Cruz v. Sullivan (1992)

Plaintiff urges this Court to “follow” Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), a non-binding out-of-district case recognizing that “[f]undamental fairness in administrative proceedings is a prerequisite for judicial recognition of its results,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 15 (quoting Cruz, 802 F. Supp. at 1017 ).

Ms. Niknam cites several cases in support of her argument, including Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), and Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008).

Thus, Ali’s due process claim fails. 13 In opposition, Ali cites Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

Mysaev responds that “fundamental fairness . . . is a prerequisite for judicial recognition of [administrative proceedings’] results.” Doc. 10, Pl.’s Resp., 10 (quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D.N.Y 1992)).

And this Court certainly had jurisdiction over Arce’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. 1331 (conferring on federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases which “aris[e] under” federal law), and to determine whether the defendants were immune from suit, see F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (explaining that immunity is a jurisdictional issue); Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he [C]ourt has, of course, clear jurisdiction to determine its jurisdictio…

And this Court certainly had jurisdiction over Arce’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. 1331 (conferring on federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases which “aris[e] under” federal law), and to determine whether the defendants were immune from suit, see F.D./.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (explaining that immunity is a jurisdictional issue); Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he [C]ourt has, of course, clear jurisdiction to determine its jurisdictio…

Although a court always has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction, see Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F.Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (S.D.N.Y.1992), the declaratory judgment dispute invites the following problem: if the Court declares that Plaintiff is a member of Harborview, then the Court would be without jurisdiction to decide the remaining state law claims between non-diverse parties; if the Court declares that Plaintiff is not a member of Harborview, the lawsuit effectively ends, wi…

See Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 900 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that Rule 12(i) “can be an excellent device for conserving time, expense, and scarce judicial resources by targeting early resolution of threshold issues”); Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F.Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (S.D.N.Y.1992).

See Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 900 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that Rule 12(1) “can be an excellent device for conserving time, expense, and scarce judicial resources by targeting early resolution of threshold issues”); Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F.Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (S.D.N.Y.1992).

See In re Martin-Trigona, 763 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir.1985); Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F.Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (S.D.N.Y.1992); United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 539 F.Supp. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

See, e.g., Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (addressing interests in the context of a social security benefits denial); Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing protected interest in immediate relative status for an alien spouse); Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (relied upon passage discussing liberty interest in marriage).5 Much like Plaintiff’s other claims, a plethora of caselaw exists to the co…

As appropriate, the Court may use that procedure to assist in “early resolution of threshold issues.” Riv era-Gomez v. de Castro, 900 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that Rule 12(i) “can be an excellent device for conserving time, expense, and scarce judicial resources”); see also Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F.Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (S.D.N.Y.1992).

See Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y.1992).