How cited: State v. Larson Transfer & Storage, Inc. · Go Syfert

State v. Larson Transfer & Storage, Inc. (1976)

green · 38 citation events across 7 courts. Showing the 12 strongest citers on record (one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
197720012026
green Baker v. Ploetz (2000)
Rule Authority · Minn. · 2 citations in this opinion
Co., 576 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Minn.1998) (quoting State v. Larson Transfer and Storage, Inc., 310 Minn. 295, 304 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1976)).
Rule Authority · Minn.
State v. Larson Transfer and Storage Inc., 310 Minn. 295 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1976).
Rule Authority · Minn. Ct. App.
State v. Larson Transfer and Storage, 310 Minn. 295, 302 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1976).
Rule Authority · Minn. Ct. App.
State v. Larson Transfer & Storage, Inc., 310 Minn. 295, 304 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1976); State v. Corbin, 343 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Minn.App.1984).
green State v. Hulst (1994)
Rule Authority · Minn. Ct. App.
State v. Larson Transfer and Storage, 310 Minn. 295, 304 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1976).
green State v. Krejci (1989)
Rule Authority · Minn. Ct. App.
See State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Minn.1985) (Minnesota follows “a long tradition of strictly construing criminal statutes.”); State v. Larson Transfer & Storage, Inc., 310 Minn. 295, 304 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1976).
green State v. Bjornson (1985)
Rule Authority · Minn. Ct. App.
State v. Larson Transfer & Storage, Inc., 310 Minn. 295, 298 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 179 (1976) (quoting State v. McCorvey, 262 Minn. 361, 365 , 114 N.W.2d 703, 706 (1962)). *9 Bjornson argues that the ordinance fails this test in two respects.
quoting State v. McCorvey, 262 Minn. 361, 365 , 114 N.W.2d 703, 706 (1962)
green State v. Lucas (1999)
Cited · Minn. · signal: see · 4 citations in this opinion
See State v. Larson Transfer and Storage, Inc., 310 Minn. 295, 304 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1976) (stating that penal provisions in statutes and municipal ordinances are strictly construed because [b]efore a person may be subject to criminal liability, it must be reasonably certain that the statute or ordinance renders his conduct a criminal offense.).
stating that penal provisions in statutes and municipal ordinances are strictly construed because [b]efore a person may be subject to criminal liability, it must be reasonably certain that the statute or ordinance renders his conduct a criminal offense.
green State v. Nelson (1993)
Cited · Minn. Ct. App. · signal: see · 2 citations in this opinion
See State v. Larson Transfer & Storage, Inc., 310 Minn. 295 , 246 N.W.2d 176 (1976) (penal provisions of statutes and ordinances are strictly construed such that person subject to criminal liability is reasonably certain that conduct is a criminal offense).
penal provisions of statutes and ordinances are strictly construed such that person subject to criminal liability is reasonably certain that conduct is a criminal offense
Cited · Chesterfield Cir. Ct. · signal: see · 2 citations in this opinion
See State v. Larson Tr. & Storage, Inc., 246 N.W.2d 176 (1976); State v. Owens, 562 P.2d 738 (Ariz. App. 1977). 2.
green State v. McAllister (1987)
Cited · Minn. Ct. App. · signal: see · 2 citations in this opinion
See State v. Larson Transfer and Storage, Inc., 310 Minn. 295, 302 , 246 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1976).
Cited (see also) · Ariz. Ct. App. · signal: see also
The court reasoned that the Tesla vehicles were “generally” on the Core Parcel for only “three days or so, and not longer than four days.” The court concluded that Tesla’s use of the Core Parcel is “more akin to a short term ‘parking’ situation than it is to a long term ‘storage’ situation.” We agree. ¶29 Courts have long distinguished between “storage” and “parking” on the basis that “[o]ne has a certain degree of permanency, while the other connotes transience.” Monument G…
same