permanency hearing in New York

2024However, the portion of the permanency hearing order that found that the petitioner had exercised reasonable efforts to implement the permanency goal of reunification with the mother and changed the permanency goal from reunification to adoption is not academic ( see Matter of Peter T. [Shay S.P.] , 173 AD3d at 1047; Matter of Victoria B. [Jonathan M.] , 164 AD3d at 580-581). "'At a permanency hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing the appropriateness of a permanency goal, or a goal change, by a preponderance of the evidence'" ( Matter of Victoria B. [Jonathan M.] , 164 AD3d

2021"At a permanency hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing the appropriateness of a permanency goal, or a goal change, by a preponderance of the evidence" ( Matter of Cristella B. , 65 AD3d at 1039 ; see Matter of Nazier B. [Anita B.] , 96 AD3d 1049 ; Matter of Darlene L. , 38 AD3d 552, 554 ).

2017Contrary to the contention of the Attorneys for the Children in appeal Nos. 2 through 4, whether the order of fact-finding and disposition has expired is immaterial inasmuch as the permanency hearing orders on appeal have superseded that order (see Matter of Jacelyn TT. [Tonia TT.–Carlton TT.], 80 AD3d 1119, 1120 ; Matter of Destiny HH., 63 AD3d 1230, 1231 , lv denied 13 NY3d 706 ).

2017Contrary to the contention of the Attorneys for the Children in appeal Nos. 2 through 4, whether the order of fact-finding and disposition has expired is immaterial inasmuch as the permanency hearing orders on appeal have superseded that order (see Matter of Jacelyn TT. [Tonia TT.—Carlton TT.], 80 AD3d 1119, 1120 [2011]; Matter of Destiny HH., 63 AD3d 1230, 1231 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]).

2021"At a permanency hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing the appropriateness of a permanency goal, or a goal change, by a preponderance of the evidence" ( Matter of Cristella B. , 65 AD3d at 1039 ; see Matter of Nazier B. [Anita B.] , 96 AD3d 1049 ; Matter of Darlene L. , 38 AD3d 552, 554 ).

2012“At a permanency hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing the appropriateness of a permanency goal, or a goal change, by a preponderance of the evidence” (Matter of Cristella B., 65 AD3d 1037, 1039 [2009]; see Matter of Nigel S., 44 AD3d 673 [2007]; Matter of Darlene L., 38 AD3d 552, 554 [2007]). “ ‘[A]n overarching consideration always obtains for children to be returned to biological parents, if at all possible and responsible’ ” (Matter of Glenn B., 303 AD2d 498, 498 [2003], quoting Matter of Dale P., 84 NY2d 72, 77 [1994]).

2012At a permanency hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing the appropriateness of a permanency goal, or a goal change, by a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Cristella B., 65 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2009]; Matter of Amber B., 50 AD3d 1028, 1029 [2008]).

2012At a permanency hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing the appropriateness of a permanency goal, or a goal change, by a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Cristella B., 65 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2009]; Matter of Amber B., 50 AD3d 1028, 1029 [2008]).

2017“At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, the court has the authority to modify an existing permanency goal and must enter a disposition based upon the proof adduced and in accordance with the best interests of the child[ren]” (Matter of Dezerea G. [Lisa G.], 97 AD3d 933 , 935 [2012] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Rebecca KK., 55 AD3d 984, 986 [2008]).

2016The caseworker stated that, in following the direction of Family Court, no real efforts had been made to further the goal of return to parent. 3 While simply complying with the court-ordered suspension of visitation is also not enough, in and of itself, to support a finding that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable efforts (see Matter of Rebecca KK., 55 AD3d 984, 985-986 [2008]), the testimony of the caseworker demonstrated very limited knowledge regarding mandated services being provided to either the subject children or respondent since the prior permanency hearing.

2012The Family Court’s actions in this regard effectively deprived the mother of her fundamental right to counsel (see US Const Amend VI; NY Const, art I, § 6; Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [i]; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra MJ, 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]), which also constituted a denial of due process and requires reversal, without regard to the merits of the mother’s position (see Matter of Williams v Bentley, 26 AD3d at 442 ; Matter of Knight v Griffith, 13 AD3d 449 [2004]).

2012The Family Court’s actions in this regard effectively deprived the mother of her fundamental right to counsel (see US Const Amend VI; NY Const, art I, § 6; Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [i]; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra MJ, 87 AD3d 735, 736 [2011]), which also constituted a denial of due process and requires reversal, without regard to the merits of the mother’s position (see Matter of Williams v Bentley, 26 AD3d at 442 ; Matter of Knight v Griffith, 13 AD3d 449 [2004]).

