12 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mayers v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Mayers v. State, 42 So.3d 33, 44-45 (Miss.App.2010) (holding that a conviction in violation of the ex post facto clause is plain error); State v. Clemons, unpublished, 2011 WL 861847 , *4 (Ohio App.2011) (same); People v. Barnes, unpublished, 2010 WL 4970759 , *4 (Mich.App.2010) (holding that imposition of increased punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause is plain error); State v. Simmick, 279 Neb. 499 , 779 N.W.2d 335, 342 (2010) (same); State v. Houston, unpublished, 2009 WL 130189 , *8 (Tenn.Crim.App.2009) (same). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simnickgreen2 sentences2012See Mayers v. State, 42 So.3d 33, 44-45 (Miss.App.2010) (holding that a conviction in violation of the ex post facto clause is plain error); State v. Clemons, unpublished, 2011 WL 861847 , *4 (Ohio App.2011) (same); People v. Barnes, unpublished, 2010 WL 4970759 , *4 (Mich.App.2010) (holding that imposition of increased punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause is plain error); State v. Simmick, 279 Neb. 499 , 779 N.W.2d 335, 342 (2010) (same); State v. Houston, unpublished, 2009 WL 130189 , *8 (Tenn.Crim.App.2009) (same). 2012See Mayers v. State, 42 So.3d 33, 44-45 (Miss.App.2010) (holding that a conviction in violation of the ex post facto clause is plain error); State v. Clemons, unpublished, 2011 WL 861847 , *4 (Ohio App.2011) (same); People v. Barnes, unpublished, 2010 WL 4970759 , *4 (Mich.App.2010) (holding that imposition of increased punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause is plain error); State v. Simmick, 279 Neb. 499 , 779 N.W.2d 335, 342 (2010) (same); State v. Houston, unpublished, 2009 WL 130189 , *8 (Tenn.Crim.App.2009) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Edmonds v. Stategreen2 sentences2007We explained the rationale of the prior conviction exception in Edmonds v. State, 118 P.3d 17, 20 (Alaska App.2005): | For [a] defendant to be convicted of [a] crime ..., one of three things had to happen: either (1) the defendant exercised their right to trial by jury, and the jury found the defendant guilty;" or (2) the defendant was offered a jury trial but waived it, choosing instead to be tried by a judge, and the judge found the defendant guilty; ' or (8) the defendant was offered a jury trial but waived trial altogether, choosing instead to enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 2007We explained the rationale of the prior conviction exception in Edmonds v. State, 118 P.3d 17, 20 (Alaska App.2005): | For [a] defendant to be convicted of [a] crime ..., one of three things had to happen: either (1) the defendant exercised their right to trial by jury, and the jury found the defendant guilty;" or (2) the defendant was offered a jury trial but waived it, choosing instead to be tried by a judge, and the judge found the defendant guilty; ' or (8) the defendant was offered a jury trial but waived trial altogether, choosing instead to enter a plea of guilty or no contest. | 1 | 1 |
Ned v. Stategreen1 sentence2006We discussed both of these cases in Ned v. State, 119 P.3d 438, 443-44 (Alaska App.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Grohs v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Alaska App.2005) (holding that when aggravator (c)(21) is based on a defendant’s uncontested prior convictions, the Blakely exception for prior convictions applies, and the aggravator need not be submitted to a jury); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (same holding with respect to aggra-vator (c)(8)). 35 .See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633-34 , 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1786-87 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68 , 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-49 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), both holding that a denial of the right to j | 1 | 1 |
Milligrock v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Alaska App.2005) (holding that when aggravator (c)(21) is based on a defendant’s uncontested prior convictions, the Blakely exception for prior convictions applies, and the aggravator need not be submitted to a jury); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (same holding with respect to aggra-vator (c)(8)). 35 .See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633-34 , 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1786-87 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68 , 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-49 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), both holding that a denial of the right to j | 1 | 1 |
People v. Riveragreen2 sentences2006See United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2001) (declaring that it is a court of appeals' duty "to apply the law as it exists," and that it is solely the prerogative of the Supreme Court to overrule its precedent if it chooses); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) ("It is our role to apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop.”); United States v. Losoya-Mancias, 332 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (D.N.D.2004); United States v. Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 548-49 (W.D.Va.2000) (the fact that a majority of the Supreme Court may have 2006See United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2001) (declaring that it is a court of appeals' duty "to apply the law as it exists," and that it is solely the prerogative of the Supreme Court to overrule its precedent if it chooses); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) ("It is our role to apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop.”); United States v. Losoya-Mancias, 332 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (D.N.D.2004); United States v. Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 548-49 (W.D.Va.2000) (the fact that a majority of the Supreme Court may have | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Larry Davisgreen1 sentence2006See United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2001) (declaring that it is a court of appeals' duty "to apply the law as it exists," and that it is solely the prerogative of the Supreme Court to overrule its precedent if it chooses); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) ("It is our role to apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop.”); United States v. Losoya-Mancias, 332 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (D.N.D.2004); United States v. Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 548-49 (W.D.Va.2000) (the fact that a majority of the Supreme Court may have | 1 | 1 |
