Jones factors in Minnesota

2026The Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony and Centrality of Credibility The supreme court has held that “[i]f credibility is a central issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions.” State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006).

2026See id. at 655-56 (holding that although a prior assault conviction was similar to the charged offense, the remaining Jones factors favored admission).

2024A district court errs when it rules on the admissibility of a prior conviction without demonstrating “on the record that it has considered and weighed the Jones factors.” Id. at 655 .

2024A district court errs when it rules on the admissibility of a prior conviction without demonstrating “on the record that it has considered and weighed the Jones factors.” Id. at 655 .

2016This is not simply a case of a failure to make a record of the Jones analysis, see, e.g., State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. App. 2001) (affirming when the district court applied the correct standard but failed to make a record of the Jones factors and application of the Jones factors showed that the prior conviction was admissible), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001); rather, there was no Jones analysis and the prior theft convictions were held admissible under the wrong standard.

2016This is not simply a case of a failure to make a record of the Jones analysis, see, e.g., State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. App. 2001) (affirming when the district court applied the correct standard but failed to make a record of the Jones factors and application of the Jones factors showed that the prior conviction was admissible), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001); rather, there was no Jones analysis and the prior theft convictions were held admissible under the wrong standard.

2017Souder directs us specifically to State v. Ihnot, where the supreme court applied the Jones factors and provided that rule 609(b)’s ten-year period is calculated to end on the date of the current charged offense. 575 N.W.2d 581, 585-86 (Minn. 1998).

2017Souder directs us specifically to State v. Ihnot, where the supreme court applied the Jones factors and provided that rule 609(b)’s ten-year period is calculated to end on the date of the current charged offense. 575 N.W.2d 581, 585-86 (Minn. 1998).

2016See State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2007) (“[I]t is error for a district court to fail to make a record of its consideration of the Jones factors, though the error is harmless if it is nonetheless clear that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit evidence of the convictions.”).

2016See State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2007) (“[I]t is error for a district court to fail to make a record of its consideration of the Jones factors, though the error is harmless if it is nonetheless clear that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit evidence of the convictions.”).

2017A district court must consider the five Jones factors when determining whether the probative value of impeachment evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect: “‘(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the 9 conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime . . . , (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.’” State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Minn. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978)).

2016After considering the Jones factors discussed in State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Minn. 2011), the district court issued an order allowing appellant to be impeached with evidence that he had an unspecified felony conviction from 2013,1 a third-degree burglary conviction from 2010,2 and either an aiding and abetting first-degree burglary conviction or a third-degree burglary conviction, that were both from 2007.

2017See Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 656 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion under rule 609(a) because only the third Jones factor weighed against admitting the prior convictions); State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980) (concluding that it was not a clear abuse of discretion to allow evidence of defendant’s prior rape for impeachment in a sexual-assault trial even though the third Jones factor weighed against admitting it); State v. Irby, 820 N.W.2d 30, 38 (Minn. App. 2012) (concluding that the third Jones factor weighed against admitting a conviction, but that th

2017See Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 656 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion under rule 609(a) because only the third Jones factor weighed against admitting the prior convictions); State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980) (concluding that it was not a clear abuse of discretion to allow evidence of defendant’s prior rape for impeachment in a sexual-assault trial even though the third Jones factor weighed against admitting it); State v. Irby, 820 N.W.2d 30, 38 (Minn. App. 2012) (concluding that the third Jones factor weighed against admitting a conviction, but that th

2016See Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655–56 (evaluating fourth and fifth Jones factors together); State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993) (same).

2016See Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655 (grouping the fourth and fifth Jones factors together); State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993) (same).

2014Id.; State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006); State v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 453, 469 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d, 826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013); State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001); State v. Lund, 474 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. App. 1991).

2002See Lund, 474 N.W.2d at 172 (finding Jones factors satisfied even when district court did not record consideration of factors).

2016Those factors are often considered together and “[i]f credibility is a central issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions.” Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655 ; accord State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Minn. 2007).

2012See State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Minn.2007) (“If credibility is a central issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions.” (quotation omitted)).

2014See State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Minn. 2003) (citing Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 587 ) (stating that the fourth and fifth factors of the Jones analysis are satisfied if the defendant’s credibility is a central issue in the case), overruled by State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 2005); State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993) (stating that the importance-of-defendant’s-testimony factor supports exclusion of impeachment evidence if, by admitting it, a defendant’s account of the events would not be heard by the jury). 9 Flowers also contends that, because his prior conviction and the pre

2014See State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Minn. 2003) (citing Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 587 ) (stating that the fourth and fifth factors of the Jones analysis are satisfied if the defendant’s credibility is a central issue in the case), overruled by State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 2005); State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993) (stating that the importance-of-defendant’s-testimony factor supports exclusion of impeachment evidence if, by admitting it, a defendant’s account of the events would not be heard by the jury). 9 Flowers also contends that, because his prior conviction and the pre

2016See State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 627 (Minn. 2013) (stating that Jones established “five factors relevant to determining if a prior conviction is more probative than prejudicial”); Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 654 (noting the district court examines the Jones factors to determine if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect).

2016See State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 627 (Minn. 2013) (stating that Jones established “five factors relevant to determining if a prior conviction is more probative than prejudicial”); Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 654 (noting the district court examines the Jones factors to determine if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect).

