McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)
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Baker v. State (2005)
But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (concluding that a statistical study did not establish sufficiently that Georgia’s capital sentencing system violated either the Equal Protection Clause or the Eighth Amendment).
concluding that a statistical study did not establish sufficiently that Georgia’s capital sentencing system violated either the Equal Protection Clause or the Eighth Amendment
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Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge (1993)
Id. at 281 , 99 S.Ct. at 2297 ; but see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (statistical evidence alone may not be enough to demonstrate discriminatory intent); see also Watson, 857 F.2d at 695-96. 4 .
statistical evidence alone may not be enough to demonstrate discriminatory intent
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Graham v. Collins (1993)
See, e. g., Walton, 497 U. S., at 661, 667 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ( Eddings rule "has completely exploded whatever coherence the notion of `guided discretion' once had" by making "random mitigation" a constitutional requirement); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S., at 306 ("States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the [death] penalty.
"States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the [death] penalty. In this respect, the State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant information offered by the defendant"
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Lewis v. Jeffers (1990)
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 306-307 (1987) ("[A]bsent a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that *780 other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty").
"[A]bsent a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that *780 other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty"
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Satterwhite v. Texas (1988)
See McCleskey, supra, at 311 (“[Discretionary exercises of leniency [by the sentencer] are final and unre viewable”).
“[Discretionary exercises of leniency [by the sentencer] are final and unre viewable”
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Walker v. Georgia (2008)
Id., at 44–46; see also McCleskey, 481 U. S., at 306 (“[W]here the statutory procedures adequately channel the sentencer’s discretion, such proportionality review is not constitution ally required”).
“[W]here the statutory procedures adequately channel the sentencer’s discretion, such proportionality review is not constitution ally required”
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Miguel Angel Flores v. Gary L. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division (2000)
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 , 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1773 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“[T]he Constitution limits a State’s ability to narrow a sentencer’s discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence.”) (emphasis in original); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 , 98 S.Ct. at 2964 (“[T]he sentencer ... [cannot] be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any …
“[T]he Constitution limits a State’s ability to narrow a sentencer’s discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence.”
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United States v. Mitchell (2007)
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) ("[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."); Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1374-77 (9th Cir.1988).
"[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."
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Armenia Cudjo, Jr. v. Robert Ayers, Jr. (2012)
Id. (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 309 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”); United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24-25 (D.C.Cir.1990); McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 416-417 (2d Cir.1979); Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir.1978); United States ex rel.
“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”
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United States v. Moore (2011)
But evidence of disparate impact will be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent only where it demonstrates a “stark ... pattern” of discriminatory impact that is “unexplainable on grounds other than race.” Id; 2 see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-94 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“statistical proof normally must present a ‘stark’ pattern to be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the Constitution”).
“statistical proof normally must present a ‘stark’ pattern to be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the Constitution”
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United States v. Anderson (2009)
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 310 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”). 7 .
“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”
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Saldano v. Dretke (2004)
Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 309 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382 , 105 S.Ct. 2727 , 86 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985) (“[A] death sentence based upon consideration of ‘factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race ... of the defendant,’ would violate the Constitution.” (dictum…
“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”
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Saldano v. Roach (2004)
Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 309 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) ("The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments."); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382 , 105 S.Ct. 2727 , 86 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985) ("[A] death sentence based upon consideration of `factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race ... of the defendant,' would violate the Constitution." (dictum…
"The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments."
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United States v. Scott Lukse, Also Known as Scott Luxley (00-6054) Joshua Hight (00-6077) (2002)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious.”).
“Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious.”
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United States v. Xiaorong You (2023)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 309 n.30 (1987) (“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”); United States v. Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Appeals to racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice during the course of a trial violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.”). 2.
“Appeals to racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice during the course of a trial violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
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Campbell v. Jones (2026)
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 309 n.30 (1987) (“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”).
“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”
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United States v. Keith Moore (2025)
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 292–93 (1987) (“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [a party] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose”).
“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [a party] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose”
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Frederick Douglass Foundation, Inc. v. DC (2023)
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (explaining “the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 311–12 (1987) (“[T]he capacity of prosecutorial discretion to provide individualized justice is firmly entrenched in American law.”) (cleaned up). 12 Prosecutorial discretion lies within the “special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Execut…
“[T]he capacity of prosecutorial discretion to provide individualized justice is firmly entrenched in American law.”
