COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs are six citizens of Mexico who were recruited to work as “Animal Scientists” at Defendant Funk Dairy, Inc. (“Funk Dairy”) in Idaho under the “TN Visa” program for “professional” employees, established under the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). But when Plaintiffs arrived at the dairy to perform such professional services, they were instead required to work substantially as general laborers. After leaving Funk Dairy’s employ, Plaintiffs brought this suit alleging a variety of claims under federal and Idaho law. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants’ bait-and-switch tactics violated applicable federal statutory prohibitions on forced labor by, inter alia, abusing the TN Visa program in order to coerce Plaintiffs to provide menial physical labor. The district court, however, granted summary judgment to Defendants on the federal claims and declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

For purposes of their summary judgment motion, Defendants expressly conceded that all Plaintiffs believed that their ability to remain lawfully in the U.S. depended on

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their continued employment at Funk Dairy. In light of that concession and our obligation to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Funk Dairy knowingly obtained Plaintiffs’ labor by abusing the TN Visa process in order to exert pressure on Plaintiffs to provide labor that was substantially different from what had been represented to them and to federal consular officials. So construed, Funk Dairy’s conduct violated the provisions of Chapter 77 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code that prohibit forced labor and trafficking of persons into forced labor. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a)(3), 1590(a). Plaintiffs therefore asserted triable causes of action under the civil suit provision of Chapter 77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

Because the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ federal claims, we also reverse its decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand the case.

I

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment for Defendants, we recount the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2019).

A

Defendant Funk Dairy, which is owned by Defendant David Funk and his wife, is a dairy operation near the town of Murtaugh in Twin Falls County, Idaho. The dairy’s principal business is producing and selling raw milk, and its

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operations are managed by the Funks’ son-in-law, Defendant Curtis Giles. The Funks also own and operate a separate entity, Defendant Shoesole Farms, Inc., which has farmland nearby. Funk Dairy buys feed from Shoesole Farms, Inc., and in return, it supplies the farm with manure to use as fertilizer. Giles, however, is not involved with the management of Shoesole Farm, Inc.

In April 2013, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) completed an audit of Funk Dairy and concluded that 78 percent of its employees were aliens who lacked sufficient documentation to confirm their eligibility to work in the U.S. In 2014, in order to address “labor issues” in Idaho and to recruit and retain employees, Giles inquired about the “TN Visa” program that he had heard about while attending conferences. To set the subsequent events concerning Funk Dairy’s use of the TN Visa program in context, we first briefly recount the basic contours of that program.

B

The TN Visa program, established “pursuant to the provisions of Section D of Annex 1603” of NAFTA, allows a citizen of Mexico or Canada to be admitted to the United States for the purpose of “engag[ing] in business activities at a professional level as provided for in such Annex.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(e)(2). 1 The referenced Section D states that

1 In early 2020, Congress amended the relevant statutory language to reflect the adoption of a new trade agreement superseding NAFTA. See United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 116-113, § 503(c), 134 Stat. ^[11], 71 (2020). Unless otherwise noted, all references to the applicable statutes and regulations are to the versions in effect at the time of the underlying events in this case in 2015–2016.

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the program only applies to a “profession set out in Appendix 1603.D.1,” see NAFTA, Annex 1603.D.1, December 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612, 666, and that Appendix lists dozens of different professions, see NAFTA, Appendix 1603.D.1, 32 I.L.M. at 668–70. The work must be performed for “a United States entity,” which may include an “individual,” see 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(b), but that entity need not be the formal “employer” of the visa holder, see id. § 214.6(d)(3)(ii), (h)(1). A person granted a TN Visa may be admitted “for a period not to exceed three years.” Id. § 214.6(e). The visa may be extended for additional periods of up to three years upon application of the “United States employer” of the beneficiary or, in the case of a foreign employer, the “United States entity” for which the work is performed. Id. § 214.6(h)(1). So long as the alien remains qualified for a TN Visa and “continues to be engaged in TN business activities for a U.S. employer or entity at a professional level,” there “is no specific limit” on the number of extensions that may be granted. Id. § 214.6(h)(1)(iv).

A Mexican citizen must apply for the TN Visa “at a United States consular office” and “must present documentation sufficient to satisfy the consular officer . . . [1] that the applicant is seeking entry to the United States to engage in business activities for a United States employer[] or entity[] at a professional level, and [2] that the applicant meets the criteria to perform at such a professional level.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(d)(3). The proof “may be in the form of a letter from the prospective employer[] in the United States, and must be supported by diplomas, degrees or membership in a professional organization.” Id. § 214.6(d)(3)(ii). The documentation must also address and “fully affirm” the following five points:

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(1) the qualifying “profession” from the list in Appendix 1603.D.1;

(2) a “description of the professional activities, including a brief summary of daily job duties, if appropriate, in which the applicant will engage in [sic] for the United States employer/entity”;

(3) the “anticipated length of stay”;

(4) the “educational qualifications or appropriate credentials” demonstrating that the alien “has professional level status”; and

(5) the “arrangements for remuneration for services to be rendered.”

