Roundtree v. State, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). · Go Syfert
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Roundtree v. State, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2018–2021 · …a party that prevails on its argument that dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in that same contract. at p. 899 ⚠ not in text Topic ↗
68 citation events (68 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: BEVERLY A ELLIS and FREDERICK J. ELLIS v. US BANK TRUST, N.A. (fladistctapp, 2021-06-23)
Treatment trajectory · 2017 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2017 2021 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) BEVERLY A ELLIS and FREDERICK J. ELLIS v. US BANK TRUST, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a party that prevails on its argument that dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in that same contract.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) JOHN W. HOPSON v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST CO., AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a party that prevails on its argument that dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a -5- provision in that same contract.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) BEVERLY A ELLIS and FREDERICK J. ELLIS v. US BANK TRUST, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a party that prevails on its argument that dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in that same contract.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Azalea Trace, Inc. v. Nora Matos and Arnold Eskin
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the plain language of section 57.105(7) has two requirements. first, the party must have prevailed. second, the party had to be a party to the contract containing the fee provision.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Ellis v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
a party that prevails on its argument that dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in that same contract.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JOSE TORRES v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
The homeowner moved for attorneys’ fees pursuant to a unilateral attorneys’ fees provision in a contract and section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2017), which provides in relevant part that “[i]f a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract.” The trial court denied the homeowner’s motion for attorneys’ fees and co…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Terri P. Page v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, etc.
Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (en banc); Fla. Cmty. Bank, 197 So. 3d at 1115.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, ETC. and U.S BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE, etc. v. FARSHADI FARAMARZ
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). 1 Faramarz’s sought attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the mortgage’s fee provision and the reciprocity provision of section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ALLEN HARRIS v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (en banc).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) KARLA RODRIGUEZ v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS TRUSTEE FOR STANWICH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST A
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), review granted, Glass v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 2018 WL 2069328 (Fla. Feb. 13, 2018), which held, “A party that prevails on its argument that dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in that same contract.” “In general, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the defendant is the prevailing party.” Thornber v. City of Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 919 (Fla. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. MICHAEL MOCCIA and DENISE C. MOCCIA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Following the trial court’s entitlement ruling, this Court issued Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), review granted, No. SC17-1387, 2018 WL 2069328 (Fla. Feb. 13, 2018), wherein we held, consistent with the Third District’s holding in Fitzgerald, that “to be entitled to fees pursuant to the reciprocity provision of section 57.105(7), the movant must establish that the parties to the suit are also entitled to enforce the contract containing the fee provision.” Citing Glass, the Bank thereafter moved for reconsideration of the entitlement ruling wh…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WELLS FARGO BANK N.A. v. JOSEPH B. ELKIND a/k/a JOSEPH ELKIND
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
The bank relies on Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), which held that “[a] party that prevails on its argument that dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in that same contract.” However, there is a difference between prevailing on the merits on a standing issue and an undifferentiated voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit prior to any merits determination.
cited Cited as authority (rule) JOSE TORRES v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), review granted, No. SC17-1387, 2018 WL 2069328 (Fla. Feb. 13, 2018).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Madl v. Wells Fargo Bank
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (en banc); Fla. Cmty. Bank, 197 So. 3d at 1115 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC v. JOSELITO L. MARTINS a/k/a JOSELITO MARTINS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); see also Christiana Tr., a Div. of Wilmington Sav.
cited Cited as authority (rule) FREDERICK SABIDO and JONELLE SABIDO v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, ETC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Id. at 898, 899 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited "see" CYNTHIA J. RENNICK and MANSON H. RENNICK v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, d/b/a CHRISTIANA TRUST, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
P. 1.420(d) (providing that costs in any dismissed action “shall be assessed and judgment for costs entered in that action, once the action is concluded as to the party seeking taxation of costs”); see In re Estate of O’Connell, 725 So. 2d 385, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (concluding trial court was required to assess costs in favor of defendant based on dismissal of action against them under rule 1.420(d)); see Glass, 219 So. 3d at 897 (denying borrower’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees on the merits, but denying motion for costs without prejudice to the borrower to seek taxable co…
cited Cited "see" CYNTHIA J. VENTURA v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Christopher ROUNDTREE
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 4D16-1153.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jun 21, 2017.
219 So. 3d 896
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant., Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allen R. Geesey, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Conner, Gross, Kuntz.
Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 69%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)
Kuntz, J.

The Defendant, Christopher Roundtree, was convicted of criminal mischief, burglary of a dwelling, petit theft, grand theft of a motor vehicle, dealing in stolen property, and failing to appear. He raises two issues on appeal and we affirm with one exception.

He argues that the court erred in adjudicating and sentencing him for both petit theft and dealing in stolen property. The State properly conceded error on this issue.

While a defendant may be charged with both theft and dealing in stolen property when relating to the same property, he cannot be convicted of both crimes. § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2012); Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230, 233 (Fla. 1984). Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for petit theft and otherwise affirm his convictions.

Reversed in part; and affirmed in part.

Gross and Conner, JJ., concur.