Beaudry v. Beaudry (1973)

Id. at 57-58, 312 A.2d at 925 (citations omitted); see also Forte v. Forte, 143 Vt. 518, 520-21 , 468 A.2d 561, 562 (1983) (error to enforce pre-1971 support order beyond new age of majority). [4] The ground for modification in this case is exactly the same as that present in Beaudry —a new age of majority is effective, and the court must apply this age to the pre-existing support order.

In Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 56 , 312 A.2d 922, 925 (1973), we held that a trial court's discretion in the area of property settlements and support orders "does not extend to the creation of obligations regarding the children of the parties other than provision for their care, custody and maintenance during minority." Plaintiff requested that the $20,000 be awarded to her and concedes that her stated intention was to use the money to complete the education of the child…

Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 56 , 312 A.2d 922, 924 (1973).

See, e.g., Milligan v. Milligan, 158 Vt. 436, 443 (1992) (in dividing marital estate, family court had no power to order that certain pension funds be used to create educational trust for children’s use beyond age of majority); Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 56 (1973) (parent could not be ordered to pay child support once child turned eighteen).

The Supreme Court of Vermont succinctly explained this concept in Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53 , 312 A.2d 922, 925 (1973): “The term ‘minor’ ... does not imply any particular age limit.... [T]he term [simply] embraces the person who has not yet arrived at the age of majority prescribed by law, for minority is a status created by law and is subject to statutory limitation and exception.” One hundred years ago, Alaska law echoed the common-law rule that a person became an ad…

In Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53 , 312 A.2d 922, 925 [5, 6] (1973), the court held that a judgment for child support is not a final judgment because the court has power to modify its terms according to changes in circumstances.

Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 58 , 312 A.2d 922, 925 (1973).

Because the court embodies the public’s paramount interest in the care and maintenance of these children, its jurisdiction is of necessity continuing until they reach the age of majority, and its decree, in so far as it touches the children’s welfare, is subject to modification. 15 V.S.A. § 292; Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 57 , 312 A.2d 922, 925 (1973); Randall v. Randall, 129 Vt. 432, 434 , 282 A.2d 794, 795 (1971); Miller v. Miller, 123 Vt. 221, 224 , 186 A.2d 93, 95 (…

Stanley v. Stanley, 112 Ariz. 282 , 541 P.2d 382 (1975); Rice v. Rice, 213 Kan. 800, 805 , 518 P.2d 477, 481 (1974); *732 Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 57 , 312 A.2d 922, 925 (1973); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 70 Wis. 2d 882, 890 , 236 N.W. 2d 657, 662 (1975).

Stanley v. Stanley, 112 Ariz. 282 , 541 P.2d 382 (1975); Rice v. Rice, 213 Kan. 800, 805 , 518 P.2d 477, 481 (1974); *764 Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 57 , 312 A.2d 922, 925 (1973); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 70 Wis. 2d 882, 890 , 236 N.W. 2d 657, 662 (1975).

See Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 56 , 312 A.2d 922, 924 (1973) (concluding that “sufficiently cognate” statutes are “in pari materia and are to be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system”). ¶ 11.

See generally Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53, 55-56 , 312 A.2d 922, 924 (1973); Brooks v. Brooks, 131 Vt. 86, 89-90 , 300 *461 A.2d 531, 533 (1973); Randall v. Randall, 129 Vt. 432, 434 , 282 A.2d 794, 795 (1971) ; 15 V.S.A. § 292.

See Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53 , 312 A.2d 922 (1973).