Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the issues dealt with, decisions under former Penal Code 1910, § 45 and former Code 1933, §§ 26-402, 26-601, as they read prior to revision of the title by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Statute is not unconstitutionally vague, indefinite, and overbroad. Wanzer v. State, 232 Ga. 523, 207 S.E.2d 466 (1974).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery as an aider and abetter under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) and (4) as a codefendant testified that the defendant had provided the gun used in the crime, which was corroborated by the defendant's admission that the defendant provided the shooter with the gun and that the defendant knew that the persons intended to use the gun to rob a place on the interstate. Terrell v. State, 268 Ga. App. 173, 601 S.E.2d 500 (2004).

Law regarding accessories before the fact is to be treated as rider on other penal statutes, describing possible relationship or status, and not creating separate offense. Chambers v. State, 194 Ga. 773, 22 S.E.2d 487, answer conformed to, 68 Ga. App. 338, 23 S.E.2d 545 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-601).

Person providing encouragement and promising to buy fruits of larceny (now theft) as party.

- One who counsels and encourages commission of misdemeanor by promising to buy fruits of larceny is guilty as a principal, although the person did not act as actual perpetrator of crime. Grant v. State, 47 Ga. App. 234, 170 S.E. 394 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 45).

Participants need not be actual perpetrators.

- Participants to a crime may be convicted of a crime even though they are not the actual perpetrators. It matters not whether it was defendant or defendant's accomplice who actually fired the gun during the robbery which resulted in the death of the victim. Lobdell v. State, 256 Ga. 769, 353 S.E.2d 799 (1987); Heath v. State, 186 Ga. App. 655, 368 S.E.2d 346 (1988) (cocaine trafficking); Cunningham v. State, 240 Ga. App. 92, 522 S.E.2d 684 (1999);(child molestation).

When the defendant, an attorney, knew that the client had received approximately $15,000 at closing, but told the client's insurer that the client had not been paid for the sale of the property because the indictment specifically charged the defendant with violating the insurance fraud statute; and the indictment further indicated, tracking the statute's own language, that the fraudulent misrepresentation was the statement of the client that the client had suffered a loss of $117,849.82, the indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 199, 193 L. Ed. 2d 128 (U.S. 2015).

Merely driving vehicle sufficient.

- There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder and aggravated assault resulting from an incident when shots were fired from a van at the victims, who were riding in a car that had formerly belonged to a drug dealer; the defendant had argued with the drug dealer the day of the shooting, the defendant's wrecked car was found in the same place as the van, the surviving victim identified the defendant as the driver of the van, the van had been traded to the defendant's brother, and even if the defendant did not actually fire the shots, being the driver would authorize the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a). Yancey v. State, 281 Ga. 664, 641 S.E.2d 524 (2007).

Common criminal intent.

- Elements of proof that one is party or accomplice to a crime require proof of common criminal intent. Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 11, 295 S.E.2d 71 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1176, 103 S. Ct. 827, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1983).

It is appropriate to consider all circumstances surrounding incident in determining whether defendant is a party. Moran v. State, 139 Ga. App. 274, 228 S.E.2d 216 (1976).

Presence, companionship, and conduct before and after offense inferring participation.

- While mere presence at scene of commission of crime is not sufficient evidence to convict one of being a party thereto, presence, companionship, and conduct before and after offense are circumstances from which one's participation in criminal intent may be inferred. Kimbro v. State, 152 Ga. App. 893, 264 S.E.2d 327 (1980); Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 305 S.E.2d 599 (1983); Lunz v. State, 174 Ga. App. 893, 332 S.E.2d 37 (1985); Stoe v. State, 187 Ga. App. 171, 369 S.E.2d 793 (1988); Simpson v. State, 265 Ga. 665, 461 S.E.2d 210 (1995); James v. State, 227 Ga. App. 907, 490 S.E.2d 556 (1997).

Intent may be proved by conduct, demeanor, and other circumstances connected with act for which defendant is being prosecuted. Brooks v. State, 151 Ga. App. 384, 259 S.E.2d 743 (1979); Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 305 S.E.2d 599 (1983); Todd v. State, 189 Ga. App. 538, 376 S.E.2d 917 (1988).

Presence and assistance in commission of crime.

- While an individual's mere presence when a crime is committed is not sufficient to warrant conviction, if the individual is present and assists in the commission of the crime, the individual may be convicted as a party thereto. Hicks v. State, 211 Ga. App. 370, 439 S.E.2d 56 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a defendant's conviction of two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-106 because the defendant's admission that defendant was holding a rifle throughout the crimes' commission, along with evidence of the defendant's flight, authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant participated in the crimes by acting as a lookout. Gant v. State, 291 Ga. App. 823, 662 S.E.2d 895 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault because, although it was unclear who fired first, the defendant admittedly fired the defendant's weapon; the jury could find that even if the victims were not hit by the defendant's bullets, the victims were struck when rap group members and supporters fired during a gun battle. Emmanuel v. State, 300 Ga. App. 378, 685 S.E.2d 361 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0301, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 301 (Ga. 2010).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, because the defendant was not only present when a robbery was committed, but also actively aided and abetted the robbery's commission and received a portion of the money taken from the victim, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of robbery by force beyond a reasonable doubt under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1). Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 375, 724 S.E.2d 410 (2012).

Presence at scene of crime.

- Mere presence at scene of crime or where criminal acts are committed, even when coupled with flight, is insufficient to authorize conviction. Bogan v. State, 158 Ga. App. 1, 279 S.E.2d 229 (1981).

Presence at scene of crime is not sufficient to show that defendant is party to crime. Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862, 302 S.E.2d 347 (1983).

Presence at the scene of a crime, even when coupled with knowledge and approval not amounting to encouragement, is not sufficient to show that the defendant is a party. Smith v. State, 188 Ga. App. 415, 373 S.E.2d 97 (1988).

Neither presence nor approval sufficient for participation.

- Presence at the scene of a crime was not sufficient to show that a defendant was a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, and even approval of the act, if not amounting to encouragement, would not suffice. This was so because of the restrictions of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) as to a conviction on circumstantial evidence. Ridgeway v. State, 187 Ga. App. 381, 370 S.E.2d 216 (1988).

Sufficiency of indictments.

- In two actions charging the defendant with being a party to the crime of aggravated assault allegedly committed with a codefendant, given that the first of two indictments failed to set out the elements of aggravated assault, and the state offered to nolle pros the same, the indictment was properly dismissed; however, a second and superseding indictment survived demurrer, as the elements of aggravated assault were sufficiently set out therein, and the disjunctive way that the offense was charged was not fatally defective as to the defendant, but simply limited the state's option of proving at trial the manner in which the aggravated assault was committed. State v. Daniels, 281 Ga. App. 224, 635 S.E.2d 835 (2006).

When the defendant, an attorney, knew that the client had received approximately $15,000 at closing, but told the client's insurer that the client had not been paid for the sale of the property, the indictment was sufficient to withstand a special demurrer because the indictment specifically identified the fraudulent statement as the client's December 8, 2008 proof of loss statement; the indictment apprised the defendant of the charges against the defendant so that the defendant could prepare a defense; and the indictment protected the defendant against subsequent prosecutions for the same offense. Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 199, 193 L. Ed. 2d 128 (U.S. 2015).

Indictment did not have to allege defendant's status as party to charged crimes.

- Although the state was required to prove that the defendant was a party to the charged crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, the state was not required to allege these provisions in the indictment. Thus, the presentation to the jury of the theories of parties to the crime and conspiracy was not a constructive amendment to the indictment. Elamin v. State, 293 Ga. App. 591, 667 S.E.2d 439 (2008).

Venue.

- After the crime is completed, a defendant may be convicted of the crime based on defendant's activities as a conspirator, even though conspiracy is not alleged in the indictment, and venue in such a case is properly laid in the county in which the substantive offense is committed, even though the defendant may never have entered that county. Hernandez v. State, 182 Ga. App. 797, 357 S.E.2d 131 (1987).

Approval, not amounting to encouragement.

- Even if the defendant's statement could be construed as constituting approval of the codefendant's offense of selling marijuana, such approval, not amounting to encouragement, does not render the defendant party to the offense charged. Parker v. State, 155 Ga. App. 617, 271 S.E.2d 871 (1980).

Approval of the act, not amounting to encouragement, will not suffice to show that a defendant is a party to the crime. Moore v. State, 255 Ga. 519, 340 S.E.2d 888 (1986).

Former definition of principal in second degree carries over to paragraph (b)(3) of section.

- Although terminology of parties to crime as principals in first and second degree has been abolished, the concept, as relating to criminal responsibility, remains constant. "Aid or abet" as used in former Code 1933, § 26-801(b)(3) should be given the same meaning as in defining principal in second degree as one "who is present, aiding, and abetting the act to be done." Hannah v. State, 125 Ga. App. 596, 188 S.E.2d 401 (1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3)).

Where numerous persons are concerned in crime, language of section may be charged.

- By virtue of former Code 1933, §§ 26-801 and 26-802 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-2-21), if evidence in criminal case shows that two or more persons were concerned in commission of alleged crime, it is not harmful error for trial court to charge in the language of these provisions or to charge jury on law of conspiracy. Battle v. State, 231 Ga. 501, 202 S.E.2d 449 (1973).

Charge under statute erroneous only when theory not supported by evidence.

- Charge under statute is error only if there is insufficient evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, to support theory. Evans v. State, 138 Ga. App. 460, 226 S.E.2d 303 (1976).

Person need not be indicted under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 before state may prove that person's culpability for crime. as a party to that crime. Wright v. State, 165 Ga. App. 790, 302 S.E.2d 706 (1983).

State's use of "party to a crime" theory to convict defendant when defendant was indicted for having directly committed the crimes was not in error; even though state was required to prove defendant was party to the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, it was not required to allege those provisions in the indictment. Trumpler v. State, 261 Ga. App. 499, 583 S.E.2d 184 (2003).

Acquittal of one party does not bar separate, distinct prosecution and conviction of another party. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E.2d 791 (1974).

Instruction cured reading of wrong indictment.

- Because state presented sufficient evidence showing defendant's involvement in sale of cocaine and the sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public housing project as a party to the crimes, and because the judge's instruction and explanation after reading the wrong indictment to the jury at trial cured any error, defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal, and mistrial based on the latter was properly denied; moreover, defendant was properly denied a new trial. Walker v. State, 290 Ga. App. 749, 660 S.E.2d 844 (2008), cert. dismissed, No. S08C1701, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 776 (Ga. 2008).

Trier of fact determines level of involvement.

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions based on the victim's testimony identifying defendant as one of the three perpetrators and the admissions by the defendant to aiding and abetting. Although the defendant claimed that the defendant's involvement was limited to trying to rescue a co-hort, there was evidence that the defendant was personally involved in the entire episode, and it was up to the trier of fact to determine what happened. Yates v. State, 298 Ga. App. 727, 681 S.E.2d 190 (2009).

Acquittal of principal is relevant evidence on the issue of the guilt or innocence of one charged as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), (b)(3) and (b)(4). White v. State, 257 Ga. 236, 356 S.E.2d 875 (1987).

Cited in Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970); Green v. State, 124 Ga. App. 469, 184 S.E.2d 194 (1971); Dutton v. State, 228 Ga. 850, 188 S.E.2d 794 (1972); Brooks v. State, 125 Ga. App. 867, 189 S.E.2d 448 (1972); Grey v. State, 126 Ga. App. 357, 190 S.E.2d 557 (1972); Bradford v. State, 126 Ga. App. 688, 191 S.E.2d 545 (1972); Yeomans v. State, 229 Ga. 488, 192 S.E.2d 362 (1972); Montgomery v. State, 128 Ga. App. 116, 195 S.E.2d 784 (1973); Swarn v. State, 230 Ga. 552, 198 S.E.2d 177 (1973); Holiday v. State, 128 Ga. App. 817, 198 S.E.2d 364 (1973); Moye v. State, 129 Ga. App. 52, 198 S.E.2d 514 (1973); Simmons v. State, 129 Ga. App. 107, 198 S.E.2d 718 (1973); Jones v. State, 129 Ga. App. 54, 198 S.E.2d 884 (1973); Overton v. State, 230 Ga. 830, 199 S.E.2d 205 (1973); Singleton v. State, 129 Ga. App. 644, 200 S.E.2d 507 (1973); Gentry v. State, 129 Ga. App. 819, 201 S.E.2d 679 (1973); Lundy v. State, 130 Ga. App. 171, 202 S.E.2d 536 (1973); Perkins v. State, 231 Ga. 680, 203 S.E.2d 854 (1974); Freeman v. State, 130 Ga. App. 718, 204 S.E.2d 445 (1974); Strong v. State, 232 Ga. 294, 206 S.E.2d 461 (1974); Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 207 S.E.2d 494 (1974); Hess v. State, 132 Ga. App. 26, 207 S.E.2d 580 (1974); Dyke v. State, 232 Ga. 817, 209 S.E.2d 166 (1974); Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41, 209 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Zinn v. State, 134 Ga. App. 51, 213 S.E.2d 156 (1975); Gaither v. State, 234 Ga. 465, 216 S.E.2d 324 (1975); Daniels v. State, 234 Ga. 523, 216 S.E.2d 819 (1975); Murray v. State, 135 Ga. App. 264, 217 S.E.2d 293 (1975); Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 217 S.E.2d 476 (1975); Cunningham v. State, 235 Ga. 126, 218 S.E.2d 854 (1975); Rucker v. State, 135 Ga. App. 468, 218 S.E.2d 146 (1975); Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 219 S.E.2d 151 (1975); Snell v. McCoy, 135 Ga. App. 832, 219 S.E.2d 482 (1975); Garland v. State, 235 Ga. 522, 221 S.E.2d 198 (1975); McNeese v. State, 236 Ga. 26, 222 S.E.2d 318 (1976); Clanton v. State, 137 Ga. App. 376, 224 S.E.2d 58 (1976); Coleman v. State, 137 Ga. App. 689, 224 S.E.2d 878 (1976); Carter v. State, 137 Ga. App. 824, 225 S.E.2d 73 (1976); Ballew v. State, 138 Ga. App. 530, 227 S.E.2d 65 (1976); Hickox v. State, 138 Ga. App. 882, 227 S.E.2d 829 (1976); Evans v. State, 139 Ga. App. 607, 229 S.E.2d 88 (1976); Loder v. State, 140 Ga. App. 166, 230 S.E.2d 124 (1976); Waldrop v. State, 141 Ga. App. 58, 232 S.E.2d 395 (1977); Lane v. State, 238 Ga. 407, 233 S.E.2d 375 (1977); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 471, 233 S.E.2d 861 (1977); Phillips v. State, 238 Ga. 632, 235 S.E.2d 12 (1977); Bostic v. State, 239 Ga. 32, 235 S.E.2d 530 (1977); Fuqua v. State, 142 Ga. App. 632, 236 S.E.2d 685 (1977); Nance v. State, 239 Ga. 381, 236 S.E.2d 752 (1977); Hendrix v. State, 239 Ga. 507, 238 S.E.2d 56 (1977); Jackson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 406, 238 S.E.2d 752 (1977); Sullens v. State, 239 Ga. 766, 238 S.E.2d 864 (1977); Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Allen v. State, 145 Ga. App. 426, 243 S.E.2d 626 (1978); Peters v. State, 241 Ga. 152, 243 S.E.2d 883 (1978); Miller v. State, 145 Ga. App. 653, 244 S.E.2d 608 (1978); Hitchcock v. State, 146 Ga. App. 470, 246 S.E.2d 477 (1978); Key v. State, 146 Ga. App. 536, 246 S.E.2d 723 (1978); Mathis v. State, 242 Ga. 761, 251 S.E.2d 305 (1978); Dixon v. State, 243 Ga. 46, 252 S.E.2d 431 (1979); Davis v. State, 242 Ga. 901, 252 S.E.2d 443 (1979); Garrett v. State, 243 Ga. 322, 253 S.E.2d 741 (1979); Barraza v. State, 149 Ga. App. 738, 256 S.E.2d 48 (1979); Hughes v. State, 150 Ga. App. 90, 256 S.E.2d 634 (1979); Cantrell v. State, 150 Ga. App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 351 (1979); Crass v. State, 150 Ga. App. 374, 257 S.E.2d 909 (1979); Crosby v. State, 150 Ga. App. 804, 258 S.E.2d 593 (1979); Harrison v. State, 151 Ga. App. 758, 261 S.E.2d 482 (1979); Womack v. State, 152 Ga. App. 325, 262 S.E.2d 598 (1979); Pittman v. State, 245 Ga. 453, 265 S.E.2d 592 (1980); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2d 201 (1980); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 258, 267 S.E.2d 863 (1980); Whitaker v. State, 246 Ga. 163, 269 S.E.2d 436 (1980); McAllister v. State, 246 Ga. 246, 271 S.E.2d 159 (1980); Morrow v. State, 155 Ga. App. 574, 271 S.E.2d 707 (1980); Highfield v. State, 246 Ga. 478, 272 S.E.2d 62 (1980); Thomas v. State, 246 Ga. 484, 272 S.E.2d 68 (1980); Harper v. State, 155 Ga. App. 764, 272 S.E.2d 736 (1980); Murphy v. State, 246 Ga. 626, 273 S.E.2d 2 (1980); Smith v. State, 156 Ga. App. 563, 275 S.E.2d 140 (1980); Webb v. State, 156 Ga. App. 623, 275 S.E.2d 707 (1980); Walker v. State, 247 Ga. 746, 280 S.E.2d 333 (1981); Royal v. State, 158 Ga. App. 405, 280 S.E.2d 427 (1981); Stevens v. State, 158 Ga. App. 656, 281 S.E.2d 629 (1981); Koza v. State, 158 Ga. App. 709, 282 S.E.2d 131 (1981); Tisdol v. State, 158 Ga. App. 852, 282 S.E.2d 411 (1981); Jenkins v. State, 159 Ga. App. 183, 283 S.E.2d 49 (1981); Smith v. State, 159 Ga. App. 468, 284 S.E.2d 21 (1981); Jackson v. State, 248 Ga. 480, 284 S.E.2d 267 (1981); Price v. State, 159 Ga. App. 662, 284 S.E.2d 676 (1981); Weathers v. State, 160 Ga. App. 581, 287 S.E.2d 565 (1981); Parrish v. State, 160 Ga. App. 601, 287 S.E.2d 603 (1981); Dawson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 121, 288 S.E.2d 247 (1982); Morgan v. State, 161 Ga. App. 67, 288 S.E.2d 836 (1982); Fleming v. State, 162 Ga. App. 112, 290 S.E.2d 214 (1982); Osborn v. State, 161 Ga. App. 132, 291 S.E.2d 22 (1982); Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982); Welch v. State, 163 Ga. App. 383, 294 S.E.2d 596 (1982); Fox v. State, 163 Ga. App. 601, 295 S.E.2d 563 (1982); Goins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 37, 296 S.E.2d 229 (1982); Ellis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 366, 296 S.E.2d 726 (1982); Johnson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 132, 299 S.E.2d 416 (1983); Moore v. State, 165 Ga. App. 207, 300 S.E.2d 543 (1983); Brooks v. State, 250 Ga. 739, 300 S.E.2d 810 (1983); Jackson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 444, 301 S.E.2d 661 (1983); Lucas v. State, 165 Ga. App. 468, 302 S.E.2d 121 (1983); Jackson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 737, 302 S.E.2d 611 (1983); Tolliver v. State, 167 Ga. App. 696, 307 S.E.2d 269 (1983); Thompson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 734, 310 S.E.2d 725 (1983); Barnes v. State, 168 Ga. App. 925, 310 S.E.2d 777 (1983); Campbell v. State, 169 Ga. App. 112, 312 S.E.2d 136 (1983); Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73 (1984); Brooks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 543, 314 S.E.2d 115 (1984); Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 319 S.E.2d 484 (1984); Jones v. State, 174 Ga. App. 783, 331 S.E.2d 633 (1985); George v. State, 175 Ga. App. 229, 333 S.E.2d 141 (1985); Robinson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 769, 334 S.E.2d 358 (1985); Norris v. State, 176 Ga. App. 164, 335 S.E.2d 611 (1985); Wilcox v. State, 177 Ga. App. 596, 340 S.E.2d 243 (1986); Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598, 340 S.E.2d 869 (1986); Bagby v. State, 178 Ga. App. 282, 342 S.E.2d 731 (1986); Barnett v. State, 178 Ga. App. 383, 343 S.E.2d 155 (1986); Wallace v. State, 178 Ga. App. 876, 344 S.E.2d 770 (1986); Lobdell v. State, 256 Ga. 769, 353 S.E.2d 799 (1987); Beck v. State, 181 Ga. App. 681, 353 S.E.2d 610 (1987); Sablon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 128, 355 S.E.2d 88 (1987); Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140 (11th Cir. 1987); In re C.D.L., 184 Ga. App. 412, 361 S.E.2d 527 (1987); Davis v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1987); Bostic v. State, 184 Ga. App. 509, 361 S.E.2d 872 (1987); Eaton v. State, 184 Ga. App. 652, 362 S.E.2d 455 (1987); Martin v. State, 185 Ga. App. 145, 363 S.E.2d 765 (1987); Jones v. State, 258 Ga. 25, 365 S.E.2d 263 (1988); King v. State, 185 Ga. App. 698, 365 S.E.2d 852 (1988); Scott v. State, 185 Ga. App. 887, 366 S.E.2d 196 (1988); Raines v. State, 186 Ga. App. 239, 366 S.E.2d 841 (1988); Dukes v. State, 186 Ga. App. 815, 369 S.E.2d 259 (1988); Lonchar v. State, 258 Ga. 447, 369 S.E.2d 749 (1988); Davis v. Williams, 258 Ga. 552, 372 S.E.2d 228 (1988); Van Huynh v. State, 258 Ga. 663, 373 S.E.2d 502 (1988); Willis v. State, 191 Ga. App. 251, 381 S.E.2d 416 (1989); Cordova v. State, 191 Ga. App. 297, 381 S.E.2d 436 (1989)

