Kennedy v. Mossafa (2003)

Compare, e. g., Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F. 3d 231, 236 (CA2 2004) (“In light of the notice’s return, the County was required to use ‘reasonably diligent efforts’ to ascertain Akey’s correct address”), and Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N. Y. 2d 1, 9, 789 N. E. 2d 607, 611 (2003) (“[W]e reject the view that the enforcing officer’s obligation is always satisfied by sending the notice to the address listed in the tax roll, even where the notice is returned as undeliverable”), with…

Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 2706 ; see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 , 70 S.Ct. 652 (due process requires "due diligence" in ascertaining whereabouts of party); Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1, 9 , 759 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 , 789 N.E.2d 607 (2003) ("when the notice is returned as undeliverable, the tax district should conduct a reasonable search of the public record"); N.Y.

Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 2706 ; see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 , 70 S.Ct. 652 (due process requires “due diligence” in ascertaining whereabouts of party); Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1, 9 , 759 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 , 789 N.E.2d 607 (2003) (“when the notice is returned as undeliverable, the tax district should conduct a reasonable search of the public record”); N.Y.

Generally; when the notice is returned as undeliverable, the tax district should conduct a reasonable search of the public record.” Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1 , 759 N.Y.S.2d 429 , 789 N.E.2d 607, 611 (2003).

Generally, when the notice is returned as undeliverable, the tax district should conduct a reasonable search of the public record." Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1 , 759 N.Y.S.2d 429 , 789 N.E.2d 607, 611 (2003). 27 Indeed, the courts so holding are legion.

Here, unlike mail returned as “undeliverable” (see Kennedy v Mossafa, supra at 9), when the mail was returned to petitioner as “unclaimed,” which did not connote an invalid address, petitioner could have reasonably believed that respondent was attempting to avoid notice by ignoring the certified mailings (see Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, supra at 141).

"Under both the federal and state constitutions, the State may not deprive a person of property without due process of law" ( Matter of Harner v County of Tioga , 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]; see US Const 14th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; Kennedy v Mossafa , 100 NY2d 1, 8-9 [2003]).

Pursuant to both the federal and state constitutions, a person may not be deprived of property without due process of law (see US Const 14th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]).

Nor has plaintiff advanced any claims separate from its statutory argument that the County failed to satisfy its obligations under the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process requiring that plaintiff be provided with “‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise’” it of the foreclosure action (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003], quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]), distinguishing this c…

“Under both the federal and state constitutions, the State may not deprive a person of property without due process of law” (Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]; see US Const 14th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8-9 [2003]). “ ‘Due process does *1612 not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his [or her] property’ ” (Matter of City of Rochester [Duvall], 92 AD3d 1297, 1298 [2012],…

Defendants were required to serve notice by certified and ordinary first class mail upon the owner whose interest was a matter of public record on the date the list of delinquent taxes was filed pursuant to RPTL 1122 (see RPTL 1125 [1]; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003]; Matter of County of Schuyler [Solomon Fin.

Defendants were required to serve notice by certified and ordinary first class mail upon the owner whose interest was a matter of public record on the date the list of delinquent taxes was filed pursuant to RPTL 1122 (see RPTL 1125 [1]; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003]; Matter of County of Schuyler [Solomon Fin.

Respondent argues that petitioner’s efforts at providing notice of the foreclosure were inadequate to meet the requirements of due process. “[D]ue process requires the government to provide ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections’ ” (Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220, 226 [2006], quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 3…

Accordingly, considering the “unique information about [the] intended recipient[s]” (547 US at —, 126 S Ct at 1716 ) which can be gleaned from the history of this matter, and taking “into account the status and conduct of the owner in determining whether notice was reasonable” (Kennedy v Mossafa, supra at 11), the defendants could reasonably draw the strong inference that the intended recipients simply were “attempting to avoid notice by ignoring the certified mailings” (Mat…

Bank of Delhi] , 77 AD3d 1146, 1147 [3d Dept 2010]; citing Kennedy v. Mossafa , 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]).

Inasmuch as tax proceedings are entitled to a presumption of regularity, respondent had "the burden of affirmatively establishing a jurisdictional defect or invalidity in . . . the foreclosure proceedings" ( Kennedy v Mossafa , 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003]; see RPTL 1134; Lakeside Realty LLC v County of Sullivan , 140 AD3d 1450, 1452 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 905 [2016]).

