United States v. Tyrone Adail, 30 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Tyrone Adail, 30 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. MacK (paed, 1999-03-19)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. MacK
E.D. Pa. · 1999 · confidence medium
See also United States v. Warf, 46 F.3d 1129 (table), 1995 WL 50155 (4th Cir.1995) (defendant had adequate notice and opportunity to challenge where he received the PSR eight days before sentencing); United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 626 (11th Cir.1995) (notice on day of sentencing did not violate Due Process because pre-trial discovery from the government had included copies of all his prior convictions, defense lawyer filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence of prior crimes that indicated his familiarity with his client’s record, and defense lawyer contacted the probation officer …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Phillip Wilson Bates
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
The other was fully set out in the presentence investigation report, leaving Bates with “ample opportunity to investigate his earlier convictions and to challenge the requirements of § 924(e)(1).” United States v. Adail, 30 F.3d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 653 , 130 L.Ed.2d 557 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Phillip W. Bates
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
The other was fully set out in the presentence investigation report, leaving Bates with "ample opportunity to investigate his earlier convictions and to challenge the requirements of § 924(e)(1)." United States v. Adail, 30 F.3d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 653 (1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Felix-Santos
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Adail, 30 F.3d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 653 (1994); United States v. McGill, 952 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1991); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1206 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kulp, 365 F. Supp. 747, 763 (E.D.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Felix-Santos
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Adail, 30 F.3d 1046 , 1047 ___ ____ ______________ _____ (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 653 (1994); United States v. _____ ______ _____________ McGill, 952 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1991); Graefenhain v. Pabst ______ ___________ _____ Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1206 (7th Cir. 1989); United States ___________ _____________ v. Kulp, 365 F. Supp. 747, 763 (E.D.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Tyrone ADAIL, Appellant
94-1866.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Aug 1, 1994.
30 F.3d 1046
Carter Collins Law, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant., Thomas J. Mehan, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.
Fagg, Wollman, Beam.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Tyrone Adail pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Although the maximum statutory penalty for a § 922(g) violation is 120 months, the district court sentenced Adail to an enhanced 204-month sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988) (providing enhanced sentences for persons convicted of violating § 922(g) who have three earlier violent felony convictions); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 (implementing § 924(e)(1)). Adail appeals his sentence.

Adail contends his sentence violates his due process rights because the Government did not notify him before he pleaded guilty which of his many earlier convictions triggered the enhanced sentence. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude Adail’s due process argument lacks merit. The record clearly shows the Government informed Adail of its intent to seek the § 924(e)(1) enhancement before he pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g)(1). Following his plea, Adail received notice in the presentence report of his earlier convictions, including[*1047] three violent felonies, and an addendum to the presentence report informed Adail the three violent felony convictions permitted an enhanced sentence under § 924(e)(1). Additionally, on the day of sentencing the Government provided Adail with certified copies of these convictions. Assuming that notice is constitutionally required, Adail received adequate notice of the specific felonies on which the enhanced sentence would depend and was given ample opportunity to investigate his earlier convictions and to challenge the requirements of § 924(e)(1). Further, any deficiency in notice would be harmless beyond reasonable doubt because Adail did not challenge any of his violent felony convictions or deny that he committed the offenses in his written objections to the presentence report, at his sentencing hearing, or on appeal.

Adail also contends his 204-month sentence violates his plea agreement. Adail’s assertion the Government agreed to a 120-month sentence is refuted by the parties’ stipulation. Before Adail’s guilty plea, Adail and the Government stipulated “[t]here is no plea agreement in this case” and Adail “acknowledge[d] that it is the government’s position that [Adail] may be subject to enhanced punishment” under § 924(e)(1) above § 922(g)’s 120-month maximum sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm Adail’s sentence.