2014See State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Minn. 2003) (citing Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 587 ) (stating that the fourth and fifth factors of the Jones analysis are satisfied if the defendant’s credibility is a central issue in the case), overruled by State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 2005); State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993) (stating that the importance-of-defendant’s-testimony factor supports exclusion of impeachment evidence if, by admitting it, a defendant’s account of the events would not be heard by the jury). 9 Flowers also contends that, because his prior conviction and the pre

2014See State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Minn. 2003) (citing Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 587 ) (stating that the fourth and fifth factors of the Jones analysis are satisfied if the defendant’s credibility is a central issue in the case), overruled by State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 2005); State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993) (stating that the importance-of-defendant’s-testimony factor supports exclusion of impeachment evidence if, by admitting it, a defendant’s account of the events would not be heard by the jury). 9 Flowers also contends that, because his prior conviction and the pre

2024See State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. 1979). 12 Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426 , 432–33 (Minn. 1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1992) (factual basis established by testimony from partial trial); Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 589 (factual basis established by grand jury transcript).

2024See State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. 1979). 12 Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426 , 432–33 (Minn. 1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1992) (factual basis established by testimony from partial trial); Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 589 (factual basis established by grand jury transcript).

2024Although K.S. gave conflicting testimony about whether Jones said anything during the moments surrounding the second-degree assault, “we ‘view the evidence in a light most 8 favorable to the verdict and assume the fact-finder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict’ when considering whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict.” State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537 , 551 (Minn. 2023) (quoting State v. Chomnarith, 654 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn. 2003)).

2024See State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. 1979). 12 Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426 , 432–33 (Minn. 1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1992) (factual basis established by testimony from partial trial); Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 589 (factual basis established by grand jury transcript).

2017See Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 656 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion under rule 609(a) because only the third Jones factor weighed against admitting the prior convictions); State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980) (concluding that it was not a clear abuse of discretion to allow evidence of defendant’s prior rape for impeachment in a sexual-assault trial even though the third Jones factor weighed against admitting it); State v. Irby, 820 N.W.2d 30, 38 (Minn. App. 2012) (concluding that the third Jones factor weighed against admitting a conviction, but that th

2017See Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 656 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion under rule 609(a) because only the third Jones factor weighed against admitting the prior convictions); State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980) (concluding that it was not a clear abuse of discretion to allow evidence of defendant’s prior rape for impeachment in a sexual-assault trial even though the third Jones factor weighed against admitting it); State v. Irby, 820 N.W.2d 30, 38 (Minn. App. 2012) (concluding that the third Jones factor weighed against admitting a conviction, but that th

2017Moreover, to reduce the possibility of any unfair prejudice, the district court gave a limiting instruction requiring the jury “to consider any previous conviction only as it may affect the weight of the defendant’s testimony” and to “not consider any previous conviction as evidence of guilt.” This court presumes “that juries follow instructions given by the [district] court.” State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 151 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

2017Moreover, to reduce the possibility of any unfair prejudice, the district court gave a limiting instruction requiring the jury “to consider any previous conviction only as it may affect the weight of the defendant’s testimony” and to “not consider any previous conviction as evidence of guilt.” This court presumes “that juries follow instructions given by the [district] court.” State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 151 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

2017“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).

2017“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).

2016See State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 29-30 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that a reasonable belief may negate the existence of a mental state essential to a charged crime).

2016See State v. Ross, 491 N.W.2d 658, 659-60 (Minn. 1992) (declining to remand for a new trial when a burglary 7 conviction erroneously admitted under rule 609(a)(2) could have been admitted under the “balancing approach of [r]ule 609(a)(1)”).

2016While we recognize that, despite this error, we may conduct our own Jones analysis, what sets this case apart is that it is not at all “clear that the [district] court could have 12 admitted the conviction[s] for impeachment purposes under the balancing approach of [r]ule 609(a)(1).” See Ross, 491 N.W.2d at 660 .

2016See Huber, 877 N.W.2d at 527 (explaining that a “large quantum” of evidence presented by the state may be sufficient to overcome prejudice caused by instructional error).

2015See State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Minn. 1984) (stating that allowing prior convictions to come in under the Jones factors did not prevent the jury from hearing a defendant’s version of events because a police officer told the jury what the defendant’s version was).

2015See State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Minn. 1984) (stating that allowing prior convictions to come in under the Jones factors did not prevent the jury from hearing a defendant’s version of events because a police officer told the jury what the defendant’s version was).

2015This court can “[consider the Jones factors] on appeal in determining whether the [district] court erred in the exercise of its discretion.” Laughnan v. State, 404 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. June 9, 1987).

2015This court can “[consider the Jones factors] on appeal in determining whether the [district] court erred in the exercise of its discretion.” Laughnan v. State, 404 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. June 9, 1987).

2014Id.; State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006); State v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 453, 469 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d, 826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013); State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001); State v. Lund, 474 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. App. 1991).

2014Id.; State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006); State v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 453, 469 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d, 826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013); State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001); State v. Lund, 474 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. App. 1991).

2013As the parties discuss, in Jones, we laid out five factors relevant to determining if a prior conviction is more probative than prejudicial: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the date of conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history; (8) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. 271 N.W.2d at 537-38 ; see also Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 518-20 (applying Jones factors).