State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1976). · Go Syfert
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State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
139 citation events (45 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Duckens Oxyde v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2025-07-16) · Strongest negative: BROOKS v. BLEVINS (flnd, 2020-07-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#5 Fla. Stat. § 877.03 cited 2× in this case · 45 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" BROOKS v. BLEVINS
N.D. Fla. · 2020 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 , 642 n.2 (Fla. 1976) (holding that a resisting-with- violence conviction does not establish the validity of the underlying arrest).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duckens Oxyde v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Defendant repeats this argument on appeal, quoting from State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1976), to limit the application of the disorderly conduct statute to apply to “no words except ‘fighting words’ or words like shouts of ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre.” Id. at 644 (Fla. 1976); see also Barry v. State, 3 934 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“[I]t is clear that speech alone will not generally support a conviction for disorderly conduct.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lopez v. City of Opa-Locka
S.D. Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
As it stands, “there are only two instances where words can amount to disorderly conduct: ‘fighting words’ and ‘words like shouts of ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre.’” Id. (quoting State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duckens Oxyde v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (holding that words alone cannot constitute disorderly conduct less they are “fighting words” or “words like shouts of ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Eric McDonough v. Carlos Garcia
11th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
USCA11 Case: 22-11421 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 01/10/2024 Page: 25 of 33 22-11421 Opinion of the Court 25 words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (alteration adopted and quotation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heather Olson v. Jason Whitfield
11th Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
The sole exceptions to this rule are words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” and “words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others.” See State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (quotation omitted and alteration adopted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heather Olson v. Jason Whitfield
11th Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
The sole exceptions to this rule are words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” and “words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others.” See State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (quotation omitted and alteration adopted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) EDMOND ST. FLEURY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
To withstand constitutional challenge, the Florida Supreme Court has 2 limited the scope of section 877.03 “to words which ‘by their very utterance . . . inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace; or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others.” State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.S., a child v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
To withstand constitutional challenge, in State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976), the supreme court construed the statute to limit its application to “words which ‘by their very utterance ... inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,’ or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others.” Id. (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Anderson v. City of Naples
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Under Florida law, a person is guilty of breach of the peace if he or she “commits such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them, or engages in brawling or fighting, or engages in such conduct as to constitute a breach of the peace or disorderly conduct.” Fla. Stat. § 877.03 . “[WJhere the basis for an arrest under § 877.03 is speech only, the statute’s application is limited” to either “words which ‘by there very utterance ... inflict injury and tend to incite an …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
In State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976), the supreme court discussed the prior constitutional challenges to the statute and concluded: In light of these considerations, we now limit the application of Section 877.03 so that it shall hereafter only apply either to words which “by their very utterance ... inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” White v. State, 330 So.2d [3, 7 (Fla.1976) ]; See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumsta…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Barry v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (internal citations omitted) (quoting White v. State, 330 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1976), and Spears v. State, 337 So.2d 977 , 980 (Fla.1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winston Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers
11th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Section 877.03, Florida Statutes defines a breach of the peace as occurring when a person commits “such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them, or engages in brawling or fighting[.]” Fla. Stat. § 877.03 . 2 Florida courts have narrowly interpreted the meaning of this statute, State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla.1976) (rejecting an expansive interpretation of Section 877.03) (citations omitted), and have required a showing that a breach of the peace presents an immine…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Daniel J. Lyons, Jr.
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976) (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
C.L.B. v. State, 689 So.2d 1171, 1171-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chandler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In fact, following the supreme court's opinion in State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976), there are only two instances where words can amount to disorderly conduct: "fighting words" and "words like shouts of `fire' in a crowded theatre." [W]e now limit the application of Section 877.03 so that it shall hereafter only apply either to words which "by their very utterance ... inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily h…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gold v. City of Miami
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
We construe the statute so that no words except "fighting words" or words like shouts of "fire" in a crowded theatre fall within its proscription, in order to avoid the constitutional problem of overbreadth, and "the danger that a citizen will be punished as a criminal for exercising his right of free speech." With these two exceptions, Section 877.03 should not be read to proscribe the use of language in any fashion whatsoever. 22 Id. at 644 (citations omitted). 23 The Florida Supreme Court's cases construing the disorderly conduct statute in circumstances similar to those presented in this c…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gold v. City of Miami
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Id. at 644 (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gold v. City of Miami
11th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Id. at 644 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gold v. City of Miami (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
To avoid First Amendment concerns in cases involving speech, the Florida Supreme Court strictly limited the law to apply in such cases only where the speech, by its very utterance, “‘inflict[s] injury or tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace ... ’ ” See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976) (quoting White v. State, 330 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1976)). 5 Based on this limitation, the Florida Supreme Court has reversed convictions for disorderly conduct where a defendant merely directed profane language at police officers in the presence of others, see Morris v. State, 335…
cited Cited as authority (rule) CLB v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Sufficiency of evidence of disorderly conduct In State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 1976), the supreme court adopted a narrow construction of section 877.03, Florida Statutes, so that the statute could withstand constitutional challenges.
cited Cited as authority (rule) B.R. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) BR v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LAT v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
To this extent, we modify our previous decisions construing the statute. 339 So.2d at 644 (footnote omitted). [1] In recognition of the foregoing authority, the State has argued on this appeal solely that the words used by L.A.T. were "fighting words." I agree that on the record made in this case, the words do not qualify as "fighting words." It would be a different matter if L.A.T. had physically interfered with the work of the officers, in which case he could be charged under an appropriate statute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) L.A.T. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
