default and a meritorious defense in New York

2025Dutton Lumber Co., Inc., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]).

2024Dutton Lumber Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Kassiano v Palm Mgt.

2020Generally, "[a] party attempting to vacate a default judgment must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense" ( Roussodimou v Zafiriadis , 238 AD2d 568, 568-569 ).

2006A defendant attempting to vacate a judgment must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see MRI Enters. v Amanat, 263 AD2d 530 [1999]; Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568, 568-569 [1997]).

2024Although "default orders are disfavored in cases involving the custody or support of children, and . . . the rules with respect to vacating default judgments are not to be applied as rigorously in those cases" ( Delgado , 171 AD3d at 1458 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Strumpf v Avery , 134 AD3d 1465, 1465-1466 [4th Dept 2015]), that does not "relieve the defaulting party of the burden of establishing a reasonable excuse for the default or a meritorious defense" ( Strumpf , 134 AD3d at 1466 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2024Although "default orders are disfavored in cases involving the custody or support of children, and . . . the rules with respect to vacating default judgments are not to be applied as rigorously in those cases" ( Delgado , 171 AD3d at 1458 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Strumpf v Avery , 134 AD3d 1465, 1465-1466 [4th Dept 2015]), that does not "relieve the defaulting party of the burden of establishing a reasonable excuse for the default or a meritorious defense" ( Strumpf , 134 AD3d at 1466 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2025NO. 114 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/04/2025 "To successfully oppose a motion for leave to enter a default judgment, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense" (Morrison Cohen LLP v Fink, 81 AD3d 467 ,468 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024NO. 29 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 08/28/2024 'demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense,' and to support their assertions through the submission of an affidavit" (Xiaoyong Zhang v Jong, 195 AD3d 435 [1st Dept 2021] citing Morrison Cohen LLP v Fink, 81 AD3d 467,468 [1st Dept 2011]).

2007To vacate their default in answering pursuant to CPLR 3211 (f), the appellants were required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Waste Mgt. of N.Y., Inc. v Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corp., 13 AD3d 362 [2004]; cf. Ennis v Lema, 305 AD2d 632, 633 [2003]).

2005To avoid the entry of judgment upon its failure to appear or answer, the defendant Joab Taxi, Inc. (hereinafter the defendant) was required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Juseinoski v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 15 AD3d 353 [2005]; Ennis v Lema, 305 AD2d 632, 633 [2003]).

2025Trucking Co., 59 NY2d 649, 650 [1983]).

2024Trucking Co., 59 NY2d 649 [1983]).

2007Although the plaintiff failed to demonstrate his entitlement to a default judgment, the court erred in deeming the defendant’s answer timely filed and served in the absence of a cross motion for this relief and without the necessary showing of a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see CFLR 2215; Giovanelli v Rivera, 23 AD3d 616 [2005]; Zino v Joab Taxi, Inc., 20 AD3d 521, 522 [2005]; Pampalone v Giant Bldg.

2007To avoid the entry of a default judgment, Fulton Street was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (see Giovanelli v Rivera, 23 AD3d 616 [2005]; Zino v Joab Taxi, Inc., 20 AD3d 521, 522 [2005]; Pampalone v Giant Bldg.

2010Brokerage, Inc., 62 AD3d 745 [2009]; Simpson v Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 48 AD3d 389 [2008]; Matter of Gambardella v Ortov Light., 278 AD2d 494, 495 [2000]; Neuman v Greenblatt, 260 AD2d 616, 617 [1999]).

2008“A party seeking to be relieved of its default must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see, CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Fennell v Mason, 204 AD2d 599 ).” (Eretz Funding v Shalosh Assoc., 266 AD2d 184, 185 [2d Dept 1999].) “It is axiomatic that a court may vacate a default upon a showing by the movant of both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious claim (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Katsnelson v ELRAC, Inc., 304 AD2d 619 [2003]; Matter of Gam bardella v Ortov Light., 278 AD2d 494 [2000]; Parker v City of New York, 272 AD2d 310 [2000]).

