*186] In 1986, after notice and hearing, the ICC ruled that the shipments were interstate and thus within the ICC’s exclusive regulatory authority. On this basis, Armstrong filed a complaint in federal district court seeking to enjoin the Texas officials from pursuing the state court action. E & B Carpet Mills v. Mattox, Civ. No. A-86-446 (W.D.Texas). As an intervening plaintiff, the ICC supported Armstrong’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In October, 1986, the district court denied the injunction, finding that Armstrong had failed to prove irreparable injury because any damages sustained by Armstrong could be compensated by law. Neither Armstrong nor the ICC appealed from the decision, although entitled to by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). In October, 1987, the ICC filed its own motion for a preliminary injunction asserting irreparable injury to the federal government. The district court has not ruled on the Commission’s request.

Meanwhile, the ICC denied petitions to reconsider its declaratory order. The State of Texas filed this direct appeal from the administrative decision. The ICC now asks this court to enjoin the state court proceeding pending our review of the ICC’s order.

II

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, [2] gives this court limited authority “to preserve the court’s jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an agency’s action through the prescribed statutory channels.” FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604, 86 S.Ct. 1738, 1742, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (1966). Moreover, because a federal agency seeks the injunction, the ICC’s motion is not directly precluded by the strictly enforced rule of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. [3] See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225-26, 77 S.Ct. 287, 290-91, 1 L.Ed.2d 267 (1957); NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 92 S.Ct. 373, 30 L.Ed.2d 328 (1971); Tampa Phosphate R. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 418 F.2d 387, 394 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 90 (1970). Nevertheless, we are guided by the overarching principle that federal courts are to be cautious about infringing on the legitimate exercise of state judicial power. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45, 91 S.Ct. 746, 750-51, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

It is difficult to see why an injunction is necessary to preserve our jurisdiction over the case. The state enforcement proceeding arguably involves application of the ICC’s declaratory order; no doubt the order constitutes Armstrong’s primary defense. But the state court does not have the power to review the ICC’s order for error and the state court’s interpretation obviously has no binding effect on our decision in that regard. If we already had reviewed and affirmed the ICC order, after which the state brought an enforcement proceeding, this court would not be compelled to enjoin the proceeding. Rather, as was the case in Service Storage, the state court’s application of the ICC’s order could be reviewed in due course by the United States Supreme Court.

In fact, as this hypothetical demonstrates, the ICC seeks this injunction because it believes the enforcement proceeding interferes with its own jurisdiction, not ours. In other words, the ICC contends that once it has entered a declaratory order, no proceeding in which the order might constitute a defense may be brought in any state court. While such a rule might better effectuate the ICC’s decisions, it has little to do with our power to review the Commission’s work. [4]

Although somewhat similar to this case, Tampa Phosphate, supra, does not control our decision. There a railroad brought condemnation suits to establish a right-of-way for a new line, even though the ICC had[*187] ruled both that the proposed line would be subject to federal regulation as interstate commerce and that no ICC certificate would be issued. A federal district court preliminarily enjoined the state-court condemnation suits, and we affirmed. However, unlike this case, the Tampa Phosphate court relied on a jurisdictional statute expressly authorizing injunctions against construction of an .unauthorized railroad line. See Tampa Phosphate, 418 F.2d at 393. Here the ICC points to no authority indicating that Congress has tipped the balance in favor of federal interests. Unlike Tampa Phosphate, then, we have no authority to issue an injunction beyond that necessary to protect our own jurisdiction. Because our jurisdiction is not threatened here, the Interstate Commerce Commission’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

1

. Obviously, we intimate no opinion as to merits of the administrative appeal or the state’s likelihood of success.

2

. "[A]ll courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

3

. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”

4

.In this regard we also note that the second of the three exceptions in the Anti-Injunction Act contains the same language as the All Writs Act,[*187] insofar as it permits a federal court to issue an injunction "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.” In cases decided under this exception, courts, have interpreted the language narrowly, finding a threat to the court’s jurisdiction only where a state proceeding threatens to dispose of property that forms the basis for federal in rem jurisdiction, see, e.g., Signal Properties, Inc. v. Farha, 482 F.2d 1136, 1140 (5th Cir.1973), or where the state proceeding threatens the continuing superintendence by a federal court, such as in a school desegregation case. See Wright & Miller Federal Practice & Procedure § 4225. In no event may the "aid of jurisdiction" exception be invoked merely because of the prospect that a concurrent state proceeding might result in a judgment inconsistent with the federal court’s decision. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 295-96, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1747-48, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970).