To this extent, we modify our previous decisions construing the statute. 339 So.2d at 644 (footnote omitted). 1 In recognition of the foregoing authority, the State has argued on this appeal solely that the words used by L.A.T. were “fighting words.” I agree that on the record made in this case, the words do not qualify as “fighting words.” It would be a different matter if L.A.T. had physically interfered with the work of the officers, in which case he could be charged under an appropriate statute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Livingston v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976); K.Y.E. v. State, 557 So.2d 956, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Blake v. State, 433 So.2d 611, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Phillips v. State, 314 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Butler v. State (2×)
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1987 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court of Florida in State v Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) in interpreting section 877.03 stated: [W]e now limit the application of Section 877.03 so that it shall hereafter only apply either to words which “by their very utterance . . . inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” White v State, 330 So.2d at 7; see Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 , 62 S. Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily ha…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) W.M. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Plainly, this conduct, coupled with the shouted profanities, “ ‘tend[ed] to incite an immediate breach of the peace,’” State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976) (quoting White v. State, 330 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1976)); stated differently, the shouted profanities m the context of this case amounted to “fighting words” within the meaning of the Saunders decision and were accordingly punishable under the disorderly conduct statute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WM v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Plainly, this conduct, coupled with the shouted profanities, "`tend[ed] to incite an immediate breach of the peace,'" State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (quoting White v. State, 330 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla. 1976)); stated differently, the shouted profanities in the context of this case amounted to "fighting words" within the meaning of the Saunders decision and were accordingly punishable under the disorderly conduct statute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) South Florida Free Beaches v. City of Miami, Fla. (2×)
S.D. Fla. · 1982 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D. C. E. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
E.’s words cannot be characterized either as “fighting words” which “by their very utterance . . . inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”, White v. State, 330 So.2d 3 at 7 (Fla.1976), or as a “false report” likely to create “a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others.” State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 at 644 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DCE v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
D.C.E.'s words cannot be characterized either as "fighting words" which "by their very utterance ... inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace", White v. State, 330 So.2d 3 at 7 (Fla. 1976), or as a "false report" likely to create "a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others." State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 at 644 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lowery v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 642, n. 2 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clanton v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
In State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976), Justice Hatchett enunciated the following interpretation of Section 877.03: [W]e now limit the application of Section 877.03 so that it shall hereafter only apply either to words which "by their very utterance ... inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," White v. State [Fla.], 330 So.2d 3 at 7 ; see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates *457 a clear and present…
discussed Cited "see" Geoffrey Carlo v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1976) (limiting disorderly conduct statute, when applied purely to speech, to fighting words and false words that create a clear and present danger to others); see also Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); C.P. v. State, 644 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). [The defendant’s] arrest was unlawful.
discussed Cited "see" Omar T. Alston v. Mark Swarbrick
11th Cir. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
Florida Statute § 877.03 defines disorderly conduct as acts “of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them.” Probable cause under § 877.03 cannot be based on “mere words.” Davis, 451 F.3d at 766 ; see State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 , 643–44 (Fla. 1976) (limiting the application of § 877.03 so that it would only apply to “fighting words” or “words like shouts of ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre” to avoid First Amendment concerns); cf. Smith v. State, 967 So. 2d 937 , 939–40…
discussed Cited "see" KMB v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (limiting the application of section 877.03, Florida Statutes, and applying it only to either words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others) (internal citations omitted); W.L. v. State, 769 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that where the juvenile yelled profanities at the officers, which did not incite a breach of the pea…
discussed Cited "see" K.M.B. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (limiting the application of section 877.03, Florida Statutes, and applying it only to either words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others) (internal citations omitted); W.L. v. State, 769 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that where the juvenile yelled profanities at the officers, which did not incite a breach of the pea…
discussed Cited "see" Baymon v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla.1976) (limiting disorderly conduct statute, when applied purely to speech, to fighting words and false words that create a clear and present danger to others); see also Miller v. State, 780 So.2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); C.P. v. State, 644 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
discussed Cited "see" Morris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See L.J.M., 541 So.2d at 1322 (citing State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976)) (holding that, except for fighting words and words like shouts of "Fire!" in a crowded theater, the breach of the peace statute "should not be read to proscribe the use of language in any fashion whatsoever," because "nobody can be punished under a statute purporting to outlaw spoken words, if the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to anybody" (quoting Spears v. State, 337 So.2d 977, 980 (Fla. 1976))).
cited Cited "see" Marsh v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited "see" T.S.S. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 , 643 (Fla.1976) (prosecution under section 877.03 allowed only when defendant uses “ ‘fighting words’ or words like shouts of ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre”).
cited Cited "see" State v. Nelson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited "see" Starks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 , 642 n. 2 (Fla. 1976) (discussing right to resist unlawful arrest without violence); Lee v. State, 368 So.2d 395, 396-97 (Fla. 3d DCA) (majority opinion and Schwartz, J., specially concurring) (same), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1979). [4] The jury instruction at issue in Wright was the instruction for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985). 586 So.2d at 1030 .
discussed Cited "see" K.Y.E. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla.1976); L.J.M. v. State, 541 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla.1989); W.M. v. State, 491 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Delaney v. State, 489 So.2d 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); C.J.R. v. State, 429 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 440 So.2d 351 (Fla.1983). .
cited Cited "see" A.R.B. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
Clanton v. State, 357 So.2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 362 So.2d 1056 (Fla.1978); see State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited "see" State v. Burke
Fla. Polk Cty. Ct. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1976) (Section 877.03 also encompasses words like shouting “fire” in a crowded theatre).
cited Cited "see" Donner v. Hetherington
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
Spicy v. City of Miami, supra; see State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1976); Ciccarelli v. City of Key West, 321 So.2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
cited Cited "see" Harbin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See § 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (1975), and footnote 2 of State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1976).
STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Rudolph S. SAUNDERS, Appellee.
48438.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Nov 12, 1976.
339 So. 2d 641
Hatchett.
Cited by 78 opinions  |  Published

