¹ Although the Appellant contends his sentence is excessive, his violation of probation is not the subject of this appeal. 2 We have reordered the Appellant’s issues for clarity. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Thomas Thomas, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION On May 11, 2019, the Appellant stabbed and killed Decora Alexander, the victim, at the Appelant’s home. After receiving calls of a disturbance, an officer attempted to force open the bolted front door of the home. The Appellant exited covered in blood with his throat cut and told the police, “She’s dead; I killed her.” The lifeless body of the victim was found inside the Appellant’s bedroom. After being treated for his injuries, the Appellant was arrested fifteen days later. In October 2019, he was indicted for first degree murder and mistreatment of a corpse and was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. Pretrial Delay. Because the Appellant alleges he was denied his right to a speedy trial, we outline below the pretrial proceedings relevant to his claim, including motions related to electronic files the Appellant correctly believed the State had not provided him in discovery, defense motions for continuances, and the death of the Appellant’s retained counsel. The Appellant was appointed his first counsel shortly after his arrest. On February 5, 2020, the trial court ordered the State to return cash taken from the Appellant’s home to the Appellant. As a result, the Appellant was no longer considered indigent and the court ordered the Appellant to retain private counsel. On February 18, 2020, retained counsel filed a notice of appearance. The Appellant’s trial was initially scheduled to begin May 17, 2021. While represented by retained counsel, the Appellant filed a pro se discovery request on June 4, 2020. Around eight months later on February 1, 2021, the Appellant filed a pro se motion for sanctions for failure to comply with the discovery request. He alleged that the State had not allowed him to copy or inspect “electronics and electronic storage devices” that were “likely instrumental in preparing a defense[.]” The trial court held a hearing on the motion on March 1, 2021. The Appellant testified that the State had “disks,” body camera footage, and lab results he had not been allowed to copy or inspect. The State said they had provided all of the evidence they intended to use at trial. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions stating, “So . . . the district attorney says they’ve given everything back. [The Appellant] is really not able to say that they haven’t.” On May 3, 2021, two weeks before the scheduled trial, retained counsel requested a continuance because “[t]here [was] still discovery coming in” and there was “other

³ The record does not contain a transcript of the hearing on the Appellant’s second motion for continuance.

⁴ The record does not contain a transcript of the hearing on the substitution of counsel.

⁵ The record does not contain a transcript of the oral motion to dismiss.

⁶ Although there are references in the record to this witness by her maiden name, we will use the name referred to by the witness in her testimony.

⁷ See In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM 2020-00428 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2020) (Order) (suspending jury trials through March 31, 2020); In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Mar. 25, 2020) (Order) (extending suspension through April 30, 2020); In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020- 00428 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2020) (Order) (extending suspension through July 3, 2020); In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2020) (Order) (suspending jury trials from November 23, 2020 through January 31, 2021); In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2020) (Order) (extending suspension through February 26, 2021); In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2021) (Order) (extending suspension through March 31, 2021). - 14 - The trial court rescheduled the Appellant’s trial four times—three times after the Appellant’s motions to continue, and once after the Appellant’s retained counsel died. The delay caused by the death of retained counsel does not weigh against either party. The delay caused by the Appellant’s requests for continuances, however, weighs against the Appellant. Because the missing discovery was part of the reason for the requests, the weight is slight. Still, we decline to attribute this delay to the State. The Appellant’s retained counsel requested the first continuance both because the Appellant was requesting more discovery and because counsel had not finished reviewing the provided discovery. He requested the second continuance solely because he had not finished reviewing the provided discovery. The Appellant, while acting pro se, requested the third continuance because his forensic expert had allegedly not yet received the electronic data. Because the first two continuances were in part, or solely, because the Appellant’s retained counsel had not finished reviewing discovery, the reason for delay weighs slightly against the Appellant. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2009) (“delay caused by the defendant’s counsel is also charged against the defendant”). C. Assertion of the Right. A defendant’s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is not a waiver of the right, but “will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; see also Bishop, 493 S.W.2d at 84. The Appellant alleges that he vaguely asserted his right on July 27, 2021, when he “orally inquired of the trial court ‘why some of this took so long’ while he was ‘just . . . sitting and waiting’ in prison[.]” He emphasizes this court’s previous statement that “[e]ven a vague request for a more timely trial that does not explicitly mention the Sixth Amendment guarantee or the desire for a speedy trial is sufficient to be considered an assertion of the right.” State v. Nichols, No. E2008-00169-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2633099, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2010) (citing State v. Easterly, 77 S.W.3d 226, 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)). The State responds that the Appellant’s comments were not a demand for a speedy trial and, therefore, the Appellant did not assert his right until December 20, 2021. We agree with the State that the Appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until December 20, 2021, two years and seven months after his arrest. His trial began five months later. Though a defendant can assert his right without explicitly mentioning the Sixth Amendment or his desire for a speedy trial, we decline to construe the Appellant’s isolated comment on July 27, 2021 as an assertion of his right to a speedy trial. Because the Appellant’s assertion of his right was not timely, this factor weighs only slightly in the Appellant’s favor. D. Prejudice to the Defendant. The most important factor is whether the accused suffered prejudice from the delay. Simmons, 54 S.W.3d at 760. This factor is assessed in light of the interests the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect—preventing oppressive - 15 - pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused, and limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Id.; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. However, “pretrial anxiety and concern are always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual showing [are] not likely to be determinative in [a] defendant’s favor.” Moon, 644 S.W.3d at 80 (quoting State v. Hernandez, No. M2016-02511-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 2150171, at *40 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2019)) (internal quotations omitted). The Appellant argues that the State’s “failure to locate and turn over [certain evidence] severely hampered [the Appellant’s] ability to prepare a defense for trial and greatly increased his anxiety and concern because he knew that additional evidence was missing all along.” The State responds that the Appellant failed to show prejudice because he “did not seek admission of [the] files as evidence and he fails to show that they would have been relevant to any issue before the court.” The Appellant does not allege, nor does the record show, that the three-year delay prejudiced his defense at trial. The Appellant obtained the missing videos before trial and did not introduce them at trial. Though the Appellant’s knowledge that the State had additional video evidence that it had not provided in discovery caused him pretrial anxiety and concern, this anxiety and concern alone does not establish prejudice in light of the other Barker factors. In the absence of any discernable prejudice, this factor weighs against the Appellant. After balancing the Barker factors, we conclude that the Appellant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. The three-year delay was caused by COVID-19, the death of the Appellant’s retained counsel, and the Appellant’s requests for continuances. The Appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until two years and seven months after his arrest. Additionally, the Appellant suffered no discernable prejudice. The Appellant is therefore not entitled to relief. II. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder. The Appellant challenges that he committed the killing “knowingly.” The State responds, and we agree, that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. “Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)). “Appellate courts evaluating the sufficiency of the convicting evidence must determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any - 16 - rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010)). The jury as the trier of fact must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’ testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)). This court “neither re-weighs the evidence nor substitutes its inferences for those drawn by the jury.” Wagner, 382 S.W.3d at 297 (citing State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)). As convicted in this case, second degree murder is the “knowing killing of another[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). In order to establish this offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “(1) the defendant killed the victim, and (2) the defendant committed the killing with a ‘knowing’ state of mind.” State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883, 904 (Tenn. 2011). To prove that the Appellant “knowingly” killed the victim, the State was required to show that his actions were: [K]nowing[] with respect to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-11-302(b). The Tennessee Supreme Court has provided guidance in determining whether a defendant “knowingly” kills a victim: Because this Court has determined that “[s]econd degree murder is a result of conduct offense,” State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 431-32 (Tenn. 2010), “[t]he ‘nature of the conduct’ that causes death or the manner in which one is killed is inconsequential under the second degree murder statute. The statute focuses purely on the result and punishes an actor who knowingly causes another’s death.” State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tenn. 2000). Thus, the proof to support the mens rea element of second degree murder needs to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt only that the accused “knew that his or her actions were reasonably certain to cause the victim’s death.” Brown, 311 S.W.3d at 432. - 17 - Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 904. The Appellant argues that he did not “knowingly” kill the victim because he was not aware of his actions at the time of the victim’s death. The Appellant refers to his testimony during trial wherein he claimed an inability to remember the events after the physical fight between him and the victim began. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the proof at trial established that the Appellant was aware that his conduct could have reasonably resulted in the victim’s death. The victim sustained forty injuries to her head, neck, torso, and extremities by multiple weapons. The Appellant testified to attacking the victim in self-defense. Though he was unsure which knife he used in the killing, the Appellant did not deny that he had used a knife to stab the victim. Based on these facts, a rational jury could have found the Appellant knowingly killed the victim. See State v. Norman, No. M2009-01246-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3448108, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2010) (holding that the jury could reasonably conclude based upon the defendant’s choice to use an axe in response to a deadly threat that he was aware striking the victim with it was reasonably certain to cause death); State v. Raines, No. E2007-00840-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2152495, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support second degree murder where the defendant pulled a pistol and fired a single shot at an unarmed victim after victim threatened and then approached defendant). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the Appellant’s conviction of second degree murder, and he is not entitled to relief. III. Self-Defense Instruction. The Appellant next argues the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on self-defense after the issue was properly raised in the proof. He contends that the trial court’s reliance on Benson during its ruling does not take into consideration the Appellant’s own testimony that the victim had a knife in her hand at one point. The State responds that the Appellant failed to show a fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm in its case-in-chief and failed to properly raise a claim of self- defense. The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 6. Proceeding from this right to a jury trial is a defendant’s “right to a correct and complete charge of the law.” Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 280 (citing State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000)). “An instruction should be considered prejudicially erroneous only if the jury charge, when read as a whole, fails to fairly submit the legal issues or misleads the jury as to the applicable law.” State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. 