green
Positive treatment
Issue: exhaustion requirementGA ↗
Issue: administrative exhaustion requirementGA ↗
Issue: administrative exhaustion requirementCA ↗
Issue: set-off claimGA ↗
Quoted verbatim 1×
31.8 score
G Cite
cited 4× by 2 distinct cases, 2012–2015 · 2 courts ·
…lake forest's claim for damages stemming from professional's refusal to fund the balance of the construction loan is clearly a claim against the assets of the failed institution rather than a defense which attacks aff's legal right to bring the action.
at p. 1265
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999
2012
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Starkey v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co.
the bank, having purchased the note from the fdic, stands in the shoes of the fdic and acquires its protected status under firrea
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Pardy & Rodriguez, PA v. Allstate Insurance Company
First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Settlers' Housing Service, Inc. v. Schaumburg Bank & Trust Co. (In re Settlers' Housing Service, Inc.)
First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Willner v. James Dimon
First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 1999) (defining an affirmative defense as “a response to a plaintiffs claim” and urging courts to “look beyond the nomenclature of a request for relief to ascertain whether ... the remedy sought by a party ... is encompassed by § 1821(d)(13)(D)”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
SunSouth Bank v. First NBC Bank
First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Stonecrest Land, LLC v. Res-Ga Scl, LLC
(19×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Thus, RES-GA is authorized to argue that it is protected by FIRREA’s administrative exhaustion requirement.7 Based on the language of 12 USC § 1821 (d) (13) (D), quoted above, the Eleventh Circuit and other circuit courts have held, “affirmative defenses are not subject to the requirements of exhaustion under [USC §] 1821 (d) (13) (D).” Lake Forest, 198 F3d at 1264 (B), and cases cited therein.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dennis E. Gravitt v. Bank of the Ozarks
(Punctuation omitted.) Bobick, 321 Ga. App. at 862 (3) (citing American First Fed. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 1999)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gravitt v. Bank of Ozarks
(Punctuation omitted.) Bobick, 321 Ga. App. at 862 (3) (citing American First Fed. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 1999)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Sally Bobick v. Community & Southern Bank
(7×)
also: Cited "see"
American First Fed. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 1999), quoting National Union Fire Ins. v. City Savings, 28 F.3d 376 , 393 (3d Cir.1994). 14 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has construed the limitation on judicial review imposed by 12 U. S. C. § 1821 (d) (13) (D) as establishing an administrative exhaustion requirement, and we find its reasoning persuasive.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Bobick v. Community & Southern Bank
(8×)
also: Cited "see"
American First Fed. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 1999), quoting National Union Fire Ins.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Westberg v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
See Village of Oakwood v. State Bank and Trust Co., 539 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that to allow claimants to circumvent the provisions of FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar by bringing claims against the assuming bank would encourage the very litigation that FIRREA aimed to avoid); and American First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, 198 F.3d 1259, n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that the acquiring bank “having purchased the note from the RTC, stands in the shoes of the RTC and acquires its protected status under FIRREA”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Front St. Constr., LLC v. Colonial Bank, N.A.
First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 1999); Aber-Shukofsky v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 755 F. Supp. 2d 441, 446-47 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Schettler v. RALRON CAPITAL CORPORATION
FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar does not apply to defenses or affirmative defenses Convincingly, a majority of courts addressing this issue have held that while FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar applies to claims and counterclaims, it does not apply to defenses and affirmative defenses. 4 See, e.g., American First Federal v. Lake Forest Park, 198 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that the “circuit courts that have addressed the question have held that affirmative defenses are not subject to the requirements of exhaustion under [FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar]”); Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 1…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Multibank 2009-1 Res-ADC Venture, LLC v. PineCrest at Neskowin, LLC
First Fed., 198 F.3d at 1264-65 (damage claim based on bank’s refusal to fully fund the construction loan at issue subject to FIR-REA’s exhaustion requirements); National Union, 28 F.3d at 386-95 (rescission is an affirmative defense and “a claim (or a counterclaim) is essentially an action which asserts a right to payment.”); Rundgren v. Wash. Mut.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Courtney, John W. v. Halleran, Neal T.
First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 1999); Maher v. Harris Trust & Sav.
cited
Cited "see"
FDIC v. Skow
See American First Federal, Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1264-65 (11th Cir.1999). .
discussed
Cited "see"
Lazarre v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(2×)
See Lake Forest Park, 198 F.3d at 1263 (noting that all categories of claims derived from the plain language of section 1821(d)(13)(D) are subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement of the FIRREA); see also Stamm, 121 F.3d at 642 (deferring to the Resolution Trust Corporation's construction of section 1821(d) so as to avoid the need for the court “to look beyond the plain language of [182 l(d)’s] jurisdictional bar”). 14 .
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
George Dernis v. Amos Financial LLC
See also American First Fed, Inc v Lake Forest Park, Inc, 198 F3d 1259 , 1263 n 3 (CA 11, 1999).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bloom v. Federal Deposit Insurance (In re First State Bancorporation)
See, e.g., Am First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259 , 1264 (11th Cir.1999) (agree ing “that an affirmative defense, that is, ‘a response to a plaintiffs claim which attacks the plaintiffs legal right to bring an action,’ ... is not subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement of Section 1821(d)(13)(D).”) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 38 (6th ed. 1991) (emphasis in original)); RTC v. Midwest Fed.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Federal Deposit Insurance v. OneBeacon Midwest Insurance
See, e.g., American First Federal, Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir.1999) (“Lake Forest’s claim for damages stemming from Professional’s refusal to fund the balance of the construction loan is clearly a claim against the assets of the failed institution rather than a defense which attacks AFF’s legal right to bring the action.”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Federal Deposit Insurance v. McFarland
See, e.g., American First Federal, Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir.1999); FDIC v. Scott, 125 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir.1997); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. v. City Sav., 28 F.3d 376, 393 (3d Cir.1994); RTC v. Midwest Fed.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Rory S. McFarland Texaco, Inc., Defendant-Third Party v. Premier Venture Capital Corp. David L. Jump, Third Party v. Dennis Joslin Co., L.L.C., Movant-Appellant
See, e.g., American First Federal, Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 1999); FDIC v. Scott, 125 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 1997); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. v. City Sav., 28 F.3d 376, 393 (3d Cir. 1994); RTC v. Midwest Fed.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
L. C., by Johnathan Zimring, as Guardian Ad Litem and Next Friend
v.
Tommy Olmstead, Commissioner of the Department of Human Resources
v.
Tommy Olmstead, Commissioner of the Department of Human Resources
97-8538.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Dec 21, 1999.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Citer courts: Massachusetts Appeals Court (1)
198 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 1999)
L. C., by Johnathan ZIMRING, as guardian ad litem
and next friend, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Tommy OLMSTEAD, Commissioner of the Department of
Human Resources; et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 97-8538
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 21, 1999.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
(No. 1:95-CV-1210-MHS); Marvin H. Shoob, Judge.
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Before TJOFLAT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and PROPST[*], Senior District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
1
We remand this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Olmstead v. L.C., --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999).
NOTES
*
Honorable Robert B. Propst, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.