People v. DePriest (2007)

(See People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 430 .) The “speedy trial guarantee under the state Constitution is triggered by the filing of a felony complaint. . . . [S]uch a violation may be premised ‘on delay occurring after the filing of the complaint and before the defendant was held to answer the charge in superior court.’” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 27 (DePriest), italics omitted; see People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 895 (Horning)). 4 Where, as here…

“Under federal and state law, a prospective juror may be excluded for cause where his views on capital punishment would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ’ ” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 20 (DePriest); see also Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 420, 424 (Witt).) Such a standard “does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ” (Witt, sup…

No sua sponte instruction against such double-counting is required.” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 59 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ].) “[T]he death penalty statute is not unconstitutional because it does not require ‘unanimity as to the truth of aggravating circumstances, or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance (other than § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigat…

Law enforcement must preserve evidence "that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense." (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 488 .) However, that duty applies "only if 7 [the evidence] possesses exculpatory value 'apparent before [it] was destroyed,' and not obtainable 'by other reasonably available means.' " (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 41 (DePriest).) The state's responsibility is further limited when the defendant challenges the failu…

(See Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [―the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts‖]; People v. DePriest, supra, at p. 21 [―The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthand—factors of ‗critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.‘ ‖].) We reject Sandoval‘s argument that the trial court erroneously ―appli…

However, “[a] criminal defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment does not exist until the state initiates adversary judicial criminal proceedings, such as by formal charge or indictment.” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 33 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ] (DePriest); see Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 987 ; see also People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 244-245 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 , 131 P.3d 995 ].) Moreover, the “right to coun…

Governing law and standard of review The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state law enforcement agencies to preserve evidence “that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488 [ 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 ] (Trombetta); People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 964 (Zapien).) “‘To fall within the scope of this duty, the evidence “must both possess an exculpatory value that …

(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 (DePriest).) Because this is a sua sponte obligation, a defendant may raise it for the first time on appeal.

(Ibid.) Section 1054.1, subdivision (f) requires the prosecutor to disclose to the defense “[r]elevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including the results of … scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at trial.” Disclosure must be made …

(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 48 [attempted rape is “the specific intent to commit rape, and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission”]; see People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 387 [a defendant who pointed a gun at a victim and threatened rape committed a direct but ineffectual act of attempted rape].) Further, both crimes— kidnapping to commit rape and attempted forcible rape—include the element of force or fear. (§§ 209, subd. (b)(1), 261,…

This duty extends to necessarily included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all the elements of the charged offense are present. . . . [¶] Nevertheless, ‘the existence of “any evidence, no matter how weak” will not justify instructions on a lesser 26 included offense. . . .’ [Citation.] Such instructions are required only where there is ‘substantial evidence’ from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense, a…

This duty extends to necessarily included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all the elements of the charged offense are present. . . . [¶] Nevertheless, ‘the existence of “any evidence, no matter how weak” will not justify instructions on a lesser 26 included offense. . . .’ [Citation.] Such instructions are required only where there is ‘substantial evidence’ from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense, a…

Governing Law on Criminal Discovery Under the criminal discovery statutes (§ 1054 et seq.), the prosecutor “must disclose to the defense relevant written, recorded, or reported statements ‘of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case,’ as well as ‘the results of . . . scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial.’ …

(See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 862 [“To strike down an act of the Legislature as irrational based on a set of untested empirical findings would be antithetical to multiple settled principles of judicial review.”]; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 58 [The concept of “life in prison with no possibility of parole is clear. [Citation.] We are not persuaded by empirical claims made outside the appellate record and untested at trial suggesting the contrary is true.”].…

Rather, defendant contended “defendant’s speedy trial rights under the State Constitution were triggered on February 15, 2006, [sic] the date when the District Attorney’s Office filed this complaint.” (Italics added.) However, defendant relied heavily on Stabio v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1488 , which exposited several federal cases in concluding that, pursuant to a Sixth Amendment analysis, prejudice could be presumed in certain [footnote continued on next page]…

(See Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 644 [statements are voluntary where “neither the length nor physical circumstances of the interrogation appear to have been coercive”]; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 35 [rejecting 24 claim of involuntariness where defendant “was not worn down by a lengthy interrogation or deprived of human comforts or necessities”].) Moreover, as discussed more fully above, Manzo Gil—a 27-year old adult suspect with significant prior experie…

Substantial Evidence Courts are obligated to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses “where there is ‘substantial evidence’ from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense, and that he is not guilty of the greater offense.” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 (DePriest).) We independently review a trial court’s decision not to instruct on the lesser included offense.

DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 43 [evidence another person “had some ‘remote’ connection to the victim or crime scene[] is not sufficient to raise the requisite reasonable doubt”].) And, contrary to defendant’s contention, evidence of motive was not required to establish intent to kill.

(See, e.g., People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513 , 573–574; People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 598 [evidence that third party visited victim’s home on same day as alleged actual killer did not show anything more than opportunity]; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 43 [evidence that another person “had some ‘remote’ connection to the victim or crime scene[] is not sufficient to raise the requisite reasonable doubt”]; People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4t…

(See People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 35 [rejecting a claim of involuntariness where the defendant “was not worn down by a lengthy interrogation or deprived of human comforts or necessities”].) The test for voluntariness includes consideration of the defendant’s traits, but defendant was a 26-year-old adult.

(See People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 35 [upholding trial court’s voluntariness decision where “interview lasted only 45 minutes as opposed to several hours” in jail interview room].) Consideration of Solorzano’s traits does not aid his claim of involuntariness either; although some support his claim, others undermine it.

(See People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 35 [rejecting a claim of involuntariness where the defendant “was not worn down by a lengthy interrogation or deprived of human comforts or necessities”].) The test for voluntariness includes consideration of the defendant’s traits, but defendant was a 26-year-old adult.

Such misconduct might be serious enough to call into question the validity of the judgment, yet fail to meet 7 See, e.g., In re Bacigalupo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 312 , 315–317 (ordering relief from judgment of death based on claim in second state habeas corpus petition that prosecution suppressed evidence that petitioner had committed his crime under duress, which would have supported petitioner’s penalty phase case in mitigation). 20 In re FRIEND Opinion of the Court by Kruger, …

(Rodriguez, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 199.) “Involuntariness means the defendant’s free will was overborne.” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 34 (DePriest).) “‘A confession may be found involuntary if extracted by threats or violence, obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper influence.’ [Citation.] However, ‘no single factor is dispositive in determining voluntariness . . . rather[,] courts consider the totality of circumstance…

In assessing an offer of proof relating to such evidence, the court must decide whether the evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt and whether it is substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325 .) These principles do “not . . . require the indiscriminate admission of any evidence offered to prove third-party culpability.” (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 10…

Guiding Principles and Analysis “Law enforcement agencies must preserve evidence only if it possesses exculpatory value ‘apparent before [it] was destroyed,’ and not obtainable ‘by other reasonably available means.’ [Citations.] The state’s responsibility is further limited when the defendant challenges the failure to preserve evidence ‘of which no more can be said then that it could have been subjected to tests’ that might have helped the defense. [Citation.] In such a case…

Guiding Principles and Analysis “Law enforcement agencies must preserve evidence only if it possesses exculpatory value ‘apparent before [it] was destroyed,’ and not obtainable ‘by other reasonably available means.’ [Citations.] The state’s responsibility is further limited when the defendant challenges the failure to preserve evidence ‘of which no more can be said then that it could have been subjected to tests’ that might have helped the defense. [Citation.] In such a case…

(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 48 [forcible rape]; People v. Warner (2006) 39 Cal.4th 548, 557 [rape, sodomy, oral copulation]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 341 [sodomy]; People v. Fox (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 394, 398 [oral copulation with a child under age 14].) Presenting more mental state evidence would not have affected those verdicts.

Jury Instructions A trial court is required to “instruct” the jury “‘on general legal principles closely related to the case.’” (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1263 (Williams), quoting People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 (DePriest).) Because this requirement lies with the court, a litigant may object to instructions that misstate the general legal principles for the first time on appeal. (§ 1259.) However, a litigant’s failure to request or otherwise objec…

(See People v. DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 50 [lesser included instructions required “only where there is ‘substantial evidence’ from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense, and that he [or she] is not guilty of the greater offense”].) Here, there is no question as to whether theft is a lesser included offense to robbery.

(See Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [―the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts‖]; People v. DePriest, supra, at p. 21 [―The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthand—factors of ‗critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.‘ ‖].) We reject Sandoval‘s argument that the trial court erroneously ―appli…

This duty extends to necessarily included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all the elements of the charged offense are present. . . . [¶] Nevertheless, ‘the existence of “any evidence, no matter how weak” will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense . . . .’ [Citation.] Such instructions are required only where there is ‘substantial evidence’ from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense, and…

(People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 779; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1114.) We have recognized that “[t]he trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthand — factors of ‘critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.’ [Citation.]” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 21 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ].) However, this deference is not appropriate when the trial c…

(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ].) In contending there was substantial evidence to warrant the instruction, Brothers relies on her testimony that she did not know “this was going to happen.” Brothers did not explain what she meant by that offhanded remark in her testimony; and, assuming Brothers meant she did not intend to kill Gates, intent to kill is an element of express, not implied, malice.

