13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hanson v. First State Bank & Trust Co.green2 sentences2014Fiduciaries, including those acting as corporate directors, officers, or managing partners, fall within the ambit of the rule requiring them “to exercise the highest degree of good faith as to all matters connected with the property committed to their care.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Hanson v. First State Bank and Trust Co., 259 Ga. 710, 712 (5) (c), n. 4 ( 385 SE2d 266 ) (1989) (regardless of whether someone is called a trustee, managing partner, or director, “he occupies a fiduciary position. 2014Fiduciaries, including those acting as corporate directors, officers, or managing partners, fall within the ambit of the rule requiring them “to exercise the highest degree of good faith as to all matters connected with the property committed to their care.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Hanson v. First State Bank and Trust Co., 259 Ga. 710, 712 (5) (c), n. 4 ( 385 SE2d 266 ) (1989) (regardless of whether someone is called a trustee, managing partner, or director, “he occupies a fiduciary position. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Grisel Ariasgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., United States v. Arias, 431 F3d 1327, 1336-1338 (11th Cir. 2005). 2024See, e.g., United States v. Arias, 431 F3d 1327, 1336-1338 (11th Cir. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2015IX establishes a different type of immunity, known as official or qualified immunity when an officer or an employee of the state is sued in his individual capacity.6 Banks 5 Although the 1991 constitutional amendment expressly authorized the enactment of a State Tort Claims Act whereby “[t]he General Assembly may waive the state’s sovereign immunity from suit” and the “Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20 [et seq.,] was subsequently enacted to waive the sovereign immunity of the state for the torts of its officers and employees, [the legislature] expressly exclude[d] counties from the ambi 2015Although the 1991 constitutional amendment expressly authorized the enactment of a State Tort Claims Act whereby “[t]he General Assembly may waive the state’s sovereign immunity from suit” and the “Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20 [et seq.,] was subsequently enacted to waive the sovereign immunity of the state for the torts of its officers and employees, [the legislature] expressly exclude[d] counties from the ambit of this waiver.” Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 746-747 (2). | 1 | 1 |
Toombs County v. O'NEALgreen2 sentences1994In Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390, 391 ( 330 SE2d 95 ) (1985), this court held that the 1983 amendment’s reservation of immunity to the “state or any of its departments or agencies” included the counties of the State of Georgia. 1994In Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390, 391 ( 330 SE2d 95 ) (1985), this court held that the 1983 amendment’s reservation of immunity to the “state or any of its departments or agencies” included the counties of the State of Georgia. | 1 | 1 |
Palmore v. Stapletongreen2 sentences1983I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 132 SE2d 155 ) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) ( 278 SE2d 476 ) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) ( 279 SE2d 302 ) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) ( 286 SE2d 315 ) (1981), all of which follow the principle: "An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. 1983I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 132 SE2d 155 ) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) ( 278 SE2d 476 ) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) ( 279 SE2d 302 ) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) ( 286 SE2d 315 ) (1981), all of which follow the principle: "An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Broomgreen2 sentences1983I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 132 SE2d 155 ) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) ( 278 SE2d 476 ) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) ( 279 SE2d 302 ) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) ( 286 SE2d 315 ) (1981), all of which follow the principle: "An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. 1983I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 132 SE2d 155 ) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) ( 278 SE2d 476 ) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) ( 279 SE2d 302 ) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) ( 286 SE2d 315 ) (1981), all of which follow the principle: "An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. | 1 | 1 |
Boatright v. Sosebeegreen2 sentences1983I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 132 SE2d 155 ) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) ( 278 SE2d 476 ) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) ( 279 SE2d 302 ) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) ( 286 SE2d 315 ) (1981), all of which follow the principle: "An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. 1983I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 132 SE2d 155 ) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) ( 278 SE2d 476 ) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) ( 279 SE2d 302 ) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) ( 286 SE2d 315 ) (1981), all of which follow the principle: "An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. | 1 | 1 |
