State v. Jackson (2010)

Start with State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 647 (2) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010), a seminal decision addressing “what the term ‘causes’ means as used in the felony murder statute.” In that decision, we 2 Because it concluded the evidence was sufficient to support Melancon’s convictions on this theory of causation, the Court of Appeals expressly declined to address the State’s other theories of causation.

Proximate cause is “that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.” Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

See, e.g., Jackson, 287 Ga. at 658 (“[W]e consider factors such as . . . .”) (citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (129 SCt 2079, 173 LE2d 955) (2009)) (emphasis supplied).

See Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017) (overruling a 45-year-old precedent on premature motions for new trial); State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656, 661- 662 (748 SE2d 910) (2013) (overruling a 38-year-old precedent regarding when a new post-appeal sentence is unconstitutionally vindictive); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 659-60 (5), (6) (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (overruling a nearly 29-year-old interpretation of the felony murder statute).

See State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law . . . .”); Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 452 ( 200 SE 796 ) (1939) (“The application of the doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the performance of a well-ordered system of jurisprudence.”); Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 169 (1) ( 880 SE2d 544 ) (2022) (Pinson, J., concurring) (following past decisions “promotes a system of equal treat…

Cf. id. at 659-660 (5) (“In large part because our Court and the Court of Appeals have not consistently applied [our prior decision], it has not had the sort of obviously far-reaching effects that are likely to stimulate a legislative response.”).

Green v. State, 318 Ga. 610, 635 (II) (C) ( 898 SE2d 500 ) (2024); Pounds v. State, 309 Ga. 376, 382 (3) ( 846 SE2d 48 ) (2020), overruled on other grounds by Johnson, 315 Ga. at 889 (3) & n.11; Jackson, 287 Ga. at 658 (5); Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374, 376 (2) ( 418 SE2d 27 ) (1992).

See Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 567-78 (2) (894 SE2d 27) (2023); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 660 (6) (697 SE2d 757) (2010).

Or can it be 16 the felony can be the start of a continuous process to death or the precipitating event to death?” After conferring with counsel, the trial court announced that it would repeat its charge on felony murder, instruct the jury that “cause” meant “proximate cause,” and then define “proximate cause.” The trial court indicated that it would use the definition of “proximate cause” in Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 413 (13) n.19 ( 811 SE2d 399 ) (2018), as requested …

See Calhoun v. State, 308 Ga. 146, 149 (2) (a) ( 839 SE2d 612 ) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted); Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648-652 (2).

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) ("The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents."); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5), 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) ("Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process."); Morse v. State, 288 Ga.App. 725, 729 , 655 S.E.2d 217 (2007) (noting that the outcome in that ca…

Moreover, “we have long held, in numerous cases, that proximate causation is the test for malice murder.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 649 ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (collecting cases).

See id. at 654 (“Proximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal 21 (or, in the civil context, tortious) conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.”).6 (b) Appellant also claims that his conviction for aggravated child molestation violates due process, because OCGA § 16-6-4 (c) is unconstitutionally vague regarding whether an act of child molestation that causes a child under the age of 16 to end…

Id. ("Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process.").

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court [of Georgia] shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); Whorton v. State, 321 Ga. App. 335, 339 (1) ( 741 SE2d 653 ) (2013) (holding that “vertical stare decisis dictates that we faithfully adhere to the precedents established by the Supreme Court of Georgia”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law ... .”).

Workers’ Comp., 309 Ga. 44, 51 (3) ( 844 SE2d 749 ) (2020) (“Generally, we adhere to the principle of stare decisis, which directs the courts to stand by their prior decisions.” (punctuation omitted)); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law ....”). 4 Benefield, 308 Ga. App. at 613 . 5 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 124 ( 140 SCt 1390 , 206 LEd2d 583 ) (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., …

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court [of Georgia] shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); Whorton v. State, 321 Ga. App. 335, 339 (1) ( 741 SE2d 653 ) (2013) (holding that “vertical stare decisis dictates that we faithfully adhere to the precedents established by the Supreme Court of Georgia”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law . . . .”); see also …

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 352 (1) ( 707 SE2d 560 ) (2011) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court.”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law . . . .”); see also Kurt T.

See, e.g., State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 122 (2) ( 829 SE2d 367 ) (2019) (overruling stat- utory-construction decision that was “reached without any meaning- ful analysis”); Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 464, 467 (1) ( 796 SE2d 261 ) (2017) (overruling statutory-construction precedent that was two sentences long and contained no statutory construction); Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 (3) (b) (overruling precedent that disre- 4 Reasonable minds may differ on how much less “permanen…

See Melancon, 319 Ga. at 751 (2) (b) (“When an intervening act was a natural or probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct, a finding of legal cause is not precluded.”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 654 (3) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (Imposing liability “for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal 22 . . . conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause . . . would include, at least in some factual scenarios, a deadly response agai…

VI (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 352 ( 707 SE2d 560 (2011) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court.”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law . . . .”); see also Kurt T.

Dunston argues that, given the reliance of his defense in large part on the question of whether Jackson’s death was proximately caused by the criminal conduct alleged in the indictment and the importance of the jury’s consideration of this factual question, the trial court should have given the civil pattern jury instruction regarding foreseeability and intervening cause, modified for the felony-murder context, or, alternatively, an instruction — based on State v. Jackson, 2…

Where, as in the case before us, there is no indication that a subsequent General Assembly has addressed itself to the particular problem, we are unpersuaded that silence is tantamount to acquiescence, let alone approval[.] State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 659 (5) n.8 (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (cleaned up) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 & n.21 (90 SCt 314, 24 LE2d 345) (1969) (citations and punctuation omitted)). b.

