administrative exhaustion requirement in California

2024By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in that the [DFEH’s] practice evidently is to issue a right-to- sue letter [citation] at the employee’s request as a matter of course [citations].” ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 83-84, fn. omitted.) To effectuate these purposes, the administrative exhaustion requirement is sat

2024(Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65 , 83 & 84, fn. 11.) The crucial exhaustion test is this: employees satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement if their court claims are like, and reasonably related to, the claims they stated in their administrative filing.

2021The administrative exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional unless the assessment is a “ ‘nullity as a matter of law.’ ” (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1264 .) In the present case, the assessment was not legally null: Even if the Assessor failed to follow the statutory procedure set out in section 531.8, that failure did not render the assessment a nullity because the real property at issue was not tax exempt, nonexistent, or outside the County’s jurisdiction.

2021The administrative exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional unless the assessment is a “ ‘nullity as a matter of law.’ ” (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1264 .) In the present case, the assessment was not legally null: Even if the Assessor failed to follow the statutory procedure set out in section 531.8, that failure did not render the assessment a nullity because the real property at issue was not tax exempt, nonexistent, or outside the County’s jurisdiction.

2019Code, § 12960, subds. (b), (d).) Thus, a plaintiff cannot sue for an act violating FEHA unless the plaintiff "specif[ied] that act in the administrative complaint." ( Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718 , 1724, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 .) Exhaustion of administrative remedies is " 'a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.' " ( Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61 , 70, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 , 5 P.3d 874 .) The administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if FEHA claims in the judicial complaint are " 'like and reasonably related to' " tho

2019Code, § 12960, subds. (b), (d).) Thus, a plaintiff cannot sue for an act violating FEHA unless the plaintiff "specif[ied] that act in the administrative complaint." ( Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718 , 1724, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 .) Exhaustion of administrative remedies is " 'a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.' " ( Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61 , 70, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 , 5 P.3d 874 .) The administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if FEHA claims in the judicial complaint are " 'like and reasonably related to' " tho

2019Code, § 12960, subds. (b), (d).) Thus, a plaintiff cannot sue for an act violating FEHA unless the plaintiff "specif[ied] that act in the administrative complaint." ( Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718 , 1724, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 .) Exhaustion of administrative remedies is " 'a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.' " ( Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61 , 70, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 , 5 P.3d 874 .) The administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if FEHA claims in the judicial complaint are " 'like and reasonably related to' " tho

2019Code, § 12960, subds. (b), (d).) Thus, a plaintiff cannot sue for an act violating FEHA unless the plaintiff "specif[ied] that act in the administrative complaint." ( Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718 , 1724, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 .) Exhaustion of administrative remedies is " 'a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.' " ( Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61 , 70, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 , 5 P.3d 874 .) The administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if FEHA claims in the judicial complaint are " 'like and reasonably related to' " tho

2013We see no basis for construing the statutes setting out the administrative exhaustion requirement so as to ignore actual notice the Board may have 4 The McKnight court observed that the exhaustion statues for sales and use taxes and income tax were identical, and it treated authorities involving sales and use taxes such as Preston, supra, 25 Cal.4th 197 equally persuasive.

2013We see no basis for construing the statutes setting out the administrative exhaustion requirement so as to ignore actual notice the Board may have 4 The McKnight court observed that the exhaustion statues for sales and use taxes and income tax were identical, and it treated authorities involving sales and use taxes such as Preston, supra, 25 Cal.4th 197 equally persuasive.

2025It found that the exhaustion requirement did not apply, but went on to separately conclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint had failed to offer anything more than conclusory allegations. ( Benson, supra, 673 F.3d at pp. 1216–1217.) 7 Indeed, Benson plainly rejects a test that would apply the administrative exhaustion requirement of section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) to any claim against a successor bank which broadly “relates to” the conduct of the failed bank.

2025It found that the exhaustion requirement did not apply, but went on to separately conclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint had failed to offer anything more than conclusory allegations. ( Benson, supra, 673 F.3d at pp. 1216–1217.) 7 Indeed, Benson plainly rejects a test that would apply the administrative exhaustion requirement of section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) to any claim against a successor bank which broadly “relates to” the conduct of the failed bank.

2025In Village of Oakwood v. State Bank & Trust Co. (6th Cir. 2008) 539 F.3d 373 , some uninsured depositors in a failed bank brought an action against a successor bank for aiding and abetting an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the FDIC as receiver for the failed bank.

2022(See Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321 .) If an administrative remedy is provided by statute or ordinance, “ ‘ “relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act.” [Citation.] The rule is a jurisdictional prerequisite in the sense that it “is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure laid down by courts . . . and binding upon all courts.” ’ ” (Clews Land & Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 161, 184 .) “For example, if the administrative procee

2021(See e.g., Gregory v. Georgia Dept. of Human Res. (11th Cir. 2004) 355 F.3d 1277 .) Consistent with these principles, the administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the FEHA claims in the judicial complaint are likely and reasonably related to those in the DFEH complaint, or are likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation.

2021(See e.g., Gregory v. Georgia Dept. of Human Res. (11th Cir. 2004) 355 F.3d 1277 .) Consistent with these principles, the administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the FEHA claims in the judicial complaint are likely and reasonably related to those in the DFEH complaint, or are likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation.