Olsen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 763, 382 S.E.2d 715 (1989); Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920 (1989); Howard v. State, 192 Ga. App. 813, 386 S.E.2d 667 (1989); Glover v. State, 192 Ga. App. 798, 386 S.E.2d 699 (1989); McMonagle v. State, 196 Ga. App. 300, 395 S.E.2d 821 (1990); Graham v. State, 197 Ga. App. 102, 397 S.E.2d 600 (1990); Fair v. State, 198 Ga. App. 437, 401 S.E.2d 626 (1991); Brown v. State, 198 Ga. App. 590, 402 S.E.2d 341 (1991); Haynes v. State, 199 Ga. App. 288, 404 S.E.2d 585 (1991); Williams v. State, 200 Ga. App. 84, 406 S.E.2d 498 (1991); Austin v. State, 261 Ga. 550, 408 S.E.2d 105 (1991); Sands v. State, 262 Ga. 367, 418 S.E.2d 55 (1992); Smith v. State, 205 Ga. App. 810, 424 S.E.2d 56 (1992); Bedford v. State, 263 Ga. 121, 429 S.E.2d 87 (1993); Ellis v. State, 211 Ga. App. 605, 440 S.E.2d 235 (1994); Griffin v. State, 214 Ga. App. 813, 449 S.E.2d 341 (1994); Lawton v. State, 218 Ga. App. 309, 460 S.E.2d 878 (1995); Gaskin v. State, 221 Ga. App. 142, 470 S.E.2d 531 (1996); Cody v. State, 222 Ga. App. 468, 474 S.E.2d 669 (1996); Bishop v. State, 223 Ga. App. 422, 477 S.E.2d 422 (1996); Johnson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 668, 478 S.E.2d 404 (1996); Leigh v. State, 223 Ga. App. 726, 478 S.E.2d 905 (1996); Taylor v. State, 226 Ga. App. 339, 486 S.E.2d 601 (1997); Dasher v. State, 229 Ga. App. 41, 494 S.E.2d 192 (1997); Tanner v. State, 230 Ga. App. 77, 495 S.E.2d 315 (1998); Johnson v. State, 269 Ga. 632, 501 S.E.2d 815 (1998); London v. State, 235 Ga. App. 30, 508 S.E.2d 247 (1998); Haney v. State, 234 Ga. App. 214, 507 S.E.2d 18 (1998); Smith v. State, 234 Ga. App. 586, 506 S.E.2d 406 (1998); Scott v. State, 238 Ga. App. 258, 518 S.E.2d 468 (1999); Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 297, 523 S.E.2d 103 (1999); York v. State, 242 Ga. App. 281, 528 S.E.2d 823 (2000); Jordan v. State, 242 Ga. App. 547, 528 S.E.2d 858 (2000); Spivey v. State, 243 Ga. App. 785, 534 S.E.2d 498 (2000); In the Interest of E.G.W., 244 Ga. App. 119, 534 S.E.2d 869 (2000); Granados v. State, 244 Ga. App. 153, 34 S.E.2d 886 (2000); Chambers v. State, 244 Ga. App. 138, 534 S.E.2d 879 (2000); Carter v. State, 249 Ga. App. 354, 548 S.E.2d 102 (2001); Darns v. State, (Apr. 17, 2001); Ricarte v. State, 249 Ga. App. 50, 547 S.E.2d 703 (2001); Vaughns v. State, 274 Ga. 13, 549 S.E.2d 86 (2001); Scott v. State, 251 Ga. App. 510, 554 S.E.2d 513 (2001); Tesfaye v. State, 275 Ga. 439, 569 S.E.2d 849 (2002); Coggins v. State, 275 Ga. 479, 569 S.E.2d 505 (2002); Bennett v. State, 266 Ga. App. 502, 597 S.E.2d 565 (2004); Petty v. Smith, 279 Ga. 273, 612 S.E.2d 276 (2005); Morris v. State, 276 Ga. App. 775, 624 S.E.2d 281 (2005); Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 630 S.E.2d 783 (2006); Oree v. State, 280 Ga. 588, 630 S.E.2d 390 (2006); Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. App. 273, 645 S.E.2d 733 (2007); Williams v. State, 287 Ga. App. 361, 651 S.E.2d 768 (2007); Dean v. State, 292 Ga. App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (2008); Powell v. State, 293 Ga. App. 442, 667 S.E.2d 213 (2008); Burton v. State, 293 Ga. App. 822, 668 S.E.2d 306 (2008); Stinson v. State, 294 Ga. App. 184, 668 S.E.2d 840 (2008); Driscoll v. State, 295 Ga. App. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824 (2008); Rayshad v. State, 295 Ga. App. 29, 670 S.E.2d 849 (2008); State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 700 S.E.2d 912 (2010); Herbert v. State, 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260 (2011); Bryson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 512, 729 S.E.2d 631 (2012); Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012); Williams v. State, 291 Ga. 501, 732 S.E.2d 47 (2012); Simmons v. State, 292 Ga. 265, 736 S.E.2d 402 (2013); Jackson v. State, 322 Ga. App. 196, 744 S.E.2d 380 (2013); Kirchner v. State, 322 Ga. App. 275, 744 S.E.2d 802 (2013); Hassel v. State, 294 Ga. 834, 755 S.E.2d 134 (2014); Chambers v. State, 327 Ga. App. 663, 760 S.E.2d 664 (2014); Cisneros v. State, 334 Ga. App. 659, 780 S.E.2d 360 (2015), aff'd, 792 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 2016); Finley v. State, 298 Ga. 451, 782 S.E.2d 651 (2016); Williams v. State, 300 Ga. 161, 794 S.E.2d 127 (2016); Allen v. State, 300 Ga. 500, 796 S.E.2d 708 (2017); Scott v. State, 342 Ga. App. 442, 803 S.E.2d 600 (2017); Jones v. State, 302 Ga. 892, 810 S.E.2d 140 (2018); Calloway v. State, 303 Ga. 48, 810 S.E.2d 105 (2018).

Conspirator must have been accessory before the fact.

- To be guilty as a conspirator to a crime pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 one must be an accessory before the fact. Grant v. State, 227 Ga. App. 243, 488 S.E.2d 763 (1997).

Error in charge to jury harmless.

- Where the state proceeded against defendant as a party to the crime of murder with the defendant's co-indictee, any possible error by the trial court in charging conspiracy was harmless since there was sufficient evidence to support a charge on parties to a crime, and the state did not attempt to use statements of the co-indictee against defendant under the conspiracy hearsay exception. Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 455 S.E.2d 27 (1995).

Charge on conspiracy appropriate.

- Evidence of defendant's gang membership showed motive, was outside the experience of the average juror, and authorized the trial court's charge on conspiracy. Edge v. State, 275 Ga. 311, 567 S.E.2d 1 (2002).

Meaning of "aid or abet."

- "Aid or abet" as used in O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) should be given the same meaning as in former Code 1933, § 26-501 defining a principal in the second degree as one "who is present, aiding and abetting the act to be done". Thus, to be guilty as a party to a crime as an aider or abettor, a defendant must be an accessory before the fact. Grant v. State, 227 Ga. App. 243, 488 S.E.2d 763 (1997).

Actions as aider and abettor support conviction despite lack of alleged personal involvement.

- Although the indictment specifically alleged the personal involvement of the defendant and there was no evidence of such involvement at trial, the defendant's actions as an aider and abettor in the commission of the crime allow defendant to be convicted of the crime. Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177, 308 S.E.2d 438 (1983).

When the defendant initiated the contact with the victim and her brother, forced her to give the defendant her earrings, fondled her, held the gun on her brother while the codefendants brutally sodomized her, and counted the money the victim surrendered, such evidence authorized the rejection of any claim that the defendant was a victim. Ramey v. State, 235 Ga. App. 690, 510 S.E.2d 358 (1998).

Circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, armed robbery, cruelty to children, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of a firearm as: (1) the defendant was driving a stolen car that the defendant knew was not the defendant's own; (2) the defendant returned to the victims' house, which the defendant had left only a short time before, slowly circling the victims' residence, pointing at the house; (3) the defendant appeared to let the codefendants out of the car for a specific purpose, since the defendant saw them enter the victims' home and waited for them, demonstrating that the defendant knew they would return shortly; (4) when the codefendants ran back to the car and jumped in, the defendant drove off in response to their rapid return; and (5) shortly thereafter, the defendant abandoned the stolen car. Parnell v. State, 260 Ga. App. 213, 581 S.E.2d 263 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to adjudicate a juvenile a delinquent for aggravated assault with intent to murder when: (1) the juvenile was willingly present when the victim was beaten and stabbed; (2) the juvenile was part of a group carrying bricks, sticks, and bats on a mission of revenge; and (3) the juvenile fled the crime scene and gave police false information moments after the incident, because, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, whether the juvenile actually stabbed the victim was not controlling, as the juvenile was an accomplice of those who did, and it could be inferred from the juvenile's conduct before and after the crime that the juvenile shared the perpetrators' criminal intent. In the Interest of N.L.G., 267 Ga. App. 428, 600 S.E.2d 401 (2004).

When the defendant sat in a stolen would-be getaway car while an accomplice murdered a victim, and then the defendant and the accomplice abandoned that car and fled the scene, a jury could find, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), that the defendant participated in the accomplice's crimes and could be held criminally liable therefor. Jackson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 279, 617 S.E.2d 249 (2005).

Fact that a codefendant did not personally use a bat to beat an assault victim did not absolve the codefendant of criminal liability because the codefendant was a party to and guilty of the crime by intentionally aiding the commission of the assault. Roberson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 557, 627 S.E.2d 161 (2006).

In light of the juvenile's companionship and conduct before, during, and after the alleged crimes of kidnapping, impersonating an officer, robbery, terroristic threats, and simple battery, the juvenile's overt participation in the overall attack on the three victims sufficed to sustain an adjudication of delinquency based on that conduct as a party to the crimes involving all three victims. In the Interest of B.M., 289 Ga. App. 214, 656 S.E.2d 855 (2008).

Evidence sufficient as to aiding and abetting armed robbery.

- Evidence was amply sufficient to authorize a reasonable trier of fact to rationally find therefrom proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, both as to the direct commission of the crime of armed robbery by defendant and as to the intentional aiding and abetting of it under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Graves v. State, 180 Ga. App. 446, 349 S.E.2d 519 (1986).

Since there was ample evidence to show that the defendant aided, abetted, encouraged, advised, and counseled another participant in a robbery and shooting, it made no difference that the other man fired the gun that injured a victim because all that the state had to prove was that the defendant and others were acting in concert. Culberson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 482, 512 S.E.2d 367 (1999).

Person who intentionally aids or abets the commission of the crime, or intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime, may be convicted of the crime as a party to the crime. Even if there was no direct evidence that the defendant actively participated in robbing the victim at gunpoint, there was ample evidence to support the defendant's guilt as a party to the crime of armed robbery because the defendant participated in a discussion concerning retaliation against the victim, and when a witness saw the defendant pointing a gun at the victim. Drake v. State, 266 Ga. App. 463, 597 S.E.2d 543 (2004).

Even had the first defendant not waived the issue of the trial court's not severing the defendant's trial from that of the second defendant, the first defendant's conviction for armed robbery was proper, as the first defendant had confessed to involvement in the robbery at a minimum as the getaway driver; since the defendant was a party to the crime, defendant could not show that the defendant was prejudiced regarding the severance ruling. Bennett v. State, 266 Ga. App. 502, 597 S.E.2d 565 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant was at least a party to the crime of burglary and guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, as the defendant's own statements established that the codefendant intended to commit an underlying offense of armed robbery when telling the defendant that they should go rob someone in order to get drinking money, and that the codefendant had a handgun; the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was present and assisted in the commission of the crime, such that the defendant was liable as an aider and abettor under a party to the crime theory pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 837 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

Defendant's conviction for armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), was supported by sufficient evidence, as the defendant and two other persons, with their faces covered and while wielding a gun and a box cutter, entered a convenience store, made the two employees sit on the floor, and took their jewelry as well as other property and cash; although the defendant claimed that the defendant participated under duress and was threatened at gunpoint, it was up to the jury to determine the believability of that claim, and the defendant was found to have participated in the crime as an aider and abettor under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). Spradley v. State, 276 Ga. App. 842, 625 S.E.2d 106 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions arising from the defendant's participation in a robbery which resulted in the death of a store clerk where, knowing that the cousin was going to commit a robbery, the defendant voluntarily went with the cousin, saw that the cousin had a gun, agreed to "stand over" the scene, and joined the cousin in using the victim's credit cards afterwards; contrary to the defendant's assertions, testimony showed that the defendant was not intimidated by the cousin. Scott v. State, 280 Ga. 466, 629 S.E.2d 211 (2006).

Testimony of a defendant's accomplice implicating the defendant in several armed robberies was sufficiently corroborated based on the defendant's admission, eyewitnesses confirming that two persons participated, and the defendant's use of the victims' bank cards after the robberies. Thus, the defendant's participation as an accessory was sufficiently corroborated by evidence other than from the accomplice. Epps v. State, 296 Ga. App. 92, 673 S.E.2d 608 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because although the defendant did not actually use a weapon, defendant's accomplice's use of a weapon could be attributed to the defendant because under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, one who intentionally aided or abetted the commission of a crime by another was a party to the crime and equally guilty with the principal; the defendant aided and abetted the accomplice by telling the accomplice to pull into an apartment complex after they saw the potential victims, giving the accomplice the defendant's gun, and then taking the victims' wallets from the victims while the accomplice pointed the gun at the victims. Barber v. State, 304 Ga. App. 453, 696 S.E.2d 433 (2010).

Defendant's conviction of attempt to commit armed robbery was affirmed because the defendant discussed the attempted armed robbery beforehand with the codefendants, provided part of the disguise for the defendant's sibling, drove the codefendants to the crime scene, was present near the scene of the attempted robbery, and fled the scene after the attempted robbery. Skipper v. State, 314 Ga. App. 870, 726 S.E.2d 127 (2012).

While there was no evidence that the defendant fired any of the weapons used in the shooting, there was evidence that the defendant supplied one of the weapons with the knowledge that the weapon was to be used to commit armed robbery, was present during the commission of the crimes, fled the scene, and accompanied several of the accomplices to dispose of two of the weapons used in the crimes; thus, there was ample evidence to inculpate the defendant as a party to the crimes. Oliphant v. State, 295 Ga. 597, 759 S.E.2d 821 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery despite no testimony showing that the defendant possessed the knife during the course of the robbery as case law has established that a defendant does not need to possess the weapon to be convicted as a party to the crime of armed robbery when the defendant's accomplice carried the weapon during the robbery. Boccia v. State, 335 Ga. App. 687, 782 S.E.2d 792 (2016).

Co-defendant's testimony constituted direct evidence that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the codefendants in committing the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault and intentionally advised, encouraged, and counseled them to commit the crimes, and there was sufficient corroboration of the co-defendant's testimony, including a recorded telephone call between the defendant and a second co-defendant, the defendant's own testimony at trial, and the defendant's statements to law enforcement. Stallings v. State, 343 Ga. App. 135, 806 S.E.2d 613 (2017).

Coercion defense to armed robbery rejected.

- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for armed robbery and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial since the state disproved the defendant's coercion defense that the defendant was forced to participate in the robbery of a restaurant because the defendant's cohorts had threatened to take the defendant's children away as the defendant never drove away from the scene of the crime while waiting outside of the restaurant, the defendant actually entered the restaurant during the crime, and the defendant never indicated a need for protection for the children once apprehended. Engrisch v. State, 293 Ga. App. 810, 668 S.E.2d 319 (2008).

By holding the victim while defendant's brother beat the victim, the defendant was clearly an aider and abettor in the beating. As an aider and abettor, the act of one party was the act of the other person in the commission of the assault. When this fist fight turned into a knife fight, both parties became guilty of aggravated assault. Johnson v. State, 188 Ga. App. 411, 373 S.E.2d 93 (1988).

Aid in assault by engaging in fistfight.

- Person who engages another in a fistfight while the other is simultaneously being beaten with an object by the person's confederate necessarily "aids and abets" the confederate in the assault upon the other, and is therefore a party to the crime committed by the confederate. Moore v. State, 216 Ga. App. 450, 454 S.E.2d 638 (1995).

Mother's participation in daughter's rape.

- Sufficient evidence existed to convict mother of aiding and abetting the statutory rape and child molestation of her daughter by two men when the evidence showed that mother encouraged the men to have sexual intercourse with her daughter and that mother ordered daughter to have sexual intercourse. Hixon v. State, 251 Ga. App. 27, 553 S.E.2d 333 (2001).

There was sufficient evidence to support the finding that a defendant parent aided and abetted, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b), the other parent's rape of their child in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1); defendant told the child to take the child's clothes off and was present when the other parent had sex with the child. Zepp v. State, 276 Ga. App. 466, 623 S.E.2d 569 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Criminal responsibility for all injuries.

- When the evidence showed that the defendant participated in the group attack on the victim, the defendant was criminally responsible for the injuries inflicted by all parties to the crime, even if the defendant personally delivered only one blow. Cox v. State, 242 Ga. App. 334, 528 S.E.2d 871 (2000).

Evidence that defendant was get-away driver was sufficient for conviction.

- In a case involving the malice murder of the deceased victim, the aggravated assaults of the deceased victim and four other victims, the false imprisonment and armed robbery of another victim, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party because the eyewitness stated that the driver of the car, the defendant, shouted to the first accomplice before the accomplice shot the deceased victim, then gestured to the first and second accomplice to get into the car, which the defendant then drove away; and the defendant acted as the driver of the getaway vehicle after both the shooting of the deceased victim and the robbery of another victim. Wright v. State, 296 Ga. 276, 766 S.E.2d 439 (2014).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Because the defendant, the parent of the codefendant who had shot into a house in retaliation for an incident in which the parent was called a name by someone inside the house, had an angry attitude about the name-calling, had encouraged the codefendant and another to shoot at the house, went with the shooters to the scene of the shooting, and later bragged about the shooting, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder and aggravated assault of the shooting victims in the house. Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459, 604 S.E.2d 133 (2004).

Sufficient evidence was introduced to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder and burglary despite the defendant's claims that the defendant was not sufficiently involved in the crimes to be convicted on those charges. Joyner v. State, 280 Ga. 37, 622 S.E.2d 319 (2005).

Because the defendant promised, - orally and in writing, - to use the victims' money to acquire tire hauling containers, but instead used it for other purposes, the jury was entitled to infer criminal intent and to find the defendant guilty of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 or as a party to the crime of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Matthiessen v. State, 277 Ga. App. 54, 625 S.E.2d 422 (2005).

Because the defendant acted as lookout and immediately alerted an unidentified driver to the presence of a police officer, resulting in the unidentified driver's escaping, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aiding or abetting the unidentified driver in the crime of theft by receiving, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20,16-8-7(a). Dixon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 656, 627 S.E.2d 406 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a trial court to find defendant delinquent for being a party to a homicide, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3), and thus, defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied; defendant's intent could be inferred easily from the fact that the defendant stood and watched while a friend beat the victim and defecated on the victim, never leaving to call for help. In the Interest of K.B.T., 279 Ga. App. 350, 631 S.E.2d 412 (2006).

Delinquency finding for acts constituting party to the crimes of aggravated assault and batter was supported by sufficient evidence showing that the appellant was one of a group of youths who punched, kicked, and struck one victim with a shotgun, and participated in the attack; the appellant also knocked another victim to the ground and hit that victim during the fracas. In the Interest of E.R., 279 Ga. App. 423, 631 S.E.2d 458 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) after the defendant's companions used metal knuckles, a metal pipe, and a gun to beat the victim; the defendant was a party to the offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as the victim, whose testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), testified that, during the incident, the defendant summoned the companions to help beat the victim, and the defendant and the companions repeatedly warned the victim not to testify in court in the defendant's criminal case. Souder v. State, 281 Ga. App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0113, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 97 (Ga. 2007).

