Cluster 302684 (1972)

See 401 U.S. at 723-724 , 91 S.Ct. 1041 ; 457 F.2d at 1355-1356. 15 We conclude that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

See 401 U.S. at 723-724 , 91 S.Ct. 1041 ; 457 F.2d at 1355-1356.

Id. at 1358 [emphasis added]. 47 .

In delaying the accrual of the taxpayer’s cause of action, the Fifth Circuit explained that the taxpayer had “no reasonable probability of successfully prosecuting his claim against the government prior to the enunciation of the new ... rule.” Id. at 1358.

In delaying the accrual of the taxpayer's cause of action, the Fifth Circuit explained that the taxpayer had "no reasonable probability of successfully prosecuting his claim against the government prior to the enunciation of the new ... rule." Id. at 1358.

Id. at 1357.

Id. at 1357.

Resp. 12 (alteration in original) (quoting Red Chevrolet, 457 F.2d at 1358); id. at 13 (citing Neely v. United States, 546 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir.1976)).

Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.25 (3d ed.1997) (footnote omitted); United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, Serial No. 11837A177369, 457 F.2d 1353, 1355 (5th Cir.1972) (“[T]he only relief that [can] be granted under Rule 60(b) [i]s the setting aside of the judgment.”); Adduono v. World Hockey Ass’n, 824 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir.1987) (“Rule 60(b) is available ... only to set aside a prior order or judgment. .

Id. at 1356 (stating that, once judgment was set aside under Rule 60(b)(4), new proceedings were required for moving party to obtain affirmative relief). 11 .

It cannot be used to impose additional affirmative relief.” United States v. One Hundred Nineteen Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Dollars, 680 F.2d 106, 107 (11th Cir.1982); see also Adduono v. World Hockey Ass’n, 824 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir.1987) (concluding that district court is limited to setting aside its order and cannot impose additional affirmative relief); United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372, 1377 (11th Cir.1981) (same); United States v. One 1…

It cannot be used to impose additional affirmative relief.” United States v. One Hundred Nineteen Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Dollars, 680 F.2d 106, 107 (11th Cir.1982); see also Adduono v. World Hockey Ass’n, 824 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir.1987) (concluding that district court is limited to setting aside its order and cannot impose additional affirmative relief); United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372, 1377 (11th Cir.1981) (same); United States v. One 1…

This is not, however, a case in which a plaintiff is ignorant of his rights, but rather a case of a plaintiff without a right. 457 F. 2d at 1358 (citations omitted).

United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, Serial No. 11837A177369, 457 F.2d 1353, 1357 (5th Cir.1972).

“Failure to bring an action within the time specified under the Tucker Act does not merely provide the government with a waivable defense to the action, but deprives the district court of jurisdiction to hear the action at all.” United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala, 457 F.2d 1353 at 1357 (5th Cir. 1972).

She cites United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972), for the proposition that a cause of action does not accrue if a plaintiff “had no reasonable probability of successfully prosecuting his claim against the government prior to the enunciation of the new . . . rule." 457 F.2d at 1358.

The court ruled that the statute of limitations did not accrue until later case law had established that the privilege against self-incrimination was a complete defense to prosecution for violation of federal wagering tax and registration statutes. 2 Until that date, the plaintiff “had no reasonable probability of successfully prosecuting his claim against the government This is not ... a case in which a plaintiff is ignorant of his rights, but rather a case of a plaintiff w…

Although Red Chevrolet was a case in which the statute of limitations had not yet run, the analysis in that decision of the statute of limitations issue is controlling in the instant case, 457 F.2d at 1357-58.

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1356-57 (5th Cir.1972) (holding that monetary remedy for void forfeiture, which depends on waiver of sovereign immunity, lies not in Rule 60(b) but in 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)); see also United States v. $119,980.00, 680 F.2d 106, 107-08 (11th Cir.1982) (holding Rule 60(b) may not be used to impose affirmative relief beyond setting aside prior judgment); United States v. One Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2…

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1356-57 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that monetary remedy for void forfeiture, which depends on waiver of sovereign immunity, lies not in Rule 60(b) but in 28 U.S.C.

See, e.g., United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1358 (5th Cir.1972).

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1358 (5th Cir.1972); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 372 F.2d 18, 20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 , 87 S.Ct. 2053 , 18 *893 L.Ed.2d 992 (1967) (a cause of action accrues with the occurrence of the final significant event necessary to make the claim suable).

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 5 Cir., 1972, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1358.

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 5 Cir., 1972, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1358.

Compare United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 5 Cir. 1972, 457 F.2d 1353 , discussed in note 13 supra. 15 .

See, e.g., United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.1972).

See also, United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972); Compton v. United States, 377 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1967); and Suhomlin v. United States, 345 F.Supp. 650 (D.Md.1972).

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1356-57(5th Cir.1972) (Rule providing for relief from judgment did not give district court authority to compensate claimant for improperly forfeited property; appropriate remedy is under Little Tucker Act); United States v. One 1965 Chevrolet Impala Convertible, 475 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir.1973) (in the event of vacated forfeiture, depreciation of property compensable under Little Tucker Act); but see, …

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.1972).

See, United States v. One 1961 *835 Red Chevrolet Impala, Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1357 (5th Cir.1972).

See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 ; see also United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 , 1357 (5th Cir.1972).

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972) (Because appellant had no reasonable probability of successfully prosecuting his claim prior to the enunciation of a new rule by the United States Supreme Court, for statute of limitations purposes the cause of action accrued on the date of the Supreme Court’s decision); United States v. LePatourel, 593 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1979).

Compare United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972), where the statute of limitations was tolled because plaintiff had no prospect of success prior to the Supreme Court’s reversal of existing Constitutional interpre *1001 tation.

See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972); Gallion v. United States, 389 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1968). 5 Even if we were to agree with plaintiff that his right of action did not accrue until an executive tribunal had finally acted on his claim we would nevertheless be compelled to conclude that this action is barred since this action was instituted more than six years after plaintiff was notified by the United States Department of Tr…

See also, United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet, supra, 457 F.2d at 1355.

See also, United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet, supra, 457 F.2d at 1355.