voluntary waiver in Maryland

1978See Spruell v. Blythe, 215 Md. 117 , 137 A. 2d 183 (1957) (statutory rights under Land Installment Sales Act could not be waived by purchaser where Act explicitly provided that failure to abide by its terms rendered contract voidable at option of purchaser); see also Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 , 65 S. Ct. 895 , 89 L.

1978See Spruell v. Blythe, 215 Md. 117 , 137 A. 2d 183 (1957) (statutory rights under Land Installment Sales Act could not be waived by purchaser where Act explicitly provided that failure to abide by its terms rendered contract voidable at option of purchaser); see also Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 , 65 S. Ct. 895 , 89 L.

1978See Spruell v. Blythe, 215 Md. 117 , 137 A. 2d 183 (1957) (statutory rights under Land Installment Sales Act could not be waived by purchaser where Act explicitly provided that failure to abide by its terms rendered contract voidable at option of purchaser); see also Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 , 65 S. Ct. 895 , 89 L.

1978See Spruell v. Blythe, 215 Md. 117 , 137 A. 2d 183 (1957) (statutory rights under Land Installment Sales Act could not be waived by purchaser where Act explicitly provided that failure to abide by its terms rendered contract voidable at option of purchaser); see also Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 , 65 S. Ct. 895 , 89 L.

1995At such a point, a'trial court may constitutionally require a defendant to choose between proceeding with current counsel and proceeding pro se; the defendant’s knowing and intelligent refusal to proceed with current able counsel has repeatedly been deemed to constitute a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.” 11 Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 605-06 , 536 A.2d 1149, 1159 (1988) (emphasis added).

1995At such a point, a'trial court may constitutionally require a defendant to choose between proceeding with current counsel and proceeding pro se; the defendant’s knowing and intelligent refusal to proceed with current able counsel has repeatedly been deemed to constitute a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.” 11 Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 605-06 , 536 A.2d 1149, 1159 (1988) (emphasis added).

2011Menefee argues also that (according to his understanding) the necessary consequence of the State's argument—that “in order to be compensated for tortious acts of HHS personnel, Mr. Menefee was not permitted to take advantage of the MTCA’s voluntary waiver of immunity, but was instead required to abide by the Local Government Tort Claims Act, and name Montgomery County as the defendant in the matter''—is "arbitrary and capricious and denies John Menefee’s right to equal protection under the law as it requires John Menefee to comply with two notice provisions only because he lives in Montgomery

2011Menefee argues also that (according to his understanding) the necessary consequence of the State's argument—that “in order to be compensated for tortious acts of HHS personnel, Mr. Menefee was not permitted to take advantage of the MTCA’s voluntary waiver of immunity, but was instead required to abide by the Local Government Tort Claims Act, and name Montgomery County as the defendant in the matter''—is "arbitrary and capricious and denies John Menefee’s right to equal protection under the law as it requires John Menefee to comply with two notice provisions only because he lives in Montgomery

2011We agree with our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals that the timing of the police deception is not dispositive and we explain, infra, why, to the extent those courts hold that a suspect is not entitled to suppression of statements he or she makes following a mid-interrogation, affirmative misrepresentation of the Miranda warnings, those courts, in our view, are incorrect. [1] My opinion is consistent with State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994), State v. Stanga, 617 N.W.2d 486, 490-91 (S.D. 2000), and United States v. Conley, 859 F.Supp. 830, 845-46 (W.D.Pa.1994), whic

2011We agree with our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals that the timing of the police deception is not dispositive and we explain, infra, why, to the extent those courts hold that a suspect is not entitled to suppression of statements he or she makes following a mid-interrogation, affirmative misrepresentation of the Miranda warnings, those courts, in our view, are incorrect. [1] My opinion is consistent with State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994), State v. Stanga, 617 N.W.2d 486, 490-91 (S.D. 2000), and United States v. Conley, 859 F.Supp. 830, 845-46 (W.D.Pa.1994), whic

2011Lee v. State, 186 Md.App. at 650-51 , 975 A.2d at 251 (citing United States v. Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir.2004) (questioning whether police misstatements after a voluntary waiver could invalidate the waiver); United States v. Chadwick, 999 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir.1993) (detective’s statement that the defendant's cooperation would "help" him did not invalidate Chadwick’s waiver of his Miranda rights; it could not have had any impact on Chadwick’s decision to waive his Miranda rights, since the waiver had occurred earlier)).