At minimum, the issue of the adequacy of the notices of tax lien sale sent by Nassau County, as framed by the parties themselves, raises an important question as to whether the failure to notify UCB of the impending tax lien sale (whether as a result of error, as East West claims, or because NCAC § 5-37.0 [a] required no such notification, as L & L contends), violated minimum due process requirements with respect to the legally protected property interests of a mortgagee (se…

Realty Corp. v American Tax Fund, Foothill, 41 AD3d 771, 774 [2007]; Temple Bnai Shalom of Great Neck v Village of Great Neck Estates, 32 AD3d 391 [2006]). “[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied where ‘notice [is] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections’ ” (Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005], quoting Mullane v Ce…

The debtor has “the burden of affirmatively establishing a jurisdictional defect or invalidity in . . . the foreclosure proceedings” because such proceedings are cloaked with a presumption of regularity (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]; see RPTL 1134; Matter of County of Sullivan [Matejkowski], 105 AD3d 1170 , 1171 [2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1062 [2013]).

It must also be noted that, while the question before the court appears to be one of first impression, of those cases that have dealt with RPTL 1166 in the past, all seem to suggest that a tax district is free to adopt a policy whereby sales made at public auction are not effective until approved by the governing body (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]; Matter of Johnstone v Treasurer of Wayne County, 118 AD3d 1378 [2014]; Matter of Belardo v City of Schenectady, 2…

“Where the names and addresses of interested parties are known, due process requires ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise’ that party of the foreclosure action, so that party may have an opportunity to appear and be heard” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003], quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]).

“Where the names and addresses of interested parties are known, due process requires ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise’ that party of the foreclosure action, so that party may have an opportunity to appear and be heard” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003], quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]).

Finally, we note that “[o]wnership carries responsibilities” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 11 [2003]), which includes an obligation to apprise the tax enforcing officer of a change in address (see RPTL 1125 [1] [d]; Matter of County of Herkimer [Moore], 104 AD3d at 1334; Matter of County of Sullivan [Spring Lake Retreat Ctr., Inc.], 39 AD3d at 1096 ).

Finally, we note that “[o]wnership carries responsibilities” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 11 [2003]), which includes an obligation to apprise the tax enforcing officer of a change in address (see RPTL 1125 [1] [d]; Matter of County of Herkimer [Moore], 104 AD3d at 1334; Matter of County of Sullivan [Spring Lake Retreat Ctr., Inc.], 39 AD3d at 1096 ).

Tax foreclosure proceedings enjoy a presumption of regularity, such that “[t]he tax debtor has the burden of affirmatively establishing a jurisdictional defect or invalidity in [such] proceedings” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]; see Lin v County of Sullivan, 100 AD3d 1076, 1077 [2012]).

Tax foreclosure proceedings enjoy a presumption of regularity, such that “[t]he tax debtor has the burden of affirmatively establishing a jurisdictional defect or invalidity in [such] proceedings” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]; see Lin v County of Sullivan, 100 AD3d 1076, 1077 [2012]).

Bank of Delhi], 77 AD3d 1146, 1147 [2010] [citations omitted]; see RPTL 1134; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]).

Bank of Delhi], 77 AD3d 1146, 1147 [2010] [citations omitted]; see RPTL 1134; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]).

It has been well established that “[b]oth the Federal and State Constitutions provide that the State may not deprive a person of property without due process of law” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8-9 [2003]; see also US Const 14th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6).

In tax lien foreclosure proceedings, notice must be provided to the property owner that is “ ‘reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise’ [the owner] of the foreclosure action, so that the party may have an opportunity to appear and be heard” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003], quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]; see Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220, 226 [2006]; Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2…

Preliminarily, we note that foreclosure proceedings commenced pursuant to RPTL article 11 enjoy a presumption that unpaid tax liens are valid (see RPTL 1134; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]; Matter of Village of Fleischmanns [Delaware Natl.

