green
Positive treatment
21.9 score
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989
2007
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Northern Management Services, Inc. v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company
Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222 , 1229 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996) and Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Mendoza
Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222 , 1229 n. 6 (10th Cir.1996) (denying a certification request by the defendant, despite the "importance and novelty of th[e] question” presented based on defendant’s choice to remove the action to federal court and the fact that defendant only sought certification after an adverse ruling); Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989) ("[0]ne who chooses to litigate his. state action in the federal forum ... must ordinarily accept the federal court’s reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Manchester School District v. Crisman Ex Rel. Kimberli M.
We have said that “one who chooses to litigate his state action in a federal forum must ordinarily accept the federal court’s reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process.” Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 548 (1st Cir.1993); Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Manchester School v. Crisman
Plaintiff could have brought this suit in the state courts, but chose the federal forum. "[0]ne who chooses to litigate . . . in the federal forum . . . must ordinarily accept the federal court's reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process." Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 548 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989)); see also Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Cantwell v. University of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir. 1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tays v. Tays
Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222 , 1229 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996) (party who chooses to litigate in federal court generally must accept federal court’s reasonable interpretation of state law, rather than seeking certification) (citing Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Littlefield v. Mobile Exploration and Producing, North America, Inc.
See Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d. 465 , 472 (11th Cir.1993); Croteau v. Olin Corporation, 884 F.2d. 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir.1988)
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Littlefield v. Mobil Exploration
See Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d. 465, 472 (11th Cir. 1993); Croteau v. Olin Corporation, 884 F.2d. 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1988). 13
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Yates Company v. Powell
Cf. Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989) ("[O]ne who chooses to litigate his state action in the federal forum ... must ordinarily accept the federal court's reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process.").
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell
Cf. Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989) (”[0]ne who chooses to litigate his state action in the federal forum ... must ordinarily accept the federal court's reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process.”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re: San Juan v. Hotel Systems
Accord Porter v. Nutter, 913 F.2d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1990); Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989); Cantwell v. University of Massachusetts, 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir. 1977).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Santiago v. Sherwin Williams,eta
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
For reasons that are largely self-explanatory, we have held that "one who chooses to litigate [her] state -6- action in the federal forum (as plaintiff did here) must ordinarily accept the federal court's reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process." Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989); see also 17A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Santiago v. Sherwin Williams,eta
For reasons that are largely self-explanatory, we have held that "one who chooses to litigate [her] state -6- action in the federal forum (as plaintiff did here) must ordinarily accept the federal court's reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process." Croteau v. Olin _______ ____ Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989); see also 17A Charles _____ ___ ____ A. Wright, Arthur R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Monica Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Company
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
For reasons that are largely self-explanatory, we have held that “one who chooses to litigate [her] state action in the federal forum (as plaintiff did here) must ordinarily accept the federal court’s reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process.” Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); see also 17A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17
This court has held specifically, however, that 'both [section 881(a)(7) ] and the case law authorize forfeiture proceedings against the entire tract of land, regardless of the magnitude of the infraction.” 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d at 45.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nos. 91-1681, 91-1682
This court has held specifically, however, that "both [section 881(a)(7) ] and the case law authorize forfeiture proceedings against the entire tract of land, regardless of the magnitude of the infraction." 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d at 45.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Putnam Resources v. Ronald M. Pateman, Ronald M. Pateman v. Frenkel & Company, Inc.
Accord Porter v. Nutter, 913 F.2d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir.1990); Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); Cantwell v. Univ. of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir.1977). 26 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gerald R. Carlton, Etc. v. Worcester Insurance Company
Co., 916 F.2d 731, 744 (1st Cir.1990); see also Porter v. Nutter, 913 F.2d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir.1990); Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); Taylor v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Maury A. Ryan, D/B/A Ryan, Klimek, Ryan Partnership v. Royal Insurance Company of America, Etc.