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., E.J. Salcines, State Atty., and Robert H. Nutter, Asst. State Atty., for appellant.

Rick B. Levinson, Levine, Freedman & Hirsch, Tampa, for appellee.

HATCHETT, Justice.

On February 16, 1974, an off-duty policeman sought to arrest one Stephens for a supposed violation of Section 877.03, Florida Statutes (1975).[1] Stephens was selling newspapers in Tampa on the corner of Franklin and Polk Streets "confronting people on the street and appearing to hassle with them." Appellee Saunders was accused by amended information of resisting Stephens' arrest with violence, in violation of Section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1975). The trial court granted an untraversed motion to dismiss the charges against Saunders on the ground that the arrest of Stephens, which Saunders concededly resisted with force, was unlawful "in that it was predicated on an unconstitutional statute, to-wit: the Breach of Peace Statute, Florida Statute 877.03." The prosecution took an appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, and that court transferred the cause here. Because the trial court "initially and directly pass[ed] on the validity of a state statute," Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, we have jurisdiction.

[*642] We conclude that there was no probable cause to justify the arrest of Stephens for violation of Section 877.03, Florida Statutes, and affirm the trial court's order of dismissal because the prosecution has urged no other lawful basis for the arrest.[2] Unlike the trial court, however, we take the view that Section 877.03, as narrowed in a series of decisions including today's, is not facially incompatible with the state or federal constitutions.