Defendant's malice murder conviction, as a party to the crime, was upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was adduced at trial of the defendant's participation in the crime, including eyewitness testimony that the defendant encouraged the shooter to shoot the victim, that the defendant had recently threatened to shoot the victim in the head, and testimony that the defendant joined the shooter and the codefendant in the confrontation and fled with them after the shooting. Sims v. State, 281 Ga. 541, 640 S.E.2d 260 (2007).

Because evidence existed that the defendant was present when the crimes charged were committed, and the jury could infer a shared criminal intent with that of the actual perpetrator from the defendant's conduct before and after the crimes were committed, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions as a party to those crimes. Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 642 S.E.2d 64 (2007).

Given sufficient evidence of the defendant's involvement in the common objective of fighting with a rival gang member as a party to the crimes, the defendant's convictions on three counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal. Garcia v. State, 290 Ga. App. 164, 658 S.E.2d 904 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence supporting a conviction for theft by deception under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3. The defendant drove an accomplice to a store, got a slipcover, obtained the sticker necessary to return the slipcover for a refund, and transferred the slipcover to the accomplice, directing the accomplice to present it for a refund; therefore, the defendant directly committed acts in furtherance of the crime and aided in the crime's commission under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Bruster v. State, 291 Ga. App. 490, 662 S.E.2d 265 (2008).

That a defendant aided and abetted in the commission of kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, and the use of a firearm in the commission of a crime was supported by evidence that defendant and the armed accomplice were willing companions; that they stopped to pick up the victim; that they intended to rob the victim; that defendant assisted the accomplice by driving the car while the accomplice was raping the victim; and that the defendant then swapped places with the accomplice so defendant could have sexual intercourse with the victim. Davis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 782, 666 S.E.2d 56 (2008).

Evidence of the defendant's shooting a victim, striking the victim's companion with a motorcycle helmet, the defendant's sibling's pointing a gun at the companion, and the sibling's pointing a gun at the victim and pulling the trigger was sufficient to convict the defendant of four counts of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the defendant was responsible for the sibling's acts as an aider and abetter under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008).

Juvenile court properly denied a juvenile's motion for a new trial with regard to the juvenile's delinquency adjudication finding the juvenile guilty for aggravated assault, criminal property damage, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct arising from the shooting of a BB gun at a passing car. The juvenile was the only Caucasian identified in the group of youth; the juvenile admitted to hiding the BB gun; the juvenile did not dispute that the juvenile encouraged another youth to shoot the gun; and the judge was the final arbiter of the credibility and witness issues and had the province to reject the testimony of the juvenile and a parent that the juvenile did not shoot the gun. In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga. App. 827, 668 S.E.2d 323 (2008).

of armed robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). It was undisputed that the defendant's sibling committed the acts in question, and the evidence showed that the defendant drove with the sibling to the place the sibling planned to rob, waited for the sibling at the sibling's instructions until the sibling returned with the fruits of the crime and the weapon, and then tried to drive away. McGordon v. State, 298 Ga. App. 161, 679 S.E.2d 743 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for interference with government property because the defendant was a party to the act of damaging the locks to the water meter for the rental home in which the defendant was staying since the testimony of the rental company's principal and the meter reader established that the locks were damaged and removed by someone living in the house for the purpose of accessing the water meter, and according to an eyewitness, the defendant was in the yard while another person who also lived in the house was "messing with the meter"; since there was evidence that the defendant was present when the crime was committed, and the jury could infer from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crime that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the actual perpetrators, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's conviction as a party to the crime. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. App. 406, 687 S.E.2d 666 (2009).

Although the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant was insufficient to convict the defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), there was other evidence, including the defendant's statements to police that the defendant urged the codefendant to kill the victim, to show that the defendant aided and abetted and counseled another to commit the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) and (b)(4). Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478, 689 S.E.2d 825 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of aiding and abetting, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, defendant's spouse in enticing a minor child for indecent purposes in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5(a) and of child molestation. Evidence was presented that the defendant had prior knowledge of the intended crimes, shared in the intent of the spouse to entice the minor victim to the defendants' home, and was present for the crimes of child molestation. Dockery v. State, 309 Ga. App. 584, 711 S.E.2d 100 (2011).

Because the victim's testimony was legally sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to establish that the defendants assaulted the victim with intent to rob, the issue of which the defendant actually held the weapon was immaterial; therefore, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), the evidence was sufficient to find both defendants guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rob and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1) and16-11-106. Clark v. State, 311 Ga. App. 58, 714 S.E.2d 736 (2011).

Defendant was properly convicted of financial identity fraud in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-120 because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find that the defendant, either directly or as a party to a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, committed financial identity fraud by accessing the resources of the victims through the use of identifying information without the authorization or permission of the victims, with the intent to unlawfully appropriate the victim's resources to the defendant's own use; the federal tax identification number of either victim was required as part of the credit card application to obtain temporary charge passes, which the defendant used to purchase thousands of dollars worth of merchandise in a short period of time. Zachery v. State, 312 Ga. App. 418, 718 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Because the driver of a delivery truck was forced at gunpoint by defendant's accomplice to drive a substantial distance to a secluded dirt road, and because the defendant followed the truck in another vehicle, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-5-40, the of kidnapping and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Sipplen v. State, 312 Ga. App. 342, 718 S.E.2d 571 (2011).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery conviction because the evidence showed the defendant actively aided and abetted the defendant's codefendant by: (1) driving the codefendant to a crime scene; (2) waiting during the crimes with an intent to use the defendant's car as a getaway car; (3) fleeing the scene with the codefendant; (4) waiting while the codefendant broke into a house; (5) fleeing the house with the codefendant; and (6) having a gunshot wound. Jones v. State, 315 Ga. App. 427, 727 S.E.2d 216 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant drove the shooter to the location of the crime, that the shooter fired shots with recklessness sufficient to imply malice, and that the defendant encouraged the shooter to fire was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 783 S.E.2d 622 (2016).

Two defendants were convicted of malice murder and other crimes in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) in connection with the shooting death of a drug dealer in the defendants' gang territory; the evidence established a nexus between the robbery of the drug dealer and an intent to further the interests of the gang based on expert testimony that the gang made most of the gang's money through armed robberies. Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 816 S.E.2d 663 (2018).

Participant in armed robbery as aiding and abetting assault during robbery.

- When appellant was a participant in armed robbery, and aggravated assault occurred during course of robbery, appellant's actions could be construed as aiding and abetting in the crime. Jackson v. State, 163 Ga. App. 526, 295 S.E.2d 206 (1982).

Trial court did not err by charging the jury on accomplice liability because while there was conflicting evidence regarding precisely who did what, there was ample evidence to implicate the defendant either as a principal or as a party to the crime of armed robbery. Cooper v. State, 342 Ga. App. 351, 801 S.E.2d 589 (2017).

Party to armed robbery by furnishing gun.

- By helping another plan a kidnapping and providing that person with a gun for that purpose, one is a party to the crime of armed robbery. However, a jury's verdict of guilty of armed robbery is not inconsistent with its verdict of not guilty of other charges, e.g., burglary, assault, kidnapping. The jury could very well believe that the gun was used only in commission of the armed robbery, and where the defendant's only criminal act as an aider and abettor was to furnish the gun, defendant was only guilty of the offense in which the gun was actually used. Shehee v. State, 167 Ga. App. 542, 307 S.E.2d 54 (1983).

Party to armed robbery by retrieving loot.

- Defendant's testimony that defendant stood by as third party robbed victim at gunpoint and that defendant picked up victim's discarded cash upon instruction by the third party was sufficient for conviction of armed robbery as an aider and abettor. Dowdy v. State, 209 Ga. App. 95, 432 S.E.2d 827 (1993).

Evidence that defendant witnessed the victim with a roll of money and then later accompanied the victim and the codefendant in the victim's car, after the codefendant showed defendant that the codefendant had a handgun in the codefendant's possession, and then took the victim's money after the codefendant shot the victim was sufficient to show that defendant was a party to and an active participant in the armed robbery of the victim. Drummer v. State, 264 Ga. App. 617, 591 S.E.2d 481 (2003).

Planning robbery and driving getaway car were sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of armed robbery, even though defendant did not enter the victim's home and participate in the actual robbery. Pryor v. State, 179 Ga. App. 293, 346 S.E.2d 104 (1986).

Trial court had sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party to those crimes by aiding and abetting, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, given evidence that the defendant helped plan the robberies of two game rooms, drove the getaway vehicle, and participated in the division of the proceeds. Norman v. State, 311 Ga. App. 721, 716 S.E.2d 805 (2011).

Officer guilty of aiding and abetting robbery.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of several crimes, including crimes arising out of the robbery of a business even though defendant did not directly participate in that crime, as the evidence showed that defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the crime; defendant, a police officer, was aware that the crime was going to occur before it happened and did not report the crime, defendant made calls to the people involved in the robbery, defendant met with the people who committed the crime afterwards and advised and counseled them, and defendant asked if defendant could receive money from the robbery even if defendant did not participate in it. Greene v. State, 257 Ga. App. 837, 572 S.E.2d 382 (2002).

One acting as look-out during burglary is as guilty as active participants.

- One who acts as look-out during commission of burglary is participating in commission of that crime within meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 and is as guilty as active participants. DeLoach v. State, 142 Ga. App. 666, 236 S.E.2d 904 (1977).

Felony murder conviction based on participation in aggravated assault.

- Evidence that defendant was seen making notes at the crime scene the day of the shooting, that the defendant accompanied the coconspirator knowing that the coconspirator intended to rob a cab driver, and that the defendant drove the coconspirator away after the shooting of the cab driver authorized the jury to find the defendant was a party to the crime of aggravated assault committed with a deadly weapon, and hence to felony murder. Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to felony murder based on aggravated assault because the state's witness testified that the defendant approached the victim's truck with the co-defendant, that the witness and the victim were ordered out of the truck at gunpoint, that the defendant helped to control the witness while the co-defendant shot the victim, and that the defendant helped clean up the crime scene; the witness's testimony was corroborated by other evidence; and, even if the jury found that the defendant did not have a gun or shoot the victim, it did not follow that the defendant could not properly be found guilty as a party to the felony murder based on the aggravated assault that the co-defendant committed. Herrington v. State, 300 Ga. 149, 794 S.E.2d 145 (2016).

Intermediary in drug sale.

- Even if defendant was not treated as the actual seller but merely the conduit or intermediary by which the sale took place, defendant was guilty of selling cocaine, because defendant aided and abetted the sale as a party to the crime. Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 487 S.E.2d 608 (1997).

While mere presence at the scene of a crime or even approval of another's criminal conduct was not sufficient to authorize a conviction, defendant's actions went far beyond mere presence and authorized the jury to find that defendant actively facilitated the drug sale as defendant aided and abetted the seller in the sale by informing the undercover drug agent about where to obtain the cocaine, by taking the agent to that location, and by intentionally procuring the seller to sell the cocaine; that evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of being a party to the sale of cocaine. Jackson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 108, 576 S.E.2d 85 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant because the defendant aided and abetted the sale of cocaine to the undercover officer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; the defendant approached an undercover officer, the defendant took money from the officer and went into a hotel room, and the defendant later returned and gave the officer cocaine. Ware v. State, 308 Ga. App. 24, 707 S.E.2d 111 (2011).

Defendant was properly convicted for trafficking in marijuana since the defendant owned the farm used by defendant's son to grow marijuana, the defendant helped to construct the building used to grow marijuana, and the defendant helped acquire necessary support devices to put the building into operation; this evidence authorized the jury to find that defendant's son had actual possession of the marijuana and that defendant had constructive possession by aiding and abetting the son's possession. Lang v. State, 171 Ga. 368, 320 S.E.2d 185 (1984).

Defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana was authorized because the defendant, a roommate, and an accomplice were willing participants in the drug offenses, and the defendant had agreed to accept delivery of the package of marijuana at the defendant's residence in exchange for $200 and an ounce of marijuana for the defendant's personal consumption; whether the defendant had physical possession of the cocaine, the defendant aided and abetted the marijuana's actual physical possession and was guilty of the offense of trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c) and under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as a party to the crime because the defendant admitted that the defendant was aiding the accomplice's efforts to commit the trafficking offense by giving the accomplice a safe haven and a means to avoid law enforcement detection. Park v. State, 308 Ga. App. 648, 708 S.E.2d 614 (2011).

When defendant who had been hired to pick up marijuana from plane had, at time of arrest, succeeded in opening only the upper portion of the door to the plane, defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana could be supported on theory of defendant being an aider and abettor of drug conspirators who were in constructive possession. State v. Lewis, 249 Ga. 565, 292 S.E.2d 667 (1982).

Aiding another in escape from confinement.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-10-53(a) (knowingly aiding another in escaping from any place of lawful confinement) preempts O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) (aiding and abetting the commission of an offense), insofar as escape from confinement is concerned. Harden v. State, 184 Ga. App. 371, 361 S.E.2d 696 (1987); Roberts v. State, 257 Ga. 180, 356 S.E.2d 871 (1987).

Arranging for victim to be present, and filming crime.

- Evidence that defendant had arranged for the victim to be present at a party and that defendant actively engaged in videotaping an act of sodomy between the roommate and the victim authorized a finding that defendant was guilty of the offense of sodomy as an aider and abettor and was guilty of the offense of exploitation of children as either a principal or as an aider and abettor. Parker v. State, 190 Ga. App. 126, 378 S.E.2d 503 (1989).

Accessory to theft by taking.

- To be guilty as a party to a crime as an aider or abettor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3), a defendant must be an accessory before the fact, and where no evidence was presented that defendant was an accessory to the commission of the crime of theft by taking of school district funds, conviction for stealing these monies was not warranted. Purvis v. State, 208 Ga. App. 653, 433 S.E.2d 58 (1993).

Evidence sufficient as to aiding and abetting felony shoplifting.

- There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, finding defendant guilty of aiding and abetting in felony shoplifting, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-14(a)(1) and16-2-20(b)(3), because employees in a store were alerted to a shoplifting in progress, and they followed the alleged shoplifter out to a car, which defendant got into and drove away; defendant was positively identified by an employee who was on the driver's side of the car, the owner of that car had loaned the car to defendant and defendant never returned it, and defendant simply contended that the car had been stolen and did not report the theft because defendant intended to get the car back. Patterson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 675, 613 S.E.2d 200 (2005).

When defendants were charged in accusation with directly committing specific acts of shoplifting, but neither was specifically accused of being a party to the other's commission of the offense, there was no error in charging the jury under the language of both O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(1) (direct commission of crime) and O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) (intentionally aiding or abetting in commission of crime). Jenkins v. State, 172 Ga. App. 715, 324 S.E.2d 491 (1984).

Even though defendant was not charged as anything other than a direct perpetrator in a prosecution for aggravated assault, an instruction that defendant could be convicted under a theory of indirect concern was proper since defendant had notice of the testimony of a defense witness authorizing the jury to find that defendant was an aider and abettor. Upshaw v. State, 221 Ga. App. 655, 472 S.E.2d 484 (1996).

Instigating gang attack supported aiding and abetting conviction.

- There was sufficient evidence to convict one defendant of malice murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 based upon defendant's actions of instigating the gang attack on the victim and participating in the attack by knocking down the victim and shooting a gun; even though that defendant did not actually fire the shot that killed the victim, defendant was criminally responsible under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 for the shot that killed the victim. Ros v. State, 279 Ga. 604, 619 S.E.2d 644 (2005).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of financial transaction card fraud.

- Because the evidence showed the defendant's family participated in a scheme whereby they obtained credit cards in the names of non-existent businesses and used the cards to buy goods for their own use with no intention of repayment, even though the defendant did not personally sign for these purchases, a jury could conclude that the defendant aided and abetted the fraudulent use of the card in light of evidence showing the defendant agreed to the step-child's offer to obtain one of the fictitious business credit cards for the defendant's use, that the defendant was aware of a scheme to commit fraud through the use of credit cards, and that the defendant was seen often in the store where the fraudulent purchases occurred. Stuart v. State, 267 Ga. App. 463, 600 S.E.2d 629 (2004).

Jury instructions.

- In a prosecution for robbery, a charge to the jury was not confusing or prejudicial which, in part, authorized finding that defendant was a party to the crime if the defendant "had knowledge of the commission of the offense and after the act drove the car in a precipitous manner," and the charge did not invade the province of the jury. Carter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 445, 481 S.E.2d 238 (1997).

Regarding the principle of parties to a crime, the trial court's substitution of "helps" for "aids or abets" in its charge was not improper since aiding and abetting encompasses the concept of helping in the commission of a crime. Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 531 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 948, 121 S. Ct. 350, 148 L. Ed. 2d 282 (2000).

Jury instruction about "parties to a crime" that stated defendant could be charged as a party, or aider or abettor, to the offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime properly stated the law, and the charge was adjusted to the evidence. Wade v. State, 261 Ga. App. 587, 583 S.E.2d 251 (2003).

Defendant's claim that the court erred by charging O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, on parties to a crime, in its entirety is without merit. When the entire Code section is charged even though a portion may be inapplicable under the facts in evidence, it is usually not cause for a new trial. Maness v. State, 265 Ga. App. 239, 593 S.E.2d 698 (2004).

Jury was properly instructed on conspiracy and parties, even though the defendant's indictment alleged that the defendant directly committed the offenses and did not specify that the defendant was only a party to or coconspirator in the criminal acts. Michael v. State, 281 Ga. App. 289, 635 S.E.2d 790 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Gibbs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 723, 798 S.E.2d 308 (2017).

Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on both the crimes of armed robbery and theft by taking, and expressly stated that in the event that the jury did not believe that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could convict on the lesser offense of theft by taking, given that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding of guilt on the armed robbery charge, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's claim that the victim knowingly assisted in the planning and perpetration of the crime. Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 651 S.E.2d 538 (2007).

There was slight evidence to justify a charge as to parties to the crime as two or more persons could have been involved; it was possible that the defendant acted with an accomplice who fled the scene in a yellow car, while the defendant fled the scene in a green car, because several witnesses claimed to have seen the robber leave in a yellow car, and other witnesses said the perpetrator got into a green car. Williams v. State, 312 Ga. App. 22, 717 S.E.2d 532 (2011).

Failure to give circumstantial evidence charge was error.

- Circumstantial evidence against a defendant in a cocaine trafficking case under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crime: defendant drove the defendant's sibling, who arranged the drug sale, to the designated place for the transaction and patrolled the parking lot, and, when the defendant saw a police officer, fled the scene. Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 71, 692 S.E.2d 737 (2010).

Evidence insufficient.

- There was insufficient evidence to convict the defendants, both of whom had been passengers in a vehicle they knew had been stolen, of theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a); there was no evidence that the defendants did anything other than allow themselves to be transported in the vehicle or that they intentionally aided or abetted the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b). Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. App. 882, 637 S.E.2d 480 (2006).

Evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106; the defendant had a fight earlier in the afternoon at a different location with several of the people who were at the scene of the shooting, and the evidence showed that the defendant had motive and intent to do harm, that the defendant was upset, that the defendant drove by the scene of the shooting before the shooting occurred, and that the defendant's brother gave the defendant a gun at least three days before the crime occurred, but the state failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Thus, what the evidence produced by the state did not show were the essential links between the defendant's proven behavior and the crimes charged. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344 (2009).

Except as to one incident, the evidence was insufficient to show that a mother aided and abetted her husband's sexual abuse of their twin daughters when they were between four and eight years old, because the record showed that the mother had no knowledge of seven of the eight incidents until she took the children to therapy, and the prosecution's circumstantial evidence - including the fact of the family's nudist lifestyle, the existence of pornographic movies in the home, and the fact that, during therapy, the mother advised the girls to not talk about their father - was insufficient to prove aiding and abetting beyond a reasonable doubt. Naylor v. State, 300 Ga. App. 401, 685 S.E.2d 383 (2009).

Convictions as aider and abettor proper despite lack of personal involvement.

- Despite the defendant's contention that the crimes against a stabbing victim were solely committed by the codefendant, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), there was ample evidence to conclude that the defendant either committed the crimes or was a party to the crimes, including that both the defendant and the codefendant drove to the stabbing victim's home, that the victim was stabbed to death, and that the victim's wallet and checkbook were stolen so that both defendants could have money to buy more drugs. Odom v. State, 279 Ga. 599, 619 S.E.2d 636 (2005).

Evidence sufficient on one count of aiding and abetting, but insufficient on another.

