State v. Moore (1985)

Most recently, the Supreme Court has noted that " coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary.'" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (emphasis added). [73] Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2046 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). [74] Gordon, 638 F. Supp. at 1145 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 , 93 S.Ct. at 2047 ); see also State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d …

Id. at 237.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-28 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).

See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further…

State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).

To assess whether a confession is the result of coercion, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including whether the police administered the Miranda warnings, the place of interrogation, the duration of questioning, whether the questioning was continuous, and the “ ‘defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health.’ ” Troyer, 910 P.2d at 1188 (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 698 , 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1754 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)); see …

Thus, we must decide under prongs two and three whether the State has shown Streeter knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and whether his statements were made voluntarily. 6 We first determine whether Street-er knowingly and intelligently waived his rights by examining “ ‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused,’” State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985) (quoting Oregon v. Bra…

C.J.) (citing State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1985)).

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(10) provides that when capital murder is charged and a jury is impaneled, the trial court is to remove from the venire those who would refuse to vote to impose the death penalty for reasons of conscience. [3] See generally State v. *1207 Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1225-26 (Utah 1986); State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237-38 (Utah 1985).

Rev. 277, 316 (1979); Annot., 55 A.L.R.Fed. 689, 699-700 (1981). [24] Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 20, at 803-150. [25] Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations & Speculations, 63 Mich.L.Rev. 1335, 1353 (1965). [26] Id. [27] Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 Va.L.Rev. 427, 511 n. 250 (1980). [28] See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 644 (Utah 1980). […

In order for a defendant to initiate a conversation with authorities that will be held to constitute a willingness to talk about the charges without counsel, he or she must indicate a desire “ ‘to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.’ ” State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985)(quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 , 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983)(plurality opinion)).

State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).

See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).

See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 588-89 (Utah 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1923 , 80 L.Ed.2d 470 (1984); cf. State v. Redford, 27 Utah 2d 379 , 496 P.2d 884 (1972); State v. Belwood, 27 Utah 214 , 494 P.2d 519 (1972).