In Re Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor. Metrobank, Creditor/appellant v. Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor/appellee, 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
In Re Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor. Metrobank, Creditor/appellant v. Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor/appellee, 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“e adopt the reasoning of the ... courts that have focused on the second sentence of section 506(a), and we now conclude that the value of lien interest is properly based on the retail value of the collateral”
70 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 27 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re Maddox (njd, 1996-09-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) In Re Maddox (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
D.N.J. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e adopt the reasoning of the ... courts that have focused on the second sentence of section 506(a), and we now conclude that the value of lien interest is properly based on the retail value of the collateral
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wade v. Solon State Bank (In Re Wade)
Bankr. D. Iowa · 2006 · confidence medium
This is known as the replacement-value standard, similar to that applied in In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531-32 (8th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Scott
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 2000 · confidence medium
And in Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530, 530 (8th Cir.1995), the parties stipulated that the wholesale value of the debtor’s pickup truck was $4,000, but that the retail value was $6,500, an increase of 38% over wholesale.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Gorham
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 2000 · confidence medium
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 957 , 117 S.Ct. 1879, 1882-83 , 138 L.Ed.2d 148 (1997); Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530, 530-31 (8th Cir.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Teigen
Bankr. D.S.D. · 1998 · confidence medium
Laws v. United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 188 B.R. 263, 269 (W.D.Mo.1995) (citing In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531 (8th Cir.1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Glueck
Bankr. S.D. Ohio · 1998 · confidence medium
In In re Roberts, 210 B.R. 325 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 1997), the court noted that it had previously utilized the “replacement value test” as set forth by the Eighth Circuit in In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531-32 (8th Cir.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Dunlap
Bankr. E.D. Ark. · 1997 · confidence medium
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 96-454, — U.S. -, ---, 117 S.Ct. 1879, 1886-87 , 138 L.Ed.2d 148 (1997); Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530, 531, 532 (8th Cir.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Roberts
Bankr. D. Iowa · 1997 · confidence medium
In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531-32 (8th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (2×)
SCOTUS · 1997 · confidence medium
Taffi v. United States, No. 96— 881; [2] In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F. 3d 72, 74-75 (CA1 1995); In re Trimble, 50 F. 3d 530, 531-532 (CA8 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Donald Taffi Madelaine Taffi, Debtors. Donald Taffi Madelaine Taffi v. United States
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Reaching this result, we put this circuit in harmony with all other circuits, except the Fifth, that have considered the question, In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531-2 (8th Cir.1995); In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72, 75-76 (1st Cir.1995); In re McClurkin, 31 F.3d 401, 405 (6th Cir.1994); In re Coker, 973 F.2d 258 , 260 (4th Cir.1992).
examined Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of Elray and Jean Rash, Debtor. Associates Commercial Corporation v. Elray Rash and Jean E. Rash (6×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
See Taffi v. United States, 68 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir.1995), reh’g en banc granted, 86 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1996); Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530, 531-32 (8th Cir.1995); Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Inst, for Sav.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Maddox
Bankr. D.N.J. · 1996 · confidence medium