Id. § 214.6(d)(3)(ii)(A)–(E).

After acquiring a TN Visa and coming to the United States, a TN Visa holder is allowed to seek to change employers if the worker finds a new employer eligible to sponsor him or her. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(i). An employer is not required to notify the Government when a worker with a TN Visa ends his or her employment. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 402.17-5(A)(8) (2017 ed.) (“There is no requirement that the TN employer or worker notify the [Government] of the termination of the employment relationship.”).

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C In the fall of 2014, Giles traveled to Mexico with the intention of recruiting workers for Funk Dairy who would qualify for visas under the TN Visa program. There, he recruited Plaintiffs César Martínez-Rodríguez (“Martínez”), Dalia Padilla-López (“Padilla”), Mayra Múñoz-Lara (“Múñoz”), Brenda Gastélum-Sierra (“Gastélum”), Leslie Ortiz-García (“Ortiz”), and Ricardo Neri-Camacho (“Neri”), who are all citizens of Mexico, to work for Funk Dairy. All of the Plaintiffs had completed four-year college degrees and were licensed to work in Mexico as either animal scientists or veterinarians.

Giles gave presentations at several different Mexican universities, describing employment opportunities at Funk Dairy. Although the presentations were nominally open to anyone interested in attending, Giles made clear that he was only interested in applicants who had already graduated and been licensed in veterinary medicine or animal science. Thus, for example, at the presentation Neri attended, there were initially 80 to 100 attendees, but most of them left early after they heard that Giles was only looking for veterinary doctors who had already graduated and had a license.

After attending one of these presentations, each Plaintiff was interviewed by Giles. During these interviews, Giles avoided providing specifics about the type of work that Plaintiffs would perform if they were hired by Funk Dairy. For example, when interviewing Gastélum, Giles “evaded [questions] regarding the activities of the job, the job duties and the details.” Giles told Gastélum they “would talk about that later,” after she arrived in Idaho. Giles similarly told

10 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

Ortiz that they would discuss the specific tasks of her job after she was selected.

Despite Giles’ evasive answers regarding the specific job duties, Plaintiffs developed, over the course of the hiring process, a general sense of what they thought the job would entail. Neri understood that the job would be “to supervise the quality of the milk, check on or supervise the workers and the machinery, the quality of the feed, and the care of the animals.” Padilla understood that the job would involve “checking the quality of the milk and the milking, not be a milker.” Gastélum, Ortiz, Múñoz, and Martínez however, did not testify as to any clear understanding of what duties would be expected, other than that the position was to be an “Animal Scientist.” Giles also described the general operations of the dairy and informed Plaintiffs that the work would include “practical, hands-on experience with dairy animals,” but he did not suggest that it would be physically demanding.

Plaintiffs also left the presentations and interviews with a general understanding of the amount of work, compensation, and other benefits that came with the jobs. Plaintiffs’ recollections varied somewhat, but they generally understood that each of them would work 130 to 144 hours in two-week pay periods, receive at least $10 per hour with the opportunity for raises, and receive a $2,000 bonus and six days of paid vacation after one year. Plaintiffs also believed, again with varying recollections, that some of their housing and their transportation costs would be covered by Funk Dairy.

Each Plaintiff received a job offer, and each Plaintiff accepted. After Plaintiffs accepted the positions, Giles arranged for legal counsel to assist them in securing TN Visas. Among the dozens of professions that are eligible for

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TN Visas under NAFTA is “Animal Scientist.” See NAFTA, Appendix 1603.D.1, 32 I.L.M. at 669; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(c). To qualify for admission as an animal scientist, the alien must have at least a “Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree,” see NAFTA, Appendix 1603.D.1, 32 I.L.M. at 669; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(b), (c). To obtain the TN Visas, Plaintiffs needed to submit applications to the U.S. Department of State for entry as animal scientists.

Funk Dairy’s agents prepared the applications for Plaintiffs and provided supporting letters to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. Each letter stated that the respective Plaintiff would be employed by Funk Dairy “in the professional-level position of animal scientist for a three- year period commencing in October 2014 at an annual salary of at least $25,000.” The letters described the specific tasks that Plaintiffs would be expected to perform and stated that, “[d]ue to the sophisticated, professional nature of the above duties, the person filling this position must hold at minimum a Bachelor’s degree in Agricultural Science, Dairy Science, Veterinary Medicine, or a closely related field.”

U.S. consular officials also interviewed each Plaintiff in Mexico. Funk Dairy’s legal counsel prepared Plaintiffs for the interviews, and specifically instructed at least one of them (Padilla) to tell U.S. consular officials that she would not be milking cows at Funk Dairy. Ultimately, each Plaintiff obtained a TN Visa authorizing entry into the U.S. for professional employment with Funk Dairy as an animal scientist.

