Notes of Decisions
Cited in
411
cases (
21 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case:
United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
· cites it 35× “§ 3432 ; (2) evidentiary rulings applying the standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c); (3) a discussion of the court’s power to strike an aggravating factor because the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove the factor beyond a reasonable doubt; (4)…”
United States v. Rejon Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 18× “And because the Government will argue for the death penalty based in part on Wilson’s alleged future dangerousness, this court must give Wilson “fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence” of that aggravating factor.”
United States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2018).
· cites it 15× “18 U.S.C. § 3593 (e). The government argued four statutory aggravating factors against both defendants: (1) death during commission of another crime, (2) procurement of offense by payment, (3) substantial planning and premeditation, and (4) multiple killings.”
United States v. Daryl Lawrence, 735 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2013).
· cites it 17× “18 U.S.C. § 3593 (f). There is no question that the district court complied with this requirement and properly instructed the jury in this regard.”
United States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009).
· cites it 20× “" 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a). "Evidence `about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed [and t]here is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other…”
United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2008).
· cites it 14× “See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a). The notice stated that the government intended to prove four threshold culpability factors, 1 *207 id.”
United States v. Wesley Ira Purkey, 428 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
· cites it 13× “§ 3591-3598 , is facially unconstitutional because it vests the prosecution with unilateral authority to seek the death penalty without ever taking the matter of whether the death penalty is justified to the grand jury, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a). Second, he argues that his…”
United States v. Gary Lee Sampson, 486 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007).
· cites it 11× “2d 556 (2002), and then served a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a). After filing numerous pretrial motions that unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the FDPA, Sampson eventually .”
United States v. Louis Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998).
· cites it 14× “As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a), the prosecution filed its Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.”
United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007).
· cites it 8× “18 U.S.C. § 3593 (e). At this stage, the jury’s task is no longer to find whether factors exist; rather, each juror is to “consider” the factors already found and to make an individualized judgment whether a death sentence is justified.”
United States v. Richard Allen Jackson, 327 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2003).
· cites it 11× “Acting under the process required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (e), the jury recommended that Jackson be sentenced to death.”
— 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(1) — 1 case
— 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) — 1 case
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