green
Positive treatment
Issue: default and a meritorious defenseNY ↗
Issue: default or a meritorious defenseNY ↗
21.2 score
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Marianys I. (Gabrielle I.)
"Pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), a court may vacate a judgment or order entered upon default if it determines that there is a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense" ( Matter of Shehatou v Louka , 145 AD3d 1533, 1534 [4th Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Oneida County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Russell R.
The determination whether to vacate an order entered upon a default is left to the sound discretion of the court ( see Matter of Troy D.B. v Jefferson County Dept. of Social Servs. , 42 AD3d 964, 965 [4th Dept 2007]), and we conclude that Family Court did not abuse its discretion here. " Pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), a court may vacate a judgment or order entered upon default if it determines that there is a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense' " ( Matter of Shehatou v Louka , 145 AD3d 1533, 1534 [4th Dept 2016]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Patience T. (Christopher T.)
Here, even assuming, arguendo, that the father established a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear for the proceeding, we conclude that he failed to establish the requisite meritorious defense ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Shehatou v Louka , 145 AD3d 1533, 1534 [4th Dept 2016]; Matter of Strumpf v Avery , 134 AD3d 1465, 1466 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Delgado v. Vega
"Pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), a court may vacate a judgment or order entered upon default if it determines that there is a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense" ( Matter of Troy D.B. v Jefferson County Dept. of Social Servs ., 42 AD3d 964 , 965 [4th Dept 2007]), and it is well settled that "[t]he determination whether to vacate an order entered upon a default is left to the sound discretion of the court" ( Matter of Shehatou v Louka , 145 AD3d 1533, 1533-1534 [4th Dept 2016]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Roache v. Hughes-Roache
Even assuming, arguendo, that the mother established a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear for the proceeding, we conclude that she failed to establish the requisite meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Shehatou v Louka, 145 AD3d 1533, 1534 [2016]; Matter of Strumpf v Avery, 134 AD3d 1465, 1466 [2015]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Matter of Aiden R. (Erie County Dept. of Social Servs.)
With respect to appeal No. 1, the determination "whether to relieve a party of a default is within the sound discretion of the [court]" ( Matter of Goldstein v Goldstein , 190 AD3d 971, 972 [2d Dept 2021]; see Matter of Shehatou v Louka , 145 AD3d 1533, 1533-1534 [4th Dept 2016]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Brian Knight
v.
Nadia Washpun, Respondent In the Matter of Nadia Washpun v. Brian Knight, Tanya J. Conley, Esq., Attorney for the Child
v.
Nadia Washpun, Respondent In the Matter of Nadia Washpun v. Brian Knight, Tanya J. Conley, Esq., Attorney for the Child
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 23, 2016.
Cur, Dejoseph, Ran, Scudder, Smith.
Published
Appeals from an order of the Family Court, Monroe County (Patricia E. Gallaher, J.), entered August 31, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6. The order, inter alia, granted primary physical custody of the parties’ son to Nadia Washpun.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision at Family Court.
Present—Smith, J.P, DeJoseph, Cur-ran and Scudder, JJ.