Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000)

Haggis v. City of L.A., 22 Cal.4th 490 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983, 987 (2000) (“It is not enough ... that a public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform the function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion.”). 1 AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 .

Because of the high degree of discretion left to officials under § 1053, we do not agree that § 1053 satisfies the standard articulated in Haggis, 22 Cal.4th at 498, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 .

Johnson’s causes of action “fail to allege a mandatory duty that may serve as a predicate for liability.” Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.4th 490, 495 (2000). 5.

Code § 815.6 ; Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 4th 490, 498-99 (2000) (to be actionable under § 815.6, the enactment at issue must: (1) be obligatory, rather than discretionary or permissive; (2) must require that a particular action be taken or not taken, and (3) require that the mandatory duty be designed to prevent the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff), in light of the policies and procedures implemented by the County to facilitate com- pliance with the Ste…

“First and foremost, ... the enactment at issue [must] be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ] (Haggis).) “It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a fu…

The first element requires that “the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather 2 than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather 3 than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” Id. (quoting 4 Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 4th 490, 498 (2000)); see also O’Toole v. Superior Court, 5 140 Cal. App. 4th 488, 510 (2006) (finding that a statute prohibiting certain conduct but not 6 …

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) As that court explained, “ ‘On appeal from dismissal following a sustained demurrer, we take as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint.’ (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 495 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ] (Haggis).)” Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint alleged the following facts.

Applicable Law Section 818.6, the inspection immunity statute, “was intended to grant absolute immunity from liability for the negligent inspection of private property to determine whether such property constitutes a hazard to health or safety.” (Clayton v. City of Sunnyvale (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 666, 671 [rejecting liability arising from negligent review of or failure to inspect patently dangerous stairwell].) The courts have interpreted section 818.6 very broadly, immunizin…

“First and foremost, application of section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 (Haggis).) “ ‘It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a functi…

“First and foremost, application of section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ] (Haggis).) Penal Code section 11167, subdivision (d)(1), clearly meets this criterion.

Code, § 815, subd. (a) [“Except as otherwise provided by statute; [][] (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person”]; Shamsian v. Department of Conservation (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 621, 632 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 ].) *926 One form of statutory public entity liability, enacted in 1963, is contained in Government Code section 815.6, which establishes a private ri…

The plaintiff must show the injury is ‘ “one of the consequences which the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory duty.” ’ ” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 (Haggis).) Finally, the breach of the duty must have been a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.

(Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498-499 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ].) “Whether an enactment creates a mandatory duty is a question of law . . . .” {Id., at p. 499.) *1090 1.

(Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 (Haggis).) “We examine the ‘language, function and apparent purpose’ of each cited enactment ‘to determine if any or each creates a mandatory duty designed to protect against’ the injury allegedly suffered by plaintiff.” (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 898 .) A statute cannot be interpreted to impose a mandatory duty unless the mandatory nature of the duty is “ ‘ “phrased in explicit and forceful language.” ’ ” (Id. …

(See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 498 [underlying enactment “must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken”].) Furthermore, the statutes do not suggest, let alone establish, that they were “ ‘designed’ to protect against the particular kind of injury” Gibbs suffered.

MANDATORY DUTY Section 815.6 provides that “[w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” A claim under section 815.6 “has three elements that must be satisfied to…

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’ Case No. 2:25-cv-00925-CAS-JDEx Date November 3, 2025 Title “Michael A. DiMatteo v. Hurdle Clay Jacke, etal st” reputational injury|], is exactly the type the Legislature sought to prevent by requiring transparency.” Id. (citing Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 4th 490, 498 (2000)).

(See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 501, fn. 3 ; The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 841, 852 .) 7 court’s conclusion that Simmons’ vehicle was within a city park and therefore covered by the municipal code provision constitutes a factual finding, and we defer to this factual finding if supported by substantial evidence.

Several statutory sections on which Plaintiffs rely, 11 however, provide for discretion and thus do not impose a mandatory duty. 12 For example, Welfare and Institutions Code § 16507.5 states that when a minor is 13 separated from their family, the county welfare department or adoption agency social worker 14 “shall make any and all reasonable and necessary provisions for the care, supervision, custody, 15 conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor.” However, the statute…

Cal. 1993): see also Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. 2000) (“Section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; 1t must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.”).

Cal. 1993): see also Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. 2000) (“Section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; 1t must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.”).

“Whether an enactment creates a mandatory duty is a question of law: ‘Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts.’ ” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 (Haggis).) “The enactment’s language ‘is, of course, a most important guide in determining legislative intent, [but] there are unquestionably instances in…

Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 4th 490, 499 (2000). 12 To interpret an enactment as imposing a mandatory duty on a public entity, “the mandatory 13 nature of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language.” Collins v. Thurmond, 41 Cal. 14 App. 5th 879, 914 (2019) (quoting Quackenbush v. Superior Ct., 57 Cal. App. 4th 660, 663 (1997)). 15 “It is not enough that some statute contains mandatory language.