L&L established, prima facie, that it satisfied the notice requirements of Nassau County Administrative Code (hereinafter the NCAC) § 5-51.0 and the due process rights of the plaintiff by furnishing constitutionally adequate notice of her right to redeem the property (see Matter of Hamer v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140-141 [2005]; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9-11 [2003]; Temple Bnai Shalom of Great Neck v Village of Great Neck Estates, 32 AD3d 391, 392-393 [2006]), and…

“Ownership carries responsibilities” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 11 [2003]), and respondent was responsible for protecting his ownership interests and chargeable with notice that failure to pay his taxes could result in foreclosure (see id.; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d at 84 ).

Where, as here, petitioner fully complied with the notice requirements of RPTL article 11 and there is no evidence that a search of the public record would have yielded any further information, due process does not require petitioner to go to lengths beyond the inquiry, publication and posting measures taken here (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 10 [2003]; Matter of County of Broome, 50 AD3d 1300, 1301-1302 [2008]; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d at 83 ; s…

In an RPTL article 11 foreclosure proceeding, an unpaid tax lien is presumptively valid, and the respondent bears the burden of establishing any affirmative defense, procedural defect or invalidity of the lien (see RPTL 1134; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]; Matter of County of Orange [Al Turi Landfill, Inc.], 75 AD3d 224, 236 [2010]).

Overview of Real Property Tax Collection Under the statutory scheme for the collection of real property taxes, “[t]owns and counties work hand in hand in maintaining tax records” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 6 [2003]).

While it is true that “[a] reasonable search of the public record . . . does not necessarily require searching the Internet, voting records, motor vehicle records, the telephone book or other sim ilar resource” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 10 [2003]), the appellant did not show that there were no reasonable steps that could have been taken to ascertain the respondents’ correct address.

An address on a check alone does not suffice as notice that it is the address to which notices should be sent (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 10 [2003]).

Although due process does not require actual notice before the government may extinguish a person’s property interest, “due process requires the government to provide ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” (Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220, 226 [2006], quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]; accord Matt…

The conduct of a party, while relevant, “does not excuse the enforcing officer from providing notice to those whose contact information is readily ascertainable” (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 11 [2003]).

Moreover, the City satisfied due process by affording the appellant notice that was reasonably calculated to apprise him of the existence of the foreclosure action (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003]).

June 30, 2005) 14 (quoting Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1 , 759 N.Y.S.2d 429 , 789 N.E.2d 607, 608 (2003)).

Review of the record reveals several factual issues, including whether the efforts at providing the underlying relevant notices to respondent complied with due process (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8-11 [2003]; see also Akey v Clinton County, N.Y., 375 F3d 231, 236 [2004]).

In a tax foreclosure proceeding, due process requires that a reasonable search of the public records be made where a notice of foreclosure sent by ordinary mail was returned as “not deliverable as addressed unable to forward” (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 5 [2003]). * Contrary to respondent’s argument, for due process purposes we discern no difference between certified mail that is “undeliverable” and certified mail that is “unclaimed” (see Prisco v County of Greene, 2…

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, adherence to the notice provisions of this statute is a prerequisite to maintaining an in rem foreclosure proceeding pursuant thereto (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 7-8 [2003]; see generally McCann v Scaduto, 71 NY2d 164, 176 [1987]; Matter of City of Troy v Garner, 257 AD2d 711, 712 [1999]).

The charges against him in the preliminary notice, coupled with the information provided in the final default notice, were reasonably calculated to apprise petitioner of the proceeding and his opportunity to be heard (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003]).

Further, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the notice sent jointly to plaintiff and her husband at the subject property was “ ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise’ [plaintiff] of the foreclosure action,” and thus satisfied the requirements of due process (Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003], quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]; cf. Masick v City of Schenectady, 164 AD2d 488, 490-491 [1…

By submitting the affidavits of service of Bedell stating that he mailed the notice of redemption to plaintiff at two addresses, defendants established that the notice of redemption was sent to plaintiff in compliance with defendants’ due process obligations (see generally Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]; Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens, 278 AD2d 814, 815 [2000]). “[Plaintiff’s denial of receipt of the notice, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumpti…

See Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1, 8 (2003) (explaining that, under Article 11, “the court enters a judgment directing that title pass in fee simple absolute to the county”).

Once vested with title to the subject property, the County would be "authorized to sell and convey the real property so acquired, which shall include any and all gas, oil or mineral rights associated with such real property, either with or without advertising for bids" (RPTL 1166[1]; see Kennedy v Mossafa , 100 NY2d at 8 ).