United States of America v. Ramon Rodriguez-Montelongogreen1 sentence2006See United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2001) (declaring that it is a court of appeals' duty "to apply the law as it exists," and that it is solely the prerogative of the Supreme Court to overrule its precedent if it chooses); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) ("It is our role to apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop.”); United States v. Losoya-Mancias, 332 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (D.N.D.2004); United States v. Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 548-49 (W.D.Va.2000) (the fact that a majority of the Supreme Court may have | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gebelegreen1 sentence2006See United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2001) (declaring that it is a court of appeals' duty "to apply the law as it exists," and that it is solely the prerogative of the Supreme Court to overrule its precedent if it chooses); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) ("It is our role to apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop.”); United States v. Losoya-Mancias, 332 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (D.N.D.2004); United States v. Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 548-49 (W.D.Va.2000) (the fact that a majority of the Supreme Court may have | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Losoya-Manciasgreen1 sentence2006See United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2001) (declaring that it is a court of appeals' duty "to apply the law as it exists," and that it is solely the prerogative of the Supreme Court to overrule its precedent if it chooses); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) ("It is our role to apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop.”); United States v. Losoya-Mancias, 332 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (D.N.D.2004); United States v. Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 548-49 (W.D.Va.2000) (the fact that a majority of the Supreme Court may have | 1 | 1 |
Cameron v. Hughesgreen1 sentence1999See Cameron v. Hughes, 825 P.2d 882 , 884 n. 2 (Alaska 1992) (applying de novo standard of review to trial court’s interpretation of appellate rule). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Felipe Guzman Santa-Cruzgreen1 sentence1998Calapp does not contest the admissibility of this conviction. [1] See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended on denial of rehearing); United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993); Ramirez-Jiminez, supra ; United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Falco, 727 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1984). [1] I do agree that Calapp's prior forgery conviction was not particularly relevant to establish his culpable mental state or discredit his claim of | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Fernando Vizcarra-Martinezgreen1 sentence1998Calapp does not contest the admissibility of this conviction. [1] See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended on denial of rehearing); United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993); Ramirez-Jiminez, supra ; United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Falco, 727 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1984). [1] I do agree that Calapp's prior forgery conviction was not particularly relevant to establish his culpable mental state or discredit his claim of | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Falcogreen1 sentence1998Calapp does not contest the admissibility of this conviction. [1] See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended on denial of rehearing); United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993); Ramirez-Jiminez, supra ; United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Falco, 727 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1984). [1] I do agree that Calapp's prior forgery conviction was not particularly relevant to establish his culpable mental state or discredit his claim of | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jose Arambula-Ruizgreen1 sentence1998Calapp does not contest the admissibility of this conviction. [1] See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended on denial of rehearing); United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993); Ramirez-Jiminez, supra ; United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Falco, 727 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1984). [1] I do agree that Calapp's prior forgery conviction was not particularly relevant to establish his culpable mental state or discredit his claim of | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Michael Galgano, United States of America v. Anthony Carminatigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanford Ralph Abramson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| William Worthy, Jr. v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Briggs v. Kellygreen | 1 | 1 |