2021III.B.3, ante, discussing Alexander, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 251–252; Cole, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1515 ; Valdez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1061 .) ALSC fails to present any argument as to how the purposes of the administrative exhaustion doctrine are thwarted in a case such as this where it is clear that Clark intended to name ALSC in her DFEH Complaint, there was no administrative investigation because the DFEH Complaint, right-to- sue notice and judicial complaint were all filed on the same day, and Clark amended her judicial complaint to properly name ALSC as a defendant a week

2021III.B.3, ante, discussing Alexander, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 251–252; Cole, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1515 ; Valdez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1061 .) ALSC fails to present any argument as to how the purposes of the administrative exhaustion doctrine are thwarted in a case such as this where it is clear that Clark intended to name ALSC in her DFEH Complaint, there was no administrative investigation because the DFEH Complaint, right-to- sue notice and judicial complaint were all filed on the same day, and Clark amended her judicial complaint to properly name ALSC as a defendant a week

2021III.B.3, ante, discussing Alexander, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 251–252; Cole, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1515 ; Valdez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1061 .) ALSC fails to present any argument as to how the purposes of the administrative exhaustion doctrine are thwarted in a case such as this where it is clear that Clark intended to name ALSC in her DFEH Complaint, there was no administrative investigation because the DFEH Complaint, right-to- sue notice and judicial complaint were all filed on the same day, and Clark amended her judicial complaint to properly name ALSC as a defendant a week

2021III.B.3, ante, discussing Alexander, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 251–252; Cole, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1515 ; Valdez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1061 .) ALSC fails to present any argument as to how the purposes of the administrative exhaustion doctrine are thwarted in a case such as this where it is clear that Clark intended to name ALSC in her DFEH Complaint, there was no administrative investigation because the DFEH Complaint, right-to- sue notice and judicial complaint were all filed on the same day, and Clark amended her judicial complaint to properly name ALSC as a defendant a week

2020It ruled the District’s single “uniform per-EDU rate for residential customers” was valid. 2 DISCUSSION The Administrative Remedy Exhaustion Doctrine Under section 1094.5, “ ‘[t]he general rule is that a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is conducted solely on the record of the proceeding before the administrative agency.’ ” (Cooper v. Kizer (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1291, 1300 .) It is normally “ ‘ “error for the court to permit the record to be augmented, in the absence of a proper preliminary foundation . . . showing . . . one of [the] exceptions [to this rule].” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “Pub

2019The Legislature has subjected such questions to an administrative exhaustion requirement precisely to obtain the benefit of the Board's expertise, permit it to correct mistakes, and save judicial resources." ( Loeffler , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1127 , 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 , 324 P.3d 50 .) We explained that allowing consumers to sue retailers under consumer protection statutes "based on a dispute over the taxability of a sale would require resolution of the taxability question in a manner inconsistent with this system, forfeiting these benefits." ( Ibid. ) In light of Loeffler , we reject plain

2019The Legislature has subjected such questions to an administrative exhaustion requirement precisely to obtain the benefit of the Board's expertise, permit it to correct mistakes, and save judicial resources." ( Loeffler , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1127 , 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 , 324 P.3d 50 .) We explained that allowing consumers to sue retailers under consumer protection statutes "based on a dispute over the taxability of a sale would require resolution of the taxability question in a manner inconsistent with this system, forfeiting these benefits." ( Ibid. ) In light of Loeffler , we reject plain

2018And, even taken on their own terms, these authorities stand only for the proposition that a plaintiff should be excused from failing to raise a noncompliance issue where a misleading project description—or complete lack of notice—has misled a plaintiff into believing there is no noncompliance issue at all. (§ 21177, subd. (e); Temecula Band, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 434 .) It does not apply where the public agency has accurately provided notice of a public hearing, but it misstates the applicable procedures to appeal the decision made at that hearing. 32 Instead, a plaintiff's remedy in thi

2018We see no basis for construing the statutes setting out the administrative exhaustion requirement so as to ignore actual notice the [FTB] may have had from sources other than the four corners of the initial claim." ( Id. at pp. 986-987, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 339 .) Analogously, here, although no class claim was filed, the FTB has actual notice-from its own records-of the identities of the thousands of individual taxpayers who have exhausted their administrative remedies by filing individual claims and the bases for those claims.

2016(See Fahlen, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 677-678.) The court recognized that it makes little sense to impose an administrative exhaustion requirement for a complaint about unsafe patient practices where the very administrative proceeding to be exhausted – focused on the complainer‘s own conduct – cannot itself afford any relief.

2015For example, in National Union, supra, 28 F.3d 376 , the court found the administrative exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable to the party's contract rescission defense, noting that because "a party cannot know what her defense is until she hears the claim leveled against her, it seems it would be nearly impossible for a party to submit future hypothetical defenses to the administrative claims procedure . . . ." (Id. at p. 395.) In this case, the Church's claims were not unknown or dependent on the nature of First- Citizens' claims.

2015(American First, supra, at p. 1264.) "Whether a request for relief is titled an affirmative defense or a counterclaim is not dispositive to the question of subject matter jurisdiction." (Ibid.) "Courts should not allow parties to avoid the procedural bar of [section] 1821(d)(13)(D) by simply labelling what is actually a counterclaim as a defense or affirmative defense." (National Union, supra, 28 F.3d at p. 394 .) The administrative exhaustion requirement applies if "the remedy sought by a party, 16 regardless of its label, . . . is in reality a claim against the assets or actions of the faile