Before this Court had placed any gloss on Section 877.03, the question of the statute's constitutionality was considered on petition for writ of habeas corpus in Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4 (M.D.Fla. 1970), and that court concluded that the language of Section 877.03, unnarrowed by judicial construction, "suffer[ed] from the constitutional defect of vagueness" 322 F. Supp. at 8, and was also "unconstitutionally overbroad." 322 F. Supp. at 10. When this Court disagreed,[3] lower state courts found themselves "in a state court versus federal court bind," State v. Migliaccio, 38 Fla. Supp. 47, 49 (17th Cir.), but "absent a controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court [generally felt] obligated to follow the controlling authorities of the Florida appellate courts." Id. We are hopeful that our decision in this cause will alleviate any "state court versus federal court bind" that may exist with regard to Section 877.03.

In In re Fuller, 255 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1971), this Court reversed an adjudication of delinquency based on[4] Section 877.03. Fuller, who had just posted a sign on a classroom door, got into an argument when another juvenile ripped the sign off the door. The Court concluded that Fuller's conduct and vulgar language fell outside the purview of Section 877.03 and, in reversing, "carefully delineated between a mere `angry altercation' between two individuals and a `commotion' which would have breached the[*643] public order." Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir.1974), cert. den. app. dism., 421 U.S. 924, 95 S.Ct. 1650, 44 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975). In line with In re Fuller, supra, other courts rejected expansive interpretations of Section 877.03. M.E.M. v. State, 277 So.2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Wertheimer v. State, 276 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); State v. Blocker, 39 Fla. Supp. 136 (Dade Cty. 1973) (statute does not forbid newspaper reporter's seeking interview). The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed a conviction under Section 877.03, in a case in which the defendant repeatedly said to a police officer, "`F____ you.'" Phillips v. State, 314 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). See also Scott v. State, 330 So.2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).

This Court declared Section 877.03 constitutional for the second time[5] in Bradshaw v. State, 286 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1973). The decision in In re Fuller, supra, was distinguished on the ground that "although the words were similar, the time, place and circumstances were quite different," 286 So.2d 8, and the conviction was upheld. But the appellants' convictions were reversed in the consolidated cases of Gonzales v. Belle Glade and Smith and Sweet v. State, 287 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1973), for insufficiency of the evidence:

All that appears from the record — taken in the light most favorable to the State and the City — is that Smith and Sweet participated in a protest march, that both made threatening comments to police officers, and that Gonzales was vocally dissatisfied with the service afforded her and her companions in an eating establishment. There was no evidence that Smith or Sweet struck or even touched a police officer, that they actually offered a physical threat to any officer, or that they violated any law. Likewise, there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by Gonzales with the possible exception of the utilization of an intemperate expletive or two. In neither case was there any evidence that the actions of any of the appellants were more than annoying to those around them, and a violation of Fla. Stat. § 877.03, F.S.A., requires more than the creation of a mere annoyance. 287 So.2d at 670.

After this decision,[6] if not before, it should have been clear that Section 877.03 did not outlaw selling newspapers, however enthusiastically.

The incident which gave rise to the present case antedates our most recent decision construing the statute, White v. State, 330 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1976).[7] In White we recognized that Section 877.03 required judicial narrowing in order to withstand a constitutional challenge on the grounds of overbreadth. Still more recently, we discussed the "[s]pecial rules of decision appl[icable] in cases where a statute makes speech punishable as a crime." Spears v. State, 337 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1976). We concluded that:

Statutes regulating speech must "punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible[*644] of application to protected expression." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 1106, 31 L.Ed.2d at 414. Where a legislative enactment "is susceptible of application to protected speech, ... [i]t is constitutionally overbroad and therefore is facially invalid." Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134, 94 S.Ct. 970, 972, 39 L.Ed.2d 214, 220 (1974). Consistently with the United States Supreme Court's decisions, nobody can be punished under a statute purporting to outlaw spoken words, if the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to anybody. "This result is deemed justified since the otherwise continued existence of the statute in unnarrowed form would tend to suppress constitutionally protected rights." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. at 620, 91 S.Ct. at 1691, 29 L.Ed.2d at 221.

In light of these considerations, we now limit the application of Section 877.03 so that it shall hereafter only apply either to words which "by their very utterance . . inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," White v. State, 330 So.2d at 7; see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others. We construe the statute so that no words except "fighting words" or words like shouts of "fire" in a crowded theatre fall within its proscription, in order to avoid the constitutional problem of overbreadth, and "the danger that a citizen will be punished as a criminal for exercising his right of free speech." Spears v. State, supra, 337 So.2d at 980. With these two exceptions, Section 877.03 should not be read to proscribe the use of language in any fashion whatsoever.[8] To this extent, we modify our previous decisions construing the statute.

