United States v. Felipe Guzman Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
Search
United States v. Felipe Guzman Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
35 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" United States v. Fernando Vizcarra-Martinez (4×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Santa Cruz, 48 F.3d at 1120 (prior possession of cocaine relevant to knowing participation in drag deal 12 weeks later); Milner, 962 F.2d at 912-13 (evidence of drag use relevant to show person conspiring to distribute drug).
examined Cited "but see" United States v. Fernando Vizcarra-Martinez (4×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Santa Cruz, 48 F.3d at 1120 (prior possession of cocaine relevant to knowing participation in drug deal 12 weeks later); Milner, 962 F.2d at 912-13 (evidence of drug use relevant to show person conspiring to distribute drug).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jorge Sosa
9th Cir. · 2015 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-20 (9th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Tunkara
D. Kan. · 2005 · confidence medium
When a prior act is offered to show knowledge it “need not be similar to the charged act as long as the prior act was one which would tend to make the existence of the defendant’s knowledge more probable than it would be without the evidence.” United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Calapp v. State (2×)
Alaska Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Calapp does not contest the admissibility of this conviction. [1] See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended on denial of rehearing); United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993); Ramirez-Jiminez, supra ; United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Falco, 727 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1984). [1] I do agree that Calapp's prior forgery conviction was not particularly relevant to establish his culpable mental state or discredit his claim of …
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Alfredo Campos-Padilla
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-20 (9th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hector De La Rosa-Contreras
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Because the prior act was offered to show knowledge it "need not be similar to the charged act as long as the prior act was one which would tend to make the existence of the defendant's knowledge more probable that it would be without the evidence." United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Anabel Aceves-Anaya (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
But, as here, when the evidence "is offered to prove knowledge, the prior act need not be similar to the charged act as long as the prior act was one which would tend to make the existence of the defendant's knowledge more probable than it would be without the [evidence]." United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation omitted). 5 Knowledge is a material element of the crimes of possession of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine, United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1992), which the government had to prove despite Aceves-Anaya's den…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Adam Shawn Peter
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
If a prior act is offered to show knowledge, however, it "need not be similar to the charged act as long as the prior act was one which would tend to make the 'existence of the defendant's knowledge more probable than it would be without the evidence.' " United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993)). 7 Peter contends that the government failed to specify the relevance of his prior drug dealing to the charged offenses.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Alejandro Ramirez-Ozuna (3×)
9th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118 , 1119 n. 1 (9th Cir.1995). 5 Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a prior act is admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). 6 At trial, evidence of Ramirez-Ozuna's prior act served to rebut his argument that he was unaware that marijuana was concealed in his vehicle.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Frank Steffensen
9th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.1995) (evidence of defendant's prior arrest for possession of small amount of cocaine was relevant to show his knowledge that he was involved in drug transaction in connection with charged offense). 8 Finally, we agree with the district court that Steffensen has failed to show due diligence in attempting to locate the witnesses.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Oscar Paredes-Lio
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Santa Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir.1995) (arrest for cocaine possession, which occurred 12 weeks before, admitted to show knowledge for later cocaine possession); Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d at 603-04 (prior arrest for possession of heroin with intent to distribute admitted in later trial for same charge); Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d at 1402 (admitting subsequent act of transporting marijuana hidden in a car's door panels as evidence of knowledge for charged crime of transporting cocaine in car roof); see also Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d at 1326 ("other act" of associating wit…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Marzelino Urena-Vasquez (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d at 1119-20 (evidence of prior possession of even a small quantity of narcotics is admissible to demonstrate knowledge of narcotics distribution); see also United States v. Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2348 , 124 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (prior use of cocaine is relevant to knowledge, intent, absence of mistake); United States v. Milner, 962 F.2d 908 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 614 , 121 L.Ed.2d 548 (1992) (evidence of drug use relevant to show person conspiring to distribute drug).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Allan Bowlun Ing, United States of America v. Richard St. Clair
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited "see" UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Catherine KEARNS, Defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118 , 1119 n. 1 (9th Cir.1995) (Rules 404(b) and 403); United States v. Rubio-Topete, 999 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.1993) (relevancy). *1427 Whether the deeds constitute “other crimes” evidence is a question of law reviewed de novo.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Peter James Holler
9th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.1995); Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d at 604 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Holler
9th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1995); Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d at 604 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Reschly
9th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir.1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Felipe Guzman SANTA-CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant
93-30296.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Feb 28, 1995.
48 F.3d 1118
Jon R. Zulauf, Finegold, Zulauf & Engel-hard, Seattle, WA, for defendant-appellant., Bonnie E. MaeNaughton, Asst. U.S. Atty., Seattle, WA, for plaintiff-appellee.
Wright, Hall, Wiggins.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

Santa-Cruz was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). He appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his prior possession of a personal use amount of cocaine under Fed. R.Evid. 404(b) and 403. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. [1]

BACKGROUND

In October 1992, Santa-Cruz was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and possessing one gram of cocaine. He was driving a blue Chevrolet. In January 1993, he and a codefendant were arrested after one of them pulled 165.4 grams of cocaine out from under the driver’s seat of the same car and gave it to a confidential informant.

At trial for the January 1993 incident, both the eodefendant and the informant testified that Santa-Cruz produced the cocaine. The codefendant also testified that he had frequently purchased small quantities of cocaine from Santa-Cruz. The United States introduced evidence of the October 1992 arrest of Santa-Cruz for possession of one gram of cocaine.

Both Santa-Cruz’s girlfriend and his aunt testified that they had never seen him in possession of drugs. He testified that, when he was arrested for the January 1993 incident, he was only along for the ride, that he had never knowingly participated in a drug sale and that the informant threw the cocaine in his lap when the police arrived. He explained that, when he was arrested for the October 1992 incident, a drunken man had given it to him in a lavatory.

ANALYSIS

Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a prior act is admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” When evidence of a prior act is offered to prove knowledge, the prior act “need not be similar to the charged act as long as the prior act was one which would tend to make ‘the existence of the defendant’s knowledge more probable than it would be without the knowledge.’” United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d 1321, 1326 (9th Cir.1992)).

Santa-Cruz’s prior act made his knowledge of his charged offense more probable. It occurred just 12 weeks earlier. It[*1120] served to rebut his argument that he had not knowingly participated in the drug transaction and that his possession of the cocaine was accidental.” The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b), notwithstanding that the prior act involved a personal use amount of cocaine.

Under Rule 403, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” This evidence connected Santa-Cruz with the car and suggested that he knew of the cocaine transaction. The court instructed the jury appropriately as to the purpose for which it could consider the evidence. The probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Rule 403.

AFFIRMED.

1

. We review for an abuse of discretion the decisions that evidence of a prior act is admissible under Rule 404(b) and that the probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 602, 604 (9th Cir.1993).