Such actions have been found nondiscretionary, and thus not immunized, because they entail the fulfillment of enacted requirements.’ ” (Ortega v. Sacramento County Dept. of Health & Human Services (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 713, 728 ; see, e.g., Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 125, 141 [liability could be imposed for social worker’s failure to comply with mandatory requirement of monthly face-to-face contact with child placed in foster care]; see also State …

The plaintiff must show the injury is ‘ “one of the consequences which the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory duty.” ’ ” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 (Haggis).) Last, the breach of the duty must have been a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.

The plaintiff must show the injury is “ ‘one of the consequences which the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory duty.’ ” ’ ” (Srouy, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 560, quoting Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 (Haggis).) “Finally, the breach of the duty must have been a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” (Srouy, at p. 560.) “Whether an enactment imposes ‘a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perfo…

(See fn. 10.) 30 general rule of public entity immunity: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” (See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499…

(See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 [Government Code section 815.6 “requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken. [Citation.] It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a function if the functio…

Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 (2000). 20 To interpret an enactment as imposing a mandatory duty on a public entity, “the mandatory 21 nature of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language.” Collins v. Thurmond, 41 Cal. 22 App. 5th 879, 914 (2019) (quoting Quackenbush v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 4th 660 , 663 23 (1997)).

(Cf. Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 506 [despite use of word “shall,” municipal code provisions regarding development of property in landslide zones did not create mandatory duty].) No such liability can exist here: Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution, as important as it is, simply declares (that is, recognizes) the “inalienable” right of privacy, as well as to due process, to equal protection and to be free from unreasonable searches.

(Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 .) “. . . ‘Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of *708 statutory interpretation for the courts.’ [Citation.]” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ].) As pointed out by the Tos real parties in interest, ascertaining the will of the electorate is paramount.

“It is not enough . . . that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ].) The choice whether to seek interim permitting authority is discretionary.

(See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 495 ["On appeal from dismissal following a sustained demurrer, we take as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint"].) 3 Attached to the SAC is a copy of "Schedule A" and "Schedule B" to the title insurance policy.

(Cf. Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ].) The statutory enactments requiring the Bonds were not intended to protect plaintiff as a property owner.

Section 815.6 has three discrete requirements which “must be met before governmental entity liability may be imposed under Government Code section 815.6: (1) an enactment must impose a mandatory duty; (2) the enactment must be meant to protect against the kind of risk of injury suffered by the party asserting section 815.6 as a basis for liability; and (3) breach of the mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury suffered.” (Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles, supr…

Under Government Code section 815.6, a public entity may be hable for injury caused by its failure to discharge a “mandatory duty” imposed by an enactment designed to protect against that type of injury. 1 Our Supreme Court has explained that, to be mandatory, “the enactment [must] be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity . . . .” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 …

(Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ]; Department of Corporations v. Superior Court (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 916, 926 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 624 ].) The parties stipulated that CHP Form 555, the Traffic Collision Report, “requires that the investigating police officers identify all parties by Name, Address, Telephone, Date of Birth, Driver’s License Number, etc. Obtaining this identifying information from parties is not discr…

(Ibid.; Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 909-910 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 251 , 559 P.2d 606 ] (Morris), disapproved on other grounds in Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 987-988, fn. 8 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ].) A reviewing court must “examine the language, function and apparent purpose of’ the statutory provision “to determine if [it] creates a mandatory duty.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 500 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993…

(See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 495 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ] [“On appeal from dismissal following a sustained demurrer, we take as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint.”].) The Miramonteses assert that Dan Clark’s “allegations in its pleadings regarding how Frehner came into possession of the Vehicles and Frehner’s subsequent conversion of these Vehicles are inconsistent and contradictory.” The details of this tran…

That the enactment `confers some benefit' on the class to which plaintiff belongs is not enough; if the benefit is `incidental' to the enactment's protective purpose, the enactment cannot serve as a predicate for liability under section 815.6." ( Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ].) The Civil Code statutes cited by C.A. do not "command specific acts designed to prevent an employee" from sexually molesting a student,…

Section 815.6—Mandatory Duty Section 815.6 further provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” “[A]pplication of section 815.6 requires that the enactme…

(Id. at p. 24.) One of the Supreme Court decisions relied on by the Sutherland court is Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ], where the Supreme Court stated: “Whether an enactment creates a mandatory duty is a question of law: ‘Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts.…

Breach of Mandatory Duty Cause of Action For liability to be invoked against a public entity or employee under Government Code section 815.6 for failing to perform a mandatory duty, the enactment at issue “must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ], original italics.) If the enactment merely confers discretionary authorit…

A. Legal Framework Section 815.6 provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” Section 815.6 has three discrete requirements, two of which are dispositive…

(Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ] (Haggis).) Because this determination is essentially a question of statutory interpretation, it is subject to de novo review.

(Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 495 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ]; Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 997 , 1007 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 ].) The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating error by the superior court. {Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 880 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 ].) Our only task is to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. {Garcia v. Super…

(Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ]; Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 631 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 , 957 P.2d 1323 ].) We exercise our independent judgment in resolving that issue.

(Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 980 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ].) Under Government *1532 Code section 815.6, “[w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to disch…

(See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 501-502, fn. 3 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ] [judicially noticeable matter properly considered in ruling on demurrer, where relevant; Supreme Court took notice of local code provisions that trial court was requested to notice in connection with demurrer, despite lack of record of any ruling on such request by trial court]; Evid.

(Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ]; Hernandez v. State of California (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 895, 899 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 205 ].) B.