2015“At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, the court has the authority to modify an existing permanency goal and must enter a disposition based upon the proof adduced and in accordance with the best interests of the child” (Matter of Dezerea G. [Lisa G.], 97 AD3d 933 , 935 [2012] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Kobe D. [Kelli F.], 97 AD3d 947 , 948 [2012]).

2015“At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, the court has the authority to modify an existing permanency goal and must enter a disposition based upon the proof adduced and in accordance with the best interests of the child” (Matter of Dezerea G. [Lisa G.], 97 AD3d 933 , 935 [2012] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Kobe D. [Kelli F.], 97 AD3d 947 , 948 [2012]).

2017Contrary to the contention of the Attorneys for the Children in appeal Nos. 2 through 4, whether the order of fact-finding and disposition has expired is immaterial inasmuch as the permanency hearing orders on appeal have superseded that order (see Matter of Jacelyn TT. [Tonia TT.–Carlton TT.], 80 AD3d 1119, 1120 ; Matter of Destiny HH., 63 AD3d 1230, 1231 , lv denied 13 NY3d 706 ).

2017Contrary to the contention of the Attorneys for the Children in appeal Nos. 2 through 4, whether the order of fact-finding and disposition has expired is immaterial inasmuch as the permanency hearing orders on appeal have superseded that order (see Matter of Jacelyn TT. [Tonia TT.—Carlton TT.], 80 AD3d 1119, 1120 [2011]; Matter of Destiny HH., 63 AD3d 1230, 1231 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]).

2025The child turned 18 years old shortly after the termination order was issued and, as of July 2025, the child continued to refuse to consent to adoption and declared that he no longer consents to remain in foster care. [FN2] Although initially joining the agency's position in this appeal, the appellate attorney for the child submitted correspondence advising that the child changed his position and wants the father to remain his legal father. [FN3] Since we may consider these subsequent developments ( see Matter of Michael B. , 80 NY2d 299, 318 [1992]; Matter of Hyacinth Angela W. , 8 AD3d 129,

2021Here, in light of the limited contact and parental access between the child and the father in the five years preceding the permanency hearing order, and the child's anxiety and distress concerning a transition to a home which does not practice Orthodox Judaism, the Family Court's determination that the child's best interests and safety warranted continuation of her placement, with expanded parental access including parental access with the father's family in Florida, was supported by a substantial basis in the record, and will not be disturbed ( see Family Ct Act § 1089[d]; Matter of Michael B

2025We have noted that Article 10-A of the [*20]FCA, which outlines the permanency hearing process, [FN8] "establish[es] uniform procedures for permanency hearings for all children who are placed in foster care . . . [in order] to provide children placed out of their homes timely and effective judicial review that promotes permanency, safety and well-being in their lives" ( Matter of Lacee L. , 32 NY3d 219, 226 [2019]).

2025We have noted that Article 10-A of the [*20]FCA, which outlines the permanency hearing process, [FN8] "establish[es] uniform procedures for permanency hearings for all children who are placed in foster care . . . [in order] to provide children placed out of their homes timely and effective judicial review that promotes permanency, safety and well-being in their lives" ( Matter of Lacee L. , 32 NY3d 219, 226 [2019]).

2012“Inasmuch as her parental rights had been terminated, [the mother] lacked standing to participate in the permanency hearing conducted by [Family Court]. [The mother] thus is not aggrieved by the permanency hearing orders and lacks standing to pursue her appeals from the orders in [appeal Nos. 4 through 6]” (Matter of April C., 31 AD3d 1200, 1201 [2006]).

2012“Inasmuch as her parental rights had been terminated, [the mother] lacked standing to participate in the permanency hearing conducted by [Family Court]. [The mother] thus is not aggrieved by the permanency hearing orders and lacks standing to pursue her appeals from the orders in [appeal Nos. 4 through 6]” (Matter of April C., 31 AD3d 1200, 1201 [2006]).

2020A subsequent permanency hearing was thereafter conducted in July 2014 and orders were issued in September 2014 continuing the goal as adoption for both children ( see Matter of Desirea F. [Angela F.] , 136 AD3d at 1075).

2020In 2016, this Court reversed Family Court's June and September 2014 orders, finding that the change in permanency goal to free for adoption lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record and remitted the matter for further proceedings before a different Family Court judge ( id. at 1076-1077).

