12 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rivera v. DiNapoligreen1 sentence2023Hence, the issue distills to whether the Retirement System successfully rebutted the heart presumption, which, in turn, required the Retirement System to demonstrate — through expert medical proof — that petitioner's cardiac condition was caused by risk factors other than his employment ( see Matter of Park v DiNapoli , 123 AD3d 1392, 1393 [3d Dept 2014]; Matter of Walters v DiNapoli , 82 AD3d 1487, 1487-1488 [3d Dept 2011]; Matter of Rivera v DiNapoli , 78 AD3d 1295, 1296 [3d Dept 2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Walters v. DiNapoligreen1 sentence2023Hence, the issue distills to whether the Retirement System successfully rebutted the heart presumption, which, in turn, required the Retirement System to demonstrate — through expert medical proof — that petitioner's cardiac condition was caused by risk factors other than his employment ( see Matter of Park v DiNapoli , 123 AD3d 1392, 1393 [3d Dept 2014]; Matter of Walters v DiNapoli , 82 AD3d 1487, 1487-1488 [3d Dept 2011]; Matter of Rivera v DiNapoli , 78 AD3d 1295, 1296 [3d Dept 2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Park v. DiNapoligreen1 sentence2023Hence, the issue distills to whether the Retirement System successfully rebutted the heart presumption, which, in turn, required the Retirement System to demonstrate — through expert medical proof — that petitioner's cardiac condition was caused by risk factors other than his employment ( see Matter of Park v DiNapoli , 123 AD3d 1392, 1393 [3d Dept 2014]; Matter of Walters v DiNapoli , 82 AD3d 1487, 1487-1488 [3d Dept 2011]; Matter of Rivera v DiNapoli , 78 AD3d 1295, 1296 [3d Dept 2010]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Alfonsogreen1 sentence2021The police officer's statement here improperly implied to defendant that the interrogation would be his "only opportunity to speak" ( Dunbar , 24 NY3d at 316 [internal quotation marks omitted]), and his advice that providing an explanation would benefit defendant effectively "implied that . . . defendant['s] words would be used to help [him], thus undoing the heart of the warning that anything [he] said could and would be used against [him]" ( id. ; see [*2]People v Alfonso , 142 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 946 [2017]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dunbargreen2 sentences2021The police officer's statement here improperly implied to defendant that the interrogation would be his "only opportunity to speak" ( Dunbar , 24 NY3d at 316 [internal quotation marks omitted]), and his advice that providing an explanation would benefit defendant effectively "implied that . . . defendant['s] words would be used to help [him], thus undoing the heart of the warning that anything [he] said could and would be used against [him]" ( id. ; see [*2]People v Alfonso , 142 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 946 [2017]). 2021The police officer's statement here improperly implied to defendant that the interrogation would be his "only opportunity to speak" ( Dunbar , 24 NY3d at 316 [internal quotation marks omitted]), and his advice that providing an explanation would benefit defendant effectively "implied that . . . defendant['s] words would be used to help [him], thus undoing the heart of the warning that anything [he] said could and would be used against [him]" ( id. ; see [*2]People v Alfonso , 142 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 946 [2017]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abdul-Jaleelgreen1 sentence2021The police officer's statement here improperly implied to defendant that the interrogation would be his "only opportunity to speak" ( Dunbar , 24 NY3d at 316 [internal quotation marks omitted]), and his advice that providing an explanation would benefit defendant effectively "implied that . . . defendant['s] words would be used to help [him], thus undoing the heart of the warning that anything [he] said could and would be used against [him]" ( id. ; see [*2]People v Alfonso , 142 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 946 [2017]). | 1 | 1 |
Nerney v. New York State Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Systemgreen1 sentence2011Notwithstanding evidence in the record that could justify a different result, Cantor’s rational and fact-based opinion provided substantial evidence to support respondent’s determination that the heart presumption had been rebutted (see Matter of Tucker v McCall, 262 AD2d 916, 917-918 [1999]; Matter of McComb v Regan, 180 AD2d 862, 863 [1992]; Matter of Nerney v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., 156 AD2d 775, 775-776 [1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 710 [1990]). | 1 | 1 |
McComb v. Regangreen1 sentence2011Notwithstanding evidence in the record that could justify a different result, Cantor’s rational and fact-based opinion provided substantial evidence to support respondent’s determination that the heart presumption had been rebutted (see Matter of Tucker v McCall, 262 AD2d 916, 917-918 [1999]; Matter of McComb v Regan, 180 AD2d 862, 863 [1992]; Matter of Nerney v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., 156 AD2d 775, 775-776 [1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 710 [1990]). | 1 | 1 |