- With regard to a juvenile's adjudication as delinquent on two counts for acts, which if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal attempt to hijack a motor vehicle, insufficient evidence existed to find that the juvenile was a party to the criminal attempt to hijack on one count because the charge showed only that the juvenile was standing by the side of the road with the two other persons who were parties to the action and remained on the side of the road when another approached the victims' motor vehicle with a handgun and attempted to take the car by force and intimidation; mere presence, association, or suspicion, without any evidence to show further participation in the commission of the crime was insufficient to authorize a conviction. However, with regard to criminal attempt to hijack a motor vehicle, sufficient evidence existed to establish that the juvenile had knowledge of what was going to take place based on the prior attempt to hijack since: (1) the juvenile stood directly in front of the victim's vehicle; (2) the juvenile assisted one of the cohorts after that person fell; and (3) an investigating officer testified to the juvenile's own admission that the juvenile fled the scene in an attempt to elude the police, which authorized the juvenile court to infer that the juvenile was a participant and not merely a bystander in the second attempted hijacking. In the Interest of C.L., 289 Ga. App. 377, 657 S.E.2d 301 (2008).

Corporate officer not shielded from criminal responsibility for acts in corporation's behalf.

- Officer or agent of corporation cannot assert that criminal acts, in form corporate acts, were not the officer's acts merely because carried out by the officer through instrumentality of the corporation which the officer controlled and dominated in all respects and which the officer employed for that purpose. Williams v. State, 158 Ga. App. 384, 280 S.E.2d 365 (1981).

One hindering apprehension or punishment of criminal.

- One guilty of violating former Code 1933, § 26-2503 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-10-50) would be classified as an accomplice after the fact at common law, and such an offender was not considered an accomplice within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 38-171 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), or a party to the crime under former Code 1933, § 26-801 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20). Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210, 240 S.E.2d 68 (1977).

Since one may not be convicted of murder as a party to that crime and also be convicted of not being a party to the crime, but only as an accessory after the fact, defendant's conviction for hindering the apprehension of a criminal was set aside. Jordan v. State, 272 Ga. 395, 530 S.E.2d 192 (2000).

Conviction as a party to the crime was reversed where the appellate court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant intentionally aided, abetted, advised, encouraged, counseled, hired, or procured others to commit the crimes; the evidence, at most, established that defendant found out about the crimes after they were committed and did everything defendant could to help the others avoid prosecution. James v. State, 260 Ga. App. 350, 579 S.E.2d 750 (2003).

An accessory after the fact is not considered an accomplice to the underlying crime itself, but is guilty of a separate, substantive offense in nature of obstruction of justice. Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210, 240 S.E.2d 68 (1977).

Presence and observation of crime may establish one as party.

- Jury question was presented where evidence showed that plaintiff was in presence of, and talking with, other party who removed hat from counter, tore out price tag, and placed it on plaintiff's head. Dixon v. S.S. Kresge, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 776, 169 S.E.2d 189 (1969).

Fact that defendant lived with person who committed offense.

- Fact that defendant lived with person who committed offense did not support guilty verdict of defendant, since mere presence in and of itself will not justify conviction. Parker v. State, 155 Ga. App. 617, 271 S.E.2d 871 (1980).

Mere presence at scene and flight from authority are insufficient to support a criminal conviction. Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1, 267 S.E.2d 314 (1980).

When a party possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony, an accomplice who is concerned in the commission of the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 is likewise guilty of both offenses. Anderson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 595, 516 S.E.2d 315 (1999).

Although the trial court might not have been presented with evidence that the defendant was in physical possession of a firearm during the hijacking of the victim's car, because the evidence that was presented authorized a finding that the defendant was a party to that crime, and that all those involved were joint conspirators, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant a new trial on grounds that the indictment charging possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was at fatal variance with the proof presented at trial. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 786, 653 S.E.2d 104 (2007).

When ownership not shown, equal access proves all defendants guilty of possession of drugs.

- When the state did not show the indicia giving rise to a presumption of ownership or exclusive control of a vehicle, no presumption arose and, therefore, there was no triggering of the equal access defense, but by showing circumstantially that each of the defendants had equal access to the drugs, the state was able to support its theory that all of the defendants were parties to the crime and thus guilty of joint constructive possession of the drugs. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817, 305 S.E.2d 629 (1983).

Collusion among relatives established by slight circumstances.

- When transactions involving relatives are under review, slight circumstances are often sufficient to induce belief that there was collusion among parties. Heard v. State, 142 Ga. App. 703, 236 S.E.2d 911 (1977).

Effect of contradictory testimony on defendant's denial of intent to participate.

- Where defendant's posture is one of admitting presence and cooperation for one criminal purpose (stealing money from the cash register), but denying the intent of participating in an armed robbery, the matter thus essentially involves the credibility of the defendant; and if the defendant's explanation of the incident is contradicted by the testimony of the police officers, the hotel employee, and the victims, the jury is authorized to reject the explanation. Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 305 S.E.2d 599 (1983).

Even though codefendants' testimony conflicted, their testimony with regard to defendant's aid to them was sufficiently corroborative to establish that defendant was a party to the burglary. Allen v. State, 224 Ga. App. 324, 480 S.E.2d 328 (1997).

Codefendant's trial should have been severed.

- Trial court erred in denying a codefendant's motion to sever the trial from the defendant's trial because the codefendant was not allowed to introduce the exculpatory portions of the statements that explained the excerpted admissions introduced by the state, which supported the codefendant's antagonistic defense that the codefendant was present at the robberies due to coercion by the defendant. To avoid potential Bruton issues, the state introduced only those portions of the codefendant's9-1-1 calls or custodial statements made establishing that the codefendant was at the scene of two robberies, that the codefendant's vehicles were used, and that the codefendant sent police to a motel room to investigate the robberies, but refused the additional portions of the statements that tended to support the codefendant's defense that the codefendant was coerced into participating in the crimes. Bowe v. State, 288 Ga. App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (2007), cert. dismissed, sub. nom., State v. Baker, No. S08C0548, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 318 (Ga. 2008).

Medicaid fraud.

- Even assuming defendant could not be considered a "provider," the wide range of activities performed by defendant, combined with defendant's supervisory role in the medical office, made the defendant a party to the crime of Medicaid fraud. Bullard v. State, 242 Ga. App. 843, 530 S.E.2d 265 (2000).

Evidence sufficient to support residential mortgage fraud conviction.

- Evidence that the defendant, a loan officer who handled the closing on a codefendant's home, was a party to a scheme whereby the defendant gave the codefendant money for the downpayment before closing, the codefendant falsely stated in the loan application that the codefendant had not borrowed the down payment, and later defaulted on the loan was sufficient to convict the defendant of residential mortgage fraud as a party to that crime. Gilford v. State, 295 Ga. App. 651, 673 S.E.2d 40 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0827, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 258 (Ga. 2009).

Inference that defendant tampered with evidence.

- When the defense to a tampering with evidence charge was that no one saw defendant pull up and destroy marijuana plants, but the police officers saw the defendant on the property with the plants, advised the defendant not to remove the plants, returned in two hours to find the plants missing, and saw no one else around the premises at either time, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant at the very least participated in the destruction and that in itself would justify conviction. Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987).

Possession of firearm during commission of crime.

- Evidence which was sufficient to authorize a conviction of defendant's codefendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime combined with evidence which was sufficient to authorize defendant's conviction of the crime during the commission of which the gun was possessed was also sufficient to sustain defendant's guilt of the possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Roberts v. State, 167 Ga. App. 38, 306 S.E.2d 43 (1983).

Defendant may properly be convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime on the ground that defendant was a party or aider or abettor to the offense. Perkins v. State, 194 Ga. App. 189, 390 S.E.2d 273 (1990).

In a prosecution for armed robbery and burglary, where evidence showed that a gun was used, that defendant at one point had possession of the gun, and that defendant disposed of the gun, defendant was guilty of armed robbery, and the court did not err in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses of robbery and theft by taking. Hopkins v. State, 227 Ga. App. 567, 489 S.E.2d 368 (1997).

Jury's verdict of acquittal on an aggravated assault charge and guilty on the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime was not necessarily inconsistent because the jury was free to reject the defendant's testimony that the defendant did not know the defendant's passenger had a gun and accept the defendant's testimony that the defendant was unaware of the intended robbery. Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. App. 443, 721 S.E.2d 643 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0800, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 484 (Ga. 2012).

Juvenile delinquency and weapons charges.

- Adjudication of delinquency for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a pistol by a person under the age of 18 was proper when juvenile defendant who was driving a relative's vehicle had free run of the relative's property while the relative was deployed overseas; also, defendant was in the vehicle the morning of and night before a traffic stop, defendant directed the other juvenile where to drive, neither gun was registered to the relative, defendant seemed to know about the guns' existence, and defendant gave a deputy false information about the defendant's identity. In the Interest of C.M., 290 Ga. App. 788, 661 S.E.2d 598 (2008).

Evidence sufficient to support finding of participation.

- Evidence of actor's conduct before, during, and after offenses sufficient to support finding that the actor was participant. In re J.S.S., 168 Ga. App. 340, 308 S.E.2d 855 (1983); In re K.B., 223 Ga. App. 105, 476 S.E.2d 875 (1996).

When the defendant was identified as the person who demanded an admission fee from everyone who entered a cock fighting area and, when captured, still had $256 in cash in defendant's pants pocket, defendant was a direct participant in the criminal enterprise, and thus chargeable with both cruelty to animals and commercial gambling under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Morgan v. State, 195 Ga. App. 52, 392 S.E.2d 715 (1990).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b), armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), based on the defendant's involvement as a party to the crimes, or as a coconspirator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b). The evidence presented was that: (1) when two people walked past the victim's parked vehicle, one of the people held a knife to the victim's stomach and ordered the victim to give the person the victim's wallet and keys; (2) the victim complied; (3) the person with the knife got into the driver's seat and the defendant, who had stood nearby during the incident, got into the passenger seat; (3) the victim identified the defendant as the person who got into the passenger seat; (4) the people drove away, but were apprehended; (5) the victim's wallet was recovered, on the ground to the rear of the vehicle, on the passenger side; and (6) the defendant wanted to leave the area because there was a warrant for the defendant's arrest. Harrelson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 710, 719 S.E.2d 569 (2011).

Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was a party to the crime because there was ample evidence, based upon the defendant's actions and the defendant's presence, companionship, conduct, and demeanor before, during, and after the commission of the crime, to conclude that the defendant was more than "merely present" during the commission of the crimes; while in a car with the victim and companions, the front-seat passenger pulled out a gun and shot the victim, and during the incident, the defendant did not say or do anything to intervene. Cook v. State, 314 Ga. App. 289, 723 S.E.2d 709 (2012).

Based on the evidence that the defendant drove and deliberately followed the victims and pulled in behind the victims' vehicle, intentionally encouraged the shooter by telling the shooter "you better not let these guys get away, go ahead and handle your business, do what you got to do," and fled with the shooter after the shooting, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant was a party to the crimes of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Talifero v. State, 319 Ga. App. 65, 734 S.E.2d 61 (2012).

Evidence sufficient for participation in crime of possessing weapon by felon.

- Convicted felon's conviction for possession of a shotgun was authorized, even though the shotgun was not in the felon's immediate possession, since the evidence supported a finding that the felon was a party to the crime of burglary and the felon and the felon's codefendant were coconspirators. Coursey v. State, 196 Ga. App. 135, 395 S.E.2d 574 (1990).

Nature of fear and threats which will relieve one aiding commission of crime from liability.

- One who aids and assists in commission of a crime, or in measures taken to conceal it, is not relieved from criminality as an accomplice on account of fear excited by threats or menaces, unless the danger be to life or member, or unless that danger be present and immediate, touching fear under the influence of which perjury is committed. Whitus v. State, 216 Ga. 284, 116 S.E.2d 205 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 831, 81 S. Ct. 718, 5 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-402).

Jury instruction properly given.

- Trial court properly instructed jury on the issue of conviction as a party to a crime, as evidence showed defendants acted jointly to rob and kidnap the victim and fled together after the shooting. The fact that first defendant did not actually fire the gun did not affect his convictions. Flournoy v. State, 294 Ga. 741, 755 S.E.2d 777 (2014).

When the defendant was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and related crimes in connection with the death of the victim, the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's jury instruction on parties to a crime, insofar as the indictment did not specifically charge the defendant as a party, because it was well-settled that the indictment need not specifically charge a criminal defendant as a party to the crime in order to permit a jury instruction on accomplice liability and authorize a conviction based thereon. Babbage v. State, 296 Ga. 364, 768 S.E.2d 461 (2015).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of child abuse.

- See Porter v. State, 243 Ga. App. 498, 532 S.E.2d 407 (2000).

Child cruelty.

- Jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant participated in a pattern of child cruelty over the course of several months, and aided and abetted in the malicious acts that caused the death of the child victim where, among other things, the defendant, the parent of the child, regularly beat the child with a belt, the defendant was aware that the child had experienced seizures before the night in question, the defendant observed the child in extreme distress that night but offered no assistance, and the defendant realized that the child's condition had worsened during the night but still took no action to procure medical care until the next morning. Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 627 S.E.2d 579 (2006).

Jury was authorized to find that the defendant was a party to the codefendant's crime of cruelty to children in the first degree in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-5-70(b) because the victim's testimony showed that the defendant was present during the codefendant's beating of the victim yet did nothing to stop the codefendant or otherwise help the victim; there was also evidence that the defendant was not only aware of prior abuse that the victim sustained via a belt but had also participated in such prior abuse. Tabb v. State, 313 Ga. App. 852, 723 S.E.2d 295 (2012).

Aided and abetted in child sexual abuse.

- Evidence was sufficient to show that a mother aided and abetted her husband's sexual abuse of their twin daughters when they were between four and eight years old, but only as to one charged incident, because one daughter told a therapist that she told her mother about this incident, and the record showed that the mother knew about and saw this offense and that she also lent her approval to her husband's conduct. Naylor v. State, 300 Ga. App. 401, 685 S.E.2d 383 (2009).

Evidence sufficient to show defendant was party to acts of aggravated child molestation.

- See Wyatt v. State, 243 Ga. App. 882, 534 S.E.2d 431 (2000).

Because sufficient evidence as to venue and of the remaining elements of the crime was presented by the child victim, via both recorded and trial testimony, the child molestation convictions entered against both the defendants under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-6-4 were upheld. Newman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 353, 649 S.E.2d 349 (2007).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) for an acquittal in the defendant's trial for aiding and abetting a housemate in committing acts of aggravated child molestation against the defendant's children because there was ample evidence that the defendant acquiesced in and encouraged the acts of child molestation by forcing the children to sleep in the same room with the housemate, although the children objected. Valentine v. State, 301 Ga. App. 630, 689 S.E.2d 76 (2009).

Rule of lenity did not apply to multiple convictions involving children.

- In a criminal trial on charges that the defendant allowed the repeated rapes of the defendant's 11-year-old child, the rule of lenity did not require that the defendant's felony convictions for being a party to rape and cruelty to children should be subsumed by the misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the deprivation of children because different facts were necessary to prove the offenses; the rape conviction required proof under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-6-1(a)(1) that the defendant took affirmative steps to aid the rapist, the cruelty to children conviction required proof under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b) that the defendant caused excessive mental pain to the child, and the conviction for contributing to the deprivation of a minor required proof under O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2(8)(A) and16-12-1(b)(3) that the defendant failed to provide the child with proper care necessary for the child's health, which the state proved by showing that the defendant failed to seek prenatal care for the child even though the defendant knew that the child was pregnant. Johnson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 99, 640 S.E.2d 644 (2006).

Employer guilty where employees sold controlled substances at employer's direction.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of selling and delivering controlled substances where, even though defendant, who operated a limousine service, was not physically present when any of the transactions took place, the deliveries in question were made by two of defendant's employees, and those employees testified that they had been acting at defendant's direction at the time. Walker v. State, 196 Ga. App. 741, 397 S.E.2d 28 (1990).

Trafficking in cocaine.

- When the evidence authorized the conclusion that defendant "fronted" the cocaine to another (via a third person) with the expectation that the other would sell the cocaine and pay defendant the proceeds, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in cocaine in the county. Hernandez v. State, 182 Ga. App. 797, 357 S.E.2d 131 (1987).

Evidence held insufficient as matter of law to sustain defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine. Crenshaw v. State, 183 Ga. App. 527, 359 S.E.2d 419 (1987).

Whether defendant had physical possession of the cocaine, the defendant aided and abetted its actual physical possession and was guilty of the offense of trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 and under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, as a party to the crime. Barrett v. State, 183 Ga. App. 729, 360 S.E.2d 400 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Gonzalez v. Abbott, 262 Ga. 671, 425 S.E.2d 272 (1993).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of trafficking in cocaine as "party thereto." Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 405 S.E.2d 716 (1991); Brown v. State, 245 Ga. App. 706, 538 S.E.2d 788 (2000).

Defendant's quick trip to a known drug supply area, and defendant's participation in a false report about who was driving the car in which cocaine was found, was sufficient evidence to convince a rational trier of fact that defendant was a party to the enterprise of trafficking in cocaine. Banks v. State, 200 Ga. App. 378, 408 S.E.2d 484 (1991); Woods v. State, 210 Ga. App. 172, 435 S.E.2d 464 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to find defendant constructively possessed more than 28 grams of cocaine and was guilty as a party to the crime of trafficking in cocaine. Stevens v. State, 245 Ga. App. 237, 537 S.E.2d 688 (2000).

Evidence that defendant's companion showed a bag of cocaine to an undercover officer while defendant stood nearby in a manner the officer described as a "show of force," and that the companion's car contained another 16 ounces of cocaine, was sufficient for a jury to find that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine as either a principal in the transaction or as a party to the crime. Martinez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 402, 577 S.E.2d 82 (2003).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict as there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine based on the observations of the police watching the defendant and codefendants engaging in suspicious behavior in a high-crime area; the contents of the backpack, which contained 377.45 grams of 50.7 percent pure cocaine heavily wrapped in saran wrap, with a street value between $8,000 and $10,000 in powder form or as much as $15,000 if cut with an agent and compressed into rocks of crack cocaine; the drugs found in the trunk of the defendant's rental vehicle; and the rental of a motel room by the defendant. Mosley v. State, 296 Ga. App. 746, 675 S.E.2d 607 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1188, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 322 (Ga. 2009).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) because the jury was authorized to find that the defendant was in joint constructive possession of the cocaine and was a party to the crime pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a) and (b)(3); the evidence showed that the defendant participated and intentionally aided in the commission of the drug trafficking offense by driving the codefendants and the cocaine to the pre-arranged location for the transaction, warning the codefendants that the principal agent was a police officer and taking possession of the funds used for the transaction. Valdez v. State, 310 Ga. App. 274, 712 S.E.2d 656 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), was supported by sufficient evidence under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20(b)(3) and former24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) since the defendant and the codefendant had both made statements regarding the defendant's involvement in the criminal activity, and the police observed the defendant's actions; there was evidence that the defendant was an active participant and a party to the trafficking offense. Martinez v. State, 314 Ga. App. 551, 724 S.E.2d 851 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), based on the defendant's participation in a sale of a sufficient amount and purity of cocaine to an undercover agent; although a codefendant conducted the sale directly, the defendant was a party to the sale under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) since the defendant was in a nearby vehicle that the codefendant went to during the transaction. McGee v. State, 316 Ga. App. 661, 730 S.E.2d 131 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) because the state presented evidence that even if the defendant did not bring the bag of cocaine to an owner's residence, the defendant possessed the cocaine and was a party to the crime of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Kegler v. State, 317 Ga. App. 427, 731 S.E.2d 111 (2012).

Regardless of whether the defendant passenger had physical possession of the cocaine, the evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant passenger actively participated in, and was a party to, the trafficking of the three kilos of 70-percent pure cocaine because a sergeant set up an undercover surveillance at an apartment complex; after the defendants exited the building, the defendants were talking back and forth and the defendant driver was carrying a black and grey duffle bag, which the defendant driver did not have upon entering the building; and, during an open-air sniff, a canine alerted to the rear passenger side of the vehicle where the detective saw the black and grey duffle bag that contained the cocaine. Williams v. State, 336 Ga. App. 64, 783 S.E.2d 666 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction of possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute.

- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction of being a party to the crimes of possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20(b)(3) and16-13-30, because the defendant was holding large quantities of drugs for an accomplice in a running car outside a hotel with knowledge that the accomplice was at the hotel to make a sale. Haywood v. State, 301 Ga. App. 717, 689 S.E.2d 82 (2009).

Evidence sufficient to show possession of cocaine.

- See Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 370 S.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 370 S.E.2d 348 (1988); McGee v. State, 191 Ga. App. 172, 381 S.E.2d 80 (1989).

Although the defendant never had physical possession of cocaine and marijuana in the cab from which the cocaine was delivered, defendant aided and abetted its actual physical possession and is guilty of trafficking under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-13-31, as a party to the crime. The "actual possession" required by § 16-13-31 to authorize a conviction for trafficking refers not merely to physical custody but to actual active participation in the possession of such substances so as to be a party to the crime of trafficking. Holder v. State, 194 Ga. App. 790, 391 S.E.2d 808 (1990).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for selling cocaine.

