Mohegan Elec. Supply Co. v. Pesach, 94 A.D.2d 717 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). · Go Syfert
Mohegan Elec. Supply Co. v. Pesach, 94 A.D.2d 717 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
31 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Empire Wine & Spirits LLC v. Colon
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Co., 94 AD2d 717, 718-719 [1983]). 2 Respondents’ claims that the subpoenas seek irrevelant, cumulative and otherwise improper information are likewise premature.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Toren v. Anderson, Kill & Olick, P. C.
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2000 · confidence medium
Co., 94 AD2d 717, 719 [2d Dept 1983].) Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for disqualification of Doyle is denied and Anderson, Kill & Olick, P. C., may continue to represent itself.
cited Cited as authority (rule) 23/23 Communications Corp. v. General Motors Corp.
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1997 · confidence medium
Co., 94 AD2d 717, 719 [2d Dept 1983]; Matter of Dwyer v Wilcox, 92 AD2d 646 [3d Dept 1983]; Matter of Hirshfeld v Craig, 239 NY 98, 117 [1924]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S
S.D.N.Y. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
The challenged advocate’s testimony must be “sufficiently adverse to the factual assertions or account of events offered on behalf of the client, such that the bar or client might have an interest in the lawyer’s independence in discrediting that testimony.” Rice v. Baron, 456 F.Supp. 1361, 1371 (S.D.N.Y.1978); see also, Ocean-Clear, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 94 A.D.2d 717 , 462 N.Y.S.2d 251 (2d Dep’t 1983).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mohegan Electric Supply Co., Inc.
v.
Max Pesach
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 9, 1983.
94 A.D.2d 717
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

— In an action to recover on two promissory notes, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Wood, J.), dated May 14, 1982, which, upon an order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint pursuant to CPLR 3213, is in favor of the plaintiff in the total principal sum of $39,321. Judgment affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. In opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, the appellants offered only conclusory allegations in support of their contention that one of the notes in issue had been fully paid and the other had been partially paid. Notably absent from the appellants’ submission was any documentation of the alleged payments, such as canceled checks. Accordingly, in view of the appellants’ total failure to produce evidentiary facts in support of their claimed defenses, summary judgment was properly granted (see, e.g., Mortgage Corp. ofAmer. v Stagg Holding Corp., 45 AD2d 770). We have examined the remaining contention, raised on behalf of appellant Pesach, and find it to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Lazer, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.