Smalis v. Pennsylvania (1986)

And an acquittal precludes retrial even if it is premised upon an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54, 68-69, 78 (1978); a mistaken understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction, Smith, 543 U. S., at 473 ; or a “misconstruction of the statute” defining the requirements to convict, Rumsey, 467 U. S., at 203, 211 ; cf. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140, 144-145, n. 7 (1986).

Smalis v. Pennsyl- vania, 476 U. S. 140, 144, n. 5 .

Jeopardy terminates upon a determination, however characterized, that the “evidence is insufficient” to prove a defendant’s “factual guilt.” Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140, 144 (1986).

Because of this focus on substance over labels, a State’s “characterization, as a matter of double jeopardy law, of [a ruling] is not bind- ing on us.” Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140, 144, n. 5 (1986); see also Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U. S. 462 , 468– 469 (2005).

It does not matter that this factual finding was arrived at under the influence of an erroneous view of the law. “[T]he fact that the acquittal may result from ... erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.” Scott, 437 U.S. at 98 , 98 S.Ct. at 2197 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 , 144 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1745 , 1748 n.…

Smith, 543 U.S. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145 ("[S]ubjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.").

See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 142 , 106 S.Ct. 1745 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986) (“[W]hen a trial court enters such a judgment [of acquittal], the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal by the prosecution[.]”); see also N.C.

The aggravating factor at issue was whether a murder occurred “‘as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.’”26 As Szalma explained, the trial court had “erroneously ruled that this aggravating circumstance only involved murders for hire, rather than any murder occurring during the course of a robbery, as the Arizona Supreme Court had interpreted the statute.”27 The United States Supreme Court concluded “that the trial …

Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144-46 , 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1748-49 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 121-22 (1986); State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 750 , 536 P.2d 738, 745 (1975).

See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 1749 ("subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause"); Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 , 104 S.Ct. 1805, 1814 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) ("Acquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy.

App. 1985) 10,11 Smalis V.Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140,145-145 (1986) 16 Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 468 , 125 S.Ct. 1129 , 160 L.Ed.2d 914 (2005).... 15 Stockman v. State, 826 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1992, pet. ref d) 4,6 UnitedStates v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) 15 IV STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Petitioner believes that oral argument will be helpful.

The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second sentencing hearing.” (Smalis v. Pennsylvania (1986) 476 U.S. 140, 145, fn. 8 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 116 , 106 S.Ct. 1745 ] (Smalis).) The Rumsey court explained: “Reliance on an error of law, however, does not change the double jeopardy effects of a judgment that amounts to an acquittal on the merits. ‘[The] fact that “the acquittal may result from . . . erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles” . . . affect…

Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144-46 , 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1748-49 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 121-22 (1986); State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 750 , 536 P.2d 738, 745 (1975).

Consequently, the United States will not likely encounter this question again after the effective date of the legislation. [26] See also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 142 , 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1747 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986) ("the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal by the prosecution not only when it might result in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate into further proceedings devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offens…

Likewise, the circuit court's "oral ruling leaves no doubt that it made its determination on the basis of '[t]he testimony' that the State had presented." Id. (citation omitted). 18 See also Smalis v. Pennsylvania , 476 U.S. 140 , 144, 106 S.Ct. 1745 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986) ("the category of acquittals includes 'judgment[s] ... by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict") (quoting Scott , 437 U.S. at 91 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 ).

Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144-46 (1986); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978); State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 750 , 536 P.2d 738, 745 (1975).

See, e.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 , 144-145 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1745 , 1748 n. 7, 90 L.Ed.2d 116 , 121 n. 7 (1986) (“The status of the trial court’s judgment as an acquittal is not affected by the Commonwealth’s allegation that the court” ... “ ‘erroneously] interpreted] ... [a] governing legal principle’ ”) (citation omitted); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 , 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2310 , 81 L.Ed.2d 164, 171 (1984) (“In making its findings, the trial court relied o…

Because the doctrine of double jeopardy raises questions as to the propriety of the state’s appeal; see Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 , 106 S. Ct. 1745 , 90 L.

See also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 , 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 122 (1986) (“subjecting the defendant to post-acquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause”).

An acquittal is “‘a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 71 (1978) (quoting Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 , 30 n.8 (1977)). “[A] judgment that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 142 (1986).

Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986); see also Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90, 92 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (“No matter how erroneous, a verdict of acquittal cannot be reviewed without putting a defendant twice in jeopardy.”).

Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986); see also Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90, 92 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (“No matter how erroneous, a verdict of acquittal cannot be reviewed without putting a defendant twice in jeopardy.”).

Smalis v. Pennsylvania , 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986).

Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986).

Chiesa Aponte, op. cit., pág. 584; Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 US 140, 145 (1986); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 US 203, 211-212 (1984).

U.S. at 467 (“[S]ubjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.” (alteration in original) (quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986))).

Cf. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 (1986) (reversing our Supreme Court and holding that sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurer constituted acquittal).

With regard to the dismissed grand larceny counts, upon which the jury had deadlocked, the court's dismissal amounted to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes ( Smalis v Pennsylvania , 476 US 140, 142 [1986]; People v Biggs , 1 NY3d 225, 229 [2003]).

Jones v. Prokes, WD84255, 2021 WL 1618002 , *3 (Mo. App. Apr. 27, 2021) (citing Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1986)).

(Doc. 12 21 at 28.) Petitioner cites to Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986), for the proposition that 22 “subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates 23 the Double Jeopardy Clause.” (Doc. 12 at 28.) Petitioner then asserts that “[t]his principal applies with 24 equal vigor on due process grounds to any attempt to modify a finding on a prior conviction,” (Doc. 12 25 at 28-29), however, as Respondent alleg…

(Doc. 12 22 at 28.) Petitioner cites to Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986), for the proposition that 23 “subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates 24 the Double Jeopardy Clause.” (Doc. 12 at 28.) Petitioner then asserts that “[t]his principal applies with 25 equal vigor on due process grounds to any attempt to modify a finding on a prior conviction,” (Doc. 12 26 at 28-29), however, as Respondent alleg…

Known As 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 476 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)).

Known As 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 476 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)). adjudicated on the merits, the instant Petition is “successive” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b).

Id. at 473 , citing Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 (1986). {¶ 43} Smith is distinguishable from this case.

"When a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has no proper purpose." Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986).

As summarized by the Supreme Court, [A]n acquittal precludes retrial even if it is premised upon an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68-69, 78 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978); a mistaken understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction, Smith [v. Massachusetts], 543 U.S. [462, 473], 125 S.Ct. 1129 , 160 L.Ed.2d 914 [2005]; or a “misconstruction of the statute” defining the requirements to convict, [Ari…

True, “subjecting [a] defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986).

Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 , 125 S. Ct. 1129, 1134 (2005) (quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 4, 16 U.S. 140 , 145, 106 S. Ct. 1745, 1749 (1986)). 12.

And an acquittal precludes retrial even if it is premised upon an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68-69, 78 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978); a mistaken understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction, Smith, 543 U.S., at 473 , 125 S.Ct. 1129 ; or a “misconception of the statute” defining the requirements to convict, [Arizona v.] Rumsey, 467 U.S., at 203, 211, 104 S.Ct. 2305 [, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) ]…

See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005); Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 230 (1994); Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 573 ; United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 290 (1970); Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143 .

Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986).

Publish. 33 Martin Linen, 430 U.S., at 571 . 34 See, e.g., Smalis, 476 U.S., at 144 (“[A] ruling that as a matter of law the State’s evidence is insufficient to establish his factual guilt … is an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”). 35 Sanabria, 437 U.S., at 68-69.

See, e.g., Smalis , 476 U.S., at 144 ("[A] ruling that as a matter of law the State's evidence is insufficient to establish his factual guilt is an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause."). 35.

Unlike Smalis v Pennsylvania, 476 US 140, 144, n 7 (1986), the trial court's error of law in this case did not involve an actual element of the crime.

Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145-46 , 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 122 (1986) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 570 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 650 (1977)).

Regardless of the manner, “subjecting the defendant to post-acquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Id. at 423 , 885 P.2d at 111 , quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986). ¶13 Here, the trial court clearly granted Musgrove’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; the reporter’s transcript and the court’s minute entry both reflect this ruling.

That, according to Smith, was not good enough: “any contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause must itself (absent a provision by the State) leave open a way of correcting errors is at odds with the well-established rule that the bar will attach to a preverdict acquittal that is patently wrong in law.” Id. (citing Smalis, 476 U.S. at 144, 106 S.Ct. 1745 ; Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68-69 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978); Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571 , 97 …

App. at 720 , 660 S.E.2d at 548 (quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 142 , 90 L.

Smalis v. Pennsylvania , 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986)(emphasis added). 12.

The United States Supreme Court has spoken directly to this issue, holding that “a judgment that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 142 , 90 L.