Busby v. State (2005)

But see Busby, 894 So.2d at 105 (Bell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Holiday, 682 So.2d at 1095 (Anstead, J., specially concurring); Holiday v. State, 665 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), decision quashed, 682 So.2d 1092 (Fla.1996); Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 659 So.2d 272 (Fla.1995); cf. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 , 120 S.Ct. 774 , 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000)(error in overruling cause challenge not rev…

But see Busby, 894 So.2d at 105 (Bell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Holiday, 682 So.2d at 1095 (Anstead, J., specially concurring); Holiday v. State, 665 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), decision quashed, 682 So.2d 1092 (Fla.1996); Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 659 So.2d 272 (Fla.1995); cf. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 , 120 S.Ct. 774 , 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000)(error in overruling cause challenge not rev…

But see Deviney v. State, 322 So. 3d 563 , 578–88 (Lawson, J., concurring in part and concurring in result) (proposing that Florida courts should adopt the harmless error standard in reviewing trial court rulings on cause challenges, by which a defendant would have to show that a “legally objectionable” juror (i.e., a biased or partial juror) ultimately sat on the jury, thus infringing upon the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury). 3 the court.” Bus…

See Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 95 (Fla.2004) (noting that standard for granting cause challenge under Florida law is whether there is reasonable doubt "as to whether the juror possesses an impartial state of mind,” which turns on "whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court”); id. at 100 (observing that "actual bias [is] the standard applicable to cause chall…

See Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 95 (Fla. 2004) (noting that standard for granting cause challenge under Florida law is whether there is reasonable doubt “as to whether the juror possesses an impartial state of mind,” which turns on “whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court”); id. at 100 (observing that “actual bias [is] the standard applicable to cause cha…

Collins admits that his argument about “constitutional error” is foreclosed by United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307 , 120 S. Ct. 774, 777 (2000), but he argues that the district court should have exercised its “supervisory powers” to make him “whole by granting . . . his request for an additional peremptory challenge,” as provided for under Florida law, see Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 103 (Fla. 2004).

Collins admits that his argument about “constitutional error” is foreclosed by United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307 , 120 S.Ct. 774, 777 , 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000), but he argues that the district court should have exercised its “supervisory powers” to make him “whole by granting ... his request for an additional peremptory challenge,” as provided for under Flori da law, see Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 103 (Fla.2004).

United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988); Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 98 (Fla. 2004).

Even if we had concluded that one or two of these three cause challenges were erroneously denied, Wolf would still not be entitled to relief because the trial court granted him two additional peremptory challenges. - 22 - See id. at 97 (“A defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice if the trial court grants the same number of additional peremptories as cause challenges that were erroneously denied.”).

As such, “the loss of a peremptory challenge, without more, does not violate the right to an impartial jury.” Busby, 894 So. 2d at 102 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).

In Bushy v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 98 (Fla.2004), the supreme court noted that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally guaranteed at the state or federal level.

Under Florida law, "juror impartiality is a firm basis for excusing a prospective juror for cause." Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 99 (Fla.2004).

Gore v. State, 706 So.2d 1328, 1332 (Fla.1997) (“Although [the jurors] expressed certain biases and prejudices, each of them also stated that they could set aside their personal views and follow the law in light of the evidence presented.”); Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984) (“The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law…

Even if we had concluded that one or two of these three cause challenges were erroneously denied, Wolf would still not be entitled to relief because the trial court granted him two additional peremptory challenges. - 22 - See id. at 97 (“A defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice if the trial court grants the same number of additional peremptories as cause challenges that were erroneously denied.”).

If the juror identified by the defendant as being objectionable is in actuality not legally objectionable, the defendant has suffered no harm and is not entitled to a new trial because any error in denying the challenge for cause was rendered harmless. - 54 - Busby, 894 So. 2d at 114 (Bell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).

"Florida law provides for two separate types of challenges to potential jurors with distinctly different underpinnings." Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 99 (Fla. 2004).

“The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 95 (Fla. 2004).

While there is no freestanding constitutional right to exercise peremptory challenges at either the state or federal level, Florida courts havé long recognized that “such challenges are nonetheless ‘one óf the most important of the rights secured to the accused.’ ” Smith v. State, 59 So.3d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 98 (Fla. 2004)).

Id. at 319-20 (citing Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004); Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 19 (Fla. 1959)).

See Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 97 (Fla. 2004) (“A defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice if the trial court grants the 2 same number of additional peremptories as cause challenges that were erroneously denied.”); see also Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838 (Fla. 2009) (finding harmless error where trial court erroneously denied two for-cause challenges and granted defendant three additional peremptory challenges).

“The value of peremptory challenges is that they are intended and can be used when defense counsel cannot surmount the standard for a cause challenge.” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 100 (Fla.2004).

Id. at 99 (recognizing that peremptory challenges “can be used to excuse a juror for any reason”).

See, e.g., Busby, 894 So.2d at 96 (“The trial court must excuse a prospective juror for cause if ‘any reasonable doubt’ exists regarding his ability to render an impartial judgment and recommendation as to punishment.”).

Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004).

Accordingly, "[a] defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice if the trial court grants the same number of additional peremptories as cause challenges that were erroneously denied." Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 97 (Fla.2004).