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In re: Michael Flynn (2020)
If evidence comes to light calling into question the integrity or purpose of an underlying criminal investigation, the Executive Branch must have the authority to decide that further prosecution is not in the interest of justice.2 As the Supreme Court has explained, “the capacity of prosecutorial discretion to provide individualized justice is firmly entrenched in American law. … 2 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-27.200 cmt. (2020) (“[A]s a matter of fundamenta…
“[T]he duty of the United States Attorney [is] not simply to prosecute but to do justice.”
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Dewayne Bearchild v. Kristy Cobban (2020)
See id. at 1050–51 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 , 182–83 (1976)); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987) (“[A]ny punishment might be unconstitutionally severe if inflicted without penological justification . . . .”).
“[A]ny punishment might be unconstitutionally severe if inflicted without penological justification . . . .”
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Dewayne Bearchild v. Kristy Cobban (2020)
See id. at 1050–51 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 , 182–83 (1976)); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987) (“[A]ny punishment might be unconstitutionally severe if inflicted without penological justification . . . .”).
“[A]ny punishment might be unconstitutionally severe if inflicted without penological justification . . . .”
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Riley v. Taylor (2001)
See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 296-97 ("[A]bsent far stronger pr oof, it is not necessary to seek a rebuttal.").
"[A]bsent far stronger pr oof, it is not necessary to seek a rebuttal."
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Lincecum v. Collins (1992)
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 221-22 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) ("The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant.").
"The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant."
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State v. Ramseur (2020)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 314–319 (1987) (“McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies.
“McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. It is not the responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes.”
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State v. Ramseur (2020)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 314–319 (1987) (“McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies.
“McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. It is not the responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes.”
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State v. Ramseur (2020)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 314–319 (1987) (“McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies.
“McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. It is not the responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes.”
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United States v. Edelin (2001)
See McCleskey *86 v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)(“Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.”); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 467-68 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996).
“Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.”
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 , 107 S. Ct. 1756 , 95 L.
“we hold that the [statistical study conducted by Professor David C. Baldus on the influence of race in death penalty sentences] is clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in [the defendant’s] case acted with discriminatory purpose”
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United States v. Frank (1998)
See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“a State must' ‘narrow the class of murderers subject to capital punishment’”) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 ).
“a State must' ‘narrow the class of murderers subject to capital punishment’”
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State v. Bey (1994)
Such a quantitative review does not, indeed cannot, take into account the complex value judgments that constitute juror determinations in the penalty-phase. 3 In the penalty phase of a capital case, where the sentencer’s discretion contemplates the influence of moral values, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 , 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1767 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262, 279-80 (1987) (“Each jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution requires that its decision rest on innumerab…
“Each jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution requires that its decision rest on innumerable factors.”
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McClean v. Duke Univ. (2019)
Univ. for Women v. Hogan , 458 U.S. 718 , 730, 102 S.Ct. 3331 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) ); McCleskey v. Kemp , 481 U.S. 279 , 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) ("[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination."
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Foster v. State (1992)
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295, n. 15 , 107 S.Ct. at 1769, n. 15 ("decisions whether to prosecute and what to charge necessarily are individualized and involve infinite factual variations... .").
"decisions whether to prosecute and what to charge necessarily are individualized and involve infinite factual variations... ."
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Hale v. Shoop (2022)
Ed. 2d 143 (1987), ‘[t]he sixth amendment is stricter because it forbids any substantial underrepresentation of minorities, regardless of ... motive,’ id.”) and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 , 107 S. Ct. 1756 , 95 L.
“Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving ‘the existence of purposeful discrimination.’”
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 309 n.30, 107 S. Ct. 1756 , 4 No. 37057-7-III In re Pers.
“prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised on the basis of race”
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Raza v. City of New York (2013)
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 294-96 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [plaintiff] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose”) (emphasis in original).
“to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [plaintiff] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose”
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Moreland v. Bradshaw (2009)
To the extent that Mr. Moreland argues generally that the Ohio death penalty scheme is unconstitutional on the basis that prosecutors in Ohio have the discretion to decide whether to prosecute, to plea bargain, or to even seek a sentence of death, that argument is rejected on the authority of McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“[T]he capacity of prosecutorial discretion is firmly entrenched in American law.”) (citation omitted).
“[T]he capacity of prosecutorial discretion is firmly entrenched in American law.”
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United States v. Perez (2002)
See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (e) (“the jury ... shah consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death”); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“In contrast to the carefully …
“In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer’s discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State’s ability to narrow a sentencer’s discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence.”