Elder v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences1983I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 132 SE2d 155 ) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) ( 278 SE2d 476 ) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) ( 279 SE2d 302 ) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) ( 286 SE2d 315 ) (1981), all of which follow the principle: "An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. 1983I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 132 SE2d 155 ) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) ( 278 SE2d 476 ) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) ( 279 SE2d 302 ) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) ( 286 SE2d 315 ) (1981), all of which follow the principle: "An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. | 1 | 1 |
Guhl v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1982We also hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the second proposed ordinance creating the office of county manager is authorized by Georgia Laws 1974, pp. 435-6. (b) Further, we agree with the trial court that the second proposed amendment, quoted supra, to Georgia Laws 1963, pp. 2237 et seq. is authorized by the County Home Rule Amendment as it concerns the hiring and firing of “personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority” aqd clearly falls within the ambit of the exception to Code Ann. § 2-5901 (c); Georgia Laws 1976, pp. 1306, 1309; Guhl v. William 1982We also hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the second proposed ordinance creating the office of county manager is authorized by Georgia Laws 1974, pp. 435-6. (b) Further, we agree with the trial court that the second proposed amendment, quoted supra, to Georgia Laws 1963, pp. 2237 et seq. is authorized by the County Home Rule Amendment as it concerns the hiring and firing of “personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority” aqd clearly falls within the ambit of the exception to Code Ann. § 2-5901 (c); Georgia Laws 1976, pp. 1306, 1309; Guhl v. William | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ely v. Stratoflex, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002Nor does actionable fraud result from a mere failure to perform promises made.” Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Garrett v. State
green
2 sentences1992“Because the date alleged in the indictment was not an essential averment, evidence of similar acts occurring within the statute of limitation was evidence of the crime charged and did not fall within the ambit of the rule relating to notice of the State’s intention to present evidence of similar transactions. [Cits.]” Garrett v. State, 188 Ga. App. 176 (1), 177 (2) ( 372 SE2d 506 ) (1988). 1992“Because the date alleged in the indictment was not an essential averment, evidence of similar acts occurring within the statute of limitation was evidence of the crime charged and did not fall within the ambit of the rule relating to notice of the State’s intention to present evidence of similar transactions. [Cits.]” Garrett v. State, 188 Ga. App. 176 (1), 177 (2) ( 372 SE2d 506 ) (1988). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pittman v. State
green
2 sentences1988Bowman v. State, 184 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 361 SE2d 58 ) (1987); Pittman v. State, 179 Ga. App. 760 (1) ( 348 SE2d 107 ) (1986). 1988Bowman v. State, 184 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 361 SE2d 58 ) (1987); Pittman v. State, 179 Ga. App. 760 (1) ( 348 SE2d 107 ) (1986). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Mitchell v. Clark
neutral
2 sentences1988To remove the present case from the ambit of that rule would require evidence that, in response to appellant's subsequent requests for repairs to the heater, appellees had actually agreed to make those repairs. " In the absence of an express agreement to do so, a landlord is under no duty to repair a patent defect in the rented premises where its existence was known to the tenant at the time the rent contract was entered into; and subsequent notice by a tenant of the existence of such a defect would not place upon the landlord any duty of inspection or repair. [Cits.]" (Emphasis supplied.) Mit 1988To remove the present case from the ambit of that rule would require evidence that, in response to appellant's subsequent requests for repairs to the heater, appellees had actually agreed to make those repairs. " In the absence of an express agreement to do so, a landlord is under no duty to repair a patent defect in the rented premises where its existence was known to the tenant at the time the rent contract was entered into; and subsequent notice by a tenant of the existence of such a defect would not place upon the landlord any duty of inspection or repair. [Cits.]" (Emphasis supplied.) Mit | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bowman v. State
green
2 sentences1988Bowman v. State, 184 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 361 SE2d 58 ) (1987); Pittman v. State, 179 Ga. App. 760 (1) ( 348 SE2d 107 ) (1986). 1988Bowman v. State, 184 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 361 SE2d 58 ) (1987); Pittman v. State, 179 Ga. App. 760 (1) ( 348 SE2d 107 ) (1986). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Morrow v. Southeastern Stages Inc.
