continuing wrong doctrine in New York

2026Plaintiff's contention that the continuing wrong doctrine tolled the statute of limitations in this case is unavailing, as is any argument premised upon his difficulty in obtaining legal counsel to aid him in bringing this action ( see Henry v Bank of Am. , 147 AD3d 599, 602 [1st Dept 2017]).

2025The Supreme Court correctly rejected NYBOCT's reliance on the tolling effect of the continuing-wrong doctrine because American Home's allegedly improper disclaimer of coverage was a "single wrong that ha[d] continuing effects[, not] a series of independent, distinct wrongs" ( Matter of Salomon v Town of Wallkill , 174 AD3d 720 , 721 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Henry v Bank of Am. , 147 AD3d 599 ).

2026The continuing wrong doctrine allows a later accrual date of a cause of action "where the harm sustained by the complaining party is not exclusively traced to the day when the original wrong was committed" (<i>Capruso v Village of Kings Point</i>, 23 NY3d 631, 639 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2024Courts will apply the continuing wrong doctrine in cases of " 'nuisance or continuing trespass where the harm sustained by the complaining party is not exclusively traced to the day when the original objectionable act was committed ' " ( Capruso v Village of Kings Point , 23 NY3d 631, 639 [2014] [emphasis added]; see Webster Golf Club, Inc. v Monroe County Water Auth. , 219 AD3d 1136, 1141 [4th Dept 2023], amended on rearg 221 AD3d 1604 [4th Dept 2023]; EPK Props., LLC , 159 AD3d at 1569).

2021The first cause of action (aiding and abetting fraud) is timely due to the continuing wrong doctrine ( see Palmeri v Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, 156 AD3d 564, 568 [1st Dept 2017]).

2021The first cause of action (aiding and abetting fraud) is timely due to the continuing wrong doctrine ( see Palmeri v Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, 156 AD3d 564, 568 [1st Dept 2017]).

2022Although the complaint alleges that Devine and Neiman induced Allen to lend money beginning in 2000, the continuing wrong doctrine ( see Selkirk v State of New York , 249 AD2d 818, 819 ; Barash v Estate of Sperlin , 271 AD2d 558 ) applies such that the six-year statute of limitations "began to run from the commission of the last wrongful act" ( Community Network Serv., Inc. v Verizon NY, Inc. , 39 AD3d 300, 301 ).

2018The continuing wrong doctrine "is usually employed where there is a series of continuing wrongs and serves to toll the running of a period of limitations to the date of the commission of the last wrongful act" ( Selkirk v State of New York, 249 AD2d 818, 819 ; see Affordable Hous.

2024There was only a single wrongful act here, i.e., the failure to pay the overage upon conclusion of the offering, which does not toll the limitations periods under the continuing wrong doctrine ( Town of Oyster Bay v Lizza Indus., Inc. , 22 NY3d 1024 , 1031—1032 [2013]).

2024There was only a single wrongful act here, i.e., the failure to pay the overage upon conclusion of the offering, which does not toll the limitations periods under the continuing wrong doctrine ( Town of Oyster Bay v Lizza Indus., Inc. , 22 NY3d 1024 , 1031—1032 [2013]).

2024(See 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Lapidus, 289 AD2d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2001] [Where a party commits a continuous or recurring wrong, "the wrong is not referable exclusively to the day the original wrong was committed; rather, a cause of action accrues anew every day, and for each injury"].) According to plaintiff, Nanto's alterations made without its consent constitute a continuing violation of the Lease and, as such, the limitation period did not begin to run until the end of the lease term.

2021Contrary to defendants' contention, the relevant duty breached by them was the requirement in the proprietary lease to comply with all laws and ordinances. "[W]here it is alleged that the complained-of conduct constituted not merely a violation of the lease, but a lease violation consisting of illegal conduct or conduct causing ongoing damage to other apartments," the usual six-year statute of limitations for contract actions is tolled for harms that cause damage within the six-year period ( 1050 Tenants Corp. v Lapidus , 289 AD2d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2001]).

2017The doctrine “may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct” (id. at 819; see Thomas v City of Oneonta, 90 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2011]).

2017The doctrine “may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct” (id. at 819; see Thomas v City of Oneonta, 90 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2011]).

2025“The continuing wrong doctrine may be applied where there is a series of continuing wrongs that tolls the running of the limitations period to the date of the last wrongful act” (225 ADC Realty Corp. v Popular Jewelry Corp., 222 AD3d 510, 511 [1st Dept 2023]).

2025“The continuing wrong doctrine may be applied where there is a series of continuing wrongs that tolls the running of the limitations period to the date of the last wrongful act” (225 ADC Realty Corp. v Popular Jewelry Corp., 222 AD3d 510, 511 [1st Dept 2023]).

