Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles (1977)

Forrester v. White, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544 , 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); see Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (citing long-established immunity of judges at common law); Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1231-32 (Ariz.1977) (en banc) (outlining reasons for judicial immunity). 4 The claims against Ticor Title Insurance Company of California and two of its attorneys were properly dismissed on the basis of lack o…

Forrester v. White, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544 , 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); see Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (citing long-established immunity of judges at common law); Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1231-32 (Ariz.1977) (en banc) (outlining reasons for judicial immunity).

See id. at 265 , 564 P.2d at 1232 ("The board members should not bear liability for taking the risk allocated to them as a statutory duty.").

See id. at 265 , 564 P.2d at 1232 (“The board members should not bear liability for taking the risk allocated to them as a statutory duty.”).

The standard of care owed, however, is that of avoiding grossly negligent or reckless release of a highly dangerous prisoner." Id., 115 Ariz. at 267 , 564 P.2d at 1234 (emphasis added).

E.g., Green Acres, 141 Ariz. at 613 , 688 P.2d at 621 (absolute immunity from defamation action for statements made in connection with judicial proceedings); Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 503 , 627 P.2d 232, 234 (1981) (qualified immunity for police officer accused of defamation); Grimm, 115 Ariz. at 265 , 564 P.2d at 1232 (qualified immunity for board of pardons and paroles); see also A.R.S. § 41-621(G) (relieving state employees of personal liability for acts with…

Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 264 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1231 (1977).

Lavit, 839 P.2d at 1144 (citing Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1231-31 (1977)); see also Seibel, 631 P.2d at 178 (noting “the unfairness of requiring an opinion and the exercise of judgment to which is given special deference and then subjecting that person to liability based on the opinion of another”).

See also Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 311 , 656 P.2d 597, 600 (1982); Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 503 , 627 P.2d 232, 234 (1981); Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1977). 4 .

The predecessor of our present statute,was jurisdictional, as stated in the case cited by the majority, Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 263 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1977).

Our supreme court noted the distinction in dicta in Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 311 , 656 P.2d at 600 , and in Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1977); and this court applied the distinction dispositively in Evenstad v. State, 178 Ariz. 578, 582-83 , 875 P.2d 811, 815-16 (App.1993).

The Arizona Supreme Court, in a case involving the Arizona Parole Board, adopted this rule: "We believe that a limited immunity for members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles with liability only for the grossly negligent or reckless release of a highly dangerous prisoner strikes the proper balance between the competing interests." Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234-35 (1977).

By that, it is a strange and paranoid lemming like march, universally criticized by academic review which was accurately described thirty-one years ago to be justified by “arguments [which] offer a wry blend of fairy tale and horror story.” Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 Cal.L.Rev. 303, 339 (1959). 2 “This development has occurred in the context of logical inconsistencies and often with only cursory reasoning.” Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz…

Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977). 5 The inmates have not claimed that any of the procedures provided for by the parole statutes have been violated.

Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977).

See id.; Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265 (1977). ¶9 Here, there is no direct connection between the defendants and the superior court.

“There is perhaps no doctrine more firmly established than the principle that liability follows tortious wrongdoing; that where negligence is the proximate cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the exception.” Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, 93 Ariz. 384, 392 , 381 P.2d 107 (1963). “[Ijmmunity deprives individuals of a remedy for wrongdoing and should be bestowed only when and at the level necessary.” Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, …

Additional reasons for allowing absolute judicial immunity include: “(1) the need to save judicial time in defending suits; (2) the need for finality in the resolution of disputes; (3) to prevent deterring competent persons from taking office; (4) to prevent the threat of lawsuit from discouraging independent action; and (5) the existence of adequate procedural safeguards such as change of venue and appellate review.” Lavit, 839 P.2d at 1144 (citing Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of P…

Explaining the distinction between judicial and administrative functions, this court, in Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1977), stated that “policy reasons for official [administrative] immunity are much weaker than for judicial immunity.” Moreover, legislative immunity is supported by similar public policy equally as compelling as that supporting judicial immunity.

Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 581-82 , 684 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984); Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977).

Our Supreme Court has specifically noted in Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977), that, “[i]t is black letter tort law that while inaction is not normally a basis for liability, negligent performance of a duty voluntarily undertaken may be a basis for liability.” Second, we note that in the' Chernov decision, there was a specific showing of reliance on the traffic control device by the pedestrian.

C., 538 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 827 , 97 S.Ct. 83 , 50 L.Ed.2d 90 (1976) (defendant’s duty depends on foreseeability of harm to public including plaintiff); Williams v. United States, 450 F.Supp. 1040, 1045 (D.S.D.1978) (hospital liable for negligent release of mental patient to all those harmed); Grim v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977) (parole board liable for negligent release of inmate to ind…

See Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977) (Board members have duty to public to avoid grossly negligent release of highly dangerous prisoners); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 319 (1965).