2005). Because the propriety of jury instructions is a mixed question of law and fact, the standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 245 (Tenn. 2016). Erroneous jury instructions are subjected to a “harmless error” analysis and will be considered - 18 - prejudicial error if they “mislead the jury as to the applicable law or fail to ‘fairly submit’ the relevant legal issues, such as available defenses.” State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 101 (Tenn. 1998)). Self-defense must be fairly raised by the proof to be submitted to the jury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-203(c); Benson, 600 S.W.3d at 903. “When determining if a defense has been fairly raised by the proof, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, including all reasonable inferences that can be made in the defendant's favor.” Benson, 600 S.W.3d at 903 (citing Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d at 129). If self-defense is submitted to the jury, the State has the burden of negating the defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Appellant argues that he killed the victim in self-defense. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(b)(2) (2017), which was in effect at the time of the offense, states: (2) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if: (A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury; (B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and (C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds. Citing Benson, the trial court found that there was not a reasonable belief that the Appellant was in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury. The trial court reasoned as follows: Now, the [Appellant] testified that when they were in the kitchen [], the victim, said I’m going to get a knife and cut him -- cut you. But [the Appellant] didn’t let her get to the knife. He pushed her towards the living room, he yelled for help. He -- they walked back into the bedroom, he followed her. And that’s where the killing occurred. The Benson case talks about self-defense in two different ways. I mean, clearly self-defense -- obviously, if you were using non-lethal self-defense - 19 - versus lethal self-defense. And . . . Justice Page said the bar is substantially higher for one trying to fairly raise the issue of the valid use of deadly force. The person has to have a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. I mean, I don’t know that [the Appellant] testified to that. The danger of creating the belief of imminent death or bodily injury must be real or honestly believed to be real and the danger was founded upon reasonable grounds. Well, I mean, it’s sort of an analogy that if someone said hey, I’m going to shoot you, but didn’t have a gun, could you take a gun and shoot them. If she says I’m going to cut you, but didn’t have a knife, could he reasonably fear enough to stab her to death? Well, the analogy would be the same. If I said I was going to shoot you, but didn’t have a gun, then I couldn’t shoot you. So it would not be reasonable to shoot and kill the person who made the threat. So I’m holding that it’s not been fairly raised by the evidence. I don’t think there’s a reasonable belief that he was in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury at the hands of Ms. Alexander. So I’m not going to charge self-defense. During the motion for new trial hearing, the trial court acknowledged the second confrontation in the Appellant’s bedroom and found “the proof in this case was solely the [Appellant’s] testimony[,]” which “could be sufficient . . . from time to time, to warrant a self-defense argument.” However, the trial court stated that “no proof, no photographs, nothing [] showed a box of knives in the bedroom.” Accordingly, the trial court again concluded that self-defense was not fairly raised by the proof. In Benson, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to fairly raise the proof necessary to show he “reasonably feared imminent death or serious bodily injury to justify his use of deadly force.” 600 S.W.3d at 907. When punched in the nose by a small, unarmed woman during a verbal altercation, the defendant responded by pulling out his handgun and fatally shooting her five times. Id. at 900. The victim sustained one gunshot wound to her left cheek, one wound to her upper chest, one to her right shoulder, and two to the left of her back. Id. The defendant argued self-defense at trial, claiming that the victim had been the first aggressor and initiated the events that led to her being fatally shot. Id. The court concluded that though the defendant raised the proof necessary to argue non-lethal self-defense in response to being punched, he had not met the higher threshold required for the use of deadly force. Id. at 907. This bar was not met because the proof at trial showed that the victim was unarmed and there was no reasonable threat of death or serious bodily injury. Id. The record shows that the Appellant testified during cross-examination that the victim threatened to harm him right before she reached for a nearby knife. As the trial court made its initial ruling during trial, it reflected solely on the initial confrontation in the - 20 - kitchen where the Appellant testified he kept the victim away from the knife. However, the confrontation continued beyond that point, and, unlike Benson, the Appellant in the present case testified to a more imminent danger than an unarmed attack. The Appellant claimed that immediately after the victim reached for a knife in the kitchen, she went to his bedroom and again reached for a weapon in the junk drawer near the entrance. She continued to threaten that she was going to “cut or stab” him as she attempted to grab a knife. After that, the Appellant testified that a physical struggle occurred between the two for the knife, and that the victim reached once more for the knife after it had fallen to the ground. The Appellant claimed that the only thing he could recall afterward was “wanting to protect [himself].” Although the Appellant also testified, as noted by the trial court, that he never claimed the victim “[came] at [him] with a knife,” he nevertheless testified to her threatening him and a struggle occurring over a blade. During closing arguments, the State itself treated the Appellant’s self-defense claims as fairly raised and refuted its validity to the jury. The State on appeal also contends the Appellant never testified outright that he feared death or serious bodily injury, nor that it was necessary to kill the victim. The Appellant responds in both his initial brief and reply brief, and we agree, that a defendant’s testimony is not required for a trial court to charge self-defense. See State v. Cole-Pugh, 588 S.W.3d 254, 264 (Tenn. 2019) (“A defendant need not testify that he reasonably feared imminent bodily harm; the trial court may draw this inference from the evidence as it is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant[.]”). The Appellant testified to facing a threat that he believed could be deadly when the victim threatened him and fought for possession of a knife multiple times. Based on the above proof, we conclude that self- defense was fairly raised by the evidence offered at trial. However, we agree with the State that any error in failing to charge self-defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because no reasonable jury would have accepted the Appellant’s self-defense theory. See