- See Stevens v. State, 210 Ga. App. 355, 436 S.E.2d 82 (1993); Height v. State, 221 Ga. App. 647, 472 S.E.2d 485 (1996); Douglas v. State, 228 Ga. App. 368, 491 S.E.2d 821 (1997); Jones v. State, 229 Ga. App. 63, 493 S.E.2d 224 (1997); Davis v. State, 244 Ga. App. 33, 535 S.E.2d 10 (2000).

Defendant who told undercover officer of ability to procure crack cocaine, took officer's money, and attempted to procure the cocaine could be reasonably found to have been a party to the sale. Little v. State, 230 Ga. App. 803, 498 S.E.2d 284 (1998).

Delivery and distribution of marijuana.

- Prior inconsistent statement by marijuana dealer charged with selling marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) that defendants were involved in selling marijuana, and evidence that defendants were in close proximity to seized marijuana did not establish that defendants were party to crime of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1). Oldwine v. State, 184 Ga. App. 173, 360 S.E.2d 915 (1987).

Evidence that a defendant participated in a plan for the delivery of a package containing 12 pounds of marijuana to a residence, along with digital scales, a marijuana grinder, and plastic baggies at the residence, and the defendant's admission that the marijuana was the defendant's, was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of marijuana, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Salinas v. State, 313 Ga. App. 720, 722 S.E.2d 432 (2012).

Trafficking in methamphetamine.

- Evidence that the defendant helped direct a witness to a police informant's home in order to buy a pound of methamphetamine, combined with the defendant's previous contact with the informant, showed more than mere presence, and, at a minimum, showed that the defendant was guilty as a party to the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine. Lopez v. State, 281 Ga. App. 623, 636 S.E.2d 770 (2006).

Sufficient corroboration existed to support a defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine when a police informant testified that the defendant appeared to be involved in the deal and the state also offered testimony that a person would not simply tag along to a drug transaction involving over 400 grams of methamphetamine. Casanova v. State, 285 Ga. App. 554, 646 S.E.2d 754 (2007).

Evidence authorized a finding that defendant was guilty as a party to trafficking methamphetamine and was not merely a passenger in the codefendant's truck since the codefendant testified that defendant obtained methamphetamine from a third party and was the supplier for the deal, defendant admitted that defendant had previously purchased methamphetamine from the third party and knew what was going on when defendant and codefendant met with the third party, and defendant remained in the truck when the codefendant took the methamphetamine and got into an agent's vehicle to make the sale. Russell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 789, 658 S.E.2d 400 (2008).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and the defendant's motion for a new trial with regard to the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine as the defendant failed to rebut the presumption that finding the defendant in possession of such a large amount of drugs was sufficient to establish trafficking. Even absent the presumption of possession, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine since the evidence established that the defendant was one of two persons expected to engage in the undercover transaction and methamphetamine was found on the defendant's person. Navarro v. State, 293 Ga. App. 329, 667 S.E.2d 125 (2008).

Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(3) because although the evidence raised grave suspicions of the defendant's guilt, the state failed to establish that the defendant had both the power and the intention at the time of the defendant's arrest to exercise dominion or control over the drugs and failed to show that other people did not have equal access to the house and the items within the house; all of the evidence was circumstantial with regard to the defendant's constructive possession of the contraband, there was nothing in the case linking the defendant to the drugs or manufacturing equipment in the house, and several other people with access to the house were unaccounted for and were not charged. Aquino v. State, 308 Ga. App. 163, 706 S.E.2d 746 (2011).

Codefendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) could not be upheld on the ground that the codefendant was a party to the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine because the state failed to adduce evidence that the codefendant intentionally caused another to commit the crime, aided or abetted in the commission of the crime, or advised or encouraged another to commit the crime; thus, the state's evidence did not show essential links between the codefendant's proven behavior and the drug trafficking charge. Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1072, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 527 (Ga. 2011).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of sale of marijuana.

- See Wimberly v. State, 205 Ga. App. 818, 423 S.E.2d 728 (1992); Madge v. State, 245 Ga. App. 848, 538 S.E.2d 907 (2000).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of constructive possession of marijuana.

- When there was more evidence to connect defendant to the marijuana than that of mere spatial proximity or presence as the marijuana was hidden during the transport in the patrol vehicle to the station by one of the three codefendants, defendant admitted to knowing the owner of the marijuana, although defendant refused to identify such person and there was evidence that marijuana had been used in defendant's vehicle and that defendant had recently used marijuana; under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of joint constructive possession, or at least as a party to the crime. Harvey v. State, 212 Ga. App. 632, 442 S.E.2d 478 (1994).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction of bringing stolen property to Georgia, eluding an officer, and possessing marijuana as a party, if not as a conspirator, since: (1) the defendant discussed with the defendant's love interest what would happen if they were apprehended by the police; (2) the love interest gave the defendant a handgun after the love interest stole a new gun and the defendant packed two guns with the defendant's personal items and the ski masks; (3) the defendant suspected that the truck was stolen, refused to ask about its origin, saw the stolen gun on the seat of the truck, observed two gas drive-offs, ate stolen food, smoked shared marijuana repeatedly, and sat next to the glove compartment where the marijuana lay; and (4) the defendant was silent during the police pursuits, saw the defendant's love interest retrieve a stolen handgun just prior to an assault of a police officer, did not hinder the love interest or warn the police, lied to the police to cover up the matter, and referred to the entire affair as having "fun for a minute." Michael v. State, 281 Ga. App. 289, 635 S.E.2d 790 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Gibbs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 723, 798 S.E.2d 308 (2017).

Common design evidenced by alcohol provided to minor.

- Evidence that defendant gave the minor, a 14-year-old, alcohol and keys to defendant's car and stood by silently as the minor got behind the wheel was sufficient to allow a jury to have reasonably concluded that defendant and the minor had a common design to allow the minor to drive after drinking alcohol. Guzman v. State, 262 Ga. App. 564, 586 S.E.2d 59 (2003).

Evidence sufficient for participation in drug offenses.

- Evidence that defendant approached a police officer, asked what the officer wanted, and then introduced the officer to the man who actually passed the contraband and collected the money is sufficient proof of guilt under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Gay v. State, 221 Ga. App. 263, 471 S.E.2d 49 (1996).

Evidence sufficient for participation in drug trafficking.

- Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of attempted trafficking in marijuana. A codefendant's testimony at the codefendant's trial and the codefendant's statement to the police were admissible as prior inconsistent statements and constituted substantive evidence of the defendant's participation in the attempted drug trafficking; furthermore, the codefendant's statements were sufficiently corroborated underformer O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by the testimony of a case agent that a loaded pistol was found at the defendant's feet and that a bag containing the currency used in the drug transaction was found within arm's reach of the defendant. Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute with regard to the police finding the contraband in the defendant's vehicle, despite the defendant's contention that the state failed to show that the defendant was in possession of the drug and failed to show an intention to distribute, based on the defendant's intentional use of the vehicle. Further, there was testimony from a witness that the witness had recently ingested methamphetamine that was procured from the defendant and the codefendants and that the defendant provided the transportation that facilitated the procurement of the methamphetamine that was ingested. Armstrong v. State, 298 Ga. App. 855, 681 S.E.2d 662 (2009).

Evidence sufficient to show defendant was party to sale of controlled substance.

- Combined evidence established that the defendant actively participated in and was a party to the three separate sales of a controlled substance based on the defendant freely and voluntarily admitting that during the last controlled drug buy, the defendant supplied an informant with 500-600 pills, the pills tested positive for trifluoromethylphenyl piperazine, and that the defendant acted the same during all of the controlled purchases. Walker v. State, 323 Ga. App. 685, 747 S.E.2d 691 (2013).

Informant's information reliable and admissible.

- In defendant's drug case, a court erred by granting a motion to suppress where an informant's information was allegedly unreliable because, by admitting the informant's presence during the making of methamphetamine, the informant was making statements against the informant's own penal interest. State v. Graddy, 262 Ga. App. 98, 585 S.E.2d 147 (2003), aff'd, 277 Ga. 765, 596 S.E.2d 109 (2004).

Witness was not accomplice in drug transaction.

- Defendant's convictions were not based on insufficient evidence when a witness gave uncorroborated testimony because the witness was not the defendant's accomplice as: (1) the defendant only asked the witness how to make a fake brick of cocaine; and (2) nothing showed the witness advised, encouraged, or counseled the defendant to commit a crime, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(4), or that the witness intended to participate in a crime. Williams v. State, 289 Ga. 672, 715 S.E.2d 76 (2011).

Jury instructions misstated law of party to a crime for marijuana possession.

- Trial court's instructions on "mere association" and "mere presence" with regard to charging a defendant as a party to a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a) were misstatements of the law and also directly conflicted with other closely related instructions, and were harmful error requiring reversal of the defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1). Able v. State, 312 Ga. App. 252, 718 S.E.2d 96 (2011).

Party to malice murder.

- Where both brothers planned the armed robbery and carried it out, even if the defendant did not know that the brother intended to kill any potential witnesses, the evidence supports the verdicts against defendant for the malice murder of the victims because as a party to the crime, defendant could be convicted of the crime even though defendant was not the actual perpetrator. Cargill v. State, 256 Ga. 252, 347 S.E.2d 559 (1986).

Where a party has committed armed robbery and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, an accomplice who is concerned in the commission of those crimes is likewise guilty of both offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the accomplice did not have actual possession of the firearm. Howze v. State, 201 Ga. App. 96, 410 S.E.2d 323 (1991).

Since defendant's conduct before, during, and after the fatal shooting supported the finding that even if defendant was not the trigger man, defendant intentionally aided and abetted the victim's murder. Whether a person is a party to a crime may be inferred from that person's presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the crime. Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 588 S.E.2d 722 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder where the defendant drove the defendant's sibling to a rendezvous with the victim, then drove while the sibling shot the victim to death in the defendant's car; thus, the defendant's life sentence was affirmed. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 623, 593 S.E.2d 343 (2004).

Evidence that two defendants who were tried together chased a victim after an argument and that the victim died after one defendant shot the victim five times was sufficient to sustain both defendants' convictions for malice murder and other crimes. Jackson v. State, 278 Ga. 235, 599 S.E.2d 129 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to show that a defendant was a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) to malice murders where: there was testimony that the defendant had previously acted violently toward the victims and had expressed the desire that the first victim die; that the defendant participated in at least one conversation planning the murders; that the defendant was present at the murder scene; that the defendant washed brown stains off the defendant's shirt after the murders; and that the defendant told two people of the murders before the bodies were discovered. Conway v. State, 281 Ga. 685, 642 S.E.2d 673 (2007).

The evidence was sufficient to support a malice murder conviction as a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. The defendant confessed that the defendant was in a car when the car's occupants targeted the victim, that the defendant accompanied the shooter to the victim's vehicle, and that the defendant was present when the shooter killed the victim, and the defendant's story was consistent with an eyewitness's, who did not identify the individuals involved but noted that the distinctive tire rims on the car in which the defendant was riding matched those on the getaway car. Boseman v. State, 283 Ga. 355, 659 S.E.2d 364 (2008).

In a malice murder case, there was no merit to a defendant's argument that the evidence established only the defendant's mere presence at the scene; at the very least, the defendant was a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a). While it was not established that the defendant actually committed the physical act of stabbing the victim, the state presented evidence that the defendant took part in another murder the night before the victim was killed, that the victim threatened to disclose the earlier murder to police, that the victim was killed to silence the victim, and that the defendant assisted the codefendants in removing the victim from the trunk of a car and dragging the body into the woods. Metz v. State, 284 Ga. 614, 669 S.E.2d 121 (2008), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for malice murder as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) as the defendant accompanied the defendant's son on two occasions to the victim's apartment, the defendant lied to gain entry into the victim's apartment, the defendant was present when the victim was fatally shot, and the defendant fled after the incident. Ashe v. State, 285 Ga. 359, 676 S.E.2d 194 (2009).

Evidence that a defendant, who was in an antagonistic relationship with a murder victim, assisted the victim's shooter (the defendant's best friend) by purchasing a handgun that was registered to the shooter and keeping the handgun following the shooting, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aiding and abetting the murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. 767, 700 S.E.2d 346 (2010).

While it was not possible to determine whether the fatal shot was fired from the defendant's pistol or the codefendant's pistol, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for malice murder because the jury was properly instructed on the law of parties to a crime, under which, even if the fatal shot was in fact fired by the codefendant, the defendant could be held liable. Coe v. State, 293 Ga. 233, 748 S.E.2d 824 (2013).

Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of felony murder, malice murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime based on the testimony of a codefendant, who detailed how the appellant wanted money and robbed and shot an individual with the codefendants to obtain money. Ryans v. State, 293 Ga. 238, 744 S.E.2d 759 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and all of the other crimes of which the defendant was convicted because the defendant was a party to the crimes as the defendant was not merely present at the scene when the victim was murdered with a pistol; and, even crediting the defendant's own version of events, the defendant agreed with an accomplice to rob the victim, and when the accomplice struck the victim with a pistol, the defendant helped silence the victim and arrange the departure from the scene, even though the defendant heard the accomplice fire a gunshot. Dixon v. State, 294 Ga. 40, 751 S.E.2d 69 (2013).

Defendant's convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felony were supported by sufficient evidence since the evidence permitted an inference that the defendant was present when the victim was shot, fled the murder scene with an accomplice, and subsequently lied about key facts when questioned by police. Rush v. State, 294 Ga. 388, 754 S.E.2d 63 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of malice murder as a party to the crime and all of the crimes of which defendant was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence showing that defendant directed a drug selling partner to shoot another person and the pair went together and found the victim and the partner shot the victim to death. Folston v. State, 294 Ga. 778, 755 S.E.2d 803 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party because the defendant was carrying a pistol, told an accomplice that the defendant wanted the gold chain before the defendant approached the victim, and pointed a gun at the victim and demanded the chain; after the victim and the defendant began fighting, the accomplice and the two women in the car heard a gunshot; the accomplice then got out of the car with the accomplice's gun drawn, walked over to where the defendant and the victim were fighting, and fired the fatal shot into the victim's head; and the defendant then went through the victim's pockets and left with the accomplice. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 404, 807 S.E.2d 418 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder as a party because, even though the victim was shot by another person, every person concerned in the commission of the crime could be convicted of the crime; witnesses saw four men together in the apartment; one witness saw the defendant shooting the defendant's weapon and saw an unidentified man shooting a shotgun out the window of a truck; that witness saw the defendant, the co-defendant, and another individual fleeing on foot in the direction taken by the truck; and the medical examiner testified that the wounds from the handgun bullets, by themselves, could have produced death from bleeding, but the immediate cause of death was the wound caused by the shotgun slug. Jackson v. State, 303 Ga. 487, 813 S.E.2d 372 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of, inter alia, malice murder as the evidence showed that one of the defendants shot and killed the victim and that the other defendant was a party to the crime because the defendants and a third person traveled together with a rifle to the scene of the shooting; the second defendant had a motive to kill the victim as the victim and the second defendant's estranged wife were romantically involved; the victim was first attacked by the first defendant and the third man and then shot repeatedly by the second defendant; both the defendants were found attempting to hide from the police; and the victim said that the second defendant shot the victim. Johnson v. State, 302 Ga. 774, 809 S.E.2d 769 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder as a party because the first co-defendant repeatedly drove by the victim's home; the victim came outside with a big gun and kept the gun at the victim's side; the defendant and the first co-defendant drove up to the victim's apartment, got out holding guns, and approached the victim, while the second co-defendant was leaning against the hood of a car; the defendant and the first co-defendant then began punching the victim in the face; as the defendant and the first co-defendant began to walk off, the second co-defendant walked up to the victim and shot the victim in the face; and the victim died shortly thereafter. Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816, 809 S.E.2d 738 (2018).

Murder and armed robbery.

- Although defendant was not the person who pulled the trigger, where there was evidence which authorized findings that defendant was present with the person who pulled the trigger for over two hours prior to the murder; that defendant drove the person who pulled the trigger to the victim's house; that defendant was present in the room when the victim was shot; that the victim was shot with a gun of the same model and caliber that defendant owned; and that defendant destroyed evidence, assisted in the disposal of the decedent's body, fled from the jurisdiction where the crimes were committed, reaped benefits from the armed robbery, and at no time made any attempt to disassociate from the criminal enterprise, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crimes of murder and armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Tho Van Huynh v. State, 257 Ga. 375, 359 S.E.2d 667 (1987).

Murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery and armed robbery.

- Defendant was concerned in the commission of murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery and armed robbery where the evidence indicated that defendant remained outside at the door of the robbed store during the commission of the criminal acts; had communicated with one of defendant's companions who employed violence inside the store moments prior to the commission of the criminal acts; and had been found the following morning walking with one of these companions along a dirt road near the abandoned get-away vehicle with a significant amount of assorted loose currency. Grace v. State, 262 Ga. 746, 425 S.E.2d 865 (1993).

Party to felony murder.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of the defendant's accomplice in an attempted armed robbery because the defendant told the accomplice's brother that the defendant, the accomplice, and another individual went to an apartment complex with the intent to rob the putative armed robbery victim, that the defendant knew the accomplice was armed, and that the accomplice was shot during the confrontation with the putative victim; the defendant admitted to being a party to the attempted armed robbery; and there was evidence corroborating the defendant's confession, including participation with the accomplice in renting the car found at the crime scene. Muckle v. State, 302 Ga. 675, 808 S.E.2d 713 (2017).

Party to murder.

- Where the evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant was a part of the conspiracy to murder a specific individual and in fact the murder did occur according to the plan of the coconspirators, the evidence supports a finding of guilt for being a party to the crime. Owens v. State, 251 Ga. 313, 305 S.E.2d 102 (1983).

Even though there was sufficient direct evidence that the defendant was guilty of concealing the death of another, there was neither direct evidence nor sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant was a party to murder. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict defendant as a party to the crime of murder. Bullard v. State, 263 Ga. 681, 436 S.E.2d 647 (1993).

When the evidence revealed that the defendant and others returned to a parking lot with the specific intent of ambushing a group of people who had earlier told the defendant not to speed and had thrown a beer bottle at the defendant's car, and when the defendant was found to be an accomplice of one who possessed a gun and fatally shot someone, there was sufficient evidence pursuant to the "party to a crime" law under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 to convict the defendant of felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and simple battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1. Smith v. State, 277 Ga. 95, 586 S.E.2d 629 (2003).

Sufficient evidence supported a defendant's convictions for felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because, although another person actually attempted to rob the victim and delivered the fatal gunshot, the defendant gave the shooter cocaine to rob the victim and the handgun used in the crime. The defendant was therefore a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Nelson v. State, 285 Ga. 838, 684 S.E.2d 613 (2009).

State proved that the defendant possessed the intent required to commit the predicate aggravated assault and conspiracy felonies for the felony murder conviction because evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to conclude that the defendant, with a coparty and coconspirator, intended to rob the victim using a deadly weapon, that the victim was reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury as a result of their intentional acts, and that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes for which the defendant was convicted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 498, 713 S.E.2d 376 (2011).

Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for new trial as the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant intentionally helped in the commission of the murder and related crimes and was a party to the offenses because the defendant brought the gun used to kill the victim; the defendant stood over the victim after the accomplice shot the victim at close range and made a statement indicating the defendant's approval of the shooting; and the defendant fled from the scene with the accomplice, leaving the victim for dead. State v. Jackson, 294 Ga. 9, 748 S.E.2d 902 (2013).

Fact that the defendant was merely the driver and did not actually fire the gun did not undermine the legal sufficiency of the evidence since it showed that the defendant threatened the victim before the shooting, drove to the victim's apartment complex, approached the victim during the altercation with the co-defendant, and drove the co-defendant away; thus, one reasonably might infer that both men shared a criminal intent and there was sufficient evidence to find the defendant was a party to the crimes. Bryant v. State, 296 Ga. 456, 769 S.E.2d 57 (2015).

Defendant's murder conviction as a party to a crime was supported by evidence permitting the jury to infer that the defendant was aware of the pistol the accomplice had and knew that the accomplice was going to use the gun to shoot the victims, including that the defendant agreed to drive the car while the accomplice sat in back with a pistol, the defendant stopped the car directly in front of the victims, and the defendant drove the accomplice from the scene and left the car to be picked up. McGruder v. State, 303 Ga. 588, 814 S.E.2d 293 (2018).

Party to voluntary manslaughter.

- Evidence that the defendant supplied a car stocked with ammunition, accompanied others to the apartment in another car, remained parked outside while maintaining phone contact with the others after they went inside, and served as the getaway driver for a wounded individual was sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Platt v. State, 335 Ga. App. 49, 778 S.E.2d 416 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder, burglary, and related offenses in connection with the death of the victim, the defendant's daughter-in-law, as a party because, although the defendant correctly pointed out that there was no physical evidence linking the defendant to the murder, there was unequivocal testimony from two witnesses identifying the defendant as the mastermind of the victim's murder; and the victim's aunt, grandmother, and sister all testified at trial as to various statements the victim had made to them regarding the defendant's disapproval of the victim due to racial and cultural differences. Rai v. State, 297 Ga. 472, 775 S.E.2d 129 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder and the other offenses, either directly or as a party to the accomplice's criminal conduct, because the defendant and the accomplice entered an apartment and took the victims' valuables; the accomplice told the defendant that they were going to have sex with two of the female victims and that they were then going to kill all the victims; a former United States Marine who was in the apartment shot at the defendant and the accomplice; the accomplice later died of the injuries the accomplice sustained; and the defendant could be convicted of felony murder as the death of the accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony. Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 777 S.E.2d 460 (2015).