We have taken pains to delineate precisely which words are proscribed because "the mere existence of statutes . . purporting to criminalize protected expression operates as a deterrent to the exercise of the rights of free expression." Id. There is also a problem of vagueness with respect to which acts are proscribed by Section 877.03, see Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1448 (1967), but this vagueness issue is an abstract question which does not now require decision. Because we have concluded that Stephens' conduct falls outside the statutory prohibition, there is no occasion in the present case to resolve the question whether the statute would have been vague if it had proscribed his conduct. If events require, we will continue to decide on a case by case basis whether Section 877.03, as construed, gives adequate notice to any citizen whom the authorities prosecute under the statute.

The judgment is affirmed.

OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.

ROBERTS and ADKINS, JJ., concur in result only.

1 Section 877.03 provides as follows:

Whoever commits such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them, or engages in brawling or fighting, or engages in such conduct as to constitute a breach of the peace or disorderly conduct, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

2 On account of the ban against ex post facto laws, see Article 1, Section 10, and Article 10, Section 9, Florida Constitution; Article 1, Section 9, Constitution of the United States, we are concerned here only with the law existing at the time of the alleged offense. At that time, Florida law permitted citizens forcibly to resist unlawful arrests. Alday v. State, 57 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1952); Gay v. State, 147 Fla. 690, 3 So.2d 514 (1941); Burgess v. State, 313 So.2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) merits not reached 326 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1976); English v. State, 293 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Smith v. State, 292 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974) cert. den. 297 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1974); Kishel v. State, 287 So.2d 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). The rule was stated in Phillips v. State, 314 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), as follows:

[I]f a person ... is to be convicted of resisting [a warrantless] arrest with violence, the state must prove that the officer was attempting to make an arrest which he had lawful authority to make without a warrant. Licata v. State, 156 Fla. 692, 24 So.2d 98 (1945); Kirby v. State, 217 So.2d 619 (4th DCA Fla. 1969). See Jones v. State, 293 So.2d 116 (3d DCA Fla. 1974); Smith v. State, 292 So.2d 69 (3d DCA Fla. 1974); Rosenberg v. State, 264 So.2d 68 (4th DCA Fla. 1972); F.S. 843.01 (1973).

After the episode which gave rise to these proceedings, the legislature enacted Ch. 74-383 § 13, Laws of Florida, now codified as Section 776.051 and effective July 1, 1975. Section 776.051(1) provides:

A person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer.

Pursuant to Ch. 74-383 § 1, Laws of Florida, codified as Section 775.011, Florida Statutes (1975), the provisions of Section 776.051 are not applicable in the present case.

3 In State v. Magee, 259 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1972), this Court affirmed a conviction under Section 877.03 for fornication in the front seat of an automobile and "h[e]ld Fla. Stat. § 877.03, F.S.A., to be constitutional." 259 So.2d at 141. But cf. E.G. v. State, 326 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (disorderly conduct not a lesser included offense of prostitution where "appellant allegedly engaged in prostitution in a quiet and orderly manner." at 446). In State ex rel. Springer v. Smith, 189 So.2d 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), the City of Dania had enacted an ordinance incorporating by reference all misdemeanors under state law. In this indirect way, Section 877.03 was brought to bear against a citizen "charged [under the ordinance] with disorderly conduct and with possessing and showing obscene motion picture films." 189 So.2d at 847. See also Moffett v. State, 340 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 1976).
4 A delinquent child is defined as "a child who commits a violation of law." Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes (1975).
5 The first time was in State v. Magee, 259 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1972). See ante, p. 642 n. 3.
6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Section 877.03 was constitutionally overbroad even as narrowed by the decisions in In re Fuller, 255 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1971), and Gonzales v. City of Belle Glade, 287 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1973):

Nothing in the construction by the state supreme court of F.S. 877.03 limits the application of the statute to those disturbances caused by a narrow class of unprotected speech — "fighting words," Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) — as opposed to those caused by controversial ideas. While the narrowing construction is thus remedial, the Florida courts have not construed F.S. 877.03 "so as to avoid all constitutional difficulties." United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1405, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971).

Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F.2d at 307.

Subsequently a different panel of the Fifth Circuit refrained from reaching the merits in a habeas proceeding because they were persuaded "that Florida may change its position with respect to the statute." Glenn v. Askew, 513 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir.1975).

7 We followed White in State v. Dwyer, 332 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1976).
8 Without exception, Section 877.03 should not be read to proscribe the exhibition of motion picture films.