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U.S. CodeTitle 18Part II— Criminal ProcedureChapter 228— Death Sentence

18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2026)

Special hearing to determine whether a sentence of death is justified

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1995–2026 411citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 411 opinions since 1995, 21 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b)(1) (1 case).

(a)Notice by the Government.—If, in a case involving an offense described in section 3591, the attorney for the government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that a sentence of death is justified under this chapter, the attorney shall, a reasonable time before the trial or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty, sign and file with the court, and serve on the defendant, a notice—(1) stating that the government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that, if the defendant is convicted, a sentence of death is justified under this chapter and that the government will seek the sentence of death; and(2) setting forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death.The factors for which notice is provided under this subsection may include factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim’s family, and may include oral testimony, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim’s family, and any other relevant information. The court may permit the attorney for the government to amend the notice upon a showing of good cause.(b)Hearing Before a Court or Jury.—If the attorney for the government has filed a notice as required under subsection (a) and the defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to an offense described in section 3591, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered, or another judge if that judge is unavailable, shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the punishment to be imposed. The hearing shall be conducted—(1) before the jury that determined the defendant’s guilt;(2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the hearing if—(A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty;(B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury;(C) the jury that determined the defendant’s guilt was discharged for good cause; or(D) after initial imposition of a sentence under this section, reconsideration of the sentence under this section is necessary; or(3) before the court alone, upon the motion of the defendant and with the approval of the attorney for the government.A jury impaneled pursuant to paragraph (2) shall consist of 12 members, unless, at any time before the conclusion of the hearing, the parties stipulate, with the approval of the court, that it shall consist of a lesser number.(c)Proof of Mitigating and Aggravating Factors.—Notwithstanding rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, when a defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty to an offense under section 3591, no presentence report shall be prepared. At the sentencing hearing, information may be presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor permitted or required to be considered under section 3592. Information presented may include the trial transcript and exhibits if the hearing is held before a jury or judge not present during the trial, or at the trial judge’s discretion. The defendant may present any information relevant to a mitigating factor. The government may present any information relevant to an aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subsection (a). Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, the fact that a victim, as defined in section 3510, attended or observed the trial shall not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. The government and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing, and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor, and as to the appropriateness in the case of imposing a sentence of death. The government shall open the argument. The defendant shall be permitted to reply. The government shall then be permitted to reply in rebuttal. The burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating factor is on the government, and is not satisfied unless the existence of such a factor is established beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of establishing the existence of any mitigating factor is on the defendant, and is not satisfied unless the existence of such a factor is established by a preponderance of the information.(d)Return of Special Findings.—The jury, or if there is no jury, the court, shall consider all the information received during the hearing. It shall return special findings identifying any aggravating factor or factors set forth in section 3592 found to exist and any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subsection (a) found to exist. A finding with respect to a mitigating factor may be made by 1 or more members of the jury, and any member of the jury who finds the existence of a mitigating factor may consider such factor established for purposes of this section regardless of the number of jurors who concur that the factor has been established. A finding with respect to any aggravating factor must be unanimous. If no aggravating factor set forth in section 3592 is found to exist, the court shall impose a sentence other than death authorized by law.(e)Return of a Finding Concerning a Sentence of Death.—If, in the case of—(1) an offense described in section 3591(a)(1), an aggravating factor required to be considered under section 3592(b) is found to exist;(2) an offense described in section 3591(a)(2), an aggravating factor required to be considered under section 3592(c) is found to exist; or(3) an offense described in section 3591(b), an aggravating factor required to be considered under section 3592(d) is found to exist,the jury, or if there is no jury, the court, shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death. Based upon this consideration, the jury by unanimous vote, or if there is no jury, the court, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence.(f)Special Precaution To Ensure Against Discrimination.—In a hearing held before a jury, the court, prior to the return of a finding under subsection (e), shall instruct the jury that, in considering whether a sentence of death is justified, it shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim may be. The jury, upon return of a finding under subsection (e), shall also return to the court a certificate, signed by each juror, that consideration of the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or any victim was not involved in reaching his or her individual decision and that the individual juror would have made the same recommendation regarding a sentence for the crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or any victim may be.(Added Pub. L. 103–322, title VI, § 60002(a), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1964; amended Pub. L. 105–6, § 2(c), Mar. 19, 1997, 111 Stat. 12; Pub. L. 107–273, div. B, title IV, § 4002(e)(8), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1810.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in subsec. (c), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

Amendments

2002—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 107–273 substituted “rule 32” for “rule 32(c)” in first sentence.

1997—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 105–6 inserted “For the purposes of the preceding sentence, the fact that a victim, as defined in section 3510, attended or observed the trial shall not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1997 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 105–6 applicable to cases pending on Mar. 19, 1997, see section 2(d) of Pub. L. 105–6, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3510 of this title.