Other courts holding that retail value is the proper measurement for purposes of determining the allowed amount of an underse-cured creditor’s secured claim in a Chapter 13 case include: In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 532 (8th Cir.1995) (“the purpose of the valuation is to determine the amount an underse-cured creditor will be paid for the debtor’s continued possession and use of the collateral, not to determine the amount such creditor would receive if it hypothetically had to repossess and sell the collateral.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re 203 North LaSalle Street Ltd. Partnership
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 1995 · confidence medium
However, the bank argues that it is improper as matter of law for any disposition costs to be used in valuing its interest in the debtor’s property, citing, among other decisions, In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72, 74 (1st Cir.1995); In re *578 Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 532 (8th Cir.1995); and In re Rash, 31 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir.1994), modified, 62 F.3d 685 , reh’g en banc granted, 68 F.3d 113 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Laws v. United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, NA
W.D. Mo. · 1995 · confidence medium
In this Circuit, the creditor’s interest is “valued in light of the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the collateral.” In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531 (8th Cir.1995). 9 Plaintiff has cited many decisions in support of his assertion that kited checks are “worthless.” United States v. McKinney, 822 F.2d 946 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Taylor, 789 F.2d 618 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Sher, 661 F.2d 34 (3d Cir.1981); Suhl v. United States, 390 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.1968); Falconi v. FDIC, 257 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.1958); Stevens v. United States, 227 F.2d …
examined Cited as authority (rule) In Re Donald Taffi Madelaine Taffi, Debtors. Donald Taffi Madelaine Taffi v. United States (8×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.1995); In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531 (8th Cir.1995); In re Rash, 31 F.3d 325, 328-29 (1994), modified, 62 F.3d 685 (5th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Madison
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 1995 · confidence medium
See, e.g., In re Rash, 31 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir.1994); Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530, 531 (8th Cir.1995); see also, In re Marshall, 181 B.R. at 603 n. 6 (collecting cases adopting retail valuation).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter Of: Elray RASH and Jean Rash, Debtors. ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Elray RASH and Jean Rash, Appellees
5th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Such an interpretation ignores the express dictates of section 506(a). 5 Id. at 531-32 (emphasis added, quotation from Rash, 31 F.3d at 329 , omitted).
cited Cited "see" In Re Hill
Bankr. E.D. Mo. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 532 (8th Cir.1995)(the replacement value of secured property is the retail value of the collater *524 al).
cited Cited "see" In Re Inter-City Beverage Co., Inc.
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 1997 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531-32 (8th Cir.1995) (ruling that replacement value was the proper valuation in the Eighth Circuit).
cited Cited "see" In Re Byington
Bankr. D. Kan. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531 (8th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Mitchell
Bankr. M.D. Ga. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir.1995); In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.1995); In re Rash, 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.1994), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 62 F.3d 685 (5th Cir.1995), reh’g en banc granted, 68 F.3d 113 (5th Cir.1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Donald Allen TRIMBLE, Debtor. Metrobank, Creditor/Appellant,
v.
Donald Allen TRIMBLE, Debtor/Appellee
94-1472.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Mar 14, 1995.
50 F.3d 530
Marcus Hubert, East Moline, IL, argued, for appellant., James C. Wherry, Davenport, IA, argued, for appellee.
Fagg, Ross, Magill.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant/creditor Metrobank appeals from the district court decision that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the value of the bank’s secured interest in an encumbered vehicle that the appel-lee/debtor intends to retain under his chapter 13 reorganization plan is limited to the wholesale value of the vehicle. We reverse.