Evidence of co-perpetrator's acquittal not admissible.

- Murder defendant was not entitled to a retrial at which evidence of the defendant's co-perpetrator's separate acquittal of the murder could be introduced; the defendant was not charged with aiding or abetting the acquitted co-perpetrator, but with the murder, and the state could make the state's case that the defendant was a party to that crime in any way, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Davis v. State, 296 Ga. 126, 765 S.E.2d 336 (2014).

Person was not an accomplice to murder since the person did not know who the intended victim was or when the attempt on the victim's life was to be made, and the person did not in any way participate in or encourage the murder. Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983).

Providing weapon sufficient.

- Participation in mutual combat by providing a weapon to one of the other parties is sufficient to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter as a party to the crime. Steele v. State, 216 Ga. App. 276, 454 S.E.2d 590 (1995) (but see Kennebrew v. State, 1996 Ga. Lexis 917 (1996) and Davis v. State, 235 App. 256, 510 S.E.2D 537 (1998)).

Providing ammunition sufficient.

- Providing ammunition for a weapon to a combatant, thereby enhancing the weapon's lethal capacity, was sufficient to support a voluntary manslaughter conviction. Mitchell v. State, 225 Ga. App. 26, 482 S.E.2d 419 (1997).

Charge regarding O.C.G.A.

§ 16-2-20 warranted. - In a murder prosecution, the court did not err in charging the substance of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 where the evidence supported a finding that a codefendant fired the fatal shot, and that the defendant aided or abetted in the commission of the crime, or intentionally advised, encouraged, hired, counseled, or procured another to commit the crime. Rogers v. State, 251 Ga. 408, 306 S.E.2d 652 (1983).

Evidence in case authorized court's charge concerning "parties to a crime." Ellis v. State, 168 Ga. App. 31, 308 S.E.2d 45 (1983); Holland v. State, 205 Ga. App. 695, 423 S.E.2d 694 (1992); Crumpton v. State, 213 Ga. App. 358, 444 S.E.2d 847 (1994).

Evidence sufficient to authorize charge utilizing language of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. King v. State, 168 Ga. App. 123, 308 S.E.2d 240 (1983); Hildebrand v. State, 209 Ga. App. 507, 433 S.E.2d 443 (1993).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of malice murder, unlawful possession of firearm during commission of crime, and criminal solicitation.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and criminal solicitation, either directly or as a party, because the victim was a drug dealer in the same area in which the defendant was also selling drugs; in late February 2006, the victim and the defendant were involved in an altercation that culminated in the victim slapping the defendant in the face; over the next few days, the defendant plotted against the victim and offered to pay several people to hurt the victim; around 2:30 on the morning of February 22, the defendant and an accomplice approached the victim; and the accomplice shot the victim in front of several witnesses. Gray v. State, 298 Ga. 885, 785 S.E.2d 517 (2016).

Evidence sufficient for participation in murder.

- Defendant was guilty of murder and assault, as a participant to the crimes, when, after hearing at least five shots, defendant grabbed the black bag that usually held money, fumbled to unlock the door, left with the shooter, and there was evidence that defendant knew the shooter. Williams v. State, 262 Ga. 677, 424 S.E.2d 624 (1993).

Evidence established more than the mere presence of the defendant during the commission of the offense of aggravated assault and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault: (1) the defendant assaulted the victim during the drive to the murder scene; (2) the defendant participated in a plot to burn the victim's body and stood lookout while the body was buried; (3) the defendant did not attempt to report the crime; and (4) the defendant watched as another person stabbed the victim before attempting to intervene. Navarrete v. State, 283 Ga. 156, 656 S.E.2d 814 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 104, 172 L. Ed. 2d 33 (2008).

Based on the evidence, a juror could infer from the conduct of the defendant before and at the time of the shooting that the defendant advised, encouraged, and counseled the shooter to fire the fatal shot. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a party to the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 887, 734 S.E.2d 41 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder and other crimes involving the shooting and killing of the first victim and the shooting and injuring of the second and third victims as a party because the defendant and the shooter entered the second victim's home; the shooter started demanding money from those present; the defendant handed the shooter a revolver; the first victim struggled with the shooter for the gun, but the defendant pushed that victim down and the shooter shot and killed that victim; the shooter shot the second victim in the neck, severely wounding that victim; and the shooter shot the third victim grazing the side of that victim's head. Glover v. State, 296 Ga. 13, 764 S.E.2d 826 (2014).

Jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendant called the defendant's gang members to retrieve the defendant from an apartment where someone was threatening the defendant, as well as the defendant's celebrating with the gang that evening after the shooting, that the defendant was a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(4) by advising, encouraging, counseling, or procuring others to commit the crime. Slaton v. State, 296 Ga. 122, 765 S.E.2d 332 (2014).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for felony-murder.

- See Jones v. State, 253 Ga. 640, 322 S.E.2d 877 (1984); Roberts v. State, 257 Ga. 180, 356 S.E.2d 871 (1987); Lark v. State, 263 Ga. 573, 436 S.E.2d 1 (1993); Royal v. State, 266 Ga. 165, 465 S.E.2d 662 (1996).

In a prosecution for armed robbery, defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on lesser included offenses of theft by taking or robbery by intimidation where robberies were perpetrated by the use of a weapon in the possession of defendant's accomplice. Jones v. State, 233 Ga. App. 362, 504 S.E.2d 259 (1998); Woods v. State, 232 Ga. App. 367, 501 S.E.2d 832 (1998).

Sufficient evidence supported a felony murder conviction because ample evidence, including the defendant's admission, showed more than a mere presence at the crime scene, and that the defendant participated in the felony murder of the victim as a party to the crime while in the commission of an armed robbery. Moreover, the defendant did not have to fire the fatal shot in order to be guilty as a principal because the offense of felony murder was accomplished when a defendant caused the death of another human being while in the commission of the underlying felony. Curinton v. State, 283 Ga. 226, 657 S.E.2d 824 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported a felony murder conviction because ample evidence, including defendant's admission, showed more than a mere presence at the crime scene, and that the defendant participated in the felony murder of the victim as a party to the crime while in the commission of an armed robbery. Moreover, defendant did not have to fire the fatal shot in order to be guilty as a principal because the offense of felony murder was accomplished when a defendant caused the death of another human being while in the commission of the underlying felony. Curinton v. State, 283 Ga. 226, 657 S.E.2d 824 (2008).

Defendants' convictions were supported by sufficient evidence because the jury was properly instructed on the law regarding parties to a crime and the eyewitness testimony and other evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find both defendants guilty. Bighams v. State, 296 Ga. 267, 765 S.E.2d 917 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to two felony murders because the defendant admitted that the defendant thought there would be a fight between the first victim and the shooter, had driven the shooter to a residence where the shooter retrieved a sawed-off shotgun on the evening before the killings, and used a ruse to make the first victim come to the scene of the first victim's eventual death; and, even though the second victim was not an intended victim, as the intended victim was the shooter's wife, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a party to the aggravated assault of the second victim under the doctrine of transferred intent. Cash v. State, 297 Ga. 859, 778 S.E.2d 785 (2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 137, 196 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to felony murder while in the commission of armed robbery because the accomplice testified that the defendant approached the accomplice with a plan to rob the victim; the defendant went to New York, but remained in contact with the accomplice; during the robbery, the accomplice shot the victim three times in the back; the defendant told the accomplice not to contact the defendant after the robbery; and two inmates who were incarcerated with the defendant testified that the defendant told them the defendant planned the robbery and enlisted the accomplice to help the defendant. Harper v. State, 298 Ga. 158, 780 S.E.2d 308 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, attempted armed robbery, and the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as a party because the defendant devised a plan to rob the victim, enlisted the help of the codefendants, and the three men approached the victim with guns, but one of the codefendants shot the victim in the head, killing the victim, before the robbery could take place. Smith v. State, 298 Ga. 357, 782 S.E.2d 26 (2016).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder and two aggravated assaults because, despite no eyewitness able to say who fired the shot that fatally wounded the victim, the defendant was among a group that fired at least three handguns, one of which fatally wounded the victim, and the state was not required to prove that the defendant personally fired the fatal shot so long as the state proved that the defendant was a party to the fatal shooting. Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 784 S.E.2d 759 (2016).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder because eyewitnesses placed the defendant at the scene of a confrontation as an armed member of a group which menaced the victim and fired at the victim; the defendant could therefore be convicted as a party to a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a). Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 785 S.E.2d 285 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant, as a party, of felony murder and related crimes in connection with a home invasion as the defendant was an active participant in the home invasion because the defendant, the first co-indictee, and the second co-indictee, all armed with firearms, approached the victim's home, kicked in the door, and confronted the victim, who fired a gun, hitting the first co-indictee in the side; the victim was fatally shot in the shootout that followed; in the ensuing investigation, the first and third co-indictees each gave recorded statements to law enforcement officers implicating the defendant in the crimes; and both the first and third co-indictees testified at trial as part of respective plea deals. Marshall v. State, 299 Ga. 825, 792 S.E.2d 350 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to felony murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery because the defendant admitted at trial that the defendant was aware of the plan to rob the victim; and other evidence at trial showed that the defendant was with the co-indictees just before and shortly after the victim was killed, that the defendant and one of the co-indictees both expressed their intention to rob someone, and contacted the victim to arrange a purported drug deal, and that the defendant admitted that evening that the defendant and the co-indictees had planned and executed the attempted robbery that resulted in the victim's death. Cushenberry v. State, 300 Ga. 190, 794 S.E.2d 165 (2016).

Defendant's conviction for felony murder in an armed robbery of a seller of hair (for hair weaves), although the defendant did not personally obtain or use a gun, was supported by evidence that the defendant planned the robbery and encouraged the others to assist the defendant; the defendant was therefore responsible, as a party to the crime and as a coconspirator, for the acts of the defendant's accomplices. Menzies v. State, Ga. , 816 S.E.2d 638 (2018).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of felony-murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.

- See Burks v. State, 268 Ga. 504, 491 S.E.2d 368 (1997).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of felony murder, aggravated assault, and burglary.

- See Parks v. State, 272 Ga. 353, 529 S.E.2d 127 (2000).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of felony murder, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and theft by taking.

- See Perkinson v. State, 273 Ga. 814, 546 S.E.2d 501 (2001).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of malice murder, armed robbery, and hijacking.

- See Eckman v. State, 274 Ga. 63, 548 S.E.2d 310 (2001).

Evidence sufficient to sustain verdict of malice murder.

- Proof of defendant's presence at shooting of victim, the use of defendant's gun, and defendant's fleeing were enough to sustain the guilty verdict of malice murder. Amerson v. State, 259 Ga. 484, 384 S.E.2d 392 (1989).

Coconspirator's testimony concerning the defendant's involvement in the murder of the defendant's spouse, corroborated by the testimony of witnesses who overheard defendant's desire to have the defendant's spouse killed and by the tape-recorded statements of defendant was sufficient evidence of defendant's participation in the crime to permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of the defendant's spouse. Gambrel v. State, 260 Ga. 197, 391 S.E.2d 406 (1990); Chapman v. State, 263 Ga. 393, 435 S.E.2d 202 (1993).

Even assuming defendant did not fire any shots, there was sufficient evidence that defendant intentionally aided or abetted the commission of murder, or that defendant intentionally advised, encouraged, or procured another to commit murder. Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646, 501 S.E.2d 219 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1078, 119 S. Ct. 817, 142 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder because the co-defendant was in the driver's seat of the vehicle and the defendant was in the passenger's seat; shots were fired from inside the car through the lowered passenger window; a witness saw the defendant holding a handgun out of the passenger window; the driver's side window was closed; the victim was fatally shot; the bullet removed from the victim was consistent with the .25 caliber shell casings found in the vehicle; and, even if the jury concluded that the co-defendant fired the handgun, there was ample evidence that the defendant was concerned in the commission of the murder and, thus, the defendant was legally culpable for the murder. Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 573, 769 S.E.2d 318 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crimes of malice murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault, among other things, because the evidence showed that, during a drug deal and the subsequent shootings, the defendant was in the apartment and the defendant's blood was later found there; witnesses saw two men matching the defendant's and the codefendant's descriptions leaving quickly; ammunition of the type used to kill the victim was found in a car that was owned by the codefendant, with whom the defendant was living; and the defendant denied knowing any of the other defendants and fabricated a story that the defendant had been shot in a confrontation at a gas station. Dixon v. State, 298 Ga. 200, 779 S.E.2d 290 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party because the defendant admitted to driving on the street when the shooter, one of the passengers, produced a gun and started shooting; the only evidence that any of the shots came from somewhere other than the defendant's vehicle was the defendant's own statement about the first shot, and the jury was free not to believe that claim; and the evidence showed that the defendant drove the shooter slowly past the crime scene, circled back, returned to the scene a second time, stopped before the shooting, and rapidly drove the shooter and another passenger away from the scene after the shooting. White v. State, 298 Ga. 416, 782 S.E.2d 280 (2016).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of felony murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault.

- Following evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions as a party or perpetrator of felony murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault: (1) the defendant and two codefendants robbed four occupants of a duplex at gunpoint; (2) a codefendant hit a victim in the head with a gun; (3) the defendant and codefendants moved the victims into another room; and (4) a codefendant fatally shot a delivery person who entered the duplex. Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 675 S.E.2d 28 (2009).

Evidence sufficient for felony murder, attempted armed robbery, and possession of firearm convictions.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to felony murder, attempted armed robbery, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the defendant told the officer that the defendant and the co-indictee had planned to rob a cab driver; the defendant admitted to calling the cab company, dropping the co-indictee off at the location to which the cab had been summoned, and picking the co-indictee up at a nearby park after the robbery attempt; the defendant admitted knowing that the co-indictee was armed with a nine-millimeter gun; and shell casings recovered from the victim's cab were later determined by a firearms expert to have been fired from a gun found in the co-indictee's home. Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 766 S.E.2d 447 (2014).

Evidence insufficient to sustain conviction for felony murder.

- In a felony murder case, the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction as a party to the crimes for which the defendant was found guilty because the state failed to elicit any evidence showing that the defendant was participating in the criminal scheme either before or during the actual commission of the crimes; there was no competent evidence that the defendant was present or otherwise involved in the planning or execution of the underlying drug transaction or subsequent shootings; and, at best, the evidence showed that the defendant was an accessory after the fact, which was a separate, substantive offense in the nature of obstruction of justice, and not a party to the crimes. Higuera-Guiterrez v. State, 298 Ga. 41, 779 S.E.2d 288 (2015).

Instruction on simple assault as lesser included offense of felony murder.

- Trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on simple assault as a lesser-included offense of felony murder as the evidence authorized the jury to consider whether the defendant attempted to commit a violent injury on the victim or placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Allaben v. State, 299 Ga. 253, 787 S.E.2d 711 (2016).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of armed robbery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, burglary, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

- Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions as a party to the offenses of armed robbery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, burglary, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-5-41,16-7-1, and16-8-41, because: (1) the defendant received information from the defendant's love interest, about the victims' house, the location of safes, where money was located, and about the alarm system; (2) the day after the home invasion the defendant's love interest saw the defendant and the defendant showed the defendant's love interest a stack of cash, and said it might be the victim's money; and (3) an FBI informant met with the defendant and the defendant told the informant that the defendant had been shorted money from the robbery, and that the defendant got the layout of the house from the defendant's love interest. Pope v. State, 266 Ga. App. 658, 598 S.E.2d 48 (2004).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction of murder, aggravated assault, and kidnapping.

- Jury reasonably could have concluded from the evidence that the defendant was aware of the first victim's presence and of the victim's being threatened by the coconspirators at least by the time the trio arrived at their destination and there was ample evidence that the defendant conspired with the others to commit the felony of armed robbery and, thus, to support the defendant's convictions for murder, aggravated assault, and kidnapping as to the first victim. McLeod v. State, 297 Ga. 99, 772 S.E.2d 641 (2015).

Evidence insufficient as party to armed robbery and aggravated assault.

- First defendant's conviction and sentence for armed robbery of the first victim was reversed and the guilty verdicts for the aggravated assaults of the first victim were set aside as there was insufficient evidence proving the first defendant was a party to those crimes because, although the first defendant's cell phone was used to place a delivery order, the co-defendant placed the order and had the first defendant's phone when the first victim arrived at the abandoned residence; and, although the first victim identified the second defendant and the co-defendant from photographic line-ups as two of the perpetrators involved in the assault, the first victim was unable to identify the first defendant either during the investigation or at trial. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 796 S.E.2d 242 (2017).

Aggravated assault.

- After defendant-A hijacked a victim's car at gunpoint, defendant-B's actions in punching the victim in the face while defendant-A waited in the car constituted aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), as defendant-B aided and abetted the commission of the carjacking pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) for purposes of the aggravated nature of the assault conviction. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 182, 630 S.E.2d 778 (2006).

Aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal based on the defendant's act of deliberately firing a gun in the direction of another; moreover, the fact that one of the defendant's cohorts also fired a weapon in the direction of the shooting victims was sufficient for the defendant to be guilty as a party to said criminal acts. Thompson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006).

Evidence supported a conviction of aggravated assault with a knife when two codefendants repeatedly struck the victim, the defendant struck the victim and threatened the victim's life, the defendant and the first codefendant entered a pharmacy to buy duct tape, and while alone with the victim, the second codefendant held a knife on the victim where the second codefendant could reach the knife and where the victim could see the knife; this authorized the conclusion that the second codefendant committed aggravated assault and that the defendant was a party. Rhines v. State, 288 Ga. App. 128, 653 S.E.2d 500 (2007).

Trial court properly convicted defendant for aggravated assault of a witness through the use of a knife as the evidence established that the defendant gave the codefendant a knife, which was used to search the witness for weapons and for money that the witness had and defendant then shared the spoils of the crimes with the codefendant. The evidence of events occurring before, during, and after the crime was sufficient to show that defendant was a party to the crime of aggravated assault. Duncan v. State, 283 Ga. 584, 662 S.E.2d 122 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant as a party to the crime of aggravated assault as the defendant did not have to possess the gun that was used and inferences gathered from the defendant's action in removing personal items from the trunk of the car before the victim was forced inside the trunk was sufficient to establish that the defendant was a party to the crime. Cornette v. State, 295 Ga. App. 877, 673 S.E.2d 531 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's convictions for aggravated assault because the defendant was involved with other members of a rap group in settling a previous altercation with a rival rap group, the defendant and others drove into an assigned park where the meeting was to be held, the defendant admitted to firing gunshots, and although others also had guns and fired shots, the defendant was liable under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 for injuries and a death to bystanders; the defendant could not assert self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(3) because the defendant was the aggressor. Taylor v. State, 296 Ga. App. 212, 674 S.E.2d 81 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant was a party to the crime of aggravated assault under the doctrine of transferred intent as, even though another individual shot the victim, the defendant participated in the gun fight that wounded the unintended victim. Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 740 S.E.2d 590 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crime of the aggravated assaults of the two victims because the jury could have concluded that the defendant accompanied the others to a house with the intent to invade a rival gang's neighborhood and that the defendant brought a gun in a black bag for that purpose; the co-defendants and other witnesses testified that the defendant had a gun at the time of the shooting, supporting an inference that the defendant displayed the gun, even if the defendant did not shoot the gun; and, after the shooting, the defendant came into the house, wiping off a gun. Taylor v. State, 331 Ga. App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (2015).

Evidence sufficient as party to armed robbery and aggravated assault.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a party to the crimes because a codefendant pointed a gun at the victim's side and demanded money; the codefendant told the defendant that they were going to kill the victim; the codefendant took the victim's cell phone, ordered the victim to disrobe, and raped the victim in the front seat of the car; during the rape, the victim could not escape from the car as the defendant was standing in front of the driver's door; and, after the victim transferred the victim's number to a new cell phone, the victim received calls for the defendant. Carter v. State, 339 Ga. App. 140, 793 S.E.2d 459 (2016).

Party to kidnapping.

- Based on the evidence provided by a codefendant that: (1) the defendant and others severely beat the victim over a drug debt; (2) the victim wanted a ride back to a bar, but the codefendants would not allow it; (3) the defendant's former love interest testified that the defendant admitted to killing the victim; and (4) the State introduced similar transaction evidence that the defendant stood by while a codefendant savagely beat another person, the defendant's kidnapping conviction was upheld on appeal and the jury was authorized to find that the victim was involuntarily held, and that the defendant was a party to that crime. Reagan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 708, 637 S.E.2d 113 (2006).