Tucker v. McCallgreen1 sentence2011Notwithstanding evidence in the record that could justify a different result, Cantor’s rational and fact-based opinion provided substantial evidence to support respondent’s determination that the heart presumption had been rebutted (see Matter of Tucker v McCall, 262 AD2d 916, 917-918 [1999]; Matter of McComb v Regan, 180 AD2d 862, 863 [1992]; Matter of Nerney v New York State Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., 156 AD2d 775, 775-776 [1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 710 [1990]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Luperongreen1 sentence2008By not raising these arguments at the hearing, defendant deprived the People of an opportunity to meet them with evidence (see People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 78 [1995] [preservation rules “require, at the very least, that any matter which a party wishes the appellate court to decide have been brought to the attention of the trial court at a time and in a way that gave the latter the opportunity to remedy the problem and thereby avert reversible error”]; People v Tutt, 38 NY2d 1011, 1013 [1976] [“(w)here . . . the defendant fails at the suppression hearing to challenge a narrow aspect of the suf | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tuttgreen1 sentence2008By not raising these arguments at the hearing, defendant deprived the People of an opportunity to meet them with evidence (see People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 78 [1995] [preservation rules “require, at the very least, that any matter which a party wishes the appellate court to decide have been brought to the attention of the trial court at a time and in a way that gave the latter the opportunity to remedy the problem and thereby avert reversible error”]; People v Tutt, 38 NY2d 1011, 1013 [1976] [“(w)here . . . the defendant fails at the suppression hearing to challenge a narrow aspect of the suf | 1 | 1 |
People v. Figliologreen1 sentence2007Thus, contrary to the finding of the County Court, the testimony of the two witnesses went to the heart of the hearing court’s finding of probable cause (see People v Figliolo, 207 AD2d 679, 681-682 [1994]), and therefore raised more than merely a question of credibility (cf. People v Rosa, 231 AD2d 534, 536 [1996]; People v Mack, 224 AD2d 447, 448 [1996]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mackgreen1 sentence2007Thus, contrary to the finding of the County Court, the testimony of the two witnesses went to the heart of the hearing court’s finding of probable cause (see People v Figliolo, 207 AD2d 679, 681-682 [1994]), and therefore raised more than merely a question of credibility (cf. People v Rosa, 231 AD2d 534, 536 [1996]; People v Mack, 224 AD2d 447, 448 [1996]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rosagreen1 sentence2007Thus, contrary to the finding of the County Court, the testimony of the two witnesses went to the heart of the hearing court’s finding of probable cause (see People v Figliolo, 207 AD2d 679, 681-682 [1994]), and therefore raised more than merely a question of credibility (cf. People v Rosa, 231 AD2d 534, 536 [1996]; People v Mack, 224 AD2d 447, 448 [1996]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Younggreen1 sentence2007It is true that, because a defendant is presumed to know the circumstances of his or her own arrest and therefore is capable of eliciting evidence of those circumstances at a pretrial hearing, motions to reopen suppression hearings generally are denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest (see People v Meachem, 288 AD2d 162 [2001]; People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001]; People v Young, 278 AD2d 437, 438 [2000]; People v Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [1999]; People v Adams, 224 AD2d 433 , 434 [1996], cert denied 526 US 1101 [1999]; People v Simon | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nastasi v. State
neutral
1 sentence2010We have previously held that a similar heart presumption established by Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-a did not excuse an applicant seeking accidental disability retirement benefits from showing that a qualifying accident occurred (see Matter of Weiss v Levitt, 55 AD2d 724 , 725 [1976], lv denied 42 NY2d 802 [1977]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Griffin v. Scott
green
1 sentence2007It is true that, because a defendant is presumed to know the circumstances of his or her own arrest and therefore is capable of eliciting evidence of those circumstances at a pretrial hearing, motions to reopen suppression hearings generally are denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest (see People v Meachem, 288 AD2d 162 [2001]; People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001]; People v Young, 278 AD2d 437, 438 [2000]; People v Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [1999]; People v Adams, 224 AD2d 433 , 434 [1996], cert denied 526 US 1101 [1999]; People v Simon | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Lynch
neutral
1 sentence2007It is true that, because a defendant is presumed to know the circumstances of his or her own arrest and therefore is capable of eliciting evidence of those circumstances at a pretrial hearing, motions to reopen suppression hearings generally are denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest (see People v Meachem, 288 AD2d 162 [2001]; People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001]; People v Young, 278 AD2d 437, 438 [2000]; People v Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [1999]; People v Adams, 224 AD2d 433 , 434 [1996], cert denied 526 US 1101 [1999]; People v Simon | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Adams
neutral
1 sentence2007It is true that, because a defendant is presumed to know the circumstances of his or her own arrest and therefore is capable of eliciting evidence of those circumstances at a pretrial hearing, motions to reopen suppression hearings generally are denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest (see People v Meachem, 288 AD2d 162 [2001]; People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001]; People v Young, 278 AD2d 437, 438 [2000]; People v Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [1999]; People v Adams, 224 AD2d 433 , 434 [1996], cert denied 526 US 1101 [1999]; People v Simon | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Barrett
green