All of the Plaintiffs understood that their employment was “at-will.” Defendants stipulated for purposes of summary judgment that all Plaintiffs understood that “if their

12 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES employment with Funk Dairy ended, their Visa would expire and they would be subject to removal back to Mexico.” 2 Upon arrival at Funk Dairy between November and December 2014, Plaintiffs learned that the activities listed in Funk Dairy’s supporting letters to the U.S. Embassy constituted only a portion of their responsibilities. Thus, although Plaintiffs performed at least some of the “Animal Scientist” activities listed in those letters, Plaintiffs were also required to perform varying amounts of unskilled, nonprofessional labor that was not materially different from the work done by the dairy’s general laborers. On at least one occasion, Ortiz directly complained to Giles that her work did not amount to animal science. In fact, Funk Dairy’s employment records listed each Plaintiff’s position as “Milker,” “Outside Help,” or simply “Calves.” And in a worker’s compensation injury report, Padilla’s occupation was listed as “General Dairy Worker.”

Plaintiffs received compensation resembling what Giles had described, but in several other respects the terms were not as expected. Neri never received his $2,000 bonus or six In addressing this issue, we must first identify what does and does not count as an objective for which the TN Visa program was designed.

A defining feature of that program, as reflected in the text of NAFTA and the implementing statute, is the As explained earlier, the applicable regulations require a TN Visa applicant to provide “documentation,” typically “in the form of a letter from the prospective employer(s) in the United States,” affirming five specified matters: (1) the qualifying “profession of the applicant” from the list in the relevant NAFTA Appendix; (2) a “description of the professional activities” that the applicant would be performing, “including a brief summary of daily job duties, if appropriate”; (3) the “anticipated length of stay”; (4) the applicant’s “professional level status,” as shown by his or her “educational qualifications” or other “appropriate credentials”; and (5) the “arrangements for remuneration.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(d)(3)(ii)(A)–(E); see also supra at 7–8. To fulfill this requirement, Funk Dairy’s agents submitted almost identically worded letters, signed by Giles, in support of each Plaintiff’s application.

In discussing the first of the five required elements, Funk Dairy’s letters stated that the dairy “wish[ed] to employ [Plaintiffs] in the professional-level position of Animal Scientist,” which is one of the qualifying professions listed in the relevant NAFTA Appendix. Addressing the second

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element (“professional activities”), the letters asserted that Plaintiffs would “help develop, implement, and oversee effective animal reproduction, nutrition, animal health, and related dairy industry programs relating to effective herd management.” The letters further elaborated on the tasks Plaintiffs would perform as follows:

Applying advanced theoretical and practical knowledge and skills in the field of animal science, [Plaintiffs] will be responsible for performing artificial insemination, sick/pregnant cow treatment, fresh cow monitoring, calving, colostrum handling, feed evaluation/preparation, and related professional duties including monitoring milk cleanliness/ concentration, and monitoring the transfer of antibodies in calf blood.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ professional qualifications for these tasks (the fourth element), the letters stated:

Due to the sophisticated, professional nature of the above duties, the person filling this position must hold at minimum a Bachelor’s degree in Agricultural Science, Dairy Science, Veterinary Medicine, or a closely related field (please note that English language fluency is not required given the specific nature of the above duties and because the animal scientist will report to bilingual supervisory personnel on-site).

The letters concluded by stating that Funk Dairy “hereby guarantee[s] that we will comply with all terms of 24 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

[Plaintiffs’] TN status for the duration of [their] employment with us.” 9

Plaintiffs’ testimony likewise supports the conclusion that, during the recruiting process, Funk Dairy represented that the “Animal Scientist” jobs being offered would qualify for the TN Visa program for professionals. Plaintiffs testified that as a result of the initial on-campus presentations, their job interviews, and the visa application process, they understood that Funk Dairy was hiring “Animal Scientists,” even though Giles was vague on the details on what that meant. See supra at 9–10. Moreover, to the extent that some of the Plaintiffs developed a more specific understanding of what the animal scientist position entailed, it was affirmatively inconsistent with the view that they were being hired to perform general labor. For example, Neri testified that his understanding was that the job “was to supervise the quality of the milk, check on or supervise the workers and the machinery, the quality of the feed, and the care of the animals.” Padilla testified that she left her initial interview “under the impression that [the job] was going to be checking the quality of the milk and the milking, not be a milker.” With other Plaintiffs, such as Gastélum and Ortiz, Giles actively evaded supplying details about what an “Animal Scientist” would do at Funk Dairy. That evasion, too, supports a reasonable inference that Funk Dairy’s actions created a misleading impression that the contemplated work would involve—as the letter to the