Dangberg Holdings Nevada, L.L.C. v. Douglas County (1999)

Neither does our opinion in Dangberg Holdings Nevada, LLC v. Douglas County, 115 Nev. 129, 139-40 , 978 P.2d 311, 317 (1999), suggest so.

Neither does our opinion in Dangberg Holdings Nevada, LLC v. Douglas County, 115 Nev. 129, 139-40 , 978 P.2d 311, 317 (1999), suggest so.

The district court's preliminary injunction specifically did not apply to the public sidewalk. [4] See Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas Co., 115 Nev. 129, 138 , 978 P.2d 311, 319 (1999). [5] Id. [6] Hermann Trust v. Varco-Pruden Buildings, 106 Nev. 564, 566 , 796 P.2d 590, 591-92 (1990). [7] Nelson v. Peckham Plaza Partnerships, 110 Nev. 23, 25 , 866 P.2d 1138, 1139 (1994). [8] SIIS v. United Exposition Services Co., 109 Nev. 28, 30 , 846 P.2d 294, 295 (1993). [9] See Dangberg H…

Court, 134 Nev. 649 , 650, 427 P.3d 1033, 1035 (2018). "[T]he inquiry upon a petition for a writ of certiorari is limited to whether the inferior tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction." Dangberg Holdings Nev., LLC v. Douglas County, 115 Nev. 129, 138 , 978 P.2d 311, 316 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A writ of certiorari is available to correct a lower tribunal's judicial action if the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction and "there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy." NRS 34.020(2); Dangberg Holdings Nev., LLC v. Douglas Cty., 115 Nev. 129, 137-38 , 978 P.2d 311, 316 (1999) (internal quotations omitted).

Op. 58, 377 P.3d 97 , 100 (2016); see also Dangberg Holdings Neu., L.L.C. v. Douglas Cty., 115 Nev. 129, 138 , 978 P.2d 311, 316 (1999) ("The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and the decision to entertain SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (U) 1947A ,Atip, such a petition is within this court's discretion.").

L.L.C. v. Douglas Cnty., 115 Nev. 129, 144-45 , 978 P.2d 311, 320-21 (1999) ("We have previously held that the district court's failure to require the applicant to post security voids an order imposing a preliminary injunction."); Strickland v. Griz Corp., 92 Nev. 322, 323 , 549 P.2d 1406, 1407 (1976) ("Where a bond is required by statute before the issuance of an injunction, it must be exacted or the order will be absolutely void.' (quoting Shelton v. Second Judicial Dist.

L.L.C. v. Douglas Cnty., 115 Nev. 129, 144-45 , 978 P.2d 311, 320-21 (1999) ("We have previously held that the district court's failure to require the applicant to post security voids an order imposing a preliminary injunction."); Strickland v. Griz Corp., 92 Nev. 322, 323 , 549 P.2d 1406, 1407 (1976) ("Where a bond is required by statute before the issuance of an injunction, it must be exacted or the order will be absolutely void." (quoting Shelton v. Second Judicial Dist.

Ct. (Ducharm), 118 Nev. 609, 614 , 55 P.3d 420, 423 (2002) (mandamus); Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas Co., 115 Nev. 129, 137-38 , 978 P.2d 311, 316 (1999) (certiorari); Karow v. Mitchell, 110 Nev. 958, 962 , 878 P.2d 978, 981 (1994) (denying a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition because the petitioner had taken an appeal from the challenged order). 6 See Consolidated Generator v. Cummins Engine, 114 Nev. 1304, 1312 , 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). 7 See Diaz v. Dist.

L.L.C. v. Douglas Cty., 115 Nev. 129, 145 , 978 P.2d 311, 320 (1999) (We have previously held that the district court's failure to require the applicant to post security voids an order imposing a preliminary injunction.").

Op. 41, 419 P.3d 148, 151 (2018); Dan,gberg Holdings Nev., LW v. Douglas fly.. 115 Nev. 129, 137 , 978 P.2d 311, 316 (1999); Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist.

See NRS 33.010; University Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 120 Nev. 712, 721 , 100 P.3d 179, 187 (2004); Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas Co., 115 Nev. 129, 142 , 978 P.2d 311, 319 (1999).

Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas Co., 115 Nev. 129, 142 , 978 P.2d 311, 319 (1999); Pickett v. Comanche Construction, Inc., 108 Nev. 422, 426 , 836 P.2d 42, 44 (1992).

Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 604 , 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981) (noting that when factual, rather than legal, issues are presented, this court will not exercise its discretion to consider an original extraordinary writ petition, even when important public interests are involved). 9 Attorney General v. NOS Communications, 120 Nev. 65, 67 , 84 P.3d 1052, 1053 (2004); S.O.C., Inc. v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. 403, 407 , 23 P.3d 243, 246 (2001); Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas…

Compare Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas Co., 115 Nev. 129, 139-42 , 978 P.2d 311, 317-19 (1999) (holding that intervention prior to a settlement agreement was timely), with Lopez, 109 Nev. at 557 , 853 P.2d at 1268 (determining that intervention after entry of judgment on a settlement agreement was not timely).

See Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas Co., 115 Nev. 129, 141 , 978 P.2d 311, 318 (1999) (providing that the timeliness of an NRCP 24 motion to intervene is directed to the district court’s sound discretion) (citing Lawler v. Ginochio, 94 Nev. 623, 626 , 584 P.2d 667, 668-69 (1978) (recognizing that this court may look to the federal courts’ interpretations of similar federal rules for guidance)); Nish v. Cohen, 191 F.R.D. 94, 96 (E.D.

If they beat the intervenor to the punch, the court may annul the settlement in order to give all interested persons adequate opportunity to participate in the negotiations and proceedings." See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ. , 902 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1990) (city park board members' motion to intervene after a court order revoked dedicated park land so land could be as a junior high school was timely, because board members could not have been aware that their interest i…

See Miller v. Lankenau Hosp., 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 266 , 618 A.2d 1197, 1198-99 (1992). ¶ 28 In Dangberg Holdings Nevada, L.L.C. v. Douglas County and Board of County Commissioners, 978 P.2d 311 (Nev.1999), the Nevada Supreme Court held that the State and the estate of a ranch vendor’s granddaughter could intervene after a settlement between the ranch purchaser and county, when the intervenors acted within two months of learning of the settlement agreement.