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United States v. Walker (1999)
“Elementary concepts of equal protection and due process alike forbid a prosecutor to seek to procure a verdict on the basis of racial animosity.” Id. “[R]acial remarks in a prosecutor’s summation can constitute a violation of an accused’s right to a fair trial, and ... a prosecutor’s argument that invokes race for a purpose that is either illogical or of very slight and uncertain logical validity is constitutionally impermissible.” United States v. Garland, 39 M.J. 618, 620…
“The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”
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United States v. Medina (1999)
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 811-12 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (“the capacity of prosecutorial discretion to provide individualized justice is ‘firmly entrenched in American law.’ 2 W.
“the capacity of prosecutorial discretion to provide individualized justice is ‘firmly entrenched in American law.’ 2 W. LaFave & D. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 13.2(a), p. 160 (1984). As we have noted, a prosecutor can decline to charge, offer a plea bargain ... ”
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Ellison v. Shinn (2024)
(Doc. 21 at 197-99.) The Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of this claim 22 was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 23 There is no federal constitutional right to proportionality review of a death sentence. 24 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306 (“[W]here the statutory procedures adequately channel the 25 sentencer’s discretion, such proportionality review is not constitutionally required.”).
“[W]here the statutory procedures adequately channel the 25 sentencer’s discretion, such proportionality review is not constitutionally required.”
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State v. Davis (2000)
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311 (“The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant.”).
“The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant.”
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Thompson v. Beausoleil (2025)
See, e.g., Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (discussing writs of habeas corpus as the proper means for “challenging violations of fundamental rights to life and liberty guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”); Tharpe v. Ford, 139 S. Ct. 911, 913 (2019) (“When [the plaintiff] went on trial for his crimes, the Constitution promised him the ‘fundamental protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.’”) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.…
“A confession obtained by these methods cannot be introduced against an accused consistently with the constitutional guarantee that his life and liberty may not be taken from him without due process of law.”
See McCleskey_v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 298 n.20 (1987) (“Although the history of racial discrimination in this country is undeniable, we cannot accept official actions taken long ago as evidence of current intent.”).
“Although the history of racial discrimination in this country is undeniable, we cannot accept official actions taken long ago as evidence of current intent.”
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Doe v. Wright (2023)
To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff “must prove the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Ballou v. McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 422 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[t]he central inquiry in any disparate treatment claim under the Equal Protection Clause is whether a government action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose”).
“[t]he central inquiry in any disparate treatment claim under the Equal Protection Clause is whether a government action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose”
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Bierk v. Tango Mobile, LLC (2021)
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 891 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 289-290 (1987).
“The district judge would not have abused his discretion if he had denied the extension, but he also did not abuse his discretion by granting it.”
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Morales v. Stanton (2020)
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show “that he was treated differently than other similarly situated intimates, and that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class.” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (“Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [Pl…
“Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [Plaintiff] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”
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Kouider v. Parma City School District (2020)
During Y.C.’s deposition, Y.C. stated that he did not remember being called a DACA.63 And both Baez and Santora deny calling Y.C. a DACA.64 59 , 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 60 , 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); , 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). 61 410 F.3d 810, 831 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[S]ummary judgment was particularly inappropriate because of the alleged racial tones to the officer[s’] conduct.”); , 86 F. App’x 790, 803 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Although the question is close, the evidence of the …
“[S]ummary judgment was particularly inappropriate because of the alleged racial tones to the officer[s’] conduct.”
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Commonwealth v. Colon (2019)
Would the fact that the defendant is Hispanic in any way interfere with your ability to render a fair and just verdict?" "[I]n our heterogeneous society the [Federal] courts have found the boundaries of race and ethnicity increasingly difficult to determine," McCleskey v. Kemp , 481 U.S. 279 , 316 n.39, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), and have noted the futility of attempting to define "ethnicity." Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd , 340 F.3d 178 , 183 (3d Cir. 2003) ("What, th…
"What, though, does 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic origin' mean .... And how does one define 'race' when the understanding of 'race' itself has changed over the centuries?"
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Patrick Allen Watkins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (2011)
See Bell v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ky. 1971) ("[I]f an objection is made, the party making the objection must insist that the trial court rule on the objection, or else it is waived."). 28 ("[A] change of venue should be granted if it appears that the defendant cannot have a fair trial in the county wherein the prosecution is pending.") (citing Brewster v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1978)); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 310 n.30 (1987) ("Widespread bia…
"Widespread bias in the community can make a change of venue constitutionally required."
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Joy Renee Watkins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (2011)
See Bell v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ky. 1971) ("[I]f an objection is made, the party making the objection must insist that the trial court rule on the objection, or else it is waived."). 28 ("[A] change of venue should be granted if it appears that the defendant cannot have a fair trial in the county wherein the prosecution is pending.") (citing Brewster v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1978)); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 310 n.30 (1987) ("Widespread bia…
"Widespread bias in the community can make a change of venue constitutionally required."