green
Positive treatment
Issue: record for legal errorDC ↗
Issue: non-constitutional errorDC ↗
Issue: issue affected errorDC ↗
Quoted verbatim 2×
40.9 score
G Cite
cited 4× by 1 distinct case ·
…a trial court may exclude outright speculation, but short of speculation, a particular expert witness's degree of certainty in proffering an opinion goes to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility, and 'the weight to be given an expert opinion is for the jury to decid…
at p. 523
⚠ not in text
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2016–2026 ·
…with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.
at p. 528
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2012 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2012
2019
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Minor v. United States
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see, e.g."
testimony could be useful to the jury's assessment of the witness's perceptions without the expert evaluating what the actual witness experienced.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
In re L.C.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
in general, expert testimony should be admitted if it is relevant and is likely to help the trier of fact in its search for the truth, that is to say, in understanding the evidence, determining the facts that must be found and rendering its verdict.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
MICHAEL WONSON v. UNITED STATES
We examine the error “in relation to all else that happened” at trial, Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764 , to discern “the likely impact of the . . . error on the jury‟s verdict,” Robinson, 50 A.3d at 528.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MICHAEL WONSON v. UNITED STATES
(2×)
We examine the error “in relation to all else that happened” at trial, Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764 , to discern “the likely impact of the . . . error on the jury‟s verdict,” Robinson, 50 A.3d at 528.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wonson v. United States
When a trial court makes a non-constitutional error, we will nonetheless affirm the conviction if we can say, “with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 528 (D.C.2012) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
KEVIN M. BELLINGER v. UNITED STATES.
Guest, 867 A.2d at 212 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also O’Brien, 962 A.2d at 316 (rejecting a Brady claim because the potential impeachment information was not known to the government, and Brady does not impose an obligation to search for information outside the government’s possession); Reyes v. United States, 933 A.2d 785, 794 (D.C.2007) (finding no Brady violation where the police failed to take identifying information from a cashier that might have impeached the complainant because that information was not in the government’s possession and there was no duty …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael D. Tann v. United States
(Michael) Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 519 (D.C.2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cynthia Sanchez v. District of Columbia
See, e.g., Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d 1257, 1269-70 (D.C.2009); Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 523 (D.C.2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
RENALDO K. LUCAS v. UNITED STATES
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“In considering claims of improper argument, ‘it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.’ ” Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 580 (D.C.2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2404 , 185 L.Ed.2d 1114 (2013) (quoting Gilliam v. United States, 46 A.3d 360, 366 (D.C. 2012)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Deleon.
(8×)
In Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 514 (D.C.2012), the criminal defendants contended that they were prejudiced by the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony regarding the effects that the complaining witness’s phencyclidine (POP) use may have had on the accuracy of her perceptions.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ronald G. Perkins v. Darcy J. Hansen
Yet such a rule cannot stand because it is at odds with the well-established principle that “a particular expert witness’s degree of certainty in proffering an opinion goes to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility, and the weight to be given an expert opinion is for the jury to decide.” Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 523 (D.C.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited "see"
Jackson v. United States
See Robinson v. United States , 50 A.3d 508 , 525 (D.C. 2012) (error to exclude expert testimony proffered by defense "about the general effects of PCP within 24 hours of use" because it would help explain to the jury whether "PCP [smoked several hours before the time in question] was still affecting [a witness]."); Kigozi v. United States , 55 A.3d 643 , 651-53 (D.C. 2012) (stating that where the crucial issue was "whether [murder victim] was actively under the influence of PCP at the time of the shooting so as to undermine the reliability of his dying declaration," defense counsel was ineffe…
cited
Cited "see"
Marques An'Rico Johnson v. United States
See Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 532-33 (D.C.2012).
discussed
Cited "see"
ANTHONY RICHARDSON and JAMES WALKER v. UNITED STATES
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See id.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Freeman v. United States
See, e.g., (Michael) Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 532 (D.C.2012) (rebuttal argument); Lee v. United States, 668 A.2d 822, 830-33 (D.C.1995) (rebuttal argument); Fornah v. United States, 460 A.2d 556, 562 (D.C.1983) (closing argument); cf. Gilliam v. United States, 46 A.3d 360, 372-77 (D.C.2012) (Ruiz, J., concurring) (rebuttal argument). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re Paul Shearman ALLEN
No. 12-BG-1148.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Aug 23, 2012.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.On consideration of the affidavit of Paul Shearman Allen, wherein he consents to disbarment from the Bar of the District of Columbia pursuant to § 12 of Rule XI of the Rules Governing the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which affidavit has been filed with the Clerk of this Court, and the report and recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility, it is this 23rd day of August 2012
ORDERED that the said Paul Shear-man Allen is hereby disbarred by consent, effective October 1, 2012. The effective date of respondent’s disbarment shall run, for reinstatement purposes, from the date respondent files his affidavit pursuant to D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(g).
The Clerk shall publish this order, but the affidavit shall not be publicly disclosed or otherwise made available except upon order of the Court or upon written consent of the respondent.
The Clerk shall cause a copy of this order to be transmitted to the Chairman of the Board on Professional Responsibility and to the respondent, thereby giving him notice of the provisions of Rule XI, §§14 and 16, which set forth certain rights and responsibilities of disbarred attorneys and the effect of failure to comply therewith.