Harrington v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 102 A.D.3d 923 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). · Go Syfert
Search
Harrington v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 102 A.D.3d 923 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
6 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Georgopoulos
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the continuing wrong doctrine does not apply here, because ACS's custody of the child from the date of birth to February 20 was a continuing effect of the defendants' earlier, allegedly negligent conduct, and not a series of independent, distinct wrongs ( see Matter of Salomon v Town of Wallkill , 174 AD3d at 721-722; Bratge v Simons , 167 AD3d at 1460; Harrington v Suffolk County , 102 AD3d at 924).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 461 Broadway, LLC v. Village of Monticello
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Auth., 13 NY3d 61, 65-66 [2009]), plaintiff’s claim arising from defendant’s allegedly negligent construction and installation is time-barred (see Town of Oyster Bay v Lizza Indus., Inc., 22 NY3d at 1032 ; New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v County of Chemung, 137 AD3d at 1554 ; Harrington v County of Suffolk, 102 AD3d 923, 924 [2013]; Liston v Town of Newburgh, 90 AD3d 861, 862 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 461 Broadway, LLC v. Village of Monticello
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Auth., 13 NY3d 61, 65-66 [2009]), plaintiff’s claim arising from defendant’s allegedly negligent construction and installation is time-barred (see Town of Oyster Bay v Lizza Indus., Inc., 22 NY3d at 1032 ; New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v County of Chemung, 137 AD3d at 1554 ; Harrington v County of Suffolk, 102 AD3d 923, 924 [2013]; Liston v Town of Newburgh, 90 AD3d 861, 862 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New York State Electric & Gas Corporation v. County of Chemung
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Accordingly, plaintiff’s damage claims arising from defendants’ allegedly negligent construction occurring in the 1960s are time-barred (see Harrington v County of Suffolk, 102 AD3d 923, 924 [2013]; Liston v Town of Newburgh, 90 AD3d 861, 862 [2011]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Thomas Harrington
v.
County of Suffolk
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jan 30, 2013.
102 A.D.3d 923
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gazzillo, J.), dated August 8, 2011, which granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, inter alia, as time-barred pursuant to CFLR 3211 (a) (5).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiffs are the parents of a man who, on October 6, 2006, at age 19, was killed in a motor vehicle accident. They commenced the instant action alleging, inter alia, that they sustained emotional injuries as a result of the negligent manner in which the investigation of the fatal accident was conducted.

[*924] In support of their motion to dismiss the complaint, the defendants met their initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the causes of action were time-barred, in that the action was not commenced within one year and 90 days after the “happening of the event” upon which the plaintiffs’ claims were based (General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]; see Greco v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 66 AD3d 836, 836-837 [2009]). In response, the plaintiffs failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or otherwise inapplicable, or whether they actually commenced the action within the applicable limitations period (see Williams v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 84 AD3d 1358, 1359 [2011]; Rakusin v Miano, 84 AD3d 1051 [2011]). The “event” upon which the claims were based was the allegedly “shoddy investigation,” which took place on the date of the accident, and the plaintiffs’ contention that the investigation amounted to a continuing wrong so as to toll the limitations period is without merit (see Klein v City of Yonkers, 53 NY2d 1011, 1013 [1981]; Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc. v Mansir, 90 AD3d 888, 889 [2011]; Greco v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 66 AD3d at 836-837; Jensen v City of New York, 288 AD2d 346, 347 [2001]; Porcaro v Town of Beekman, 15 AD3d 377, 378 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5).

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Chambers and Hall, JJ., concur.