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law[.]”); McKibben v. State, 340 Ga. App. 89 , 92 n.10 ( 796 SE2d 478 ) (2017) (noting that decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia “remains binding authority over this Court unless and until it is overturned by our Supreme Court”); Whorton v…

See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (defining parties to a crime); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652-653 (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (noting “the dangerous and violent nature of armed robbery and drug dealing”); Everritt v. State, 277 Ga. 457, 459-460 (588 SE2d 691) (2003) (discussing legal responsibility of a criminal defendant for “natural and probable” or “reasonably foreseeable” collateral acts of a co-conspirator (emphasis in original)).

See also Robinson v. State, 298 Ga. 455, 457-459 (1) ( 782 SE2d 657 ) (2016) (holding that the fatal shooting of the defendant’s accomplice by the victim during an attempted armed robbery was foreseeable); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 654 (3) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Proximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal . . . conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.”). 2.

“In reconsidering our prior decisions, ‘we must balance the importance of having the questions decided against the importance of having it decided right.’” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010)).

See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 660 ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010).

See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) ; State v. Jackson , 287 Ga. 646 , 654, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) ("Proximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal ... conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.").

See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 654 ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Proximate causation imposes liability for the 15 reasonably foreseeable results of criminal . . . conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.”).

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) ("The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents."); State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345 , 352 (1), 707 S.E.2d 560 (2011) ("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court."); see also State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646 , 658 (5), 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) ("Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law...."); Kurt T.

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) ("The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents."); State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345 , 352 (1), 707 S.E.2d 560 (2011) ("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court."); see also State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646 , 658 (5), 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) ("Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law ...."); Kurt T.

See, e.g., State v. Jackson , 287 Ga. 646 , 649, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) ("[W]e have repeatedly held ... that the phrase 'he causes' in OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) establishes proximate causation as the standard for liability in felony murder cases."); State v. Cross , 260 Ga. 845 , 847, 401 S.E.2d 510 (1991) ("There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the victim must die during the commission of the underlying felony under a felony-murder indictment."); Jones v. State , 220 …

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 352 (1) ( 707 SE2d 560 ) (2011) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court.”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law . . . .”); see also Kurt T.

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 352 (1) ( 707 SE2d 560 ) (2011) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court.”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law....”); see also Kurt T.

See also Jackson, 287 Ga. at 654 (“Proximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal. . . conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.”).

Doyle, P. J., and Miller, J., concur. 29 Benefield v. Tominich, 308 Ga. App. 605, 613 ( 708 SE2d 563 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring dubitante) (punctuation omitted). 30 See State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law . . . .”) 15

See State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“[The doctrine of] stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law . .. .”).

See also State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 654 (3) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Proximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results *108 of criminal . . . conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.”).

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 352 ( 707 SE2d 560 ) (2011) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court.”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law....”); see also Kurt T.

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 352 ( 707 SE2d 560 ) (2011) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court.”); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law . . . .”); see also Kurt T.

Such an interpretation is not only contrary to the statute’s text, but is also inconsistent with more than a century of precedent holding that the County Presentment Statute requires presentment of claims against the county to the county.21 Although stare decisis is an important principle for promoting the rule of law, especially in the context of statutory interpretation, it is “not an inexorable command, 19 See Moats II, 310 Ga. at 125 (3) (a) (Nahmias, P. J., concurring) …

Hill alludes that the language of the reinstatement provision indicates that the General Assembly did not foresee, and thus did not provide for, the specific circumstance where the suspension resulted from a federal indictment; but “[l]egislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 659 (5), n.8 ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010). 12 And as noted above, Hill has failed to supply…

When a justification defense applies, we have said that adults were “not engaged in any crime at all,” Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768, 771 (2) ( 723 SE2d 915 ) (2012), “committed no crime,” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 655 (4) n.6 ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010), or were engaged in “lawful” conduct, Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812, 814 (2) (a) ( 607 SE2d 581 ) (2005).

See also Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 808-14 (3) ( 771 SE2d 362 ) (2015) (overruling 24-year-old interpretation of justification defense statute); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 659-60 (5)-(6) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (overruling nearly 29- year-old interpretation of felony murder statute).

This Court has held that “the felony murder statute requires only that the defendant’s felonious conduct proximately cause the death of another person.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 660 (6) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010).

“Under this review, we must put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of fact.” Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 853 (1) (a) ( 823 SE2d 325 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[T]he felony murder statute requires only that the defendant’s felonious conduct proximately cause the death of another person.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646…

See, e.g., Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 808-814 (3) ( 771 SE2d 362 ) (2015) (overruling 24-year-old interpretation of justification statute); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 659-660 (5), (6) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010) (overruling nearly 29-year-old interpretation of felony murder statute).

However, assuming without deciding that counsel’s trial preparation and defense presentation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, thus, constituted deficient performance, Calhoun has failed to demonstrate prejudice. “[T]he felony murder statute requires only that the defendant’s 6 felonious conduct proximately cause the death of another person.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 660 ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010). “[P]roximate cause exists when the accused’s act or …

VI, § VI, ¶ VI (1983) ("The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents."); State v. Jackson , 287 Ga. 646 , 658 (5), 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) ("Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process."); Morse v. State , 288 Ga. App. 725 , 729 (1), 655 S.E.2d 217 (2007) (noting that the outcome in…