In re Stephen Daniel A., 87 A.D.3d 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). · Go Syfert
In re Stephen Daniel A., 87 A.D.3d 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
32 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Treatment trajectory · 2012 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Saber v. Saccone
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
However, although the court warned the father that he would have to proceed even if he failed to retain counsel, we cannot find that it conducted the requisite searching inquiry to be reasonably certain that he "understood the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right of counsel" ( Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.] , 87 AD3d 735, 737 [2011]; see Matter of Hensley v DeMun , 163 AD3d 1100 , 1102-1103 [2018]; Matter of Madison County Support Collection Unit v Feketa , 112 AD3d 1091, 1093 [2013]; compare Martinez v Gomez-Munoz , 154 AD3d 1085, 1086 [2017]; Matter of Anthon…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of DiNunzio v. Zylinski
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
I would add that, in civil matters like this case, which do not involve an issue of constitutional proportion ( cf. Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.] , 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2d Dept 2011]), the aggrievement concept is relational in the sense that the contest must exist between or among the parties—not as the majority appears to perceive, between the court and a party.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Gugliara v. Gugliara
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
There is no rigid formula, but the record must demonstrate that the party has chosen to proceed without counsel despite being aware of and understanding the dangers and disadvantages of doing so (see Matter of Belmonte v Batista, 102 AD3d 682, 683 [2013]; Matter of Rosof v Mallory, 88 AD3d 802, 802 [2011]; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.], 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Bianco v. Bruce-Ross
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
A party in a custody dispute has the right to be represented by counsel (see Matter of Moiseeva v Sichkin, 129 AD3d 974, 975 [2015]; Matter of Belmonte v Batista, 102 AD3d 682, 682 [2013]), but may waive that right, provided that he or she does so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.], 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Ryan v. Alexander
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
A party in a custody proceeding has the right to be represented by counsel (see Matter of Moiseeva v Sichkin, 129 AD3d 974, 975 [2015]; Matter of Belmonte v Batista, 102 AD3d 682, 682 [2013]), but may waive that right, provided that he or she does so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.], 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Belmonte v. Batista (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
However, prior to permitting a party to proceed pro se, the court must determine that the decision to do so is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (see id.; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.], 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]; Matter of Casey N., 59 AD 3d 625, 627 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Belmonte v. Batista (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
However, prior to permitting a party to proceed pro se, the court must determine that the decision to do so is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (see id.; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.], 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]; Matter of Casey N., 59 AD 3d 625, 627 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Stephen D.A.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
On prior appeals from those orders by the mother, this Court determined that, at the June 9, 2009 proceeding, “the Family Court [had] failed to conduct a ‘searching inquiry’ of the mother in order to be reasonably certain that she understood the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right of counsel,” and, thus, “did not ensure that the mother’s waiver of her right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” (Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.], 87 AD3d 735, 737 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Stephen D.A.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
On prior appeals from those orders by the mother, this Court determined that, at the June 9, 2009 proceeding, “the Family Court [had] failed to conduct a ‘searching inquiry’ of the mother in order to be reasonably certain that she understood the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right of counsel,” and, thus, “did not ensure that the mother’s waiver of her right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” (Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.], 87 AD3d 735, 737 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Dashawn N.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
The Family Court’s actions in this regard effectively deprived the mother of her fundamental right to counsel (see US Const Amend VI; NY Const, art I, § 6; Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [i]; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra MJ, 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]), which also constituted a denial of due process and requires reversal, without regard to the merits of the mother’s position (see Matter of Williams v Bentley, 26 AD3d at 442 ; Matter of Knight v Griffith, 13 AD3d 449 [2004]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Dashawn N.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
The Family Court’s actions in this regard effectively deprived the mother of her fundamental right to counsel (see US Const Amend VI; NY Const, art I, § 6; Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [i]; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra MJ, 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]), which also constituted a denial of due process and requires reversal, without regard to the merits of the mother’s position (see Matter of Williams v Bentley, 26 AD3d at 442 ; Matter of Knight v Griffith, 13 AD3d 449 [2004]).
discussed Cited "see" Matter of Cecile D. (Kassia D.)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
"A waiver is voluntarily made when the trial court advises the [respondent] and can be certain that the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed upon the [respondent]" ( Matter of Kathleen K. [Steven K.] , 17 NY3d 380, 385-386 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Stephen Daniel A. v Sandra M. , 87 AD3d at 736 ; Matter of Jetter v Jetter , 43 AD3d 821, 822 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Stephen Daniel A. Administration for Children's Services, Respondent Sandra M.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Aug 30, 2011.
87 A.D.3d 735
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published

[*736] As a respondent in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the mother had both a constitutional and a statutory right to the assistance of counsel (see US Const Amend VI; NY Const, art I, § 6; Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [i]; Matter of Jung [State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 11 NY3d 365, 373 [2008]; Matter of Ella B., 30 NY2d 352, 356-357 [1972]; Matter of Casey N, 59 AD3d 625, 627 [2009]). A party may waive that right and proceed without counsel (see People v Arroyo, 98 NY2d 101, 103 [2002]; Matter of Guzzo v Guzzo, 50 AD3d 687, 688 [2008]; Matter of Jetter v Jetter, 43 AD3d 821, 822 [2007])- However, prior to permitting a party to proceed pro se, the court must determine that the decision to do so is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (see People v Arroyo, 98 NY2d at 103). In determining whether a waiver meets this requirement, the court should conduct a “searching inquiry” of that party (Matter of Kathleen K. [Steven K], 17 NY3d 380, 385 [2011]; People v Arroyo, 98 NY2d at 103; People v Slaughter, 78 NY2d 485, 491 [1991]; Matter of Spencer v Spencer, 77 AD3d 761, 761-762 [2010]; Matter of Casey N, 59 AD3d at 627; Matter of Jetter v Jetter, 43 AD3d at 822). “Although there is no ‘rigid formula’ as to the questions the court needs to ask for counsel waivers, there must be a showing that the party ‘was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel’ ” (Matter of Jetter v Jetter, 43 AD3d at 822, quoting People v Providence, 2 NY3d 579, 582-583 [2004]; see Matter of Deon M. [Vernon B.], 68 AD3d 1740, 1741-1742 [2009]; Matter of Casey N., 59 AD3d at 627).

Here, the Family Court permitted the mother to change counsel on multiple occasions, cautioned her to retain counsel, and appointed counsel to represent her. Prior to the two permanency hearings at issue, upon the mother’s request, the Family Court allowed the mother to proceed pro se and directed the mother’s appointed counsel to provide assistance to her in an[*737] advisory capacity. However, the Family Court failed to conduct a “searching inquiry” of the mother in order to be reasonably certain that she understood the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right of counsel (see Matter of Spencer v Spencer, 77 AD3d at 761-762; Matter of Casey N., 59 AD3d at 627). Accordingly, because the Family Court did not ensure that the mother’s waiver of her right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, we reverse the orders dated September 29, 2009, and April 19, 2010, insofar as appealed from and remit the matter to the Family Court, Queens County, for a new permanency hearing and determination.

The mother’s remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.E, Balkin, Lott and Austin, JJ., concur.