I.

Appellee/debtor Donald Allen Trimble secured financing through appellant/creditor Metrobank, for the purchase of a 1988 Ford Ranger pickup. Subsequently, the debtor filed for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The principal balance owing on the truck at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy was $6,404.84. Under the proposed chapter 13 plan, Metrobank’s secured interest in the vehicle was valued at $4,000 with interest, while the remainder of the debt was unsecured, to be paid through the plan without interest. Although the plan provided that Metrobank’s claim would be paid in full, Metrobank objected to the plan, arguing that it was fully secured and that interest should be paid on the entire debt. [1] By a joint stipulation of fact, the parties agreed that the wholesale value of the vehicle is $4,000 and the retail value is $6,500. The bankruptcy court ruled that the bank was only secured to the extent of the wholesale value of the vehicle. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling.

II.

Section 1325(a)(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, if a debtor in chapter 13 intends to retain property subject to a lien, the secured creditor must receive the present value of its allowed secured claim. Unless the creditor’s present value is preserved, confirmation cannot occur over the creditor’s[*531] objections. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). The amount of a secured claim is determined by 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), which provides in relevant part:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property....

11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Courts interpreting section 506(a) have placed varying importance on the statute’s two clauses, resulting in disagreement as to the proper valuation method of a creditor’s secured claim. One line of cases determines that the decisive language of section 506(a) is the language of the first sentence which provides that the creditor’s claim is secured to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property. See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 303, 121 L.Ed.2d 226 (1992); In re Overholt, 125 B.R. 202, 214 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1990). The proponents of this theory contend that, based on the language of the first sentence of section 506(a), the property interest being valued is the creditor’s lien interest in the collateral and not the debtor’s ownership interest. According to this theory, because a lien is simply a right to take possession of the collateral and sell it in satisfaction of an obligation, the value of the lien is equal to the amount the creditor could receive upon sale of the collateral, or, in other words, the wholesale value of the collateral.

A second line of cases focuses instead on the language of the second sentence of section 506(a) which provides that the creditor’s lien interest must be valued in light of the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the collateral. See, e.g., In re Rash, 31 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir.1994); In re Green, 151 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr.D.Minn.1993). Under this theory, where the debtor intends to retain and use the collateral, the value of the creditor’s secured interest should be based upon the replacement cost to the debtor, or the retail value of the collateral. “[W]hen a debtor intends to continue use of creditor’s collateral, the Debtors are acknowledging the value of the collateral to be greater than if liquidated.” In re Rash, 31 F.3d at 329 (quoting In re Penz, 102 B.R. 826, 828 (Bankr.E.D.Okla.1989)). As the court wrote in Green:

It is true that the plain meaning of the first sentence of section 506(a) requires a valuation of the creditor’s lien interest in the collateral. However, the fact that a hen in property gives the lienholder a right to repossess and sell the collateral does not automatically mean that the value of the hen is equal to the amount that the creditor would receive upon disposition of the cohateral in satisfaction of its hen. It must be remembered that a hen is fundamentally a security interest which secures payment of an obhgation. To value such an interest in property based solely on the amount that could be realized upon sale of the collateral ignores the value associated with the right to receive the stream of payments that the hen secures.

In re Green, 151 B.R. at 505 (emphasis in original). Therefore, according to this theory, “the value of the creditor’s hen is derived from the stream of payments that the hen secures, rather than the right to foreclose, since no liquidation of the cohateral is contemplated.” In re Rash, 31 F.3d at 329 (quoting In re Green, 151 B.R. at 504). Nor should the costs associated with the sale of the cohateral be deducted since no sale is contemplated. Because the value of the creditor’s hen is to be determined in hght of the debtor’s intended use of the cohateral and the purpose of the valuation, the value will be dictated by the facts of each particular case. See S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854, 6312 (“[C]ourts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis.”).

We adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in In re Rash, and other courts that have focused on the second sentence of section[*532] 506(a), and we now conclude that the value of Metrobank’s lien interest is properly based on the retail value of the collateral without deduction for costs of sale. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the retad valuation method is the only method that gives full effect to the entire language of section 506(a). “If the first sentence of § 506(a) were interpreted to mean that the value must be fixed at the amount which the creditor would receive on foreclosure, then the last sentence of the statute which provides that the value should be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of the property, would be surplusage.” In re Rash, 31 F.3d at 329 (quoting In re Courtright, 57 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr.D.Or.1986)). Under the wholesale valuation method, the creditor’s interest would always be valued at the amount the creditor would receive upon disposition of the collateral, regardless of the purpose of the valuation or of the proposed disposition or use of the property. The wholesale method would not be affected by whether the debtor intended to release the property or intended, instead, to retain and use the property. Rather, where a debtor intends to retain and use the collateral, the purpose of the valuation is to determine the amount an underse-cured creditor will be paid for the debtor’s continued possession and use of the collateral, not to determine the amount such creditor would receive if it hypothetically had to repossess and sell the collateral. Such an interpretation ignores the express dictates of section 506(a).

Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude the amount of Metrobank’s secured claim is the lesser of the principal balance of the debt or the retail value of the encumbered vehicle, without deduction for costs of repossession or sale.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

. Because the debtor's plan proposes to pay unsecured claims in full, the only issue in the present case is the amount of interest to be paid. The parties estimate that perhaps $150 in interest is in dispute in this case.