Zerbinos v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1965Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1964); Abramson v. United States, 326 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 957 , 84 S.Ct. 1636 , 12 L.Ed.2d 500 ; United States v. Galgano, 281 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir.1960), cert. denied, Carminati v. United States, 366 U.S. 960 , 81 S.Ct. 1916 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1253 , cert. denied, 366 U.S. 967 , 81 S.Ct. 1929 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1257 ; See Zerbinos v. Lewis, 394 P.2d 886, 890 (Alaska 1964), Briggs v. Kelly, 376 P.2d 715, 717 (Alaska 1962). 1965Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. [28] Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1964); Abramson v. United States, 326 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 957 , 84 S.Ct. 1636 , 12 L.Ed.2d 500 ; United States v. Galgano, 281 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir.1960), cert. denied, Carminati v. United States, 366 U.S. 960 , 81 S.Ct. 1916 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1253 , cert. denied, 366 U.S. 967 , 81 S.Ct. 1929 , 6 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tyler v. State
green
2 sentences2007Regardless of how the defendant was found guilty, the defendant's right to jury trial and the defendant's right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt were both honored-and thus Blakely is satisfied." Second, as. we recently noted in Tyler v. State, 133 P.3d 686 (Alaska App.2006), even though lawyers and judges might reasonably dispute the continuing vitality of the prior conviction exception, "the United States Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts that they should not deviate from Supreme Court precedent, even when the Supreme Court's later decisions seemingly invalidate that precedent or cal 2007Thus, even though there may be reason to doubt whether the prior conviction exception still commands five votes among the members of the Supreme Court, "[this exception continues to be the law of the land unless and until the United States Supreme Court expressly abandons or modifies it." Id. at 690 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2006See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Alaska App.2005) (holding that when aggravator (c)(21) is based on a defendant’s uncontested prior convictions, the Blakely exception for prior convictions applies, and the aggravator need not be submitted to a jury); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (same holding with respect to aggra-vator (c)(8)). 35 .See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633-34 , 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1786-87 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68 , 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-49 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), both holding that a denial of the right to j 2006See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Alaska App.2005) (holding that when aggravator (c)(21) is based on a defendant’s uncontested prior convictions, the Blakely exception for prior convictions applies, and the aggravator need not be submitted to a jury); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (same holding with respect to aggra-vator (c)(8)). 35 .See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633-34 , 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1786-87 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68 , 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-49 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), both holding that a denial of the right to j | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Cotton
green
2 sentences2006See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Alaska App.2005) (holding that when aggravator (c)(21) is based on a defendant’s uncontested prior convictions, the Blakely exception for prior convictions applies, and the aggravator need not be submitted to a jury); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (same holding with respect to aggra-vator (c)(8)). 35 .See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633-34 , 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1786-87 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68 , 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-49 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), both holding that a denial of the right to j 2006See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Alaska App.2005) (holding that when aggravator (c)(21) is based on a defendant’s uncontested prior convictions, the Blakely exception for prior convictions applies, and the aggravator need not be submitted to a jury); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (same holding with respect to aggra-vator (c)(8)). 35 .See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633-34 , 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1786-87 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68 , 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-49 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), both holding that a denial of the right to j | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Samuel Hyman
green
1 sentence1998Calapp does not contest the admissibility of this conviction. [1] See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended on denial of rehearing); United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993); Ramirez-Jiminez, supra ; United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Falco, 727 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1984). [1] I do agree that Calapp's prior forgery conviction was not particularly relevant to establish his culpable mental state or discredit his claim of | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Hector Ramirez-Jiminez
green
1 sentence1998Calapp does not contest the admissibility of this conviction. [1] See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended on denial of rehearing); United States v. Santa-Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993); Ramirez-Jiminez, supra ; United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Falco, 727 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1984). [1] I do agree that Calapp's prior forgery conviction was not particularly relevant to establish his culpable mental state or discredit his claim of | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Scott v. Robertson
green
1 sentence1986Scott, 583 P.2d at 192 n. 16 & accompanying text. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Richardson v. State
green