1 sentence2007It is true that, because a defendant is presumed to know the circumstances of his or her own arrest and therefore is capable of eliciting evidence of those circumstances at a pretrial hearing, motions to reopen suppression hearings generally are denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest (see People v Meachem, 288 AD2d 162 [2001]; People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001]; People v Young, 278 AD2d 437, 438 [2000]; People v Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [1999]; People v Adams, 224 AD2d 433 , 434 [1996], cert denied 526 US 1101 [1999]; People v Simon | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Henderson
green
1 sentence2007It is true that, because a defendant is presumed to know the circumstances of his or her own arrest and therefore is capable of eliciting evidence of those circumstances at a pretrial hearing, motions to reopen suppression hearings generally are denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest (see People v Meachem, 288 AD2d 162 [2001]; People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001]; People v Young, 278 AD2d 437, 438 [2000]; People v Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [1999]; People v Adams, 224 AD2d 433 , 434 [1996], cert denied 526 US 1101 [1999]; People v Simon | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lambert v. Fordham University
green
1 sentence2007It is true that, because a defendant is presumed to know the circumstances of his or her own arrest and therefore is capable of eliciting evidence of those circumstances at a pretrial hearing, motions to reopen suppression hearings generally are denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest (see People v Meachem, 288 AD2d 162 [2001]; People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001]; People v Young, 278 AD2d 437, 438 [2000]; People v Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [1999]; People v Adams, 224 AD2d 433 , 434 [1996], cert denied 526 US 1101 [1999]; People v Simon | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Brown v. New York City Department of Correction
green
1 sentence2007It is true that, because a defendant is presumed to know the circumstances of his or her own arrest and therefore is capable of eliciting evidence of those circumstances at a pretrial hearing, motions to reopen suppression hearings generally are denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest (see People v Meachem, 288 AD2d 162 [2001]; People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001]; People v Young, 278 AD2d 437, 438 [2000]; People v Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [1999]; People v Adams, 224 AD2d 433 , 434 [1996], cert denied 526 US 1101 [1999]; People v Simon | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Munoz v. Strahm Farms
green
1 sentence2003(See Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v United States, 172 F3d 1338 [1999]; Munoz v Strahm Farms, Inc., 69 F3d 501 [1995].) In People v DiSalvo ( 284 AD2d 547 [2001]), the Appellate Division held that a prosecution witness could lay a proper foundation for the admission of documents neither created by the county nor the witness, but rather created by the defendant but regularly relied upon by the county. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v. United States
green
1 sentence2003(See Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v United States, 172 F3d 1338 [1999]; Munoz v Strahm Farms, Inc., 69 F3d 501 [1995].) In People v DiSalvo ( 284 AD2d 547 [2001]), the Appellate Division held that a prosecution witness could lay a proper foundation for the admission of documents neither created by the county nor the witness, but rather created by the defendant but regularly relied upon by the county. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Butler
green
1 sentence2003(See Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v United States, 172 F3d 1338 [1999]; Munoz v Strahm Farms, Inc., 69 F3d 501 [1995].) In People v DiSalvo ( 284 AD2d 547 [2001]), the Appellate Division held that a prosecution witness could lay a proper foundation for the admission of documents neither created by the county nor the witness, but rather created by the defendant but regularly relied upon by the county. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Mohegan Electric Supply Co. v. Pesach
green
1 sentence1994Co., 94 AD2d 717 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Sharpe Pitts, Jr.
green
1 sentence1994Indeed, defendant's success depended solely on the jury's assessment of his credibility and its acceptance of defendant's claim that his father was the true possessor of the gun, and the missing witness charge may well have influenced the jury on this critical determination ( see , United States v Pitts , 918 F.2d 197, 201 , supra ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
McGinnis v. Royster
green
1 sentence1980Defendant must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the classifications contained therein fail to rationally further a legitimate legislative purpose (see McGinnis v Royster, 410 US 263, 270 ; Kiffer v United States, 477 F2d 349, cert den 414 US 831 ; People v Lang, 36 NY2d 366, 370 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Brigham v. United States
green
1 sentence1980Defendant must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the classifications contained therein fail to rationally further a legitimate legislative purpose (see McGinnis v Royster, 410 US 263, 270 ; Kiffer v United States, 477 F2d 349, cert den 414 US 831 ; People v Lang, 36 NY2d 366, 370 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Lang green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Brown v. Mississippi green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Blackburn v. Alabama green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Malloy v. Hogan green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.