At the same time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party's possible culpability. . . . [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime." ( Hall, supra, at p. 833 .) In People v. DePriest (2007) 4…

(See People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 44-45 [defendant not only possessed murder weapon, but also had motive and opportunity and upon arrest was in possession of property stolen from murder victim]; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 361-362 [conviction supported not only by ballistics evidence showing same gun was used in two crimes, but also by multiple eyewitness identifications, evidence regarding distinctive jacket worn by both gunman and defendant, shoep…

Discussion Defendant contends all of his statements made during the questioning should have been excluded at trial because they were violative of Miranda, and also were involuntary. 5 The applicable law is settled: “ ‘As a prophylactic safeguard to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court, in Miranda, required law enforcement agencies to advise a suspect, before any custodial law enforcement questioning, that “…

(People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1085 .) “A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” (§ 242.) Appellant is correct that battery is a lesser included offense of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse. (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1457 (Hamlin).) 5 “The trial court must instruct sua sponte on ‘lesser included offenses if the evidence ‘raises a question as to whether all of th…

(People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 715 ; People v. DePriest (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1, 38-39 [court did not err in failing to grant a continuance to conduct an additional investigation of evidence where appellant had an opportunity to investigate and defend against the evidence during the trial].) Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude the court did not err in denying appellant’s motion.

(Trombetta, at p. 489; Alexander , at p. 878.) If, however, “no more can be said [of the evidence] than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant” (Youngblood, at p. 57, italics added), the proscriptions of the federal Constitution are narrower; “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law”…

(People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 715 ; People v. DePriest (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1, 38-39 [court did not err in failing to grant a continuance to conduct an additional investigation of evidence where appellant had an opportunity to investigate and defend against the evidence during the trial].) Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude the court did not err in denying appellant’s motion.

(People v DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 34-36 [statements voluntary although the police failed to read the defendant his Miranda rights and continued interrogation after defendant asserted rights]; People v Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774 ; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1 , 57- 60 [statements voluntary even where police ignored nine requests for an attorney and promised the defendant better jail conditions].) None of Dinh‘s arguments undermine our conclusion…

“Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.” (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9 .) “Hence, the trial judge may be left with the ‘definite impression’ that the person cannot impartially apply the law even though, as is often true, [she] has not expressed [her] views w…

Evidence that another person had ‘motive or opportunity’ to commit the charged crime, or had some ‘remote’ connection to the victim or crime scene, is not sufficient to raise the requisite reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Under Hall and its progeny, third party culpability evidence is relevant and admissible only if it succeeds in ‘linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.’” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 43 (DePriest).) Courts “should simply t…

(See People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 48 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ] [“Forcible rape is a general intent crime involving an act of sexual intercourse accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force or fear.”].) However, we must read this subdivision together with subdivision (k)(l) of section 289, which defines the act of sexual penetration to be “the act of *1540 causing the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of any person …

He contends the error violated state law and deprived him of his rights to a fair jury trial, to due process of law, and to reliable guilt and penalty determinations under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution, requiring that we vacate the guilt, special circumstances and penalty determinations. “ ‘The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law …

(E.g., People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 26 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ] [“ ‘arrest with continuing restraint’ ”]; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 891 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305 , 102 P.3d 228 ] [“actual restraint”]; Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th 750, 761-763, 765 [“Under the federal Constitution, as we have seen, the speedy trial right does not attach upon the filing of a felony complaint, but only upon either arrest with continuing restraint or the filing o…

(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 20-21 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ]; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 14, 16 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 , 117 P.3d 591 ].) 3 *791 a.

(People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1176 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 652 , 209 P.3d 977 ]; Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 370; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 59-60 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ] .) 26 Defendant seeks to distinguish this case on the grounds that (1) an alternate juror was seated during the penalty phase and (2) the court gave CALJIC No. 17.51.1, which provides in pertinent part that “the alternate juror must *768 accept as having been proved beyo…

At bottom, capital jurors must be willing and able to follow the law, weigh the sentencing factors, and choose the appropriate penalty in the particular case. [Citations.]” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 20 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 , 163 P.3d 896 ] (DePriest).) “ ‘ “Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court must determine whether the prospective juror will …