2025In the context of a hostile work environment claim “[a] continuing violation may be found where there is proof of specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice” (Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook & Ladder Co. No. 1, 151 AD3d 860, 861-862 [2d Dept 2017]). “[T]he statute of limitations requires that only one [discriminatory] act … occur within [the statutory period] and that once that is shown, a court . . . may consi

2025In the context of a hostile work environment claim “[a] continuing violation may be found where there is proof of specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice” (Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook & Ladder Co. No. 1, 151 AD3d 860, 861-862 [2d Dept 2017]). “[T]he statute of limitations requires that only one [discriminatory] act … occur within [the statutory period] and that once that is shown, a court . . . may consi

2025Although it is true that the continuing wrong doctrine "tolls the running of the statute of limitations where there is a series of independent, distinct wrongs" ( see Ganzi v Ganzi , 183 AD3d 433, 434 [1st Dept 2020]), it saves claims for recovery of damages only "to the extent of wrongs committed within the applicable statute of limitations" ( Henry v Bank of Am. , 147 AD3d 599, 601 [1st Dept 2017]; accord CWCapital Cobalt VR Ltd. v CWCapital Invs.

2025Although it is true that the continuing wrong doctrine "tolls the running of the statute of limitations where there is a series of independent, distinct wrongs" ( see Ganzi v Ganzi , 183 AD3d 433, 434 [1st Dept 2020]), it saves claims for recovery of damages only "to the extent of wrongs committed within the applicable statute of limitations" ( Henry v Bank of Am. , 147 AD3d 599, 601 [1st Dept 2017]; accord CWCapital Cobalt VR Ltd. v CWCapital Invs.

2024Courts will apply the continuing wrong doctrine in cases of " 'nuisance or continuing trespass where the harm sustained by the complaining party is not exclusively traced to the day when the original objectionable act was committed ' " ( Capruso v Village of Kings Point , 23 NY3d 631, 639 [2014] [emphasis added]; see Webster Golf Club, Inc. v Monroe County Water Auth. , 219 AD3d 1136, 1141 [4th Dept 2023], amended on rearg 221 AD3d 1604 [4th Dept 2023]; EPK Props., LLC , 159 AD3d at 1569).

2024Consequently, we conclude that the continuing wrong doctrine does not apply here to preclude dismissal of the trespass and nuisance causes of action ( see generally Webster Golf Club, Inc. , 219 AD3d at 1141 ; EPK Props., LLC , 159 AD3d at 1569).

2024Plaintiffs cannot assert for the first time on appeal a claim for a constructive trust ( Haughton v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith , 278 AD2d 29, 30 [1st Dept 2000]).

2024Plaintiffs cannot assert for the first time on appeal a claim for a constructive trust ( Haughton v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith , 278 AD2d 29, 30 [1st Dept 2000]).

2023The "continuing wrong doctrine" applies " 'in certain cases such as nuisance or continuing trespass where the harm sustained by the complaining party is not exclusively traced to the day when the original objectionable act was committed' " ( Capruso v Village of Kings Point , 23 NY3d 631, 639 [2014], quoting Covington v Walker , 3 NY3d 287, 292 [2004], cert denied 545 US 1131 [2005]; see Bratge v Simons , 167 AD3d 1458 , 1460 [4th Dept 2018]).

2017(See Pilatich v Town of New Baltimore, 100 AD3d 1248, 1249 [3d Dept 2012]; City of New York v College Point Sports Assn., Inc., 61 AD3d 33, 49 [2d Dept 2009]; Lucchesi v Perfetto, 72 AD3d 909, 912 [2d Dept 2010]; see generally Covington v Walker, 3 NY3d 287, 292 [2004].) Here, the City cannot recover on its public nuisance cause of action to the extent that the events it has complained of go back more than three years from when it commenced its complaint, or July 18, 2013.

2023Plaintiff failed to state a Monell claim ( Monell v Department of Social Servs. of City of New York , 436 US 658 [1978]), as he did not allege facts showing that an official policy or custom caused the arresting officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights (CPLR 3211[a][7]; see De Lourdes Torres v Jones , 26 NY3d 742, 768 [2016]; Graham v City of New York , 279 AD2d 435, 436 [1st Dept 2001]).

2023Plaintiff failed to state a Monell claim ( Monell v Department of Social Servs. of City of New York , 436 US 658 [1978]), as he did not allege facts showing that an official policy or custom caused the arresting officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights (CPLR 3211[a][7]; see De Lourdes Torres v Jones , 26 NY3d 742, 768 [2016]; Graham v City of New York , 279 AD2d 435, 436 [1st Dept 2001]).

2023Plaintiff failed to state a Monell claim ( Monell v Department of Social Servs. of City of New York , 436 US 658 [1978]), as he did not allege facts showing that an official policy or custom caused the arresting officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights (CPLR 3211[a][7]; see De Lourdes Torres v Jones , 26 NY3d 742, 768 [2016]; Graham v City of New York , 279 AD2d 435, 436 [1st Dept 2001]).

2023Plaintiff failed to state a Monell claim ( Monell v Department of Social Servs. of City of New York , 436 US 658 [1978]), as he did not allege facts showing that an official policy or custom caused the arresting officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights (CPLR 3211[a][7]; see De Lourdes Torres v Jones , 26 NY3d 742, 768 [2016]; Graham v City of New York , 279 AD2d 435, 436 [1st Dept 2001]).