2025Footnote 3: Had the court promptly returned the child upon dismissal of the neglect proceeding against the mother, there would have been no reason to hold a permanency hearing, which is only held while a child is in foster care ( Jamie J. , 30 NY3d at 283).

2025Footnote 3: Had the court promptly returned the child upon dismissal of the neglect proceeding against the mother, there would have been no reason to hold a permanency hearing, which is only held while a child is in foster care ( Jamie J. , 30 NY3d at 283 ).

2023Contrary to the mother's contention, this case does not warrant the invocation of the exception to the mootness doctrine ( see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 ).

2010As to the permanency hearing orders, in May 2010 Family Court issued subsequent orders which, among other things, returned respondent’s son to him and concluded that it was without legal authority to return the daughter to respondent because he is not her biological father and “has never had legal custody of [her].” Without reaching any opinion as to the merits, we find that these subsequent orders render the appeals from the prior permanency orders moot because respondent’s rights will no longer be directly affected by determination of the present appeals (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,

2017In September 2009, respondent submitted a permanency hearing report recommending that the permanency goal be changed to placement for adoption, and, after a hearing, Family Court (Potter, J.) erroneously imposed the concurrent and inherently contradictory permanency goals of return to parent and free for adoption (Matter of Dakota F. [Angela F.], 92 AD3d at 1098-1099 ).

2016In our view, the meager record from the February 2014 proceeding does not reflect that Family Court engaged in any “age [-] appropriate consultation” with the subject children (Family Ct Act § 1089 [d]; see Matter of Dakota F. [Angela F.], 92 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2012]) and, while not dispositive (see Matter of Alexus SS. [Chezzy SS.], 125 AD3d at 1143 n 2), this error is further compounded by a permanency hearing lacking in both form and substance.

2007Matter of Commissioner of Admin, for Children’s Servs. of City of N.Y., 254 AD2d 416 [2d Dept 1998] [stressing that the higher burden of proof in a petition to terminate parental rights is to ensure that parents receive due process protection when the State seeks to permanently deprive them of custody], citing Santosky, 455 US 745 [1982].) Notably, a court cannot sever a parent’s parental rights at a permanency hearing, which is why the higher burden of proof is required at a termination of parental rights proceeding.

2007Matter of Commissioner of Admin. for Children's Servs. of City of N.Y. , 254 AD2d 416 [2d Dept 1998] [stressing that the higher burden of proof in a petition to terminate parental rights is to ensure that parents receive due process protection when the State seeks to permanently deprive them of custody], citing Santosky , 455 US 745 [1982].) Notably, a court cannot sever a parent's parental rights at a permanency hearing, which is why the higher burden of proof is required at a termination of parental rights proceeding. ( See , Santosky , 455 US at 759 .) In this case, Tatiana has been in fost

2020"At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, [Family C]ourt has the authority to modify an existing permanency goal and must enter a disposition based upon the proof adduced and in accordance with the best interests of the child[ren]" ( Matter of Dezerea G. [Lisa G.] , 97 AD3d 933 , 935 [2012] [citations omitted]; accord Matter of Dawn M. [Michael M.] , 151 AD3d 1489, 1490 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 917 [2017]; Matter of Alexus SS. [Chezzy SS.] , 125 AD3d 1141 , 1142 [2015]).

2016Respondent appealed from the four orders (two on each date) and we consolidated the appeals. 2 “At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, Family Court is required to make findings and enter an order of disposition ‘upon the proof adduced . . . and in accordance with the best interests and safety of the child’ ” (Matter of Jacelyn TT. [Tonia TT.—Carlton TT. ], 80 AD3d 1119, 1120 [2011], quoting Family Ct Act § 1089 [d]; see Matter of Alexus SS. [Chezzy SS.], 125 AD3d 1141 , 1142 [2015]).

2004Bests interests will be relevant at the termination of parental rights dispositional hearing and the subsequent permanency hearing. ( See Betty C. v Ulster County Dep't of Social Servs. , 299 AD2d 758 , supra .) Significantly, in ultimately ascertaining the child's best interest, the court will be guided by a principle which reflects a "considered social judgment in this society respecting the family and parenthood " not just parenthood ( Bennett v Jeffreys , 40 NY2d at 549 , supra , quoting Matter of Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv v. Polk , 29 NY2d 196, 204 ).

1999(Cf., e.g., Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, supra, 40 NY2d, at 549 .) Certainly, the permanency hearing is not intended as a substitute for previously enacted procedures to determine the child’s need for protection and an appropriate disposition upon a finding of abuse or neglect under Family Court Act article 10.