Party to rape.

- Rape conviction is proper even though a defendant does not have sexual intercourse with the victim if the evidence shows that the defendant held down the victim while defendant's companions raped the victim. Ceaser v. State, 184 Ga. App. 599, 362 S.E.2d 156 (1987).

Jury could find the defendant guilty of rape as a party because the defendant did not object when the codefendant had carnal knowledge of the victim in defendant's presence. Cole v. State, 279 Ga. App. 219, 630 S.E.2d 817 (2006).

Defendant was properly convicted of being a party to rape under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-6-1(a)(1), because evidence that the defendant knew that the defendant's 11-year-old child was being raped, told the child to lie to investigators, failed to prevent the rapist from having contact with the child, helped the rapist get out of jail, and allowed the rapist to move in with the defendant and the child showed that the defendant affirmatively encouraged and was a party to the rapes. Johnson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 99, 640 S.E.2d 644 (2006).

In the defendants' joint trial for rape, murder, and other crimes against three separate victims, the evidence supported the felony murder verdict against one defendant because witnesses placed the defendants together prior to the murder, text messages on the defendant's phone discussed robbing the victim, and the defendant fled the state after the murder; but the evidence as to the rape merely placed the defendant at the scene, requiring reversal. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 796 S.E.2d 242 (2017).

Motion for directed verdict on aggravated sodomy charge properly denied.

- Denial of a motion for a directed verdict on a charge of aggravated sodomy was proper because the defendant and the codefendant sexually assaulted three victims during an armed robbery, including one instance in which the defendant and the codefendant took turns raping one victim, and the aggravated sodomy was committed during the sexual assaults; the jury could reasonably find that the defendant and the codefendant had a common criminal intent to commit the sexual assaults and the defendant could be found guilty of the act performed by the codefendant. Coley v. State, 272 Ga. App. 446, 612 S.E.2d 608 (2005).

Charge not warranted.

- There was no evidence to support a charge on O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(2), (4), and contrary to the defendant's contention, the failure to charge the jury on these subsections was proper, where the victim of an aggravated assault had seen only the defendant prior to the moment when the victim was shot, but had seen a second individual at the scene and had not actually seen the defendant with the gun, but only heard it cock. Waddell v. State, 277 Ga. App. 772, 627 S.E.2d 840 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 731, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 9304, 166 L. Ed. 2d 567 (2006).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's requested jury instruction on a "parties to a crime" issue, as the overall jury charge the trial court gave, which included the applicable portions of the pattern instruction on parties to a crime, and generally tracked the statutory language of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, as well as the entire pattern instruction on "mere presence," substantially covered the principles necessary. Morales v. State, 281 Ga. App. 18, 635 S.E.2d 325 (2006).

Evidence sufficient for participation in false imprisonment.

- Jury was authorized to find that the defendant was a party to the crime of false imprisonment, and the conviction was affirmed, since the evidence demonstrated that the defendant, along with two other codefendants, took an active role in confining and/or detaining the victims; the victims testified that the defendant was positioned at the foot of their bed, participated in tying the victims up, and, despite the defendant's claim that the defendant was a reluctant participant acting out of fear, that the defendant never seemed afraid or intimidated. Adcock v. State, 269 Ga. App. 9, 603 S.E.2d 340 (2004).

Evidence sufficient for participation in sexual assault.

- Evidence was sufficient to support a juvenile court's finding that a minor had committed aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because the evidence showed that the minor blocked the victim's flight, assisted the friend in pushing the victim into the bedroom, and committed sexual battery, all while the friend remained armed with the gun that the friend had pointed at the victim's head; the defendant could be convicted under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. In the Interest of A.J., 273 Ga. App. 51, 614 S.E.2d 159 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the appellant guilty of sexual battery as a party to the crime because the evidence showed that the appellant, together with several co-indictees, planned and executed the armed robbery and burglary, that the appellant acted as a driver and lookout while the others directly participated in those crimes, and that one co-conspirator committed a sexual battery while in the victims' home. Cisneros v. State, 299 Ga. 841, 792 S.E.2d 326 (2016).

Evidence sufficient for participation in aggravated assault.

- In a case involving a defendant's cohort shooting a man at a gas station, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony since the evidence showed that the defendant willingly drove the cohort to the gas station, waited in a stolen truck while armed with an assault rifle as the cohort pulled the victim out of the victim's car and then shot the victim, and then rescued the injured cohort and fled the police; the defendant's criminal intent was properly inferred from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. McClendon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 238, 651 S.E.2d 165 (2007).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault based on the victims' testimony that guns were used in the commission of the crimes, the testimony of the defendant's girlfriend and the presence of a cell phone found near the scene of the crimes, and the victims identifying the defendant's accent was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant was an armed participant in the crimes. Jordan v. State, 320 Ga. App. 265, 739 S.E.2d 743 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and a violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., because various gang members including the defendant's brother and their associate were on the dance floor flashing gang hand signs and dancing roughly, purposefully bumping into other club patrons, and an altercation ensued; the defendant's brother struck the victim in the back of the victim's head with a beer bottle; the defendant's associate and several others struck the victim and punched the victim in the head; when the victim walked toward the exit door, the defendant hit the victim across the face with a bottle; and the victim was taken by ambulance to a hospital. Dowdell v. State, 325 Ga. App. 593, 754 S.E.2d 383 (2014).

Robbery and aggravated assault did not merge.

- Because an attempted armed robbery began when the defendant kicked down the victim's door, entered the victim's home with a firearm, and demanded that the victim give it up, and continued as the victim and a co-defendant struggled outside; after the victim was able to run away, the co-defendant shot the victim twice; the robbery and aggravated assault were separate offenses and did not merge. Cuyler v. State, 344 Ga. App. 532, 811 S.E.2d 42 (2018).

Evidence sufficient for participation in battery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and other offenses.

- Defendant's convictions for simple battery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and kidnapping with a bodily injury were supported by sufficient evidence as the evidence showed that the defendant helped the codefendant tie up the victim, kicked the victim, and helped the codefendant zip the victim into a sleeping bag and load the victim into the back of the codefendant's pickup truck. Thus, the defendant was criminally responsible under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a) as a party to the crimes. Wilkinson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 190, 679 S.E.2d 766 (2009).

Evidence insufficient to support finding of participation in false imprisonment and robbery.

- With regard to a jail escape wherein the night jailer was overtaken by at least two inmates, the defendants' convictions for false imprisonment and robbery were reversed on appeal as the state failed to present evidence that either intentionally advised, encouraged, hired, counseled, or procured anyone to commit the crimes since the state presented evidence that only two inmates attacked the night jailer, none of which included the defendants. Under the circumstances presented, the state failed to present evidence which excluded every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendants' guilt. Shearin v. State, 293 Ga. App. 794, 668 S.E.2d 300 (2008).

Evidence insufficient to support finding of participation in aggravated assault case.

- Evidence that the defendant drove a codefendant away from the crime scene in a subdivision after the codefendant shot the victim and that a box of bullets was found in the defendant's car when the defendant was later arrested did not support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant's possession of a box of bullets of the same caliber as those used in the murder weapon in no way proved the defendant's possession of the weapon during the commission of the assault; driving the codefendant away with knowledge that the codefendant had committed the crime did not, in and of itself, render the defendant guilty as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; and to the extent that the evidence that the defendant's car had been parked at some point with the car's front end facing in the direction going out of the subdivision constituted circumstantial evidence of guilt, the evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Ratana v. State, 297 Ga. App. 747, 678 S.E.2d 193 (2009).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault as a party because there was no evidence in the record to show that the defendant knew that the grandfather was likely to respond to the defendant's initial cries for help by firing a shot, or that the defendant's cries intentionally encouraged the grandfather to discharge the single shot actually fired; and, although the defendant's exclamation after the single shot was fired could be interpreted as an expression of encouragement or incitement, it was made after the grandfather's already completed act of firing a revolver near the officers, which was the act that formed the basis of the indictment against both the defendant and the grandfather. Hoglen v. State, 336 Ga. App. 471, 784 S.E.2d 832 (2016).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction of kidnapping and hijacking.

- There was ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the defendant was more than "merely present" when defendant's cohorts committed the offenses of kidnapping and hijacking a motor vehicle since: (1) the defendant made no attempt to distance self from the hijacking while it was occurring and did not offer the victim any help whatsoever after a coperpetrator pulled a gun on the victim; and (2) there was evidence that the defendant drove the stolen vehicle for a full month before defendant was finally arrested, remained with an associate for some time after the hijacking, made a concerted effort to hide the vehicle's true identity and lied to an officer about the vehicle's ownership. Williams v. State, 236 Ga. App. 790, 513 S.E.2d 757 (1999).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of aggravated assault.

- See Glore v. State, 241 Ga. App. 646, 526 S.E.2d 630 (1999), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368, 578 S.E.2d 885 (2003).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as: (1) defendant and the codefendant tried to convince a victim to participate in a fake armed robbery; (2) defendant told the victim that they would take the bullets out of the gun if it would make the victim feel better; (3) defendant watched over the victim while the codefendant retrieved the gun; (4) defendant informed the victim that the victim would not get hurt if the victim cooperated with codefendant; and (5) defendant left in the car with codefendant. Broome v. State, 273 Ga. App. 273, 614 S.E.2d 807 (2005).

Defendant's conviction as a party for aggravated assault and aggravated battery was affirmed as: (1) the defendant drove a car knowing a gun was inside; (2) the defendant extinguished the headlights and drove slowly past a crowded corner as a passenger opened fire; (3) the defendant stopped the car next to a prone victim while the passenger continued shooting; and (4) the defendant told the police that the defendant did not care who had been shot. Ford v. State, 280 Ga. App. 580, 634 S.E.2d 522 (2006).

Jury was entitled to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, charged in the indictment "with the intent to rob," based on the corroboration of the defendant's admission to going on a "lick," which meant to go find someone to rob, and that the defendant knew what a passenger was going to do when that passenger reached out of the car window in an attempt to snatch the elderly victim's purse, resulting in the victim being struck by the car and falling to the ground; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's amended motion for a new trial. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 506, 636 S.E.2d 694 (2006).

In a late-evening robbery of a pizzeria, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of one count of aggravated assault when the second defendant struck one of the employees with brass knuckles because the jury was authorized to find that brass knuckles qualified, at a minimum, as an object, device, or instrumentality that was likely to cause serious bodily injury; and the first defendant was party to the second defendant's use of the brass knuckles against the employee. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363 (2018).

In a late-evening robbery of a pizzeria, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of two counts of aggravated assault when the first defendant pointed a firearm at two store employees as a jury could thus infer that the defendants' acts placed both employees in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury because the first employee testified that the act of pointing the gun at the first employee, along with the verbal threats made by the assailants, caused the first employee to fear that the first employee would be injured or killed; the second employee noted that the first defendant asked about no one wanting to die; and the second defendant aided and abetted the first defendant in committing the offenses. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363 (2018).

Evidence sufficient as party to armed robbery.

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery based on the victim identifying the defendant as the person who hit the victim on the head, an accomplice's testimony, the victim's car keys were found in a bag that the defendant had been holding when stopped by an officer, and the defendant fled from the officers when the officers attempted to arrest. Brooks v. State, 323 Ga. App. 681, 747 S.E.2d 688 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery, aggravated assault against the manager and cashier, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery because the law allowed defendant to be charged with and convicted of the same offenses as co-defendant since the evidence showed that defendant drove co-defendant to the fast food restaurant that was robbed and waited as the getaway driver. Broyard v. State, 325 Ga. App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery as a party to a crime given evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle with three other occupants to the site of the robbery, that there were four black masks for the four men, that the defendant hid a shotgun and showed police where to find the shotgun, and that the defendant was found one street over from the robbery site and was the only person in the area. Clemente v. State, 331 Ga. App. 84, 769 S.E.2d 790 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the four armed robberies as a party as the accomplice testified that the robberies were executed pursuant to a plan orchestrated and aided by the defendant; the accomplice never pointed the weapon at the defendant, nor demanded the defendant's property; and, although the defendant had successfully fled the property, the defendant circled back to the residence - while the accomplice was still there - and attempted to steal electronic equipment. Styles v. State, 329 Ga. App. 143, 764 S.E.2d 166 (2014).

Defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's armed robbery and felony murder convictions because only the codefendant used a gun was rejected because the defendant was a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, and the defendant also pretended that the defendant's cellphone was a gun, satisfying O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a)'s language of "device having the appearance of such weapon." Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 778 S.E.2d 205 (2015).

When the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crimes as the state showed that the defendant was quickly found by police while driving a car containing the possessions of the victim who had been robbed by two armed men. Demps v. State, 337 Ga. App. 657, 788 S.E.2d 525 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants were at least parties to the crimes of which the appellants were convicted because the evidence showed that the appellants were present in Room 160 for the discussion with three other defendants about robbing the drug dealer in Room 161; thus, the jury could reasonably infer that all the appellants acted with a shared criminal intent to rob the victims at gunpoint. Stewart v. State, 299 Ga. 622, 791 S.E.2d 61 (2016).

Defendants were properly convicted of being parties to the crime of attempted armed robbery of one of the victims and the aggravated assault of another victim because a drug dealer had lured the victim/buyers to an isolated area to rob them of the drug money, and the defendants, armed, stood by the car and shot into the car at the dealer's command. Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505, 801 S.E.2d 782 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of two counts of armed robbery because the first defendant was in possession of a firearm when the first defendant entered the pizzeria; and the first defendant used that weapon to demand cash from one employee and the cell phone of a second employee, both of which were then taken; and because the second defendant was a party to those offenses as the second defendant directed the getaway driver to purchase the Halloween mask that was used during the robbery; the second defendant participated in demanding money from the employees and took the cell phone of one of the employees; and the second defendant admitted to the driver moments later that the defendants had robbed the pizzeria. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363 (2018).

Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault on a police officer.

- Fact that the defendant did not fire a gun used by another defendant to shoot a police officer did not preclude the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer; the defendant was with the other defendant in a truck when the officer was shot and drove the truck from the scene of the crime. Grace v. State, 210 Ga. App. 718, 437 S.E.2d 485 (1993); Shorter v. State, 239 Ga. App. 625, 521 S.E.2d 684 (1999).

Evidence sufficient to convict for hijacking.

- Victim's testimony as to defendant's hijacking of the victim's car with the aid of defendant's accomplice, the arresting officer's testimony as to how the officer spotted defendant and the stolen vehicle minutes after hearing a police dispatch report, and the testimony of the detective who interrogated the accomplice all sufficiently corroborated the testimony of the accomplice at trial. Boykin v. State, 264 Ga. App. 836, 592 S.E.2d 426 (2003).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of shoplifting.

- See Carter v. State, 188 Ga. App. 464, 373 S.E.2d 277 (1988); Watson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 645, 448 S.E.2d 752 (1994); Brown v. State, 228 Ga. App. 281, 491 S.E.2d 488 (1997); Butler v. State, 240 Ga. App. 559, 524 S.E.2d 251 (1999); Stewart v. State, 243 Ga. App. 860, 534 S.E.2d 544 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's conviction as a party to the crime of violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a) for fleeing and eluding because the appellant testified and admitted shoplifting, admitted to having a prior record of shoplifting, had only recently been released from prison, and that getting caught on the day of the events would be a parole violation that would send the appellant back to prison. McNeely v. State, 296 Ga. 422, 768 S.E.2d 751 (2015).

Accepting stolen goods and harboring robbers.

- Evidence that the defendant, who was convicted of armed robbery but who did not "directly commit" the offense and was not present at the crime, accepted stolen coins and attempted to hide the robbery participants was constitutionally insufficient to support a conviction. Tenner v. Wallace, 615 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ga. 1985).

Evidence sufficient to support robbery conviction.

- Even if the defendant did not ever have physical possession of the money bag, there was sufficient evidence to support a robbery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as: (1) after a struggle, the victim's money bag was taken by an assailant wearing a sweatshirt; (2) the victim identified the truck used in the robbery, the money bag, and the sweatshirt worn by the assailant; (3) the truck fled from police and then the suspects fled on foot; (4) defendant and codefendant were apprehended after a foot chase; and (5) the money bag was found in a nearby bush. Robertson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 231, 626 S.E.2d 206 (2006).

Appeals court rejected a contention that the defendant lacked any prior knowledge that the defendant's vehicle was being used to commit armed robberies, and that at most, the evidence could only characterize defendant as an accessory after the fact and not a party to the crime, given that the state's evidence tended to show that the codefendant informed the defendant for the first time that the codefendant had just committed an armed robbery using the car and convinced the defendant to call the police and lie about the car being stolen, all within three minutes after said robbery occurred; further, an additional robbery was committed using the car after the defendant reported it stolen. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. App. 479, 636 S.E.2d 547 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aiding and abetting a burglary because, knowing that her husband and another person were removing portable items from the home of an unknown person, she asked her husband to take specific items from the victim's home. Green v. State, 301 Ga. App. 866, 689 S.E.2d 132 (2010).

Rational trier of fact was authorized to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of being a party to the crime of robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-8-40 because the defendant's admission that the defendant was present at the scene of the robbery, in conjunction with the defendant's possession of the recently stolen item, which the jury could find was unsatisfactorily explained by defendant, was sufficient to support the defendant's robbery conviction; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's version of events because although the defendant contended that defendant's videotaped police interview and defendant's trial testimony created a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, defendant's interview and trial testimony were not consistent with one another in all material respects, and defendant's statements also were inconsistent with the testimony of the pursuing patrol officers. Boggs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find all defendants guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim testified that one of the defendants had a knife during the attack and that all three defendants struck and kicked the victim while taking the victim's necklaces and money. Cruz v. State, 305 Ga. App. 805, 700 S.E.2d 631 (2010).

Trial court did not err in finding that similar transaction evidence was relevant and admissible because the evidence showed that the defendant was involved in the planning and/or execution of each of the similar transactions pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, even if the defendant was not the actual perpetrator of the crime; given that the defendant was identified as an active participant in individual crimes that were part of this continuing criminal enterprise, and that the defendant's possession of a ring stolen from a car salesperson further demonstrated the involvement in the crime spree, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant committed the independent offenses or acts as either an actual perpetrator or as a party to the crimes. Walker v. State, 310 Ga. App. 223, 713 S.E.2d 413 (2011).

Party to armed robbery.

- The defendant was a party to armed robbery, at a minimum, even though defendant was unarmed, where defendant's participation with codefendants in a violent argument with the victim resulted in the victim being shot and killed by a codefendant, after which the defendant left the scene with the codefendants in the victim's car. Hudson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 895, 508 S.E.2d 682 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a),16-2-20(a), and16-2-20(b)(3) because defendant: (1) flagged the victims down; (2) was present during the crime; (3) fled with an accomplice; and (4) was apprehended while in the company of the accomplice. Furthermore, defendant could not argue on appeal that defendant was a mere bystander, surprised by the crime when defendant testified at trial that a crime never occurred. Lowery v. State, 264 Ga. App. 655, 592 S.E.2d 102 (2003).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for robbery as a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a) as it was defendant's idea to rob a store; the statements of defendant's three accomplices corroborated each other and there was additional evidence to corroborate those statements, including defendant's admissions that the defendant entered the store to see how many people were inside and reported it to the others and that the defendant divided the proceeds and kept a portion personally. Moore v. State, 274 Ga. App. 432, 618 S.E.2d 122 (2005).

Because: (1) the testimony of the defendant's two accomplices adequately described the defendant's involvement in an armed robbery of a restaurant; (2) the defendant later told one cohort not to speak if caught; (3) the same handgun that the defendant used in the prior and subsequent robberies was used to rob the restaurant; and (4) all three robberies were performed in the same manner and on the same day, sufficient evidence was presented to support the defendant's armed robbery conviction as a party to the crime. Boone v. State, 282 Ga. App. 67, 637 S.E.2d 795 (2006).

Evidence overwhelmingly established that a defendant was a party to an armed robbery; the defendant made inculpatory admissions at trial, the defendant met the physical description given by witnesses, and the gun and proceeds from the armed robbery were on the defendant's person when the defendant was arrested. Hawkins v. State, 292 Ga. App. 76, 663 S.E.2d 406 (2008).

While a defendant was assaulting and raping a victim at gunpoint, the defendant's accomplice was robbing the residence. As the defendant was legally responsible for the acts of the accomplice under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

In an armed robbery case, as the victim identified the defendant as the driver of a car and the codefendant as the passenger who robbed the victim at gunpoint, and the pistol used in the robbery was found in the car's locked glove compartment, to which only the defendant had the key, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant aided and abetted the codefendant in the robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 and sufficiently corroborated the codefendant's accomplice testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Bailey v. State, 295 Ga. App. 480, 672 S.E.2d 450 (2009).