State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 404-05 (Tenn. 2017) (concluding that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury regarding self-defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “because no reasonable jury would have accepted the defendant’s self-defense theory”). The victim’s received forty sharp force and defensive injuries. The forensic pathologist testified that the cause and severity of the victim’s injuries would have required “repeated attempts[.]” Accordingly, the Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. IV. Probation Officer’s Testimony. The Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by allowing his probation officer to testify regarding her occupation and her reason for being at the Appellant’s home on the day of the offense. The Appellant claims - 21 - that the testimony of his probation officer was not relevant and overly prejudicial since she never entered the home. The State responds, and we agree, that the probative value of her occupation and relationship with the Appellant outweighed any prejudicial effect by providing context as to why she was at the Appellant’s home. Rule 404(b) provides that: Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity with the character trait. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes. The conditions which must be satisfied before allowing such evidence are: (1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence; (2) The court must determine that a material issue exists other than conduct conforming with a character trait and must upon request state on the record the material issue, the ruling, and the reasons for admitting the evidence; (3) The court must find proof of the other crime, wrong, or act to be clear and convincing; and (4) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). Pursuant to the Advisory Commission Comment to Rule 404, “evidence of other crimes should usually be excluded.” Tenn. R. Evid 404(b), Adv. Comm’n Cmt. However, in exceptional cases, “where another crime is arguably relevant to an issue other than the accused’s character,” such as “identity (including motive and common scheme or plan), intent, or rebuttal of accident or mistake,” the evidence may be admissible. Id.; see State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 582 (Tenn. 2004) (stating that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible if it establishes the defendant’s motive, intent, guilty knowledge, identity of the defendant, absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan, completion of the story, opportunity, or preparation). Additionally, evidence of other acts may be admitted to provide the jury with necessary contextual background. State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 272 (Tenn. 2000); see also State v. Little, 402 S.W.3d 202, 210 (Tenn. 2013) (“Moreover, this Court has expanded the list of exceptions to include a limited amount of other crimes evidence when necessary to provide a ‘contextual background.’”). - 22 - In Gilliland, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that to ascertain the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for the purpose of providing contextual background, the State must establish and the trial court must find that: “(1) the absence of the evidence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the state’s presentation of its case; (2) the void created by the absence of the evidence would likely result in significant jury confusion as to the material issues or evidence in the case; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d at 272. If a trial court does not substantially comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 404(b), then this court will review the trial court’s admissibility ruling de novo. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 287 (Tenn. 2014). However, if a trial court substantially complies with Rule 404(b)’s requirements, the court’s ruling will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing State v. Kiser, 284 S.W.3d 227, 288-89 (Tenn. 2009); State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997)). This court will find an abuse of discretion “only when the trial court applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employed reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 116 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Konvalinka v. Chattanooga–Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008)). The Appellant concedes in his principal brief that the trial court substantially complied with Rule 404(b)’s procedural requirements despite not explicitly weighing the probative value of the testimony against its prejudicial effect. However, it has previously been held that a trial court’s failure to make an explicit finding on the record that the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice makes its ruling subject to de novo review. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d at 652-53 (reviewing admission of evidence de novo after trial court failed to balance probative and prejudicial value); State v. Berkley, No. W2015-00831-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3006941, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016) (concluding that the trial court’s failure to make an explicit finding on the record that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect subjected the admission of evidence to de novo review). Because the trial court made no such finding in this case, we will review the admission of the testimony de novo. The record shows that the probation officer’s testimony was admitted at trial over the objection of defense counsel. The trial court allowed the probation officer to testify for the purposes of “context[.]” The trial court made only one finding during the bench conference: - 23 - All right. . . . I’m going to sustain [defense counsel] objection if you’re bringing in anything about what he is on probation for. But it does provide contextual information . . . that the jury is entitled to hear. As reflected in the factual section above, the probation officer testified that the Appellant was a probationer of hers, and that she was at his home on the day of the offense for an initial home visit. She said that she heard a scream inside the home, followed by noises, then silence, and that she and her partner immediately called 911, although she had originally believed the noise to be caused by children. The probation officer and her partner left and were soon called back to the home by law enforcement, and they knocked on the doors and windows but received no answer. The probation officer and her partner left again and were called back a second time. She subsequently gave a statement to a responding officer. The trial court did not err in allowing the Appellant’s probation officer to testify about her occupation and her reason for being at the Appellant’s home. The probation officer’s testimony was related to a material issue by introducing to the jury that loud noises were heard within the home around the time the victim’s murder occurred. It also explained the circumstances surrounding responding officers’ first visit to the home. We agree with the State that excluding mention of the probation officer’s occupation and relationship to the Appellant would have left the jury confused concerning why she