See In the Interest of J.R., 436 Pa.Super. 416 , 648 A.2d 28, 36-37 (1994). [24] 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977). [25] Id. at 1232 (quoting ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 31-412 (1977) (amended 1978)). [26] Id. [27] Id. [28] See 7 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 52.210 (2002) (providing that review board must consider several factors "[i]n determining whether a resident should be released, whether the resident's commitment should be allowed to elapse, or whether a recommendati…

See Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 (1977); Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); Nova Univ., Inc. v. Wagner, 491 So.2d 1116 (Fla.1986); Bradley Cntr., Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 , 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211 , 723 P.2d 755 (1986); Bailor v. Salvation Army, 51 F.3d 678 (7th Cir.1995) (Indiana law); C.J.W. v. State, 253 Kan. 1 , 853 P.2d 4 (1993); Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554 , 675 P.2d 57 (1984…

See, e.g., Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 263 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1977) (action against state could not proceed because plaintiff had not first filed claim against agency); see also Andress v. City of Chandler, 198 Ariz. 112 , 115 ¶ 15, 7 P.3d 121 , 124 ¶ 15 (App.2000) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiffs who failed to serve notice of tort claim within time limit set by A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A)). 1Í18 ADOR next argues that the tax refund st…

Mammo; see also Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 (1977).

See Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (Ariz.1977).

See also Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 (1977); Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554 , 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (both cases involving parolees with known dangerous propensities).

See also Grimm v. Arizona, Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1231-33 (1977); Medeiros v. Kondo, 55 Hawaii 499 , 522 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1974).

See, e.g., Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 (1977) and A.R.S. § 12-820.02 (a legislative response to Grim giving qualified immunity to public employees for dealings with prisoners absent intent to cause injury or gross negligence).

See, e.g., Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 (1977) and A.R.S. § 12-820.02 (a legislative response to Grim giving qualified immunity to public employees for dealings with prisoners absent intent to cause injury or gross negligence).

See Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 (1977); State v. Brooks, 23 Ariz.App. 463 , 534 P.2d 271 (1975).

See Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 (1977); Dassinger v. Oden, 124 Ariz. 551 , 606 P.2d 41 (App.1979); State v. Brooks, 23 Ariz.App. 463 , 534 P.2d 271 (1975).

See Parish v. Truman, supra. See also Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267 , 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977).

See Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 (1977); Arizona State Highway Dept. v. Bechtold, 105 Ariz. 125 , 460 P.2d 179 (1969); Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518 , 456 P.2d 376 (1969); Patterson v. City of Phoenix, 103 Ariz. 64 , 436 P.2d 613 (1968); Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195 , 427 P.2d 335 (1967); Besserman v. Town of Paradise Valley, Inc., 116 Ariz. 471 , 569 P.2d 1369 (App.1977); Ivicevic v. City of Glendale, 26 …

Decision of the Court whether his activities would deprive another person of their rights.” Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 558 ; see also Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 , 267–68 (1977) (immunity ceases “only for the grossly negligent or reckless” conduct); Garibay v. Johnson in and for Cnty. of Pima, 259 Ariz. 248 , 246, ¶ 38 (2025) (“A party is grossly negligent if they know, or have reason to know, facts that would lead a reasonable person to recognize t…

See Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267-68 (1977) (Parole board members can be liable “only for [their] grossly negligent or reckless” conduct and are immune “from suit for reasonable decisions.”). 2 Restatement § 895D also provides several factors to consider when determining whether an action is discretionary: (1) the nature and importance of the function performed, (2) how much the court passing judgment on the officer’s discretion requires it to i…

See also Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267 (1977). ¶9 Because duty in this context turns on whether Basami House knew or should have known Smith was likely to cause harm, Dellinger contends the superior court erred by deciding the issue as a matter of law.

The doctrine thus “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Donaldson, 185 Ariz. at 50 (quoting Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229 ). ¶10 If qualified immunity applies, a public official performing a discretionary act “within the scope of [her] public duties” may be liable only if she “knew or should have known that [s]he was acting in violation of established law or acted in reckless disregard of…

See Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267-68 (1977); Barkhurst v. Kingsmen of Route 66, Inc., 234 Ariz. 470, 472-73, ¶ 10 (App. 2014); Second Restatement §§ 315, 316, 317, 319.

See Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 1977), which held that the parole board could be liable to a member of the general public who was injured by a prisoner upon his release.