green
2 sentences1983I concur in the judgment of reversal as this case falls squarely within the ambit of the rule, set forth in Morrow v. Southeastern Stages, 68 Ga. App. 142 ( 22 SE2d 336 ) (1942) and Toles v. Hair, 83 Ga. App. 144 (2) ( 63 SE2d 3 ) (1951), that the charge of accident is improper when the evidence clearly shows that the injury resulted exclusively from the negligence of one or both of the two involved vehicles. 1983I concur in the judgment of reversal as this case falls squarely within the ambit of the rule, set forth in Morrow v. Southeastern Stages, 68 Ga. App. 142 ( 22 SE2d 336 ) (1942) and Toles v. Hair, 83 Ga. App. 144 (2) ( 63 SE2d 3 ) (1951), that the charge of accident is improper when the evidence clearly shows that the injury resulted exclusively from the negligence of one or both of the two involved vehicles. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Toles v. Hair
green
2 sentences1983I concur in the judgment of reversal as this case falls squarely within the ambit of the rule, set forth in Morrow v. Southeastern Stages, 68 Ga. App. 142 ( 22 SE2d 336 ) (1942) and Toles v. Hair, 83 Ga. App. 144 (2) ( 63 SE2d 3 ) (1951), that the charge of accident is improper when the evidence clearly shows that the injury resulted exclusively from the negligence of one or both of the two involved vehicles. 1983I concur in the judgment of reversal as this case falls squarely within the ambit of the rule, set forth in Morrow v. Southeastern Stages, 68 Ga. App. 142 ( 22 SE2d 336 ) (1942) and Toles v. Hair, 83 Ga. App. 144 (2) ( 63 SE2d 3 ) (1951), that the charge of accident is improper when the evidence clearly shows that the injury resulted exclusively from the negligence of one or both of the two involved vehicles. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Elliott v. Stone Baking Co.
green
1 sentence1967Although the allegations of the present plaintiff's decedent's condition at the time of his suicide, i. e., "dazed," "stunned," "shocked," "extremely irrational" and "violent," are not identical to the conditions involved in Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515 , supra, and other such cases, i.e., "rage," "frenzy," "delirium," "in response to an uncontrollable impulse," "without conscious volition to produce death," "insane," "bereft of reason" and "mentally irresponsible," they are sufficient to place the petition within the ambit of the rule in these cases. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Healey v. Webb
neutral
2 sentences1967The ruling of the majority is in conflict, too, with the case of Healey v. Webb, 60 Ga. App. 331 ( 3 SE2d 868 ) where it was held that mechanical devices known as clay pigeon traps, which are spring operated catapults for throwing clay pigeons into the air for target practice, when left unloaded and uncocked are not inherently dangerous and do not come within the ambit of the doctrine. 1967The ruling of the majority is in conflict, too, with the case of Healey v. Webb, 60 Ga. App. 331 ( 3 SE2d 868 ) where it was held that mechanical devices known as clay pigeon traps, which are spring operated catapults for throwing clay pigeons into the air for target practice, when left unloaded and uncocked are not inherently dangerous and do not come within the ambit of the doctrine. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Brown v. Bone
green
2 sentences1967This is in conflict with a general principle of law enunciated in controlling decisions, that the attractive nuisance doctrine will not be extended beyond the principle of the turntable cases.” I do not rely upon the case of Brown v. Bone, 85 Ga. App. 22 ( 68 SE2d 190 ) where it was held that as to a trespassing child a soil pan on a bulldozer suspended in a precarious state of balance with a mechanism like unto that of a gun trigger to release it did not come within the ambit of the doctrine. 1967This is in conflict with a general principle of law enunciated in controlling decisions, that the attractive nuisance doctrine will not be extended beyond the principle of the turntable cases.” I do not rely upon the case of Brown v. Bone, 85 Ga. App. 22 ( 68 SE2d 190 ) where it was held that as to a trespassing child a soil pan on a bulldozer suspended in a precarious state of balance with a mechanism like unto that of a gun trigger to release it did not come within the ambit of the doctrine. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.