2008“A party seeking to be relieved of its default must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see, CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Fennell v Mason, 204 AD2d 599 ).” (Eretz Funding v Shalosh Assoc., 266 AD2d 184, 185 [2d Dept 1999].) “It is axiomatic that a court may vacate a default upon a showing by the movant of both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious claim (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Katsnelson v ELRAC, Inc., 304 AD2d 619 [2003]; Matter of Gam bardella v Ortov Light., 278 AD2d 494 [2000]; Parker v City of New York, 272 AD2d 310 [2000]).

2006Memorandum: A party seeking to vacate a default judgment is “required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action” (Fennell v Mason, 204 AD2d 599, 599 [1994]; see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]).

1999To vacate a judgment entered upon a default, the movant must demonstrate the existence of a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see, Schorr v Schorr, 213 AD2d 621 ; Sayagh v Sayagh, 205 AD2d 678 ; Kellerman v Kellerman, 203 AD2d 533 ).

1999While it is well settled that a party attempting to vacate a default judgment must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense or cause of action (CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see, Schorr v Schorr, 213 AD2d 621 ; Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d 403 ), the defendant’s motion was not brought under the ground of excusable default as delineated in CPLR 5015 (a) (1).

2015Nonetheless, in order “to be relieved of a judgment [or order] on the ground of ‘excusable default’ ... [a party] must establish that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious claim or defense” (Pekarek v Votaw, 216 AD2d 829, 830 [1995], quoting CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see Doane v Kiwanis Club of Rotterdam, N.Y., Inc., 128 AD3d 1309 , 1310 [2015]).

2006“To be relieved of a judgment on the ground of excusable default (see, CPLR 5015 [a] [1]), a party ‘must establish that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious claim or defense’ ” (Nulty v Wolff, 291 AB2d 763, 764 [2002], quoting Pekarek v Votaw, 216 AD2d 829, 830 [1995]; see Hann v Morrison, 247 AD2d 706, 707 [1998]).

2023To support vacatur of a default [*2]pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), a defendant must show both "a valid excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the underlying action" ( Tandy Computer Leasing v Video X Home Lib ., 124 AD2d 530, 531 [1st Dept 1986]).

2023To support vacatur of a default [*2]pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), a defendant must show both "a valid excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the underlying action" ( Tandy Computer Leasing v Video X Home Lib ., 124 AD2d 530, 531 [1st Dept 1986]).

2022In moving to vacate under CPLR 5015(a)(1), "[w]hile a liberal approach toward vacating defaults in matrimonial proceedings is warranted because of the important public policy of determining those actions on their merits, 'it is still incumbent upon a party seeking vacatur to establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense'" ( Ugweches v Ugweches , 78 AD3d 558, 559 [1st Dept 2010], quoting Estate of Allen v Allen , 258 AD2d 423, 423 [1st Dept 1999]).

2022In moving to vacate under CPLR 5015(a)(1), "[w]hile a liberal approach toward vacating defaults in matrimonial proceedings is warranted because of the important public policy of determining those actions on their merits, 'it is still incumbent upon a party seeking vacatur to establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense'" ( Ugweches v Ugweches , 78 AD3d 558, 559 [1st Dept 2010], quoting Estate of Allen v Allen , 258 AD2d 423, 423 [1st Dept 1999]).

2009While a party moving to vacate a default must establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Matter of Helen T. v Roosevelt B., 256 AD2d 583, 584 [1998]), this rule is not applied with equal rigor in filiation and support cases where a disposition on the merits is favored (see Matter of Gabriel v Cooper, 26 AD3d 493, 494 [2006]; Adams v Adams, 255 AD2d 535, 536 [1998]).

2000Although the courts have adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions, the defaulting party is still required to show a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see, Adams v Adams, 255 AD2d 535 ; Kogan v Kogan, 253 AD2d 739 ; Booska v Booska, 246 AD2d 567 ).

2010Although the courts have adopted a liberal policy with respect to the vacatur of defaults in matrimonial actions, it is still the general rule that it is incumbent upon a defaulting defendant to establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Atwater v Mace, 39 AD3d 573, 574 [2007]; Wexler v Wexler, 34 AD3d 458, 459 [2006]; Rosen v Rosen, 308 AD2d 482, 483 [2003]; Baruch v Baruch, 224 AD2d 649 [1996]; Conner v Conner, 240 AD2d 614, 615 [1997]).

