complaint to add claim in New York

2015Evidence of a violation of a safety standard is an insufficient ground for granting a motion for leave to amend a complaint to add a claim for punitive damages inasmuch as such a violation does not constitute “negligence per se,” but is “merely some evidence of negligence” (Bauer v Female Academy of Sacred Heart, 97 NY2d 445, 453 [2002]; see Cowsert v Macy’s E., Inc., 74 AD3d 1444, 1445 [2010]; Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 25 [2003]; cf. Shaheen v Hueber-Breuer Constr.

2015Evidence of a violation of a safety standard is an insufficient ground for granting a motion for leave to amend a complaint to add a claim for punitive damages inasmuch as such a violation does not constitute “negligence per se,” but is “merely some evidence of negligence” (Bauer v Female Academy of Sacred Heart, 97 NY2d 445, 453 [2002]; see Cowsert v Macy’s E., Inc., 74 AD3d 1444, 1445 [2010]; Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 25 [2003]; cf. Shaheen v Hueber-Breuer Constr.

2015Evidence of a violation of a safety standard is an insufficient ground for granting a motion for leave to amend a complaint to add a claim for punitive damages inasmuch as such a violation does not constitute “negligence per se,” but is “merely some evidence of negligence” (Bauer v Female Academy of Sacred Heart, 97 NY2d 445, 453 [2002]; see Cowsert v Macy’s E., Inc., 74 AD3d 1444, 1445 [2010]; Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 25 [2003]; cf. Shaheen v Hueber-Breuer Constr.

2015Evidence of a violation of a safety standard is an insufficient ground for granting a motion for leave to amend a complaint to add a claim for punitive damages inasmuch as such a violation does not constitute “negligence per se,” but is “merely some evidence of negligence” (Bauer v Female Academy of Sacred Heart, 97 NY2d 445, 453 [2002]; see Cowsert v Macy’s E., Inc., 74 AD3d 1444, 1445 [2010]; Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 25 [2003]; cf. Shaheen v Hueber-Breuer Constr.

2015Co., 4 AD3d 761, 762-763 [2004]).

2015Co., 4 AD3d 761, 762-763 [2004]).

2015Evidence of a violation of a safety standard is an insufficient ground for granting a motion for leave to amend a complaint to add a claim for punitive damages inasmuch as such a violation does not constitute “negligence per se,” but is “merely some evidence of negligence” (Bauer v Female Academy of Sacred Heart, 97 NY2d 445, 453 [2002]; see Cowsert v Macy’s E., Inc., 74 AD3d 1444, 1445 [2010]; Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 25 [2003]; cf. Shaheen v Hueber-Breuer Constr.

2015Evidence of a violation of a safety standard is an insufficient ground for granting a motion for leave to amend a complaint to add a claim for punitive damages inasmuch as such a violation does not constitute “negligence per se,” but is “merely some evidence of negligence” (Bauer v Female Academy of Sacred Heart, 97 NY2d 445, 453 [2002]; see Cowsert v Macy’s E., Inc., 74 AD3d 1444, 1445 [2010]; Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 25 [2003]; cf. Shaheen v Hueber-Breuer Constr.

2025DISCUSSION "On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired" ( Benn v Benn , 82 AD3d 548, 548 [1st Dept 2011][ quoting Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C ., 49 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2008]); see also Gravel v Cicola , 297 AD2d 620 [2d Dept 2002]).

2025DISCUSSION "On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired" ( Benn v Benn , 82 AD3d 548, 548 [1st Dept 2011][ quoting Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C ., 49 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2008]); see also Gravel v Cicola , 297 AD2d 620 [2d Dept 2002]).

2025DISCUSSION "On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired" ( Benn v Benn , 82 AD3d 548, 548 [1st Dept 2011][ quoting Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C ., 49 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2008]); see also Gravel v Cicola , 297 AD2d 620 [2d Dept 2002]).

2025DISCUSSION "On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired" ( Benn v Benn , 82 AD3d 548, 548 [1st Dept 2011][ quoting Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C ., 49 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2008]); see also Gravel v Cicola , 297 AD2d 620 [2d Dept 2002]).

2025DISCUSSION "On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired" ( Benn v Benn , 82 AD3d 548, 548 [1st Dept 2011][ quoting Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C ., 49 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2008]); see also Gravel v Cicola , 297 AD2d 620 [2d Dept 2002]).

2025DISCUSSION "On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired" ( Benn v Benn , 82 AD3d 548, 548 [1st Dept 2011][ quoting Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C ., 49 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2008]); see also Gravel v Cicola , 297 AD2d 620 [2d Dept 2002]).

2023A jury might find that such conduct sufficiently demonstrated a conscious and willful disregard of the interests of others ( see Marinaccio v Town of Clarence, 20 NY3d 506, 511-512 [2013]).

2023A jury might find that such conduct sufficiently demonstrated a conscious and willful disregard of the interests of others ( see Marinaccio v Town of Clarence, 20 NY3d 506, 511-512 [2013]).

