Oken v. State (2003)

Whether, in light of Ring v. Arizona, this Court should overrule Borehardt v. State [, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001),] and hold that the Maryland death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face because it provides that a sentence of death may be imposed if the State proves only that the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.” Oken IV, 378 Md. at 185 , 835 A.2d at 1108 (alteration added).

We acknowledged in Baker that, in Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 184-86 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1108, 1157-58 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 , 124 S.Ct. 2084 , 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004), and in Evans v. State, supra, 382 Md. at 279 , 855 A.2d at 309 , we had recognized a limited exception to that general principle and had entertained a motion under Rule 4-345(a) where "in a capital sentencing proceeding, an alleged error of constitutional dimension may have contributed to the death …

"We have consistently found no due process violation in the provision directing that the weighing process be based on a preponderance of the evidence." Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 253 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1148 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 , 124 S.Ct. 2084 , 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004) (quoting Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 121 , 786 A.2d 631, 648-49 (2001)).

United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir.2007) ("As other courts have recognized, the requisite weighing constitutes a process, not a fact to be found."); United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 750 (8th Cir.2005) (characterizing the weighing process as "the lens through which the jury must focus the facts that it has found" to reach its individualized determination); Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 818 (11th Cir.1983) ("While the existence of an aggravating or mi…

As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi's requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. "[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility …

As the Supreme Court held in Booker, Apprendi’s requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a discretionary sentencing judgment between two statutory penalties that are available on the basis of an existing jury verdict, which in this case includes the verdict of guilt on the crime of first degree murder and the determination that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he federal constitution requires that eligibility …

In Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 184-85 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1108 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 , 124 S.Ct. 2084 , 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004), Oken raised *135 a constitutional challenge to the Maryland death penalty statute in a Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Perhaps the best explanation for this approach is articulated by the dissenting judge in a Maryland case, Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1163-65 (Md. 2003) (Raker, J., dissenting).

Subsequently, in Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 462-63 , 886 A.2d 562, 565 (2005), the Court confirmed its Baker decision, holding that "a statistical analysis conducted by Raymond Paternoster, a Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, which Evans claims establishes a pattern of racial and geographic discrimination in the implementation of the death penalty in Maryland," is not "an appropriate vehicle to raise this issue." Like Baker, howev…

Evans, 382 Md. at 278-79 , 855 A.2d at 309 ; see Baker v. State, 389 Md. 127, 133-137 , 883 A.2d 916, 919-922 (2005) (recognizing in a capital sentencing that an error premised on a novel constitutional question decided after imposition of a capital sentence may be raised in a motion to correct an illegal sentence); Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 184-85 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1108 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 , 124 S.Ct. 2084 , 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004) (alleging a constitutional…

See, e.g., Ex parte Hodges, 856 So.2d 936, 944 (Ala.2003); People v. Prieto, 30 Cal.4th 226 , 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18 , 66 P.3d 1123, 1147 (2003); People v. Davis, 205 Ill.2d 349 , 275 Ill.Dec. 781 , 793 N.E.2d 552, 565-66 (2002); Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind.2004); Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1147 (2003); State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598 , 658 N.W.2d 604, 626-27 (2003); State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845, 864-65 (Tenn.2004). . 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(1). . 42…

Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 264-68 , 2004 WL 1153062 (Ind.2004); See also Ex Parte Waldrop v. Alabama, 859 So.2d 1181, 1189 (Ala.2002); People v. Prieto, 30 Cal.4th 226 , 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18 , 66 P.3d 1123, 1147 (2003); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 322 (Del.2003); Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1120 (2003); Nebraska v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598 , 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003).

Md. 2010) ("Whether the aggravating factors presented by the prosecution outweigh the mitigating factors presented by the defense is a normative question rather than a factual one."); State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 534 (N.M.2005) ("[T]he weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is thus not a 'fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximums."); Commonwealth v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351, 360 (Pa. 2005) (finding Apprendi does not apply to…

Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1122 (Md. 2003).

Oken, 378 Md. at 194-95 , 835 A.2d at 1114 (alterations added).

Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1147 (2003).

See Oken, 378 Md. at 254 , 835 A.2d at 1148-49 .

See Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105 (2003); Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001); Parker v. State, 185 Md.App. 399 , 970 A.2d 968 (2009); Jones v. State, 138 Md.App. 12 , 769 A.2d 1015 (2001).