Schragel v. Juszczyk, 43 A.D.3d 1375 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). · Go Syfert
Schragel v. Juszczyk, 43 A.D.3d 1375 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
6 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chiara v. Dernago
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
However, driving while intoxicated may support an award for punitive damages where there is additional evidence that the defendant engaged in “wanton and reckless” conduct evincing heedlessness and an utter disregard for the safety of others (Schragel v Juszczyk, 43 AD3d 1375, 1375 [2007]; see Parkhill v Cleary, 305 AD2d 1088, 1089 [2003]; Taylor v Dyer, 190 AD2d 902, 903 [1993]; Sweeney v McCormick, 159 AD2d 832, 834 [1990]; see also Deon v Fortuna, 283 AD2d at 389 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RICE, RICHARD J. v. CORASANTI, M.D., JAMES G.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant met his initial burden with regard to the claim for punitive damages, we conclude that plaintiffs’ evidence raises triable issues of fact whether defendant’s conduct warrants an award of such damages (see Schragel v Juszczyk, 43 AD3d 1375, 1375-1376 [2007]; Thorne v Grubman, 21 AD3d 254, 255 [2005]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D'Angelo v. Litterer
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Supreme Court properly denied that part of plaintiffs motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. “[T]he fact that defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated ‘is insufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punitive damages’ ” (Schragel v Juszczyk, 43 AD3d 1375, 1375 [2007]), and plaintiff failed to allege additional facts demonstrating that “defendant acted so recklessly or wantonly as to warrant an award of punitive damages” (Deon v Fortuna, 283 AD2d 388, 389 [2001]).
discussed Cited "see" Gershman v. Ahmad
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
With regard to the availability of punitive damages in personal injury cases involving drunk drivers, while this Court has held that “[evidence that a defendant was driving while intoxicated is insufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punitive damages” (Boykin v Mora, 274 AD2d 441, 442 [2000]; see Rodgers v Duffy, 95 AD3d 864, 866-867 [2012]), this Court has also held that “driving while intoxicated may support an award for punitive damages where there is additional evidence that the defendant engaged in ‘wanton and reckless’ conduct evincing heedlessness and an utter disr…
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Megan E. Schragel
v.
Stephen Juszczyk
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Sep 28, 2007.
43 A.D.3d 1375
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Donna M. Siwek, J.), entered September 13, 2006 in a personal injury action. The order granted the motion of defendant Stephen Juszczyk to dismiss the claim for punitive damages against him.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied and the claim for punitive damages against defendant Stephen Juszczyk is reinstated.

Memorandum: Flaintiff commenced this action seeking compensatory and punitive damages for injuries she sustained when the motor vehicle she was operating was struck by a vehicle operated by Stephen Juszczyk (defendant) and owned by defendant GMAC Leasing Corporation. We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in granting the motion of defendant to dismiss plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against him. We conclude on the record before us that plaintiff raised “a triable issue of fact whether defendant’s conduct was ‘so reckless or wantonly negligent as to be the equivalent of a conscious disregard of the rights of others’ ” (Arumugam v Smith, 277 AD2d 979 [2000]). Although the fact that defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]) “is insufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punitive damages” (Boykin v Mora, 274 AD2d 441, 442 [2000]; see Parkhill v Cleary, 305 AD2d 1088, 1090 [2003]; Taylor v Dyer, 190 AD2d 902, 903 [1993]; Sweeney v McCormick, 159 AD2d 832, 834 [1990]), in this case plaintiff raised an issue of fact whether defendant engaged in the requisite wanton and reckless conduct in addition to intoxication to warrant the imposi[*1376] tion of punitive damages (see e.g. Parkhill, 305 AD2d at 1090; Letterman v Reddington, 278 AD2d 868 [2000]; Arumugam, 277 AD2d 979 [2000]; Silvin v Karwoski, 242 AD2d 945 [1997]). Plaintiff established that the breathalyzer test administered by the police indicated that defendant had a blood alcohol content of .26%. Moreover, although defendant testified at his deposition that he had refused to participate in field sobriety tests because he knew that he would fail them, plaintiff submitted police reports establishing that defendant in fact participated in several field tests and failed each one. Defendant further testified at his deposition that, in the three to four hours prior to the accident, he consumed four 22-ounce beers and four or five shots containing tequila, that he could not recall the speed at which he was traveling when he exited the parking lot of the shopping plaza where he had consumed the alcohol, and that he could not recall whether he stopped at the stop sign posted at the parking lot exit or whether he had seen plaintiffs vehicle at any time before the accident. Thus, “taking into account the nature of [defendant’s] conduct and the level of his intoxication” (Sweeney, 159 AD2d at 834), including defendant’s “ ‘heedlessness and . . . utter disregard’ for the ‘rights and safety of others’ ” (id.), we conclude on the record before us that plaintiff raised an issue of fact whether an award of punitive damages is warranted. Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Gorski, Centra and Green, JJ.