was present at the Appellant’s home that day. We also agree with the State that exclusion may have caused jury confusion regarding why the probation officer would have notified the police upon the first sign of difficulty with completing the visit. See Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d at 272. The evidence in her testimony concerning her occupation was admissible for the “other purpose” exception under Rule 404(b) where exclusion would create a “chronological or conceptual void” in the case for the jury. Id. References to the Appellant’s probation status were minimal and the evidence had a low danger of unfair prejudice. During the probation officer’s testimony, the trial court limited its prejudicial effect and only allowed the probation officer to testify about her relationship to the Appellant and the reason for being at his home. The Appellant is not entitled to relief. V. Photographs. The Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting ten photographs that were not relevant and unduly prejudicial. The State responds that the photographs were properly admitted, and even if they were not, the error is harmless because “the evidence of the [Appellant’s] guilt is overwhelming.” On March 19, 2021, the Appellant’s retained counsel filed a motion to exclude certain crime scene photographs from the trial under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 401 and - 24 - 403. The State filed a response arguing that the photographs were admissible because they provided proof that the murder was intentional and premeditated. At the April 7, 2021 hearing on the motion, the State further explained: We’re not presenting these photographs in order to shock the jury. It all goes to the question of premeditation. This is filed as a first [] degree murder case. And the repeated blows using different kinds of instruments are indicia of premeditation, and that’s what we plan to prove at trial. The trial court discussed each photograph, excluding some that were duplicative and reserving a ruling until trial for some that were “close” or “[were] in fact pretty graphic.” The court concluded that the remaining photographs were admissible because they were “not overly gruesome” and showed either: (1) the weapons used; (2) where those weapons were found in relation to the victim’s body; or (3) the victim’s unbroken finger nails. On December 20, 2021, the court issued its order denying the motion in part. At trial, none of the remaining photographs were admitted into evidence. On May 19, 2022, four days before trial, the Appellant’s newly-appointed trial counsel filed a motion to exclude “all unfairly prejudicial photos, whether made before the death of the victim or after.” The State filed a response highlighting that the trial court had already ruled on the crime scene photographs. The State also noted that it “[had] one photograph of the victim, taken prior to her death, that the State intend[ed] to use during the guilt phase to identify the victim for the witnesses and the jury.” The photograph, attached to the response, showed the victim in her college cheerleading uniform. The record does not contain a pretrial ruling on the life-in-being photograph. During trial, the Appellant objected to admission of the photograph by stating, “We’ve had this hearing before. But for the purpose of appeal, I have to make the objection again.” The trial court responded, “All right,” and the photograph was admitted. At the motion for new trial hearing, the Appellant argued that the trial court erred by admitting the life-in-being photograph and crime scene photographs because they were not relevant and unduly prejudicial. The State argued that the life-in-being photograph was “simply necessary to personalize the victim.” In its order denying the motion, the trial court stated that “[t]he life-in-being photograph personalized the victim for the jury and was not highly prejudicial.” The court also stated that the photograph of the victim’s entire body “was not unduly graphic” and the remaining crime scene photographs “were not highly prejudicial.” The admission of photographs lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling we will not disturb absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Odom, 336 S.W.3d 541, 565 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, - 25 - 949 (Tenn. 1978)). “The reviewing court need not find that the trial court made the best decision or the one the appellate court would have made; instead, the reviewing court must confine itself to determining whether the trial court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternatives.” State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 729 (Tenn. 2016). In order to be admitted into evidence, a photograph must be relevant to an issue in dispute. Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 102; Tenn. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Even a relevant photograph, however, “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice is “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951. This court has also stated that “[p]rejudice becomes unfair when the primary purpose of the evidence at issue is to elicit emotions of ‘bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror.’” State v. Collins, 986 S.W.2d 13, 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 182-83 (2d ed. 1986)). A. Life-in-Being Photograph. The Appellant first challenges the admission of exhibit 2, the life-in-being photograph of the victim in her college cheerleading uniform. He contends that: (1) the photograph was not relevant because neither the existence of a life-in-being nor the general appearance of the victim was at issue; and (2) the photograph “unnecessarily evok[ed] the sympathy and emotions of the jury,” creating a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed any probative value. The State responds that the Appellant has waived this issue because there is no record of its consideration by the trial court. See State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Tenn. 1993). Alternatively, the State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because: (1) Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-103(c) permitted the admission of the photograph, “assuming the State offered [it] as evidence to show the victim’s appearance before her death”; and (2) “[n]othing about the photograph suggests any danger of unfair prejudice.” We conclude that the Appellant properly preserved the issue and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the photograph. The Appellant properly preserved the issue of the life-in-being photograph’s admissibility. A party seeking appellate review has a “duty to prepare a record which conveys a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to the issues forming the basis of the appeal.” Ballard, 855 S.W.2d at 560; see also Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). In Ballard, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to preserve an issue when the record did not contain transcripts of three separate hearings the defendant - 26 - stated were held on the issue. 