2022"At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, the court has the authority to modify an existing permanency goal and must enter a disposition based upon the proof adduced and in accordance with the best interests [*2]of the children" ( Matter of Dawn M. [Michael M.] , 151 AD3d 1489, 1490 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 29 NY3d 917 [2017]).

2020"At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, [Family C]ourt has the authority to modify an existing permanency goal and must enter a disposition based upon the proof adduced and in accordance with the best interests of the child[ren]" ( Matter of Dezerea G. [Lisa G.] , 97 AD3d 933 , 935 [2012] [citations omitted]; accord Matter of Dawn M. [Michael M.] , 151 AD3d 1489, 1490 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 917 [2017]; Matter of Alexus SS. [Chezzy SS.] , 125 AD3d 1141 , 1142 [2015]).

2019Furthermore, ACS presented evidence that the mother could not successfully maintain either the trial discharge of the older child to her or her unsupervised visitation with the children, and that the older child had been in foster care for approximately six years at the time of the permanency hearing ( see Matter of Victoria B. [Jonathan M.] , 161 AD3d at 1146; Matter of Michael D. [Antionette R.] , 71 AD3d 1017 ; Matter of Jennifer R. , 29 AD3d at 1004-1005 ).

2010Turning to the permanency hearing order, Family Court was empowered to modify the permanency goal for the children {see Family Ct Act § 1089 [d] [2] [i]; [e]; Matter of Rebecca KK., 55 AD3d 984, 986 [2008]), and respondents’ wholesale failure to engage in services since the children entered foster care provided a sound and substantial basis in the record for its decision to do so here (see Matter of Patrice S., 63 AD3d 620, 621 [2009]; Matter of Rebecca KK., 55 AD3d at 986 ; Matter of Jennifer R., 29 AD3d 1003, 1004-1005 [2006]).

2019The mother's appeal from so much of the permanency hearing order as continued the subject child's placement in the custody of the petitioner until the completion of the next permanency hearing must be dismissed as academic, as that portion of the order has expired ( see Matter of Victoria B. [Jonathan M.] , 164 AD3d 578 , 580; Matter of Jayline J. [Jarren J.] , 156 AD3d 701 ; Matter of Elizabeth C. [Omar C.] , 156 AD3d 193, 198-199 ; Matter of Agam B. [Janna W.] , 143 AD3d 702, 702-703 ; Matter of Grayson J. [Sharon H.] , 119 AD3d 575, 576 ).

2019The mother's appeal from so much of the permanency hearing order as continued the subject child's placement in the custody of the petitioner until the completion of the next permanency hearing must be dismissed as academic, as that portion of the order has expired ( see Matter of Victoria B. [Jonathan M.] , 164 AD3d 578 , 580; Matter of Jayline J. [Jarren J.] , 156 AD3d 701 ; Matter of Elizabeth C. [Omar C.] , 156 AD3d 193, 198-199 ; Matter of Agam B. [Janna W.] , 143 AD3d 702, 702-703 ; Matter of Grayson J. [Sharon H.] , 119 AD3d 575, 576 ).

2016Although we share the concern of our dissenting colleagues that the mother’s right to raise her child must be protected, that contention is not properly before us on this appeal because the order was entered upon the consent of the parties (see Matter of Adney v Morton, 68 AD3d 1742, 1742 [2009]), and the mother retained the right to challenge on appeal only the court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a permanency hearing.

2016Although we share the concern of our dissenting colleagues that the mother’s right to raise her child must be protected, that contention is not properly before us on this appeal because the order was entered upon the consent of the parties (see Matter of Adney v Morton, 68 AD3d 1742, 1742 [2009]), and the mother retained the right to challenge on appeal only the court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a permanency hearing.

2016The Department of Social Services opposed this out of concern that his appearance would be emotionally upsetting to him, based upon testimony from his clinical specialist regarding his behavior surrounding the previous permanency hearing, including “punching staff, running into the road and twice pulling fire alarms” (Matter of Pedro M., 21 Misc 3d 645, 648-649 [Fam Ct, Albany County 2008]).

2012Pursuant to Family Ct Act § 1089 (d), the proof adduced at a permanency hearing “shall include age-appropriate consultation with the child who is the subject of the permanency hearing.” Although the statute does not require a young child, such as then-six-year-old Dakota, to be personally produced in court (see Matter of Pedro M., 21 Misc 3d 645, 646-648 [2008]), Family Court must find some age-appropriate manner to consult with the child.