State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1979). · Go Syfert
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State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
8 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Clarence Bruce Beaulieu (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Minn. · 2015 · confidence medium
The court rejected both arguments, concluding in part that under the circumstances of Beaulieu’s case, one could assume he “was adequately informed of his rights because he was represented by counsel.” State v. Beaulieu, No. A12-2192, 2013 WL 4779046 , at *4 (Minn. App. Sept. 9, 2013) (citing State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. 1979) (explaining that a presumption arose that the defendants had been fully advised of their rights when the record revealed that both defendants had discussed their cases with their respective attorneys)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) German N. Salgado Velasquez v. State of Minnesota
Minn. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. 1979); see also State v. Propotnik, 299 Minn. 56, 58 , 216 N.W.2d 637, 638 (1974) (collecting cases supporting the presumption that when a “defendant had full opportunity to consult with his counsel before entering his plea, we may safely presume that counsel informed him adequately concerning” a right on which he was not “specifically” questioned); cf. State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that when a defendant has no attorney “the duty of inquiry” falls upon the district court).
discussed Cited "see" Cedric Lamont Berry v. State of Minnesota
Minn. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37 , 38 & n.2 (Minn. 1979) (“[E]ven without an express representation by defense counsel that he had advised the defendant of his rights, one may properly presume that counsel had given such advice.” (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976)).
discussed Cited "see" State of Minnesota v. Sylvester Jones
Minn. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. 1979). 12 Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426 , 432–33 (Minn. 1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1992) (factual basis established by testimony from partial trial); Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 589 (factual basis established by grand jury transcript).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Minnesota
v.
Lance Allen LORENTZ, Appellant and STATE of Minnesota v. Kim Marie LORENTZ
Nos. 48569, 48734.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Jan 26, 1979.
276 N.W.2d 37
Kurzman & Manahan, Minneapolis, for appellants., Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., William Randall, County Atty., Steven C. DeCoster, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

These combined appeals are from separate orders of the district court denying separate motions of defendants (who are siblings) to withdraw their guilty pleas.[1] [*38] The issue in each appeal relates to whether the defendant’s plea was intelligently — that is, knowingly and understandingly — entered. We affirm.

Defendants contend basically that their respective defense counsel failed to adequately inform them that if their cases went to trial the state would have to prove that the substance that they were charged with possessing was in fact marijuana and that they had a right to call their own experts to challenge the conclusions of the state’s experts. The records reveal that both defendants were questioned by the trial court regarding their understanding of the charges, their desire to plead guilty, and their knowledge of their procedural rights. Additionally, the records reveal that both defendants had discussed their cases with their respective attorneys; therefore, a presumption arose that they had been fully advised of their rights.[2] Accordingly, under the approach that we have taken in numerous cases, the records must be deemed adequate to support a conclusion that the pleas were intelligently (as well as voluntarily) entered. See, e. g., State v. Nace, 308 Minn. 170, 241 N.W.2d 101 (1976).

Affirmed.

1

Both defendants were originally charged with possession of marijuana with intent to sell. Defendant Kim Lorentz, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to this charge in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to recommend a presentence investigation and a limit of 2 years on the maximum sentence, which otherwise would have been 5 years. The court sentenced Ms. Lorentz to a 2-year prison term. Defendant Lance Lorentz pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of possession of marijuana and was sentenced to 3 years in prison but was[*38] placed on probation, the first year to be served in the workhouse.

2

Support for relying on this presumption of adequate advice, which this court has done in numerous cases, see, e. g., State v. Propotnik, 299 Minn. 56, 216 N.W.2d 637 (1974), may be found in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647, 96 S.ct. 2253, 2258, 49 L.Ed.2d 108, 115-16 (1976), where the court said that even without an express representation by defense counsel that he had advised the defendant of his rights, one may properly presume that counsel had given such advice.