Meyer v. City of Center Line (2000)

Pena, 255 Mich. App. at 310-11 ; Meyer v. City of Center Line, 242 Mich. App. 560, 568-69 (2000).

Meyer v. City of Center Line, 242 Mich.App. 560 , 619 N.W.2d 182, 191 (Mich.Ct.App.2000); Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 602 (6th Cir.2006).

Meyer v. City of Center Line, 619 N.W.2d 182, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 602 (6th Cir. 2006).

An “adverse employment action” for purposes of proving unlawful discrimination must be materially adverse in that it is more than a “mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities,” and “must have an objective basis for demonstrating that the change is adverse, rather than the mere subjective impressions of the plaintiff.” Meyer v. City of Center Line, 242 Mich.App. 560 , 619 N.W.2d 182, 188 (2002) (citing Wilcoxon v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.

And Michigan courts elaborate what constitutes an adverse employment action: it (1) must be “materially adverse in that it is more than mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities, and (2) must have an objective basis for demonstrating that the change is adverse, rather than the mere subjective impressions of the plaintiff.” Meyer v. City of Center Line, 242 Mich.App. 560 , 619 N.W.2d 182, 188 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).

Notably, Michigan courts have found federal precedent interpreting Title VII to be “highly persuasive.” See Meyer, 242 MichApp. at 569, 619 N.W.2d 182 ; see also Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1311-12 (6th Cir.1989) (stating that “Michigan courts clearly look to Title VII in resolving questions arising under EllioL-Larsen”).

ElliotL-Larsen “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under [ElliotL-Larsen], a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, (2) that this was known by the defendant, (3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Meyer v. City of Center Line, 242 Mich.App. 560 , 619 N.W.2d 182, 188 (Mich.App.Ct.2000…

Therefore, as with hostile environment sexual harassment, retaliatory harassment by a supervisor that occurs prior to any tangible employment decision must be severe or pervasive to be actionable.”); Meyer v. City of Centerline, 242 Mich.App. 560 , 619 N.W.2d 182, 189 (2000) (“Where the harassment is sufficiently severe, a supervisor’s failure to take action to respond can constitute a materially adverse change in the conditions of employment.”).

Line, 619 N.W.2d 182, 188-89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).

Line, 619 N.W.2d 182, 188-89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).

Meyer v City of Ctr Line, 242 Mich App 560, 571 ; 619 NW2d 182, 189 (2000). i. CHOJNOWSKI’S CLAIMS In dismissing Chojnowski’s claims, the trial court noted: In this case the plaintiff has asserted two counts; Count I is sex discrimination, which arguably includes gender discrimination and sexual harassment; and Count II intentional infliction or [sic] emotional distress.

A “supervisor’s decision not to take action to stop harassment” can be considered an “adverse employment action.” Meyer v Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 571 (2000).

Since state law discrimination claims parallel the Sixth Circuit’s Title VII jurisprudence, see Meyer v. City of Center Line, 242 Mich.App. 560, 569 , 619 N.W.2d 182, 188 (2000), the plaintiffs sex discrimination claim should be analyzed under White’s, new test.

See Meyer, 242 Mich.App. at 569-71 , 619 N.W.2d 182 .

See also Meyer v. City of Center Line, 242 Mich.App. 560, 575-576 , 619 N.W.2d 182 (2000) (recognizing that the trial court may award reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2802, and that the decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion), Featherston v. Steinhoff, 226 Mich.App. 584, 592-593 , 575 N.W.2d 6 (1997) (recognizing that a trial court may award reasonable attorney fees pursuant to MCR 3.206(C)(2) for the defense of a custody action and …

See Meyer v Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 569 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000) (recognizing that an adverse employment action must be materially adverse and must have an objective basis for demonstrating that the change is adverse, “rather than the mere subjective impressions of the plaintiff.”) Plaintiff also claims that Franke’s failure to put a stop to Vajda’s adverse treatment after she was informed of Vajda’s alleged conduct was, itself, an adverse employment action.

See Meyer v Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 575 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000); MCR 2.116(G)(4).

Amini v. Rite Aid Corp., 819 F. App’x 344 , 350 (6th Cir. 2020) (addressing a retaliatory harassment claim under the ELCRA); see Meyer v. City of Center Line, 619 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Mich. App. 2000) (retaliatory harassment can constitute an adverse action).

See Meyer, 242 Mich App at 575 .

See Meyer, 242 Mich App at 572 .

See also Meyer, 242 Mich App at 575 (concluding that the trial court erred when it granted an improperly supported motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)).

See also Meyer v Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 575 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000) (concluding that the trial court erred when it granted an improperly supported motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)). -1- In my view, the trial court should have denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition because it was not properly supported.

See Meyer v City of Centerline, 242 Mich App 560, 571 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000) and Jackson v Quanex Corp., 191 F3d 647, 665 (CA 6, 1999).

See Meyer v City of Centerline, 242 Mich App 560, 571 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000) and Jackson v Quanex Corp., 191 F3d 647, 665 (CA 6, 1999).

MCR 2.116(G)(4); see also Meyer v City of Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 575 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000) (concluding that the trial court erred when it granted an improperly supported motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116[C][10]). [Barnard Mfg Co v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369-370 ; 775 NW2d 618 (2009).] “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.

MCR 2.116(G)(4); see also Meyer v City of Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 575 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000) (concluding that the trial court erred when it granted an improperly supported motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116[C][10]). [Barnard Mfg Co v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369-370 ; 775 NW2d 618 (2009).] “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.

See id.; see also Meyer v City of Ctr Line, 242 Mich App 560, 575 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000) (finding summary disposition improperly granted where the moving party failed to support is position).

MCR 2.116(G)(4); see also Meyer v Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 575 ; 619 NW2d 182 (2000) (concluding that the trial court erred when it granted an improperly supported motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116[C][10]).