The 20 cases that cite 18 U.S.C. § 3593 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENUnited States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
cites § 3593 35×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“§ 3432 ; (2) evidentiary rulings applying the standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c); (3) a discussion of the court’s power to strike an aggravating factor because the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove the factor beyond a reasonable doubt; (4)…”
The case’s holding
Evidence is admissible in a penalty phase unless its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury.
Later courts cite it for
“provided much more than a 'quick glimpse' of the victim's life” · 3 citing courts
2
REDUnited States v. Rejon Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016).
cites § 3593 18×cited by 105 cases
Abrogated by United States v. Davis: 2 citing opinions say abrogated.
Where it cites § 3593
“And because the Government will argue for the death penalty based in part on Wilson’s alleged future dangerousness, this court must give Wilson “fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence” of that aggravating factor.”
The case’s holding
A district court does not abuse its discretion by relying on juror demeanor rather than explicit questioning to determine the absence of bias regarding media reports.
Later courts cite it for
“is considerably narrower than the statute invalidated by the court in johnson ....” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENUnited States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2018).
cites § 3593 15×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“18 U.S.C. § 3593 (e). The government argued four statutory aggravating factors against both defendants: (1) death during commission of another crime, (2) procurement of offense by payment, (3) substantial planning and premeditation, and (4) multiple killings.”
The case’s holding
A recusal motion is untimely and subject to denial if unexplained delay suggests the statute is being misused for strategic purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“where 'unexplained delay' in filing a recusal motion 'suggests that the recusal statute is being misused for strategic purposes,' the motion will be denied as untimely.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENUnited States v. Daryl Lawrence, 735 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2013).
cites § 3593 17×cited by 100 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“18 U.S.C. § 3593 (f). There is no question that the district court complied with this requirement and properly instructed the jury in this regard.”
The case’s holding
The omission of a required component from a jury's nondiscrimination certification in a capital case is a statutory defect subject to harmless-error review rather than structural error.
Later courts cite it for
“an error of law is an abuse of discretion.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENUnited States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009).
cites § 3593 20×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“" 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a). "Evidence `about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed [and t]here is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other…”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor's brief claim to speak for a victim is improper if the comment appeals excessively to jurors' emotions within the context of surrounding statements.
Later courts cite it for
“a prosecutor's brief claim to 'speak for' a victim is improper if, in the context of surrounding statements, the comment appeals excessively to jurors' emotions.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENUnited States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2008).
cites § 3593 14×cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a). The notice stated that the government intended to prove four threshold culpability factors, 1 *207 id.”
The case’s holding
A defendant's conviction may be vacated if prosecutorial misconduct causes substantial prejudice implicating the right to due process.
Later courts cite it for
“two factors are not duplicative merely because they are supported by the same evidence.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENUnited States v. Wesley Ira Purkey, 428 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
cites § 3593 13×cited by 103 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“§ 3591-3598 , is facially unconstitutional because it vests the prosecution with unilateral authority to seek the death penalty without ever taking the matter of whether the death penalty is justified to the grand jury, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a). Second, he argues that his…”
The case’s holding
The Federal Death Penalty Act does not grant the defense carte blanche to introduce any and all evidence during a capital sentencing hearing.
Later courts cite it for
“does not mean that the defense has carte blanche to introduce any and all evidence that it wishes.” · 7 citing courts
8
GREENUnited States v. Gary Lee Sampson, 486 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007).
cites § 3593 11×cited by 128 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“2d 556 (2002), and then served a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a). After filing numerous pretrial motions that unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the FDPA, Sampson eventually .”
The case’s holding
Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions provided by the trial court.
Later courts cite it for
“jurors are normally presumed to follow the trial court's instructions.” · 5 citing courts
9
GREENUnited States v. David Runyon, 707 F.3d 475 (4th Cir. 2013).
cites § 3593 12×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“Two, they directly alluded to the defendant himself.”
The case’s holding
The admission of an interrogation video containing irrelevant racial and religious references constitutes harmless error when the court provides limiting instructions and requires jurors to sign certificates excluding those factors.
Later courts cite it for
“it is the rare trial that will be an ideal specimen in all respects, given that even the most well-intentioned trial participants may commit the occasional error.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENUnited States v. Louis Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998).
cites § 3593 14×cited by 145 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a), the prosecution filed its Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.”
The case’s holding
The federal death penalty act narrows sentencing discretion by requiring both a specific intent and the presence of at least one statutory aggravating factor.
Later courts cite it for
“the fdpa's relaxed evidentiary standard does not impair the reliability or relevance of information at capital sentencing hearings, but helps to accomplish the individualized sentencing required by the constitution” · 5 citing courts
11
GREENUnited States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007).
