Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 176 S.E. 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934). · Go Syfert
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Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 176 S.E. 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …while in this insane condition and as a result of this condition, he killed himself by shooting himself in the head. ✓
24 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1958 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1958 1992 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Richmond Hill v. Maia
Ga. · 2017 · confidence medium
Though it is true that, generally speaking, the foreseeability of an intervening cause maintains the causal connection between the original wrongful conduct and the subsequent injury, see, e.g., Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 336 ( 26 SE2d 698 ) (1943), we stress that the usual foreseeability principle does not apply to cases involving suicide because suicide is generally deemed an unforeseeable intervening cause as a matter of law, and the Court of Appeals’s apparent reliance on the general foreseeability principle in its decision below was error. 3 Instead, Georgia law has carved out two …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CITY OF RICHMOND HILL v. MAIA
Ga. · 2017 · confidence medium
We have not been asked to consider whether this century-old exception remains good law, and, because we need not resolve that issue in this case, we leave that question for another day. 5 As discussed below, we disapprove Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo to the extent that it fails to fully address the exceptions to the general rule regarding proximate cause in cases involving suicide; nevertheless, it remains good law with respect to its discussion regarding the rage-or-frenzy exception. 7 the causal connection between the homicide and the act which caused the injury.” Elliott v. Stone Baking C…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Appling v. Jones, 115 Ga. App. 301 (2) ( 154 SE2d 406 ) (1967); see also Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515 ( 176 SE 112 ) (1934).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sneider v. Hyatt Corporation (2×)
N.D. Ga. · 1975 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Elliot v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga.App. 515 , 176 S.E. 112 (1934).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Elliott
v.
Stone Baking Company
23628.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Sep 18, 1934.
176 S.E. 112
Burress & Dillard, for plaintiff. Sidney Smith, for defendant.
Stephens.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Stephens, J.

1. Where, as the proximate result of an injury upon Ms head caused by the negligence of another, the person injured becomes insane and bereft of reason, and while in this condition and as a result thereof he takes his own life, his act is not a voluntary one, but is involuntary, and is not an act which breaks the causal connection between the homicide and the act which caused the injury, and the latter act is the proximate cause of the homicide. Green on Proximate Cause, 37; Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U. S. 527, 531 (7 Sup. Ct. 685, 30 L.[*516] ed. 740); Life Association v. Waller, 57 Ga. 533; Southern Railway Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152 (42 S. E. 395, 59 L. R. A. 109); People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551 (3) (57 Pac. 470, 45 L. R. A. 783); Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214 (119 Atl. 577); Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 26 (50 N. W. 927).

Decided September 18, 1934. Burress & Dillard, for plaintiff. Sidney Smith, for defendant.

2. Where it is alleged in the petition in a suit by a wife to recover for the homicide of her husband that he received physical injuries about the head as a result of the defendant’s negligence in hitting him with an automobile, that the injuries caused him to become mentally irresponsible and insane, that while in this insane condition and as a result of this condition, he killed himself by shooting himself in the head, that his death was proximately caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, and that the plaintiff was therefore damaged in the amount of the value of the husband’s life, the petition set out a cause of action.

3. The court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the petition.

Judgment reversed.

Jenkins, P. J., and Sutton, J., concur.