record for legal error in District of Columbia

2025When reviewing claims of misstatements of law or improper argument, we “review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge.” Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C. 1989).

2025To reiterate the standard of review for improper argument, we “review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge.” Irick, 565 A.2d at 33 .

2023Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508 , 530 (D.C. 2012) (“In considering claims of improper argument, ‘it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.’” (quoting Gilliam v. United States, 46 A.3d 360, 366 (D.C. 2012))).

2014“In considering claims of improper argument, ‘it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.’ ” Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 580 (D.C.2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2404 , 185 L.Ed.2d 1114 (2013) (quoting Gilliam v. United States, 46 A.3d 360, 366 (D.C. 2012)).

2025In so doing, we “first determine whether [counsel’s] challenged comments were improper.” Gilliam v. United States, 46 A.3d 41 360, 366 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Najafi v. United States, 886 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C. 2005)).

2012In doing so, “we must first determine whether the prosecutor’s challenged comments were improper.” Najafi v. United States, 886 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C.2005) (citing Irick, 565 A.2d at 32 ).

2012See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 145 (D.C.1992) (“[I]t is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.”) (quoting Ir-ick, 565 A.2d at 33 ).

2002In determining whether Foreman’s conviction should be reversed, “it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.” Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 145 (D.C.1992) (quoting Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989)).

2023Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508 , 530 (D.C. 2012) (“In considering claims of improper argument, ‘it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.’” (quoting Gilliam v. United States, 46 A.3d 360, 366 (D.C. 2012))).

2014“In considering claims of improper argument, ‘it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.’ ” Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 580 (D.C.2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2404 , 185 L.Ed.2d 1114 (2013) (quoting Gilliam v. United States, 46 A.3d 360, 366 (D.C. 2012)).

2011Even if we conclude that the statements were improper, we will affirm the conviction unless we find — looking at “the gravity of the misconduct, [its] direct relationship to the issue of guilt, the effect of specific corrective instructions by the trial court, and the strength of the government’s case,” Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 80 (D.C.2009) (quoting Diaz, 716 A.2d at 181 )— that the defendant suffered “substantial prejudice.” McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Williams v. United States, 483 A.2d 292, 297 (D.C.1984)).

2011Diaz v. United States, 716 A.2d 173, 179 (D.C.1998) (quoting Coreas v. United States, 565 A.2d 594, 600 (D.C.1989)); Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989) (“[I]t is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.”).

2011Even if we conclude that the statements were improper, we will affirm the conviction unless we find — looking at “the gravity of the misconduct, [its] direct relationship to the issue of guilt, the effect of specific corrective instructions by the trial court, and the strength of the government’s case,” Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 80 (D.C.2009) (quoting Diaz, 716 A.2d at 181 )— that the defendant suffered “substantial prejudice.” McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Williams v. United States, 483 A.2d 292, 297 (D.C.1984)).

2011In the alternative, Kumar relies on Tompkins, supra, to argue that, to the extent appel-lees’ motion was different from their original motion for summary judgment, Kumar was deprived of the required ten-day period in order to respond to a motion for summary judgment. 433 A.2d at 1099 ("[T]he ten-day notice provision is mandatory, not discretionary, and trial judges are obliged to enforce the *14 provision strictly unless it is waived.”) (citing Super.

2011In the alternative, Kumar relies on Tompkins, supra, to argue that, to the extent appel-lees’ motion was different from their original motion for summary judgment, Kumar was deprived of the required ten-day period in order to respond to a motion for summary judgment. 433 A.2d at 1099 ("[T]he ten-day notice provision is mandatory, not discretionary, and trial judges are obliged to enforce the *14 provision strictly unless it is waived.”) (citing Super.

2011Even if we conclude that the statements were improper, we will affirm the conviction unless we find — looking at “the gravity of the misconduct, [its] direct relationship to the issue of guilt, the effect of specific corrective instructions by the trial court, and the strength of the government’s case,” Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 80 (D.C.2009) (quoting Diaz, 716 A.2d at 181 )— that the defendant suffered “substantial prejudice.” McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Williams v. United States, 483 A.2d 292, 297 (D.C.1984)).

2011Diaz v. United States, 716 A.2d 173, 179 (D.C.1998) (quoting Coreas v. United States, 565 A.2d 594, 600 (D.C.1989)); Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989) (“[I]t is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.”).

2011Even if we conclude that the statements were improper, we will affirm the conviction unless we find — looking at “the gravity of the misconduct, [its] direct relationship to the issue of guilt, the effect of specific corrective instructions by the trial court, and the strength of the government’s case,” Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 80 (D.C.2009) (quoting Diaz, 716 A.2d at 181 )— that the defendant suffered “substantial prejudice.” McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Williams v. United States, 483 A.2d 292, 297 (D.C.1984)).

2003Cf. District of Columbia v. Bethel, 567 A.2d 1331, 1337 (D.C.1990) (failure of party to object to trial court’s curative instruction or demand a mistrial following opposing counsel’s misstatements in closing argument precluded appellant from seeking a new trial on appeal). “[I]t is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.” Id. (quoting Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989)).

2003Cf. District of Columbia v. Bethel, 567 A.2d 1331, 1337 (D.C.1990) (failure of party to object to trial court’s curative instruction or demand a mistrial following opposing counsel’s misstatements in closing argument precluded appellant from seeking a new trial on appeal). “[I]t is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.” Id. (quoting Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989)).

1989Such error or abuse may, to be sure, embrace not only incorrect rulings but also, on occasion, failure to intervene sua sponte when such intervention is called for, United States v. Jenkins, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 392, 397 , 436 F.2d 140, 145 (1970), or to react with sufficient promptness and vigor to prosecutorial misdeeds.

1989Such error or abuse may, to be sure, embrace not only incorrect rulings but also, on occasion, failure to intervene sua sponte when such intervention is called for, United States v. Jenkins, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 392, 397 , 436 F.2d 140, 145 (1970), or to react with sufficient promptness and vigor to prosecutorial misdeeds.