2011Lee v. State, 186 Md.App. at 650-51 , 975 A.2d at 251 (citing United States v. Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir.2004) (questioning whether police misstatements after a voluntary waiver could invalidate the waiver); United States v. Chadwick, 999 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir.1993) (detective's statement that the defendant's cooperation would "help" him did not invalidate Chadwick's waiver of his Miranda rights; it could not have had any impact on Chadwick's decision to waive his Miranda rights, since the waiver had occurred earlier)).

2011We agree with our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals that the timing of the police deception is not dispositive and we explain, infra, why, to the extent those courts hold that a suspect is not entitled to suppression of statements he or she makes following a mid-interrogation, affirmative misrepresentation of the Miranda warnings, those courts, in our view, are incorrect. [1] My opinion is consistent with State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994), State v. Stanga, 617 N.W.2d 486, 490-91 (S.D. 2000), and United States v. Conley, 859 F.Supp. 830, 845-46 (W.D.Pa.1994), whic

2011Lee v. State, 186 Md.App. at 650-51 , 975 A.2d at 251 (citing United States v. Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir.2004) (questioning whether police misstatements after a voluntary waiver could invalidate the waiver); United States v. Chadwick, 999 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir.1993) (detective’s statement that the defendant's cooperation would "help" him did not invalidate Chadwick’s waiver of his Miranda rights; it could not have had any impact on Chadwick’s decision to waive his Miranda rights, since the waiver had occurred earlier)).

2011Lee v. State, 186 Md.App. at 650-51 , 975 A.2d at 251 (citing United States v. Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir.2004) (questioning whether police misstatements after a voluntary waiver could invalidate the waiver); United States v. Chadwick, 999 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir.1993) (detective's statement that the defendant's cooperation would "help" him did not invalidate Chadwick's waiver of his Miranda rights; it could not have had any impact on Chadwick's decision to waive his Miranda rights, since the waiver had occurred earlier)).

2004Braun v. Heidrich, 241 N.W. 599, 601 , 62 N.D. 85, 90-91 (N.D.1932).

2004Braun v. Heidrich, 241 N.W. 599, 601 , 62 N.D. 85, 90-91 (N.D.1932).

2001See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to "regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge...."); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra , and purporting to understand the r

2001See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to "regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge...."); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra , and purporting to understand the r

2001See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to "regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge...."); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra , and purporting to understand the r

2001See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to "regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge...."); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra , and purporting to understand the r

2001See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to “regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge.... ”); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra, and purporting to understand the r

2001See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to "regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge...."); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra , and purporting to understand the r

2001See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to “regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge.... ”); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra, and purporting to understand the r

2001See also Ryfeul, supra, 650 P.2d at 372 (stressing the circumstances of the case as basis for holding that proceeding with a hearing to modify a divorce decree in the absence of one of the parties was error); Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, 60 So.2d at 397 (noting the power of the court to "regulate the appearance [of a party] to prevent the opposite party from being victimized and the jury from being deceived by ... subterfuge...."); Purvis, supra, 203 So.2d at 510-11 (noting the distinction between Florida Greyhound Lines and Dickson v. Bober, supra , and purporting to understand the r

1993In Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-297 , 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2394 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261, 272-275 (1988), the Supreme Court deemed a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights sweeping enough to include an implicit waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as it quoted with approval from Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422-423 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 : “Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, th

1993In Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-297 , 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2394 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261, 272-275 (1988), the Supreme Court deemed a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights sweeping enough to include an implicit waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as it quoted with approval from Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422-423 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 : “Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, th

1988See, e.g., Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859 , 104 S.Ct. 183 , 78 L.Ed.2d 163 (1983); Maynard v. Meachum, supra, 545 F.2d at 278 ; United States ex rel.