2002Although this Court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions (see Louis v Louis, 231 AD2d 612 ; Fayet v Fayet, 214 AD2d 534 ), it is still incumbent upon the moving party to show a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Conner v Conner, 240 AD2d 614 ; Baruch v Baruch, 224 AD2d 649 ).

2004“Although a party seeking to vacate a default judgment must establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense, this Court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions” (Louis v Louis, 231 AD2d 612 [1996]).

2003Although the courts have adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions (see Viner v Viner, 291 AD2d 398 [2002]; Louis v Louis, 231 AD2d 612 [1996]), it is still incumbent upon a defaulting defendant to establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Benjamin v Benjamin, 249 AD2d 348 [1998]; Kellerman v Kellerman, 203 AD2d 533 [1994]).

2004Motion to Vacate Default Judgment In considering a party's motion to vacate a judgment of divorce, a trial court must adopt the liberal policy supporting the disposition on the merits of the marital res and related issues ( Viner v. Viner, 291 AD2d 398 [2d Dept 2002](citations omitted), provided that the party seeking vacatur establishes a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious claim ( Payne v. Payne, 4 AD3d 512, 513 [2d Dept 2004]); the court must also consider the interests of innocent third parties ( Goia v. Goia, 245 AD 373, 374 [4th Dept 1935].

2003Although the courts have adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions (see Viner v Viner, 291 AD2d 398 [2002]; Louis v Louis, 231 AD2d 612 [1996]), it is still incumbent upon a defaulting defendant to establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Benjamin v Benjamin, 249 AD2d 348 [1998]; Kellerman v Kellerman, 203 AD2d 533 [1994]).

2003A defendant seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering must demonstrate a justifiable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695 ; Gray v B.R.

2001While the party seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense or cause of action (see, CPLR 5015 [a] [1]), as well as an absence of willfulness and a lack of prejudice to the opposing party (see, Asterino v Asterino & Assocs., 275 AD2d 517, 519 ), the sufficiency of the defaulting party’s affidavit is “ ‘ordinarily * * * left to the discretion of the lower courts’ ” (Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Andersen & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695 , quoting Barasch v Micucci, 49 NY2d 594, 599 ).

2009A parent seeking to vacate an order entered upon his or her default in a termination of parental rights proceeding must establish that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the relief sought in the petition (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Anna Coral DeL., 50 AD3d 792 [2008]; Matter of Unique M.C., 16 AD3d 1155 [2005]; Matter of Vanessa F., 9 AD3d 464 [2004]).

2008A parent seeking to vacate such an order in a termination of parental rights proceeding must establish that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Miguel M.-R.B., 36 AD3d 613, 614 [2007]; Matter of Vanessa F., 9 AD3d 464, 465 [2004]).

2006Corp., 10 AD3d 393 [2004]; Wyckoff Hgts.

2005Corp., 10 AD3d 393 [2004]; Spells v A&P Supermarkets, 253 AD2d 422 [1998]; Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568, 569 [1997]).

1999P., dissents and votes to reverse the order appealed from, with the following memorandum: Just a short time ago in a factually analogous case, this Court held: “[although a party attempting to vacate a judgment entered upon his or her default must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see, Sayagh v Sayagh, 205 AD2d 678 ; Fennell v Mason, 204 AD2d 599 ), this rule is not ‘applied with equal rigor in matrimonial actions where the State’s interest in the marital res and allied issues (such as child support and custody) have called forth a more liberal ap pr

1999While it is well settled that a party attempting to vacate a default judgment must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense or cause of action (CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see, Schorr v Schorr, 213 AD2d 621 ; Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d 403 ), the defendant’s motion was not brought under the ground of excusable default as delineated in CPLR 5015 (a) (1).

2024A party seeking to vacate a judgment based on excusable default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense ( Leader v Parkside Group , 174 AD3d 420, 421 [1st Dept 2019], lv dismissed 33 NY3d 1111 [2019]).

2024A party seeking to vacate a judgment based on excusable default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense ( Leader v Parkside Group , 174 AD3d 420 , 421 [1st Dept 2019], lv dismissed 33 NY3d 1111 [2019]).