cites § 3593 8×cited by 191 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“18 U.S.C. § 3593 (e). At this stage, the jury’s task is no longer to find whether factors exist; rather, each juror is to “consider” the factors already found and to make an individualized judgment whether a death sentence is justified.”
The case’s holding
A competency hearing is required only if the evidence of incompetence is sufficient to cause a reasonable judge to experience genuine doubt regarding the defendant's competence.
Later courts cite it for
“inquiry is not whether the trial court could have found the defendant either competent or incompetent, nor whether the reviewing court would find the defendant incompetent.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENUnited States v. Richard Allen Jackson, 327 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2003).
cites § 3593 11×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“Acting under the process required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (e), the jury recommended that Jackson be sentenced to death.”
The case’s holding
An indictment must allege at least one statutory aggravating factor to charge the aggravated offense for which the death penalty is authorized.
Later courts cite it for
“during sentencing in a capital case, the factfinder may 'not be precluded from considering, as a mitigat- ing factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” · 4 citing courts
13
GREENJones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
cites § 3593 7×cited by 980 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“See 18 U. S. C. § 3593 . [5] In death-eligible homicide cases, the Act instructs, the jury must respond sequentially to three inquiries; imposition of the death penalty requires unanimity on each of the three.”
The case’s holding
The Eighth Amendment does not require a trial court to instruct a jury on the consequences of failing to reach a unanimous decision in a capital sentencing proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually affected his substantial rights.” · 45 citing courts
14
GREENUnited States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007).
cites § 3593 6×cited by 339 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c). Additionally, under the FDPA a sentencing judge may exclude information if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”
The case’s holding
The Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of testimonial hearsay used solely by a sentencing authority to select an appropriate punishment.
Later courts cite it for
“an especially high level of deference” · 11 citing courts
15
GREENUnited States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2000).
cites § 3593 21×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“1 Addressed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are: (1) Cooper’s Motion to Compel Disclosure of the United States Attorney’s Initial Recommendation to the Attorney General Regarding Decision to Seek the Death Penalty; (2) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Notice of Intent to Seek…”
The case’s holding
The use of unadjudicated criminal conduct as a non-statutory aggravating factor in a capital sentencing hearing is constitutionally permissible.
cites § 3593 7×cited by 181 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“We therefore find no constitutional infirmity with the FDPA’s permitting the prosecution to. propose nonstatutory aggravating factors to fit the particular circumstances of a crime and to assist the jury in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed upon a defendant…”
The case’s holding
Informing a suspect of the status of an ongoing investigation does not constitute a functional equivalent of interrogation for Fifth Amendment purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“924(j) is fairly interpreted as an additional aggravating punishment for the scheme already set out in 924(c)” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENUnited States v. Donald Lee Ferebe, 332 F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 2003).
cites § 3593 15×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“We conclude that the proper analysis that is to be applied in deciding challenges to the timeliness of a filing under the Death Notice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a), is that of a pre-trial inquiry into the objective reasonableness of that timing.”
The case’s holding
Orders denying motions to strike untimely death penalty notices are collateral orders subject to immediate appellate review.
Later courts cite it for
“a reasonable time before the trial.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENUnited States v. Dustin John Higgs, 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003).
cites § 3593 6×cited by 260 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593 (a). On December 20, 1999, the grand jury returned a second superseding indictment, and the government filed an amended death notice on February 8, 2000.”
The case’s holding
An indictment is sufficient if it alleges at least one statutory aggravating factor required to render a defendant death-eligible.
Later courts cite it for
“the fdpa and the constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor ... not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.” · 7 citing courts
19
GREENUnited States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525 (D. Kan. 1996).
cites § 3593 16×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c). If the jury unanimously so finds, it moves to the next step of the penalty process.”
The case’s holding
The federal death penalty statute, including its statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors, is constitutional and does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
20
GREENUnited States v. Jorge Torrez, 869 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2017).
cites § 3593 11×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 3593
“18 U.S.C. § 3593 (b). Courts addressing the issue, however, have held that this language does not preclude a bifurcated sentencing hearing resulting in an overall trifurcated proceeding.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199520102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 38 cases in 2005. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
4th Cir.415th Cir.298th Cir.28E.D. Va.25E.D.N.Y242d Cir.166th Cir.161st Cir.15

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 79 courts in all.

By subsection
(b)(1)1 case
United States v. Darryl Lamont Johnson, 223 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2000).
(e)1 case
United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923 (10th Cir. 2008).

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Enactment and amendments
(Added Pub. L. 103–322, title VI, § 60002(a), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1964; amended Pub. L. 105–6, § 2(c), Mar. 19, 1997, 111 Stat. 12; Pub. L. 107–273, div. B, title IV, § 4002(e)(8), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1810.)
Amendment years (notes): 2002, 1997
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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