855 S.W.2d at 560. In this case, however, neither party has alleged that the trial court considered the issue beyond what is reflected in the record. The Appellant’s newly-appointed trial counsel filed the motion to exclude the photograph on a Thursday and trial began on the following Monday. The record does not contain a transcript of a hearing or an order on the motion. At trial, the Appellant objected to the photograph’s admission, stating “We’ve had this hearing before. But for the purpose of appeal, I have to make the objection again.” The court responded, “All right,” and admitted the photograph. Despite trial counsel’s reference to a previous hearing, neither party on appeal has alleged that there was such a hearing in the short time between the filing of the motion and trial. The State emphasizes that the Appellant “provides no reference or citation to the record where this issue was addressed in a prior hearing.” This lack of citation to the record, without a claim that the court did conduct a hearing that the Appellant failed to include a transcript of, is not enough for this court to conclude that the record is incomplete. Accordingly, we will address the merits of this issue. The Tennessee Supreme Court has “consistently cautioned” against the admission of life-in-being photographs because they “typically lack relevance to the issues on trial” and have the “potential to unnecessarily arouse the sympathy of the jury.” State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 657 (Tenn. 2013). Prior to admitting a life-in-being photograph, the trial court “must determine whether the photographs are relevant by considering whether the purported use of the photograph—such as depicting a life-in-being—is a disputed issue at trial.” Id. at 658. If the issue is not disputed, then the photograph is not relevant and must be excluded. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. Following Adams, the legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-103(c), which now provides that “[i]n a prosecution for any criminal homicide, an appropriate photograph of the victim while alive shall be admissible evidence when offered by the district attorney general to show the general appearance and condition of the victim while alive.” Despite the statute’s mandatory language, a photograph relevant to show the general appearance and condition of the victim while alive may still be excluded it if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. State v. Reed, No. E2019-00771-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 5588677, at *24 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020), no perm. app. filed (citing State v. Donaldson, No. E2019-00543-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 2494478, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020), no perm. app. filed). The trial court abused its discretion by admitting a life-in-being photograph of the victim in her college cheerleading uniform because it was not relevant to a disputed issue at trial. Though the State argues that the photograph is admissible “assuming the State offered [it] as evidence to show the victim’s appearance before her death,” we need not assume the State’s reason for offering the photograph. Before trial, the State explicitly said it intended to use the photograph to prove the victim’s identity. At the hearing on the Appellant’s motion for new trial, the State said that the photograph was “simply necessary - 27 - to personalize the victim.” Though the trial court did not explain its reasoning for admitting the photograph during trial, the court explained in its order denying the Appellant’s motion for new trial that the photograph was properly admitted because it “personalized the victim for the jury.” Neither of these purported uses justify the admission of the photograph. The victim’s identity was not disputed and a desire to personalize the victim does not render irrelevant evidence admissible. Because the photograph was not relevant to any disputed issue at trial and served only to “personalize the victim[,]” which was not relevant to any issue at trial, it should have been excluded. See Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 657; Tenn. R. Evid. 402. Despite the trial court’s abuse of discretion, the Appellant is not entitled to relief because the error was harmless. “Generally, photographs taken during the life of a victim are not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.” Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 658. Though the photograph may have aroused sympathy from the jury, the evidence against the Appellant was overwhelming. See State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 106-07 (Tenn. 2006) (“While the jury’s sympathies may have been stirred by the photographs of the victim as a child, we are convinced beyond any doubt that the jury would have rendered the same verdict of guilt had the photographs been excluded[.]”). However, the fact that we conclude that the error in the present case was harmless should not be taken as support for the admission of similarly irrelevant life-in-being photographs in future cases. Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 658 (citing State v. Richardson, 995 S.W.2d 119, 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that the conclusion that the prosecutor’s biblical reference at trial was harmless error “should not be taken as precedent for similar improper argument in the future”)). B. Crime Scene Photographs. The Appellant next challenges the admission of nine crime scene photographs. The challenged photographs are: exhibits 5 (color photograph of the victim’s body and the surrounding area); 7A (color photograph of the serrated razor blade); 7B (color photograph of the serrated razor blade, from further away); 7C (color photograph of the victim’s left leg, with her phone and the large knife with a brown handle visible); 7D (color photograph of the victim’s hand and long, unbroken finger nails); 7E (color photograph of the victim’s right leg, and the knife with a silver handle under her calf); 7F (color photograph of a camera and the folding knife, with the victim’s body from the waist up visible); 7G (color photograph of the large knife with a brown handle); and 7H (color photograph of the victim’s phone next to the large knife with a brown handle). The Appellant contends that these photographs were “irrelevant, unduly graphic, and highly prejudicial.” He emphasizes that the photographs were needlessly cumulative of testimonial evidence and therefore “added nothing but sympathy and horror.” The State responds that the photographs were relevant to establish the cause and manner of the victim’s death, as well as the defendant’s intent, and were not “overly gruesome or shocking.” - 28 - “Crime scene photographs of a victim tend to be prejudicial by nature, but this fact does not make them excludable per se.” Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 658. Photographs of a victim’s body are admissible “if they are relevant to the issues on trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and horrifying character.” Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950-51. “The more gruesome the photographs, the more difficult it is to establish that their probative value and relevance outweigh their prejudicial effect.” Id. at 951. When assessing whether the probative value of a relevant photograph of a victim’s body is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court must consider the following: the value of photographs as evidence, that is, their accuracy and clarity, and whether they were taken before the corpse was moved, if the position and location of the body when found is material; the inadequacy of testimonial evidence in relating the facts to the jury; and the need for the evidence to establish a prima facie case of guilt or to rebut the defendant's contentions. Id. If the photographs do not add anything to testimonial descriptions of the injuries, they may be excluded. Id. However, “photographs are not necessarily rendered inadmissible because they are cumulative of other evidence or because descriptive words could be used.” Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 728 (quoting State v. Williamson, No. M2010-01067-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3557827, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2011)). “[T]he fact that the State could have made its case using only descriptive words is a consideration in balancing the probative value against the prejudicial effect, but does not mandate exclusion of the photographs.” Id. We cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to admit the crime scene photographs was outside the range of acceptable alternatives. The State offered the photographs to show that the killing was intentional and premeditated. Because whether the killing was intentional and premeditated was disputed at trial, the photographs were relevant. The photographs showed the brutality of the attack and the four weapons used, from which the jury could have inferred the killing was intentional and premeditated. See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950 (a jury may infer that the killing was premeditated and intentional based on the brutality of the attack). The fact that other evidence established the extent of the victim’s injuries, the weapons used, and where those weapons were found in relation to the victim’s body decreases the probative value of the photographs, but it does not mandate their exclusion. See Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 728. The photographs were clear, accurate, and taken before the victim’s body was moved. Though the photographs show significant injuries to the victim and a substantial amount of blood, the trial court found that the photographs “were not overly gruesome” and, therefore, not highly prejudicial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the Appellant is not entitled to relief. See id. at 725-29 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting “quite disturbing” photographs, including one of a “severed and - 29 - severely decomposed head” because they showed premeditation); Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949 (“Photographs showing the injuries of the victim are properly admitted if the defendant admits he killed the victim but seeks to show a non-criminal homicide or that the offense was of a lesser degree than murder.”). VI. Sentencing. The Appellant lastly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum within-range sentence for second degree murder and ordering it to be served consecutively with his four-year probation violation sentence. The State responds, and we agree, that the trial court acted within its discretion. A. Sentence Length. The Appellant contends that the trial court’s twenty-five year sentence does not reflect any consideration of the mitigation proof presented by the Appellant. He claims the four character reference letters submitted to the court supported mitigating factors (11) and (13), that the offense was committed under circumstances so unusual that the Appellant likely did not intend to violate the law and the “catchall” factor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113. The State responds that the trial court considered the mitigation proof by the Appellant relevant to factor (11) and rejected it. We agree with the State. A trial court’s sentencing determinations are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review and will be upheld “so long as the statutory purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act, along with any applicable enhancement and mitigating factors, have been properly addressed.” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tenn. 2012). “[A] sentence imposed by a trial court should be upheld so long as it is within the appropriate sentencing range and is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles of the sentencing statute.” Id. at 684. A trial court is “to be guided by—but not bound by—any applicable enhancement or mitigating factors when adjusting the length of a sentence.” Id. at 706. A trial court's misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Sentencing Act, as amended in 2005. Id. The trial court must consider the following when determining the defendant’s sentence: (1) The evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) The presentence report; (3) The principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) The nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; - 30 - (5) Evidence and information offered by the parties on the mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; (6) Any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) Any statement the defendant wishes to make on the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing; and (8) The result of the validated risk and needs assessment conducted by the department and contained in the presentence report. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b). The defendant bears the burden of showing that the sentence is improper. Id. § 40-35-401(d), Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. The trial court must consider the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation or treatment when determining the sentence. Id. § 40-35-102(3)(C), -103(5). The sentence imposed by the trial court must be “no greater than that deserved for the offense committed” and “the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” Id. § 40-35-103(2), (4). The Appellant cites as support State v. Jackson, No. W2021-00208-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 370090, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2022) wherein this court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion, modified the defendant’s sentence, and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of properly reviewing the jury-imposed fine. In Jackson, defense counsel made an argument to the trial court pertaining to the defendant’s extended and admitted history of substance abuse, attempts to seek treatment, and diagnosed schizophrenia, paranoia, and depression. Id. at *4. Additionally, the presentence report, Strong R Needs report, and witness testimony at trial corroborated the argument. However, when sentencing the defendant, the trial court stated, “I just don’t find any mitigating factors to be present in this case. He indicated he has had a past drug abuse history of cocaine, marijuana and ecstasy. So, you know, I don’t show any mitigating factors to be present.” Id. This court held that the record clearly established the existence of mitigating proof that therefore should have been considered by the trial court when sentencing the defendant. In this case, the trial court applied enhancement factors (1), (5), (9), and (13)(c) and applied no mitigating factors to the Appellant’s second