Evidence that a defendant discussed robbing a store, drove two robbers there, drove the getaway car evasively while being chased by police, fled after crashing the car, and took a share of the stolen money was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery as a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a). Dorsey v. State, 297 Ga. App. 268, 676 S.E.2d 890 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because an accomplice testified to committing a series of armed robberies and that the defendant had participated by selecting the stores to rob, supplying the gun, acting as the getaway driver, and receiving part of the stolen money; law enforcement officers testified that the accomplice implicated the defendant during an interrogation, and officers found items of clothing matching those worn by the armed robber in the defendant's hotel room. Williams v. State, 314 Ga. App. 840, 726 S.E.2d 66 (2012).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of theft by receiving and possessing firearm during crime.

- While an assailant pointed a handgun to the victim's neck, the defendant and another assailant held and searched the victim and took the victim's cell phone and cash; the armed assailant, who had stolen the handgun, displayed the handgun to the others before the crimes were committed. Under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant as an accomplice of theft by receiving and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (2008).

Possession of burglary tools by one conspirator is possession by all.

- When two or more persons enter into a conspiracy to commit burglary, and in attempting to carry out such felonious design either of the people have possession of burglary tools, such possession is the possession of all, and each is guilty of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-20, prohibiting and punishing the possession of such tools. Solomon v. State, 180 Ga. App. 636, 350 S.E.2d 35 (1986).

Merger of multiple counts of possession of firearm during commission of crime.

- Trial court properly refused to merge the two arms possession counts for sentencing purposes because those charges were based on the defendants' possession of two guns during the burglary; the acts were separate crimes involving multiple defendants, separate crimes for which each defendant bore individual responsibility as either a principal or an accessory. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).

Variance in indictment and proof at trial was not fatal.

- Defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal because a variance in the indictment and the proof at trial was not fatal: (1) the names subject to the alleged variance in fact referred to the same person; and (2) the testimony of a codefendant, when combined with the defendant's post-arrest admissions, sufficiently proved the defendant's commission of an armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party to the crimes. Brown v. State, 289 Ga. App. 421, 657 S.E.2d 322 (2008).

Evidence sufficient for participation in robbery.

- Jury was authorized to infer from defendant's physical position during the robbery, defendant's flight with the robbers immediately afterward, and defendant's attempt to hide from the police that defendant was a participant in the crime and not merely a bystander. Cummings v. State, 227 Ga. App. 564, 489 S.E.2d 370 (1997).

Finding that defendant aided and abetted in the crimes of aggravated assault, kidnapping, and armed robbery was shown by evidence that defendant supplied the suggested target, the weapon, and transportation, and by defendant's admission to discussing the robbery with an accomplice. Howard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 437, 496 S.E.2d 532 (1998).

Defendant's participation in armed robbery was shown by evidence that defendant was present during discussion of the robbery, called to confirm that victim was home, and benefited from the proceeds. Brown v. State, 233 Ga. App. 195, 504 S.E.2d 35 (1998).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions as a party to robbery by intimidation and false imprisonment as the defendant lured the victim to the defendant's apartment where the codefendant struck the victim in the back of the head and robbed the victim at gunpoint. Smith v. State, 269 Ga. App. 133, 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004).

Despite the defendant's claim of innocence, convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence showing that the defendant waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted the codefendants in an attempted escape; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (2006).

As the evidence provided by the state at defendants' criminal trial demonstrated that based on information from defendant-B regarding a large quantity of marijuana possessed by a victim, defendant-A and another man forcibly entered the victim's residence while defendant-A was armed, pushed the victim to the ground, demanded to know where the marijuana was, and a physical struggle resulted, the evidence supported defendants' convictions for burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault; defendant-B was convicted as a party to the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(4). Garland v. State, 283 Ga. App. 622, 642 S.E.2d 320 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 282 Ga. 201, 657 S.E.2d 842 (2008).

In a case where four persons riding in a stolen car robbed a cab driver at gunpoint, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime; the defendant led a detective to the gun the defendant possessed and admitted being in the stolen vehicle on the date in question, and a witness testified that the witness saw the defendant holding a gun and approaching the cab driver. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 866, 648 S.E.2d 183 (2007).

Evidence sufficient for participation in burglary.

- Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was actively involved in a common scheme with others to secure money with which to buy illegal drugs; that defendant knew or should have known that the criminal acts were being committed; that defendant actively participated in the burglary; that defendant failed to prevent or to render aid after the remaining crimes; and that defendant enthusiastically shared in the proceeds resulting from the criminal acts. Peppers v. State, 242 Ga. App. 416, 530 S.E.2d 34 (2000).

Evidence that the defendant had driven the defendant's son to a home that was burglarized, was waiting by the side of the road for the defendant's son to return, and received numerous calls from the defendant's son while an officer stopped to talk to the defendant, was sufficient to convict the defendant for being a party to the crime of burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-7-1(b). Wise v. State, 325 Ga. App. 377, 752 S.E.2d 628 (2013).

Evidence sufficient for participation in armed robbery.

- There was sufficient evidence to show that defendant aided, abetted, advised, and counseled the codefendants in the commission of the crimes against the victim. It made no difference that defendant was not the one who shot the victim as the state only needed to prove that defendant was acting in concert with the others. Arrington v. State, 244 Ga. App. 529, 536 S.E.2d 212 (2000).

Evidence that defendant devised a plan for another person to rob a store, advised and encouraged that other person, provided the other person with a weapon, and aided the other person in the commission of the crimes was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Davis v. State, 249 Ga. App. 579, 548 S.E.2d 678 (2001).

Evidence sufficient for participation in armed robbery and kidnapping.

- Because the defendant participated in a carjacking, drove the victim's car from the scene of a murder, asked the defendant's love interest to lie about the defendant's whereabouts, and lied repeatedly to the police about what happened, a jury was free to conclude that the defendant participated in an armed robbery and kidnapping as an accomplice under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20,16-5-40(a), and16-8-41(a); thus, the trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict. Owens v. State, 263 Ga. App. 478, 588 S.E.2d 265 (2003).

Evidence sufficient for participation in robbery by snatching.

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for robbery by snatching under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a) as: (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict the codefendant of the same crime, so it was sufficient to convict defendant as a party to that crime, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3); and (2) the claim that no one saw the defendant with the victim's wallet or with the codefendant was inapposite as the victim saw the two of them in the same vicinity simultaneously. Barker v. State, 275 Ga. App. 213, 620 S.E.2d 457 (2005).

Evidence that the defendant intentionally struck the victim with a stick and that either the defendant or one of the other parties to the assault intentionally struck the victim with their fists and a concrete block supported an aggravated assault conviction; further, although the victim was the only person who testified about having been hit with a concrete block, and was not sure which of the attackers struck that blow, this testimony was sufficient to establish that the victim was hit with a concrete block because it made no difference whether an accomplice, and not the defendant, assaulted the victim in the manner alleged in the indictment. Oliver v. State, 278 Ga. App. 425, 629 S.E.2d 63 (2006).

Defendant's motion for a new trial on the defendant's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the aggravated assault charges was properly denied as the defendant's actions before, during, and after a friend's aggravated assault and firearm possession crimes at a home showed not only that the defendant was a party to those crimes, but that the defendant was a fellow conspirator in the assault against the victim as the defendant: (1) forced the victim at gunpoint to drive to the home; (2) stayed in the nearby living room while the friend shot a gun and threatened the victim (and defendant looked into the bedroom after the gun was fired); (3) accompanied the friend and the handcuffed the victim in the vehicle following the incident while the friend searched for the victim's love interest's residence; (4) encouraged the friend to kill the victim; and (5) did not protest any of the friend's actions throughout the evening. Sapp v. State, 280 Ga. App. 592, 634 S.E.2d 523 (2006).

Evidence sufficient for participation in armed robbery, aggravated assault, and other offenses.

- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the state showed that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted a home invasion in which the home was burglarized and the homeowner's teenage child was detained and robbed by use of a handgun. Even in the absence of evidence sufficient to show that the defendant directly committed the charged offenses, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was a party to the offenses in that the defendant and a person armed with a gun loaded a truck with property stolen from the home during the two-hour home invasion, the defendant was present speaking with the armed person during the home invasion, and the defendant confirmed that the child was home alone. Whitley v. State, 293 Ga. App. 605, 667 S.E.2d 447 (2008).

Evidence sufficient for participation in home invasion robbery.

- Although a defendant's accomplice in a home invasion robbery was the one who beat and choked the victim, left the victim for dead, and set the house on fire to conceal the evidence, causing the unconscious victim to die of smoke inhalation, the defendant helped plan the robbery, was aware that the accomplice was choking the victim, took the victim's wallet and disposed of the wallet, and returned to see the burning house. Accordingly, the defendant was a party to the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Cooper v. State, 286 Ga. 66, 685 S.E.2d 285 (2009).

Evidence insufficient to support finding of participation in receiving stolen property.

- Defendant's adjudication as delinquent for committing theft by receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle, was reversed on appeal since there was no evidence that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the car under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. The defendant's mere presence as a passenger in the vehicle and the presence of a gasoline tank in the back seat where the defendant was observed sitting was insufficient to support any finding of guilt. In the Interest of J.Q.W., 288 Ga. App. 444, 654 S.E.2d 424 (2007).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of arson.

- See Moak v. State, 222 Ga. App. 36, 473 S.E.2d 576 (1996).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for burglary.

- See Stokes v. State, 232 Ga. App. 232, 501 S.E.2d 599 (1998); Dunn v. State, 245 Ga. App. 847, 539 S.E.2d 198 (2000).

Because defendant's statement was sufficiently corroborated by evidence that a bullet from the 9 mm handgun in the defendant's possession killed the victim, and by defendant's admission to both being involved in the commission and planning of the robbery of the victim, sufficient evidence existed to find the defendant guilty as a party to the crime of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Valentine v. State, 289 Ga. App. 60, 656 S.E.2d 208 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary as a party because, pursuant to a plan the defendant designed, the defendant gained entry into the residence, then assisted the accomplice's unauthorized entry by returning to the door, peering outside where the accomplice was staged with a gun and mask, then leaving that door ajar for the accomplice's unauthorized entry, and, seconds later, the accomplice abruptly entered through that door, taking money and property from the other individuals present by use of a gun. Styles v. State, 329 Ga. App. 143, 764 S.E.2d 166 (2014).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for attempted burglary.

- While mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient evidence to convict one of being a party to a crime, criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before, during and after the offense; thus, the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant, who was convicted of attempted burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-7-1, had the intent to rob the sawmill in question. The defendant and others set out early on a Saturday and entered the property in an unusual way; and the defendant drove the getaway truck, lied to police, and failed to produce a flashlight when asked to empty the defendant's pockets. Armour v. State, 292 Ga. App. 111, 663 S.E.2d 367 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for attempted burglary, sufficient evidence supported the conviction because the jury evaluated the nature of the circumstances of the morning's events, as well as the daughter's eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant and, although the defendant explained that it was mistakenly the wrong house, the jury was authorized to come to a different and reasonable conclusion based on the state's case. White v. State, 323 Ga. App. 660, 744 S.E.2d 857 (2013).

Evidence was insufficient to support burglary convictions because the state failed to show that defendant participated in an on-going burglary and presented no witnesses connecting the defendant to any conspiracy existing when the burglaries occurred. Crumpton v. State, 240 Ga. App. 422, 523 S.E.2d 624 (1999).

False statements and writings.

- Dismissal of an indictment for the use of false certificates was not required on the basis that defendant did not submit the certificates personally but only provided them to others who submitted them to a state department. State v. Johnson, 269 Ga. 370, 499 S.E.2d 56 (1998).

Presenter of check not an accomplice.

- Uttering element was established by sufficient evidence that the defendant's friend presented the check to a bank for cashing at the defendant's behest; trial court properly charged the jury on the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony even though the jury determined that the friend was not an accomplice. King v. State, 277 Ga. App. 190, 626 S.E.2d 161 (2006).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction of forgery.

- See Hunt v. State, 244 Ga. App. 578, 536 S.E.2d 251 (2000).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of theft by conversion.

- When the defendant routinely purchased property under his wife's name, the jury was authorized to conclude that the conversion which defendant was instrumental in performing was for his use. Furthermore, the evidence of defendant's conduct before, during, and after the conversion was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a party to the codefendant's conversion of the victims' funds. Cochran v. State, 204 Ga. App. 602, 420 S.E.2d 32, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 921, 420 S.E.2d 32 (1992).

Evidence sufficient to show defendant's involvement in armed robbery.

- Evidence was sufficient since the evidence established that the defendant was involved in the initial plan to commit armed robbery at the victim's residence, the defendant furnished the defendant's weapon, mask, and gloves to one of the coperpetrators, remained at the car awaiting the return of the perpetrators and the anticipated fruits of the armed robbery, and thereafter, did not reveal the commission of the offenses to law enforcement. Dunn v. State, 248 Ga. App. 223, 546 S.E.2d 27 (2001).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for armed robbery.

- See Scott v. State, 166 Ga. App. 240, 304 S.E.2d 89 (1983); Smith v. State, 255 Ga. 654, 341 S.E.2d 5 (1986); Stowers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 518, 422 S.E.2d 870 (1992), cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 422 S.E.2d 870 (1992); Ridings v. State, 226 Ga. App. 155, 486 S.E.2d 378 (1997); Collins v. State, 229 Ga. App. 210, 493 S.E.2d 592 (1997); Cantrell v. State, 230 Ga. App. 693, 498 S.E.2d 90 (1998); Tucker v. State, 231 Ga. App. 210, 498 S.E.2d 774 (1998); Nealy v. State, 239 Ga. App. 651, 522 S.E.2d 34 (1999); Hemphill v. State, 242 Ga. App. 751, 531 S.E.2d 150 (2000).

Although the evidence was circumstantial, a rational trier of fact could have found proof of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant's explanation of new found wealth was that after having discussed robbing UPS and failing to report to work, defendant woke up at UPS in the codefendant's car with a large sum of money. Bailey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 133, 416 S.E.2d 151 (1992).

Defendant was properly convicted for armed robbery, where, though defendant might not have had knowledge that defendant's accomplices intended to use a weapon to perpetrate the offense, defendant had nonetheless masterminded the plan while leaving to the accomplices the manner in which they would extract money from the victim. Crawford v. State, 210 Ga. App. 36, 435 S.E.2d 64 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant either directly committed or was a party to the crime of armed robbery. McGhee v. State, 229 Ga. App. 10, 492 S.E.2d 904 (1997).

By helping a coconspirator plan an armed robbery, providing the coconspirator with a gun for that purpose, and sharing in the proceeds of the robbery, the defendant was a party to the crime of armed robbery and the evidence therefore was sufficient to support a conviction of that offense. Short v. State, 234 Ga. App. 633, 507 S.E.2d 514 (1998).

Identification of defendant by the victim and the store clerk, and the documents defendant left in the store during escape, clearly supported a finding that defendant was in recent possession of the money orders stolen at gunpoint and was sufficient for an armed robbery conviction. Thomas v. State, 256 Ga. App. 712, 569 S.E.2d 620 (2002).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

- See Green v. State, 233 Ga. App. 87, 503 S.E.2d 339 (1998).

Two intruders entered a house through a window, threatened the occupants with handguns, and stole items from the house. As circumstantial evidence established that the defendant drove the get-away vehicle, the defendant was properly convicted as a party to armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a burglary. Olds v. State, 293 Ga. App. 884, 668 S.E.2d 485 (2008).

Various offenses chargeable from participation in armed robbery.

- Defendant was concerned in the commission of armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, where the evidence showed the victim saw the defendant after being shot for the third time, was lethally threatened by the defendant and victim pled with the defendant throughout the course of the ordeal. Vincent v. State, 210 Ga. App. 6, 435 S.E.2d 222 (1993), aff'd, 264 Ga. 234, 442 S.E.2d 748 (1994).

Evidence sufficient to support finding that defendant was party to automobile theft.

- See Golden v. State, 176 Ga. App. 412, 336 S.E.2d 332 (1985).

Defendant's own custodial statement, in which defendant admitted to driving the follow-up vehicle away from the scene of the robbery, emptying and sorting out the contents of the victim's purse, and knowing about the replacement of the stolen vehicle's tag served both to corroborate the custodial statement of codefendant and to connect the appellant with the crime. Marlow v. State, 207 Ga. App. 269, 427 S.E.2d 600 (1993).

Party to the crime of entering an automobile with intent to commit theft.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of theft in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18 as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, given that the defendant drove the defendant's truck to a pharmacy, waited with the truck idling while the defendant's friend got out, smashed a car window, and stole a purse, then drove away with the friend and hid the friend at the defendant's apartment when the police came. Rinks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 37, 718 S.E.2d 359 (2011).

Evidence insufficient to support conviction of theft by taking.

- Because the evidence presented at trial did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the driver had stolen the truck without defendant's knowledge or participation prior to the time defendant started riding around in the truck, defendant's conviction for theft by taking the truck was insupportable as a matter of law. Grant v. State, 227 Ga. App. 243, 488 S.E.2d 763 (1997).

Jury was authorized to find from the evidence that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 because evidence that another house cleaner could have taken the money would not necessarily have precluded a finding of the defendant's guilt. Cookston v. State, 309 Ga. App. 708, 710 S.E.2d 900 (2011).

Evidence sufficient to show defendant was party to theft of services.

- Because sufficient evidence supported the defendant's theft of services conviction, as such permitted the jury to infer that: (1) by paying a store clerk $50 to access another credit application in order to provide the defendant with a cell phone, the defendant encouraged, hired, or procured the store clerk to engage in deception; and (2) the defendant did not intend to pay for the communications services received as a result. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 822, 648 S.E.2d 133 (2007).

Evidence insufficient to support conviction for receiving stolen property.

- When all evidence indicated that the defendant was simply along for the ride in a stolen van, and evidence was lacking that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the van or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime, adjudication of delinquency for theft by receiving stolen property was erroneous. In re C.W., 226 Ga. App. 30, 485 S.E.2d 561 (1997); Harris v. State, 247 Ga. App. 41, 543 S.E.2d 75 (2000).

Defendant's adjudication as delinquent for committing theft by receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle, was reversed on appeal since there was no evidence that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the car under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. The defendant's mere presence as a passenger in the vehicle and the presence of a gasoline tank in the back seat where the defendant was observed sitting was insufficient to support any finding of guilt. In the Interest of J.Q.W., 288 Ga. App. 444, 654 S.E.2d 424 (2007).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property was reversed as there was no evidence that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the stolen car, or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime, since the state only presented the police officers' general statements that based on conversations with the suspects, the officers believed they were linked to the vehicle, that the defendant had given the officers a false name, and that the suspects were wearing wet clothing, which might have indicated that they attempted to hide from the officers; there was no evidence that the steering column was damaged, that the car was driven without keys, that the defendant had stolen property in defendant's possession, or that the defendant admitted doubts as to the car's ownership. Morgan v. State, 280 Ga. App. 646, 634 S.E.2d 818 (2006).

Evidence sufficient as party to attempted robbery.

- Evidence that the defendant stated a desire and intention to procure money for one of the defendant's children, drove an accomplice to the area of the robbery, drove the getaway car, fled erratically, failed to tell police the defendant's accomplice had been shot and was in the truck, and misled police about the defendant's relationship with the accomplice was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty as a party to the crime of attempted robbery. Robinson v. State, 298 Ga. 455, 782 S.E.2d 657 (2016).

Corporate agent who aids or abets principal in commission of crime is a party.

- Where corporate agent has either committed offense in all its elements and particulars or has intentionally aided or abetted the corporate principal in commission of crime in all its particulars and elements, the corporate agent is a party to the offense and punishable as such. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-155.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 186 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 164.

ALR.

- Criminal responsibility of one cooperating in offense which he is incapable of committing personally, 5 A.L.R. 782; 74 A.L.R. 1110; 131 A.L.R. 1322.

Individual criminal responsibility of officer or employee for larceny or embezzlement, through corporate act, of property of third person, 33 A.L.R. 787.

Penal or criminal liability as affected by defendant's employment of an independent contractor, 55 A.L.R. 642.

Criminal responsibility of one who furnishes instrumentality of a kind ordinarily used for legitimate purposes, with knowledge that it is to be used by another for criminal purposes, 108 A.L.R. 331.

Homicide by companion of defendant while attempting to escape from scene of crime as murder in first degree, 108 A.L.R. 847.

Who other than actor is liable for manslaughter, 95 A.L.R.2d 175.

Offense of aiding and abetting illegal possession of drugs or narcotics, 47 A.L.R.3d 1239.

Acquittal of principal, or his conviction of lesser degree of offense, as affecting prosecution of accessory, or aider and abettor, 9 A.L.R.4th 972.

Sufficiency of evidence to establish criminal participation by individual involved in gang fight or assault, 24 A.L.R.4th 243.

Criminal liability for death of another as result of accused's attempt to kill self or assist another's suicide, 40 A.L.R.4th 702.

Prosecution of female as principal for rape, 67 A.L.R.4th 1127.

Criminality of act of directing to, or recommending, source from which illicit drugs may be purchased, 34 A.L.R.5th 125.