2 sentences1985Richardson, 579 P.2d at 1376-77 . 1 Alaska Rule of Evidence 609(c) provides: Before a witness may be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction, the court shall be advised of the existence of the conviction and shall rule if the witness may be impeached by proof of the conviction by weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect. 1985Richardson, 579 P.2d at 1376-77 . [1] Alaska Rule of Evidence 609(c) provides: *446 Before a witness may be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction, the court shall be advised of the existence of the conviction and shall rule if the witness may be impeached by proof of the conviction by weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Kirby v. United States
green
2 sentences1981The court agrees and reverses, citing Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 , 19 S.Ct. 574 , 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899). [1] The state defends the admissibility of the conviction, citing three hearsay exceptions: (1) the business records or official records exceptions, see Alaska Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(8)(a); (2) the declaration against penal interest exception, see Rule 804(b)(3); and (3) the catch-all exception for evidence otherwise sufficiently verified, see Rules 804(5) and 803(23). *359 The official and business records exceptions would excuse the absence of the person or persons prepar 1981The court agrees and reverses, citing Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 , 19 S.Ct. 574 , 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899). [1] The state defends the admissibility of the conviction, citing three hearsay exceptions: (1) the business records or official records exceptions, see Alaska Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(8)(a); (2) the declaration against penal interest exception, see Rule 804(b)(3); and (3) the catch-all exception for evidence otherwise sufficiently verified, see Rules 804(5) and 803(23). *359 The official and business records exceptions would excuse the absence of the person or persons prepar | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission
green
1 sentence1978Before a witness may be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction, the court shall be advised of the existence of the conviction and shall rule if the witness may be impeached by proof of the conviction by weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect.” A statutory provision similar to this was sustained against constitutional attack in Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C.App.1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). 4 We find little in appellant’s constitutional argument which we did not consider in deciding Parish v. State, supra. We are | 1 | 1978–1978 |
McKinnon v. State
green
1 sentence1978In McKinnon , we held that “. . . where a defendant has been denied the right to be represented by his chosen counsel, the subsequent entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere does not shield a conviction from challenge on appeal, since the voluntariness and reliability of such plea is inherently suspect 526 P.2d at 24 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Jernigan v. Economy Exterminating Co.
green
1 sentence1978Before a witness may be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction, the court shall be advised of the existence of the conviction and shall rule if the witness may be impeached by proof of the conviction by weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect.” A statutory provision similar to this was sustained against constitutional attack in Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C.App.1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). 4 We find little in appellant’s constitutional argument which we did not consider in deciding Parish v. State, supra. We are | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Dixon v. United States
green
1 sentence1978Before a witness may be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction, the court shall be advised of the existence of the conviction and shall rule if the witness may be impeached by proof of the conviction by weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect.” A statutory provision similar to this was sustained against constitutional attack in Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C.App.1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). 4 We find little in appellant’s constitutional argument which we did not consider in deciding Parish v. State, supra. We are | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Coleman v. State green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Russell v. United States green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Carminati v. United States green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Dupuis v. Central & Southern Florida Flood Control District green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Myers v. United States neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Pollino v. Fay neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Sorce v. United States
green
2 sentences1965Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1964); Abramson v. United States, 326 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 957 , 84 S.Ct. 1636 , 12 L.Ed.2d 500 ; United States v. Galgano, 281 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir.1960), cert. denied, Carminati v. United States, 366 U.S. 960 , 81 S.Ct. 1916 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1253 , cert. denied, 366 U.S. 967 , 81 S.Ct. 1929 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1257 ; See Zerbinos v. Lewis, 394 P.2d 886, 890 (Alaska 1964), Briggs v. Kelly, 376 P.2d 715, 717 (Alaska 1962). 1965Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. [28] Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1964); Abramson v. United States, 326 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 957 , 84 S.Ct. 1636 , 12 L.Ed.2d 500 ; United States v. Galgano, 281 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir.1960), cert. denied, Carminati v. United States, 366 U.S. 960 , 81 S.Ct. 1916 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1253 , cert. denied, 366 U.S. 967 , 81 S.Ct. 1929 , 6 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.