degree murder conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114. Although the Appellant contends the trial court’s sentence does not reflect consideration of the mitigating proof, the record reflects that the trial court considered the evidence and information offered on mitigating and enhancement factors. - 31 - Two character reference letters were read aloud, and the remaining two were also submitted into evidence. The Appellant gave an allocution statement. The trial court then simply rejected the Appellant’s mitigating proof by not applying any mitigating factors when it sentenced the Appellant to the maximum within-range sentence. A trial court does not need to express lengthy reasoning as to why it accepted or rejected the Appellant’s mitigating proof, only that it had considered it. See Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)) (“[W]hile ‘[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority,’ there is no requirement that such reasoning be particularly lengthy or detailed.”). Moreover, this court held that there was error in Jackson where the trial court “refused to acknowledge” mitigating proof in light of abundant and overwhelming proof that amounted to the trial court having departed from the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. 2022 WL 370090, at *6. The only mitigating proof the Appellant argues was not considered were four character letters offered at the sentencing hearing to show that the crime was out of character for him that the trial court simply did not put great weight on. We conclude that the Jackson case is distinguishable by these facts. Furthermore, though the Appellant argues that the trial court failed to properly consider the mitigating factors, we note that the statutory enhancement and mitigating factors are advisory only and that “a trial court’s weighing of various mitigating and enhancement factors [is] left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tenn. 2008); see also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the Appellant to the maximum within-range sentence. The trial court properly applied the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. When sentencing the Appellant, the trial court noted the Appellant’s prior convictions and previous criminal history with the victim. It highlighted the gruesome nature of the victim’s injuries. It also afforded little weight to the Appellant’s allocution statement. The Appellant is not entitled to relief. B. Consecutive Sentences. Additionally, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the Appellant’s twenty-five year sentence to be served consecutively to his four year sentence for violation of his probation. The State responds, and we agree, that the trial court correctly ordered the Appellant’s sentences to run consecutively where the offense was committed while he was on probation. “[T]he abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness, applies to consecutive sentencing determinations.” State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tenn. 2013). When the trial court fails to provide adequate reasons on - 32 - the record for imposing consecutive sentences, however, this court “should neither presume that the consecutive sentences are reasonable nor defer to the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary authority.” Id. at 863-64. Instead, this court “has two options: (1) conduct a de novo review to determine whether there is an adequate basis for imposing consecutive sentences; or (2) remand for the trial court to consider the requisite factors in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.” Id. at 864. A trial court may order sentences to be served consecutively if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on probation[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(6). In this case, the trial court noted when ordering consecutive sentences that the Appellant was on supervised probation for bribery of a witness and violation of a protection order at the time of the offense as shown by the presentence report. The Appellant’s probation officer testified at trial. The record supports the trial court’s finding that the Appellant was on probation at the time of the offense, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences based on the Appellant’s probation status. Accordingly, the Appellant is not entitled to relief. VII. Cumulative Error. The Appellant argues that even if the alleged errors alone do not warrant relief, their cumulative effect deprived the Appellant of his right to a fair trial. The State responds that no errors occurred and even if they did, “there is no cumulative effect of such errors so great as to require reversal[.]” Though we concluded that the trial court erred by failing to provide a self-defense jury instruction and by admitting a life-in-being photograph, the cumulative effect of these two errors did not deprive the Appellant of his right to a fair trial. The cumulative error doctrine recognizes that “there may be multiple errors committed in trial proceedings, each of which in isolation constitutes mere harmless error, but which when aggregated, have a cumulative effect on the proceedings so great as to require reversal in order to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 76 (Tenn. 2010). The doctrine applies when there has been more than one error committed in trial proceedings, but circumstances warranting a reversal are rare. Id. at 76- 77; see also Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d at 273 (Tenn. 2000) (“Although the Constitution of our state and of the United States guarantees criminal defendants the right to a fair trial, neither guarantees criminal defendants the right to a perfect trial.”). The Tennessee Supreme Court has provided the following guidance for assessing whether the aggregated errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial: A reviewing tribunal must consider each such claim against the background of the case as a whole, paying particular weight to factors such as the nature and number of the errors committed; their interrelationship, if any, and - 33 - combined effect; how the [trial] court dealt with the errors as they arose (including the efficacy—or lack of efficacy—of any remedial efforts); and the strength of the [State’s] case. The run of the trial may also be important; a handful of miscues, in combination, may often pack a greater punch in a short trial than in a much longer trial. Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 77 (quoting United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir. 1993)). The cumulative effect of the trial court’s failure to provide a self-defense jury instruction and the admission of a life-in-being photograph was not so great as to require reversal. Given the strength of the State’s case, we concluded that no reasonable jury would have accepted the Appellant’s self-defense theory. This conclusion remains, even when considering the added prejudice of the life-in-being photograph. Accordingly, the Appellant is not entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. CONCLUSION Based on the above reasoning and authority, we find no reversible error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. ___________________________________________ CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE - 34 -