2022The defamation claim was properly dismissed as against Saland because the alleged defamatory statements were either subject to the fair report privilege ( see Civil Rights Law § 74) or nonactionable opinion ( see generally Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 269-270 [2014]).

2022The defamation claim was properly dismissed as against Saland because the alleged defamatory statements were either subject to the fair report privilege ( see Civil Rights Law § 74) or nonactionable opinion ( see generally Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 269-270 [2014]).

2015The proposed claim, as pleaded, was for conversion of property, not for trespass (see Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 487 [1983]).

2015The proposed claim, as pleaded, was for conversion of property, not for trespass (see Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 487 [1983]).

2026"Pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), a party may amend its pleadings at any time by leave of the court, which shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just" ( Passeri v Brody , 199 AD3d 1260, 1261 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Mohammed v New York State Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Inc. , 209 AD3d 1151, 1152 [3d Dept 2022]).

2026"Pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), a party may amend its pleadings at any time by leave of the court, which shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just" ( Passeri v Brody , 199 AD3d 1260, 1261 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Mohammed v New York State Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Inc. , 209 AD3d 1151, 1152 [3d Dept 2022]).

2026"Pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), a party may amend its pleadings at any time by leave of the court, which shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just" ( Passeri v Brody , 199 AD3d 1260, 1261 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Mohammed v New York State Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Inc. , 209 AD3d 1151, 1152 [3d Dept 2022]).

2026"Pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), a party may amend its pleadings at any time by leave of the court, which shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just" ( Passeri v Brody , 199 AD3d 1260, 1261 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Mohammed v New York State Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Inc. , 209 AD3d 1151, 1152 [3d Dept 2022]).

2024NO. 389 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 07/11/2024 Transactions)].) "[C]alling an organization a partnership does not make it one." (Brodsky v Stadlen, 138 AD2d 662, 663 [2d Dept 1988].) Thus, plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Kaplan, CSG, and CSG RE arising out of a purported partnership is denied.

2023Plaintiff was required to allege "the existence of the underlying fraud, actual knowledge, and substantial assistance" ( Oster v Kirschner , 77 AD3d 51, 55 [1st Dept 2010]).

2021Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for a class action, as plaintiff has submitted no evidentiary proof of questions of law or fact common to the class that would predominate over any questions affecting only individual members ( see Velarde v City of New York , 149 AD3d 457, 457 [1st Dept 2017]; Ross v Amrep Corp. , 57 AD2d 99, 102 [1st Dept 1977]).

2021Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for a class action, as plaintiff has submitted no evidentiary proof of questions of law or fact common to the class that would predominate over any questions affecting only individual members ( see Velarde v City of New York , 149 AD3d 457, 457 [1st Dept 2017]; Ross v Amrep Corp. , 57 AD2d 99, 102 [1st Dept 1977]).

2017The motion court improperly granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to add the claim under 42 USC § 1983 , because the three-year statute of limitations on that claim (see Veal v Geraci, 23 F3d 722, 724 [2d Cir 1994]) had expired by the time plaintiff sought amendment, in August 2014.

2015Here, in opposition to that branch of the appellant’s motion which was for leave to amend the complaint to add the defense of lack of standing, the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence of physical delivery to it of the note on March 19, 2009, which was prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Taylor, 25 NY3d 355 [2015]; cf. HSBC Bank USA v Hernandez, 92 AD3d 843, 844 [2012]).

2010The court also properly denied that part of plaintiffs motion seeking to compel defendant to produce her hospital toxicology report from the date of the accident inasmuch as defendant has not waived the physician-patient privilege with respect to that report (see Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d 278, 287-288 [1989]).

2010Supreme Court properly denied that part of plaintiffs motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. “[T]he fact that defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated ‘is insufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punitive damages’ ” (Schragel v Juszczyk, 43 AD3d 1375, 1375 [2007]), and plaintiff failed to allege additional facts demonstrating that “defendant acted so recklessly or wantonly as to warrant an award of punitive damages” (Deon v Fortuna, 283 AD2d 388, 389 [2001]).

2010Supreme Court properly denied that part of plaintiffs motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. “[T]he fact that defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated ‘is insufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punitive damages’ ” (Schragel v Juszczyk, 43 AD3d 1375, 1375 [2007]), and plaintiff failed to allege additional facts demonstrating that “defendant acted so recklessly or wantonly as to warrant an award of punitive damages” (Deon v Fortuna, 283 AD2d 388, 389 [2001]).

2008The proposed claim is not viable in light of the lack of evidence that defendants were on notice of repeated criminal activity on the premises, or that the decedent’s injuries were a foreseeable result of defendants’ inaction in failing to remove the alleged drug dealers from the building (see Maria S. v Willow Enters., 234 AD2d 177, 178-179 [1996]).

2007Corp., 27 AD3d 723, 724 [2006]). “ ‘Punitive damages are warranted where the conduct of the party being held liable evidences a high degree of moral culpability . . . , or where the conduct constitutes willful or wanton negligence or recklessness’ ” (Hale v Odd Fellow & Rebekah Health Care Facility, 302 AD2d 948, 949 [2003]; see Home Ins.