Mason v. Moore, 226 A.D.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Mason v. Moore, 226 A.D.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2001 · …a stereotypical assumption that a party's disability will prejudice the jury, ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1997 · …in our view where, as here, the movant relies solely on a stereotypical assumption that a party's disability will prejudice the jury, there are insufficient grounds for excluding that party from the trial. ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2002 · …it is axiomatic that, absent an express wavier or unusual circumstances, a party to a civil action is entitled to be present during all stages of the trial. at p. 197 ✓
43 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carpenter v. County of Essex
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Here, bifurcation would likely prolong adjudication of these actions as well as the emotional toll taken on the families. 2 The nature of the injuries suffered in this accident has an important bearing on the question of liability, rendering bifurcation inappropriate because the “liability and damages issues are entwined” (Mason v Moore 226 AD2d 993, 994 [1996]; see DeGregorio v Lutheran Med.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Onaka v. Onaka
Haw. · 2006 · confidence medium
Ass'n, Inc., 366 Md. 597 , 785 A.2d 361, 373 (2001) ("In concert with courts throughout the country, we have made clear that a party to a civil litigation has a right to be present for and to participate in the trial of his/her case.”); In re Valle, 31 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) ("[W]e generally recognize that the party litigant is entitled to be present in all stages of the actual trial of the case.”); Cary by and through Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 204 (Okla.1997) ("The ideals behind due process and a fair trial permit a party to be present in the courtroom absent extreme …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. Time Moving & Storage
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
Plainly, such an assumption does not rise to the level of an unusual circumstance (see Mason v Moore, 226 AD2d 993, 994 [1996]; see also Rulers v State of New York, 141 Misc 2d 1079, 1082 [1988]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gittleman v. Berrios
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
We affirm because the nature and extent of plaintiffs injuries will likely have an important bearing on the question of how the incident occurred (see Barron v Terry, 268 AD2d 760, 762 [2000]; Mason v Moore, 226 AD2d 993, 994 [1996]; Fetterman v Evans, 204 AD2d 888, 889 [1994]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan Ex Rel. Jordan v. Deery (2×)
Ind. · 2002 · confidence medium
On a challenge to the ruling on appeal, the court simply stated “[i]t is axiomatic that, absent an express wavier or unusual circumstances, a party to a civil action is entitled to be present during all stages of the trial.” Id. at 197.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Green v. North Arundel Hospital Association, Inc. (2×)
Md. · 2001 · confidence medium
See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to “regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge.... ”); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra, and purporting to understand t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ake v. General Motors Corp.
W.D.N.Y. · 1996 · confidence medium
May 30, 1996) (denying bifurcation of liability and damages in personal injury case arising out of all-terrain-vehicle accident; evidence of nature of plaintiffs injuries was necessary to substantiate his account of how the accident occurred, and possible prejudice to defendant could be dealt with through cautionary instruction); Monaghan v. SZS 33 Associates, L.P., 827 F.Supp. 233, 245-46 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (denying bifurcation of liability and damages in premises liability action by parents of shooting victim; though evidence of brutal nature of attack, and of victim’s suffering, would elicit …
discussed Cited "see" Cary by and Through Cary v. Oneok, Inc. (2×)
Okla. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mason v. Moore, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 196 ; Marks, 562 F.Supp. at 768 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John Mason, Individually and as Parents and Guardians of John Mason, Jr., an Infant
v.
Francis E. Moore, Jr.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Apr 18, 1996.
226 A.D.2d 993
White.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
White, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Mon-serrate, J.), entered May 25, 1995 in Broome County, which denied defendants’ motion for, inter alia, a bifurcated trial.

This medical malpractice action arises from the treatment[*994] rendered by defendants to plaintiff Julie Mason and her son, John Mason, Jr., during the course of labor and delivery of the child on May 27, 1990, as well as the treatment administered to him after his birth. Plaintiffs allege that because of defendants’ negligent treatment, their son sustained brain damage as a result of asphyxia during delivery, resulting in spastic quadriplegia with severe developmental delays and physical disability. Prior to commencement of the trial of this matter, defendants brought a motion requesting that the liability and damages portions of the trial be bifurcated for the purpose of avoiding prejudice to defendants from any sympathy the jurors might feel for plaintiffs’ child. For the same reason, defendants also sought to exclude plaintiffs’ son from the courtroom during the liability portion of the trial. Supreme Court denied the motion in its entirety and this appeal by defendants ensued.

Bifurcation of the trial of a personal injury action is appropriate where the questions of liability and damages are discrete and such procedure will result in a shorter, simpler, less expensive trial (see, Stanford v Resler, 206 AD2d 468; Fetterman v Evans, 204 AD2d 888, 889). Conversely, bifurcation is not appropriate where the nature of the injuries has an important bearing on the question of liability (see, Amato v Hudson County Montessori School, 185 AD2d 803, 804; Parmar v Skinner, 154 AD2d 444, 445).

Here, plaintiffs have shown that it will be necessary for their medical experts to analyze the infant’s injuries and symptoms to support their opinion that asphyxia caused his condition. Notably, defendants’ medical experts will also refer to the infant’s medical history to support their claim that his disability is attributable to a subarachnoid hemorrhage rather than asphyxia. Therefore, inasmuch as the liability and damages issues are entwined, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ request for a bifurcated trial (see, DeGregorio v Lutheran Med. Ctr., 142 AD2d 543, 544).

It is axiomatic that, absent an express waiver or unusual circumstances, a party to a civil action is entitled to be present during all stages of the trial (see, Liquori v Barrow, 160 AD2d 843, 844; Matter of Radjpaul v Patton, 145 AD2d 494, 497-498). In our view where, as here, the movant relies solely on a stereotypical assumption that a party’s disability will prejudice the jury, there are insufficient grounds for excluding that party from the trial. Thus, Supreme Court properly denied defendants’ request to exclude the infant.

Mikoll, J. P., Mercure, Crew III and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.