See, e.g., Porter v. Nutter, 913 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir.1990); Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 950 (1st Cir.1989); Cantwell v. University of Massachusetts, 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir.1977).
discussed
Cited "see"
Emhart Industries, Inc. v. Home Insurance
See Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989) (“[0]ne who chooses to litigate his state action in the federal forum (as plaintiff did here) must ordinarily accept the federal court’s reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process.”).
cited
Cited "see"
Bragg v. Buck
See Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d 465, 472 (11th Cir. 1993) and Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989). -9-
cited
Cited "see"
Isabelita Mas v. United States of America
See Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45 (1st Cir.1989) (declining to certify the case when certification was not sought in the district court).
cited
Cited "see"
Edward F. Ryan v. Gerald W. Clemente
See Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 73 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 , 105 S.Ct. 433 , 83 L.Ed.2d 359 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
Daniel Beckwith v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Daniel Beckwith v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
See Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 896 (1st Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Blanyar v. Pagnotti Enterprises, Inc.
(2×)
See also Croteau v. Olin Corp., 704 F.Supp. 318 (D.N.H.1989), aff'd, 884 F.2d 45 (owner of allegedly *275 defective rifle could not maintain claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress upon witnessing injuries to two first cousins after the gun discharged; as a matter of law, first cousins are not "closely related"); Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal.App.3d 576 , 195 Cal.Rptr. 902 (1983) (complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress dismissed although victim and plaintiff, who were both fourteen years of age at time of accident, were best friends and plaintiff cared for victim …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Marta v. U of PR
Honda Motor Co., 971 F.2d 811 , 817 n.3 ______________________________________ (1st Cir. 1992); see also Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45 , 46 ___ ____ _______ __________ (1st Cir. 1989); Fischer, 857 F.2d at 8 ; Tidler, 851 F.2d at 426; _______ ______ Perkins v. Clark Equip.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Nieves v. University of Puerto Rico
Honda Motor Co., 971 F.2d 811 , 817 n. 3 (1st Cir.1992); see also Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); Fischer, 857 F.2d at 8 ; Tidier, 851 F.2d at 426 ; Perkins v. Clark Equip.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
John S. Porter v. Harold Nutter
See also Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1989); Cantwell v. University of Massachusetts, 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir.1977); cf. Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1349 (1st Cir.1988) (party removing ease from state court “hard put to complain if the federal court follows state practice in regard to state-law claims”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Paul CROTEAU, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
OLIN CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee
v.
OLIN CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee
89-1199.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Sep 6, 1989.
B.J. Branch with whom Backus, Meyer & Solomon, Manchester, N.H., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant., Thomas M. Carney with whom Joel I. Dennis, Husch, Eppenberger, Donohue, Cornfeld & Jenkins, St. Louis, Mo., Howard B. Myers and Myers, Jordan & Gfroerer, Concord, N.H., were on brief, for defendant, appellee.
Campbell, Torruella, Woodlock.
Cited by 28 opinions | Published
LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff in this strict products liability action appeals from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The district court held that, under New Hampshire law, plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing the injury to his first cousins which resulted from his accidental firing of an allegedly defective firearm. We affirm, essentially on the basis of the district court’s opinion, 704 F.Supp. 318 (D.N.H.1989), and add the following observations.
In response to our prompting during oral argument, the parties debated whether the question of plaintiff’s right to recover in these circumstances should be certified to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. After carefully considering the arguments and fully reviewing the record, we have decided that certification would be inappropriate for the following reasons. First, one who chooses to litigate his state action in the federal forum (as plaintiff did here) must ordinarily accept the federal court’s reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking extensions via the certification process. See Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 192 n. 5 (1st Cir.1980). On the question as framed below, the district court provided a well-reasoned interpretation of current New Hampshire law, an interpretation to which we owe some deference. Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 744 F.2d 898, 896 (1st Cir.1984). Second, the extent of any entitlement to certification is “considerably weakened” by the fact that plaintiff did not request certification below. See Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking and Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir.1988). Finally, plaintiff’s argument regarding his special status as a “user” of the firearm, see Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F.Supp. 1201 (D.S.D.1983), was raised for the first time on appeal. The district court had no opportunity to consider it, and we therefore regard that argument as having been waived. See Saco Defense System Div. v. Weinberger, 806 F.2d 308, 309-10 (1st Cir.1986). We accordingly do not believe it would be appropriate to certify any question here to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
Affirmed.