As this Court explained in Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 95 (Fla.2004): “It is within a trial court’s province to determine whether a challenge for cause is proper, and the trial court’s determination of juror competency will not be overturned absent manifest error.” Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 281 (Fla.1999).

This Court is the ultimate “arbiter[] of the meaning and extent of the safeguards provided under Florida’s Constitution.” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 102 (Fla.2004).

See State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984), receded from on other grounds by State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993) (“The primary purpose of peremptory challenges is to aid and assist in the selection of an impartial jury.”); State v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1993) (“[T]he peremptory challenge contributes significantly to the selection of a fair jury[.]”); Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 102 (Fla. 2004) (“[T]he ability to exercise peremptory challen…

Even assuming any error occurred, to establish prejudice Boatman must “show that an objectionable juror has served on the jury.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004) (citing Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1991)).

“The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 95 (Fla. 2004). 3 A juror should be excused if there is any reasonable doubt about his or her ability to render an impartial verdict.

In Smith v. State, 59 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 2011), we recognized that although peremptory challenges are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed at either the state or federal level, they are “nonetheless ‘one of the most important rights secured to the accused.’ ” Id. at 1111 (citing Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 98 (Fla. 2004)).

Id. (citing Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 95 (Fla. 2004)).

“The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 95 (Fla. 2004).

Further, “[t]he mere fact that a juror gives equivocal responses does not [automatically] disqualify that juror for service.” Suri, 937 So. 2d at 219 (quoting Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 96 (Fla. 2004)).

Indeed, “[p]eremptory challenges . . . can be used to excuse a [prospective] juror for any reason, so long as that reason does not serve as a pretext for discrimination.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 99 (Fla. 2004).

Our determination that Florida’s right to trial by jury requires unanimity fell squarely within our role as “the arbiters of the meaning and extent of the safeguards provided under Florida’s Constitution.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 102 (Fla. 2004). “[W]e have the duty to independently examine and determine questions of state law so long as we do not run afoul of federal - 54 - constitutional protections or the provisions of the Florida Constitution that require us to ap…

See Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 97 (Fla. 2004) (“A defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice if the trial court grants the same number of additional peremptories as cause challenges that were erroneously denied.”).

See Weinstein Design Grp., 884 So. 2d at 995 (concluding court abused its discretion in denying cause challenges to jurors who "confirmed that they could not set aside 'the edge' they would give" to a party); Jaffe v. Applebaum, 830 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (concluding court abused its discretion in denying challenge for cause where juror admitted that plaintiffs would be starting out with "a half strike" against them). "[E]xpenditure of a peremptory challenge to …

“Requiring the defendant to show actual bias-the standard applicable to cause challenges-for the forced expenditure of a peremptory challenge renders the separate statutory grant of peremptory challenges totally meaningless.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 100 (Fla. 2004).

Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam). 6.

Jury Selection Process During jury selection, “Florida law provides both cause and peremptory challenges to both sides involved in criminal proceedings.” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 98 (Fla. 2004) (citing §§ 913.03, 913.08, Fla. Stat. (2003)).

See, e.g., State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213 , 849 A.2d 648, 670 (2004); Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 96-97 (Fla.2004); Hanson v. State, 72 P.3d 40, 48-49 (Okla.Crim.App.2003); Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). 138 "Were I writing on a blank slate, I might be persuaded to adopt such a standard, which seeks to give effect to the distinction between challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.

Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 95 (Fla.2004)).

“It is within the trial court’s' province to determine whether a challenge for cause should be granted based on a juror’s competency, and such a determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error.” Guzman v. State, 934 So.2d 11, 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (citing Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 95 (Fla.2004)); see also Matarranz v. State, — So.3d -, -, 2011 WL 3300367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

Id. at 14 (citing Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 95 (Fla.2004)); see also Morrison v. State, 818 So.2d 432, 442 (Fla.2002); Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 281 (Fla.1999); State v. Williams, 465 So.2d 1229, 1231 (Fla.1985); Mills v. State, 462 So.2d 1075, 1079 (Fla.1985).

A defendant demonstrates prejudice from the “expenditure of a peremptory challenge to cure the trial court’s improper denial of a cause challenge ... if a defendant exhausts all remaining peremptory challenges and can show that an objectionable juror has served on the jury.” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 96-97 (Fla.2005).

Nor does the record establish that the information Mr. Maxwell failed to disclose would have made a peremptory challenge by the defense likely. “ ‘While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable.’ ” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 99 (Fla.2004) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 20…

Our Precedent Regarding Peremptorg Challenges As recognized by this Court, “the very purpose of peremptory challenges is ‘the effectuation of the constitutional guaranty of trial by an impartial jury.’ Although peremptory challenges are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed at either the state or federal level, such challenges are nonetheless ‘one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.’” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 98 (Fla.2004) (citations omitted…

Indeed, the supreme court has specifically refused to adopt a standard that would require the defendant to show that a seated juror was “ ‘legally objectionable,’ or one who [was] biased or partial.” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 97 (Fla.2004).

Further, as noted in Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 96 (Fla.2004), the mere fact that a juror gives equivocal responses does not disqualify that juror for service.