39 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vela, Kennethgreen2 sentences2025“The overarching rule of statutory construction is that we construe a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its text unless the text is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the legislature could not possibly have intended.” Ex parte Vela, 460 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. 2025“The overarching rule of statutory construction is that we construe a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its text unless the text is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the legislature could not possibly have intended.” Ex parte Vela, 460 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 7 |
Zeifman v. Michelsgreen2 sentences2021Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). 2013Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). | 6 | 6 |
Montanez v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2012); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). 2013Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2012); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). | 2 | 2 |
Tucker, Thomas Paulgreen2 sentences2015Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2012); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). 2013Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2012); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). | 2 | 2 |
Stockton Ex Rel. Stockton v. Offenbachgreen2 sentences2014Within this overarching inquiry, we review de novo any legal determinations by the district court (e.g., construction of the MLA), see Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex.2011), but defer to any factual determinations to the extent they are supported by evidence. 2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma | 2 | 2 |
Walling v. Metcalfegreen2 sentences2008See Walling v. Metcalfe , 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) (“We have held repeatedly that the courts of appeals may not reverse the judgment of a trial court for a reason not raised in a point of error.”). 1. 2008See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1993) (“We have held repeatedly that the courts of appeals may not reverse the judgment of a trial court for a reason not raised in a point of error.”). 1. | 2 | 2 |
Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc.green1 sentence2021As for intent to cause injury, the third element, we start with the overarching principle that “[i]ntent is a fact question uniquely within the realm of the trier of fact because it so depends upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony” and “invariably must be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434, 435 (Tex. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Colemangreen1 sentence2019The overarching principle of interpretation with the TCPA (or any statute) commands that we go no further to understand the Act than the plain meaning of the words it uses: “Our objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the [l]egislature’s intent, which requires us to first look to the statute’s plain language.” If the statute’s language is unambiguous, “we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning.” Additionally, “[w]e presume [that] the [l]egislature included each word in the statute for a purpose and that words not included were purposefully omitted.” 13 ExxonMobil I | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Weisegreen2 sentences2017The overarching principle when determining whether a claim is cognizable on pretrial habeas is that pretrial habeas relief is available in situations in which “the protection of the applicant’s substantive rights or the conservation of judicial resources would be better served by interlocutory review.” See Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619. 2017Thus, pretrial habeas relief may be proper if “the alleged defect would bring into question the trial court’s power to proceed.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
State of Texas v. United States of America, and Interstate Commerce Commissiongreen1 sentence2016REv. 137 (1998) (describing generally the Younger doctrine and its purpose). 82 In considering an injunction against state court litigation, the Fifth Circuit stated, "Nevertheless, we are guided by the overarching principle that federal courts are to be cautious about infringing on the legitimate exercise of state judicial power." State of Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)). 82428 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Younger v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2016REv. 137 (1998) (describing generally the Younger doctrine and its purpose). 82 In considering an injunction against state court litigation, the Fifth Circuit stated, "Nevertheless, we are guided by the overarching principle that federal courts are to be cautious about infringing on the legitimate exercise of state judicial power." State of Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)). 82428 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Thomas Taylorgreen1 sentence2016See id. | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2015See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-96 , 104 S. Ct. 20S2 (repeatedly stating prejudice inquiry in aggregate terms of reasonable probability counsel's errors affected outcome of proceeding; see Fisher 282 F.3d at 1307-1311 (assessing prejudice from counsel's numerous shortcomings and omissions," and holding "these errors" had a "devastating impact on the defense."); Turner v. Duncan; 1S8 F.3d 449, .4S7 (9th Cir. 1998) ("it is appropriate to consider the cumulative impact of counsel's errors in assessing prejudice). -~1em5IttHtittnl- 62 }1 The overarching test for effective assistance of counsel is 2015Strickland 466 U.S. at 686 ("The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."). | 1 | 1 |
National Industrial Sand Ass'n v. Gibsongreen1 sentence2015Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
American Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palaciosgreen2 sentences2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma 2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma | 1 | 1 |
Richard Hebert and Janet Hebert v. Timothy E. Hopkins, M.D., and Shannon Clinicgreen1 sentence2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma | 1 | 1 |
Bowie Memorial Hospital v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma 2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Packergreen2 sentences2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma 2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma | 1 | 1 |
Griggs v. Capitol MacHine Works, Inc.green1 sentence2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma | 1 | 1 |
William Marsh Rice University v. Colemangreen1 sentence2014Although the appellate courts may not ordinarily entertain interlocutory challenges to denial of a motion for summary judgment, see William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Coleman, 291 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. dism’d), here, Appellant argues that the trial court incorrectly denied the motion for summary judgment because by virtue of the Texas Tort Claims Act’s election-of-remedies provision, he is a government employee immune from suit. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Firstmerit Bank, N.A.green1 sentence2013See In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 756 (noting that party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving a defense against arbitration). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Phyllis Jean Whittingtongreen1 sentence2013State v. Whittington, 401 S.W.3d 263, 272 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
| General Motors Corp. v. Braygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bennett v. State of Texas
green
2 sentences2024However, the jury ultimately was required to determine “whether appellant, viewed strictly from his standpoint, reasonably believed that [the deceased] was acting lawfully,” thus keeping the jury focused on the overarching inquiry central to appellant’s self-defense claim.1 Id. 2024However, the jury ultimately was required to determine “whether appellant, viewed strictly from his standpoint, reasonably believed that [the deceased] was acting lawfully,” thus keeping the jury focused on the overarching inquiry central to appellant’s self-defense claim.2 Id. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. and Endeavor Petroleum, L.L.C. v. Discovery Operating, Inc. and Patriot Royalty and Land, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2026“A special limitation in an oil-and- gas lease is a term that ‘provides that the lease will automatically terminate upon the happening of a stipulated event.’” Id. at 524 (quoting Discovery Operating Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 606 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2026While we acknowledge the leases at issue in Cromwell contained ambiguities other than the mutual subordination of conflicting provisions, we nevertheless conclude that the overarching principle applied in 13 Cromwell applies equally in this case, that principle being that “we will not hold the lease’s language to impose a special limitation on the grant unless the language is so clear, precise, and unequivocal that we can reasonably give it no other meaning.” Id. at 523-24 (citing Thompson, 94 S.W.3d at 554 ). 2026“A special limitation in an oil-and- gas lease is a term that ‘provides that the lease will automatically terminate upon the happening of a stipulated event.’” Id. at 524 (quoting Discovery Operating Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 606 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
University of Texas v. Poindexter
green
1 sentence2022The overarching test to determine whether the facts fall into the latter category is that “many if not most of the challenged jurisdictional facts will also determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief on the merits of her case.” Id. at 807 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
City of Laredo, Texas v. Laredo Merchants Association
green
1 sentence2021The overarching principle that guides this determination is whether the intent to impose a limitation on the municipality’s powers appears with “unmistakable clarity.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Liverman v. State
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Jelinek v. Casas
green
1 sentence2014The MLA also prescribes the qualifications of the “expert” who may prepare an “expert report,” see id. § 74.351(r)(5), but Wall has not disputed that Bates met those standards here. 8 Id. § 74.351(l). 4 merit.9 The only information relevant to determining whether an expert report complies with these requirements is that contained within “the four corners” of the report itself.10 We review the trial court’s determination regarding the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion.11 Generally stated, a trial court “abuses its discretion” when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable ma | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Stamper v. Knox
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Morales green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Chrysler Corp. v. Honorable Robert Blackmon green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.