2021The continuing wrong doctrine enables every breach to be independently actionable irrespective of whether the initial breach of a continuing duty happened outside the applicable limitations period ( see Moses v Dunlop , 155 AD3d 466, 468 [1st Dept 2017]).

2021The continuing wrong doctrine enables every breach to be independently actionable irrespective of whether the initial breach of a continuing duty happened outside the applicable limitations period ( see Moses v Dunlop , 155 AD3d 466, 468 [1st Dept 2017]).

2021For example, in Bulova , the defendant did not simply guarantee the condition/performance of the supplied roofing materials but also made a separate promise for the performance of future repair services, which the court found constituted an agreement distinct from the supply contract ( see Bulova Watch Co. v Celotex Corp. , 46 NY2d 606, 611 [1979]).

2021For example, in Bulova , the defendant did not simply guarantee the condition/performance of the supplied roofing materials but also made a separate promise for the performance of future repair services, which the court found constituted an agreement distinct from the supply contract ( see Bulova Watch Co. v Celotex Corp. , 46 NY2d 606, 611 [1979]).

2017(See Pilatich v Town of New Baltimore, 100 AD3d 1248, 1249 [3d Dept 2012]; City of New York v College Point Sports Assn., Inc., 61 AD3d 33, 49 [2d Dept 2009]; Lucchesi v Perfetto, 72 AD3d 909, 912 [2d Dept 2010]; see generally Covington v Walker, 3 NY3d 287, 292 [2004].) Here, the City cannot recover on its public nuisance cause of action to the extent that the events it has complained of go back more than three years from when it commenced its complaint, or July 18, 2013.

2017Auth., 13 NY3d 61, 66 [2009]; Lucchesi v Perfetto, 72 AD3d 909, 912 [2010]), the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss Aristea Mousis’s cause of action alleging a private nuisance resulting from the remediation work.

2016The continuing wrong doctrine is inapplicable to this case (see generally Kaymakcian v Board of Mgrs. of Charles House Condominium, 49 AD3d 407 [1st Dept 2008]).

2015Plaintiffs’ argument that the limitations period began to run anew each time the guest policy was amended, based on the continuing wrong doctrine, is unavailing under the circumstances of this case (cf. Kaymakcian v Board of Mgrs. of Charles House Condominium, 49 AD3d 407, 407-408 [1st Dept 2008] [breach of fiduciary duty claim not time-barred where, pursuant to bylaws, board had continuing duty to repair certain common elements that were source of recurring leaks and failure to do so constituted continuing wrong]).

2014Co., 82 NY2d at 90 ).

2002Co., 82 NY2d 77, 81, 88 ).

2026"The test of sufficiency of a Notice of Claim is merely whether it includes information sufficient to enable the [municipality or agency] to investigate" (<i>Brown v City of New York</i>, 95 NY2d 389, 393 [internal quotation marks omitted]).</p> <p>This Court holds that the notice of claim was timely because the continuing wrong doctrine applies (<i>see</i> <i>Motta v Eldred Cent.

2025Supreme Court was not incorrect in describing the effect of the continuing wrong doctrine to the statute of limitations of the Attorney General's claims — that it applies where the original wrong in the series of wrongs occurred outside the ordinarily-applicable statute of limitations to render timely only those harms in the series occurring during the applicable statute of limitations, and that the doctrine does not operate to permit recovery on the wrongs occurring outside that statute of limitations ( see CWCapital Cobalt VR Ltd. 195 AD3d at 19-20; Great Jones Studios Inc. , 190 AD3d at 588

2025Supreme Court was not incorrect in describing the effect of the continuing wrong doctrine to the statute of limitations of the Attorney General's claims — that it applies where the original wrong in the series of wrongs occurred outside the ordinarily-applicable statute of limitations to render timely only those harms in the series occurring during the applicable statute of limitations, and that the doctrine does not operate to permit recovery on the wrongs occurring outside that statute of limitations ( see CWCapital Cobalt VR Ltd. 195 AD3d at 19-20; Great Jones Studios Inc. , 190 AD3d at 588

2025Justice Higgitt acknowledges that we may very well be correct in our assessment of what Trump I intended but he comes to a different conclusion based on his interpretation of the language, context, and structure of that decision, and in particular Trump I 's citations to Boesky v Levine (193 AD3d 403, 405 [1st Dept 2021]) and Rogal v Wechsler (135 AD2d 384, 385 [1st Dept 1987]).

2025On the ensuing appeals from Supreme Court's decision, we found that a six-year statute of limitations and the tolls applied, and further found: "Applying the proper statute of limitations and the appropriate tolling, claims are time barred if they accrued — that is, the transactions were completed — before February 6, 2016 ( see Boesky v Levine , 193 AD3d 403, 405 [1st Dept 2021]; Rogal v Wechsler , 135 AD2d 384, 385 [1st Dept 1987]).

2025The court properly determined that the tenant's deposition testimony contradicted the assertion that the alleged conduct remained ongoing beyond July 2018, therefore precluding the application of the continuing wrong doctrine ( see Bruce v College Props., Inc. , 10 AD3d 538, 538 [1st Dept 2004]).