Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City (1983)

See 463 U. S., at 635 ("a private action against recipients of federal funds"); id., at 636 ("implied caus[e] of action"); id., at 638 ("Title VI authorizes appropriate relief").

See 463 U.S., at 635 ("a private action against recipients of federal funds"), id., at 636 ("implied caus[e] of action"); id., at 638 ("Title VI authorizes appropriate relief").

Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582 , 599–602 (1983) (opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.); id., at 609 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.

Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582, 607, n. 27 (1983) (holding that Title VI, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq., does “not allow compensatory relief in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent”); Sandoval, 532 U. S., at 280 (similar).

Second, a different majority of the Court rejected the workers' argument that monetary damages were recoverable in cases of unintentional discrimination. 1 Of the seven opinions filed in that case, only Justice White's opinion suggested a standard for "intentional discrimination." See id. at 584 ("I conclude that... in the absence of proof of discriminatory animus, compensatory relief should not be awarded to private Title VI plaintiffs") (White, J.); id. at 607 n.27 (same).

See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 , 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983) (“I note first that Title VI is spending-power legislation.”).

See Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525, 528-29 (4th Cir.1991) (expungement of poor employee performance rating mooted declaratory judgment claim because plaintiff was unable to show any indication that such treatment would recur); see also Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1004 (3rd Cir.1980) (claim for declaratory relief may survive dismissal on mootness grounds if claim is a predicate to damages) 3 Contrast the following observations from two Supreme Court opinions decided a …

See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 , 103 S.Ct. 3221 , 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) ("I note first that Title VI is spending-power legislation.").

See id. ("This is, therefore, not a case of discriminatory effect, but one of discriminatory intention.").

See id. (“This is, therefore, not a case of discriminatory effect, but one of discriminatory intention.”).

Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 633 , 103 S.Ct. 3221 , 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (“Because Title VI is intended to ensure that ‘no person’ is subject to discrimination in federally assisted programs, private parties function as third-party beneficiaries to these contracts.”); United States v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth, 970 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir.1992) (concluding that Title VI protects physician staff in hospitals that receive federal funding); Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 3…

Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 603 (1983) (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment).

Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 597 , 103 S.Ct. 3221 , 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (“Remedies to enforce spending power statutes must respect the privilege of the recipient of federal funds to withdraw and terminate its receipt of federal money.”).

Comm’n of City of New York, the Supreme Court noted that Title VI’s “legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended Title VI to be a typical ‘contractual’ spending power provision.” 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983).

Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (affirming judgment of lower court when there was no evidence of discriminatory animus or intent); see also id. at 599–600 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that a private right of action for Title VI violations requires “proof of intentional discrimination”). 12 714 F.2d at 1356 (emphasis in original). 13 629 F.3d at 454 (emphasis added) (citing Marvin H., 714 F.2d at 1357 ). 14 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Monahan v. Nebraska, 6…

Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983)) (alteration in Gebser).

Comm’n of City of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 587 (1983). 25 Case: 17-13595 Date Filed: 09/17/2019 Page: 26 of 66 Act, and Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments14 to the Attorney General.

Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (White, J., op.)); see also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (“The federal 3 Chief Judge Wood’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc relies heavily on FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011), but there the Second Circuit summarily followed the lead of other circuits in reading section 13(b) to include an implied power to order restitution.

Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (White, J., op.)); see also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (“The federal 3 Chief Judge Wood’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc relies heavily on FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011), but there the Second Circuit summarily followed the lead of other circuits in reading section 13(b) to include an implied power to order restitution.

Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (White, J., op.)); see also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (“The federal 3 Chief Judge Wood’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc relies heavily on FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011), but there the Second Circuit summarily followed the lead of other circuits in reading section 13(b) to include an implied power to order restitution.

Com’n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (“Whether a litigant has a cause of action ‘is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive.”); CustomGuide v. CareerBuilder, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1002 (N.D.

Com’n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (“Whether a litigant has a cause of action ‘is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive.”); CustomGuide v. CareerBuilder, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1002 (N.D.

See Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 596-97 , 103 S.Ct. 3221 .

Comm’n of N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582 , 630 n. 24, 103 S.Ct. 3221 , 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (“the Federal Government can always sue any recipient who fails to comply with the terms of the grant agreement”); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 772 , 99 S.Ct. 1946 , 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (“The ‘other means’ provisions of [Title VI] include agency suits to enforce contractual antidiscrimination provisions”); United States v. Marion Cnty.

Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 604 , 103 S.Ct. 3221 , 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (“[I]n the Eleventh Amendment context ... the relief cannot include a monetary award for past wrongs, even if the award is in the form of ‘equitable restitution’ instead of damages.”).

See also Guardians Assoc. of the New York City Police Department, Inc. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 633 F.2d 232, 251 (2d Cir.1980), aff'd, 463 U.S. 582 , 103 S.Ct. 3221 , 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (“[a]ll plaintiffs injured by the department’s post-Act adherence to [a discriminatory hiring policy] are therefore entitled to relief”).

Nothing in the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act alters the construction of § 504 that “there can be no private right of action under Title VI for damages absent intentional discrimination.” See Marvin H. v. Austin Independent School District, 714 F.2d 1348, 1357 (5th Cir.1983); see also Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 , 607 n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 3221 , 3235 n. 27, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (“[N]o compensatory relief should …

Comm’n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 635, 643 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding “an administrative agency may validly impose additional requirements” that are “consistent with . . . [statutory] objectives”).

Com’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983).

Guardian Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 592 (opinion of White, J.); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (opinion of Powell, J.). ¶ 31 Subsequently, however, in CSX Transportation, 562 U.S. at 286 , the Court relied upon the “ordinary meaning of the word [discriminates]” as set forth in its dictionary definition.

See 463 U.S. at 598 , 103 S.Ct. at 3230 (“I note first that Title VI is spending-power legislation”) (White, J., plurality opinion).

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 , 96 S.Ct. 1251 , 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). 19 However, a back pay award remains within the discretion of the court and is available only where “the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice .... ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); see also Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, — U.S. —, —, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3235 , 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (“a private plaintiff should recover …

Com’n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).

Comm’n of the City of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983).

Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 594-95 (1983); see also Pruitt v. Anderson, Civ.

Comm'n 18 of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983). 19 20 21 22 23 24 5 The fourth “breach,” as written here, is consistent with the facts alleged.

Comm'n of N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (“Whether a litigant has a cause of action ‘is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive’” (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979))).

Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 597, 607 (1983)); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-83 (2001).

Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (holding that private individuals must demonstrate intentional discrimination to recover compensatory damages under Title VI).

Comm’n., 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (“Discriminatory purpose must be pleaded and proven in actions brought under 42 USC §1981 .”).

Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983).

Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983).

Com’n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983)).

Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983).

Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983), the Court also held that Title IX offered an implied private right of action, see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 716– 17.

Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983)); Sewell v. Monroe City Sch.

Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 633 (1983)] (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“When a court concludes that a recipient has breached its contract, it should enforce the broken promise by protecting the expectation that the recipient would not discriminate. ...

Comm’n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 601 (1983); Marvin H. v. Austin Indep.

Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 604, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 77 L.

Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 610-11 (1983)).